6.10 DDR and Security Sector Reform

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6.10 DDR and Security Sector Reform

Summary

DDR and security sector reform (SSR) are inherently political processes that, in a post-conflict environment, are typically closely linked. However, there are important differences in the focus, scope and timeline of DDR and SSR processes. While DDR focuses on finding solutions for armed groups and their members in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts that have seen high levels of military mobilization, SSR processes aim to develop and rebuild a wide range of institutions, processes and mechanisms that would re-establish the functioning of an effective and accountable security sector under the control and oversight of a civilian government and institutions.

There are many points of natural intersection between DDR and SSR. DDR processes are typically linked to SSR through the integration of former combatants into the security sector in the context of a peace agreement. Equally, DDR-related tools, including community violence reduction (CVR) and transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM), can provide bottom-up, people-centred complements to top-down SSR processes. Finally, reintegration support can also be provided to former combatants who wish to enter the security sector but are found to be ineligible or for integration into security institutions. The most prominent linkage between DDR and SSR in post-conflict contexts is to be found in integration processes. It is generally accepted that the failure or relative success of any integration process will have a significant impact on the durability of peace accords and the probability of relapse into conflict.

When considering the linkage between DDR and SSR, DDR practitioners shall always seek to understand national and local aspirations, as expressed through political dialogue, rather than attempt to impose externally defined and developed processes on national actors. DDR practitioners shall seek to integrate SSR issues into DDR assessments and, as DDR and SSR often operate on different timescales, shall ensure that DDR processes are undertaken in ways that do not hinder or block subsequent or future security sector reform. One example is the support to the establishment of transitional security arrangements that primarily involve former combatants and that are intended to pave the way for long-term security institutions and governance arrangements. Experience has shown that support to the establishment of temporary and transitional security arrangements, in particular, has to be carefully balanced against the need to use limited political and financial resources to reach sustainable political and security solutions.

Equally, practitioners need to ensure that demands of armed groups that are deemed to reflect root causes of the conflict, such as political and economic exclusion, abuse and discrimination stemming from the security sector, are accounted for when designing the SSR process. The failure of any integration process can significantly impact post-conflict environments by threatening peace and security, and the durability of peace accords.
Importantly, when discussing opportunities involved in DDR with former or current members of armed forces and groups, including women, men, and youth, DDR practitioners shall not imply any individual entitlement to integration into the security sector, especially not merely because of the individual’s status as a former member of an armed force or group. Instead, DDR practitioners should be aware of the existing legal and policy framework, and ensure that they understand the status of the SSR process and how it may or may not relate to demands, grievances and/or questions raised by armed groups. Integration processes are typically based on political agreements. Yet DDR-related tools are sometimes undertaken in the absence of such agreements – making it challenging to develop the right linkages to the SSR process. Even where political agreements exist, provisions on integration and related rights/entitlements of former combatants are often vague and may require additional and ongoing negotiations, if they are to be translated into policies and plans for SSR processes.

Where possible, the peace agreement should outline specific provisions on the integration of both males and females into representative and inclusive security sector institutions. Action should be taken to ensure the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in both DDR and SSR processes and in all decision-making settings, and, when a DDR programme is linked to integration into the security sector, women shall be given the same opportunity to integrate as men.

1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides DDR practitioners with an overview of areas where DDR programmes, DDR-related tools and reintegration support may be linked to SSR. The objective is to support close coordination between DDR and SSR efforts by actively promoting synergies and preventing harmful interactions in the planning, design and implementation of DDR and SSR processes. The guidance is applicable to both mission and non-mission settings.

2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘may’, ‘can’ and ‘must’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

a. ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard;
b. ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications;
c. ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action;
d. ‘can’ is used to indicate a possibility and capability;
e. ‘must’ is used to indicate an external constraint or obligation.
**Integrated DDR processes** are composed of different combinations of DDR programmes, DDR-related tools and reintegration support (see IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR).

**Security sector** is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.¹

**Security sector reform** describes a process of assessment, review and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation, led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.²

**Integration into the security sector** refers to the process through which former members of armed forces and groups are incorporated into the national security structures and institutions responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country.

**Rightsizing** occurs when the number of personnel within the security sector is adapted (increased or reduced) to match the needs of the security sector, as defined through national consultations and assessments.

### 3. Introduction

The provision of security is a core function of the State. However, in some contexts, the statutory security sector is not able to protect the population against threats, and may marginalize, exclude or even prey on the very populations it is entrusted to protect. If the national security sector is corrupt, non-inclusive, unresponsive, incoherent, ineffective, inefficient and/or unaccountable to the public, the sector may be considered among the root causes of conflict – and, as such, could also be among the factors that led to the emergence of armed groups. In a post-conflict context, security sector reform offers an opportunity to address shortcomings of the security sector that may have contributed to the conflict and that increase the risk that the country will relapse into conflict if not addressed.
BOX 1: COMMON FEATURES OF EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE SECURITY SECTORS

The UN Secretary-General’s 2008 report on SSR (A/62/659 – S/2008/39) recognizes that effective and accountable security sectors have a number of common features, including:

- A legal and constitutional framework that provides for the legitimate and accountable use of force in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards, including sanctioning mechanisms for the use of force and defined roles and responsibilities of different actors.
- An institutionalized system of governance and management that offers mechanisms for the direction and oversight of security provided by authorities and institutions, including systems for financial management and review, as well as the protection of human rights.
- Capacities, including structures, personnel, equipment and resources, to provide effective security.
- Mechanisms for interaction among security actors that establish transparent modalities for coordination and cooperation, based on various actors’ constitutional or legal roles and responsibilities.
- A culture of service that promotes unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for human rights among security actors and shapes the manner in which they carry out their duties.

It is important to understand the overarching political framework that will define and drive DDR and SSR processes, and the entry points as well as limitations that these frameworks present for addressing DDR- and SSR-related challenges. Relevant political and security frameworks, agreements, strategies and plans will typically also define the way in which DDR and SSR processes interlink in that particular context.

In (post-)conflict settings where a peace agreement was signed or a political settlement reached, the agreement will typically outline the objectives, scope and possibly timelines of DDR and SSR processes. DDR may contribute to SSR and vice versa; neither is a prerequisite for the other, and SSR and DDR processes often operate on different timelines. Yet, while certain aspects of the SSR and/or DDR process may be defined in detail, sensitive provisions that link DDR to SSR, such as the integration of combatants into the security sector, are often left to further negotiation, while only temporary and transitional security arrangements are defined in the peace agreement.

It is important to keep in mind that nationally led SSR processes will result in national decisions on the mandate, structure and composition of security sector institutions. National SSR decisions will typically be reflected in national security policies, strategies and legislation and will effectively translate (often vague) SSR provisions from peace agreements into national policy and legal frameworks. This is a deeply political process that will unfold over the course of many years and that has the potential to transform the power relations and representation of societal groups in the security sector over time.

If political and security-related demands made by armed forces and groups that were contained in the political and/or peace agreement preceding the national SSR process are not sufficiently integrated into the SSR process, this may pose a significant risk for relapse into conflict. Therefore, it is critical that UN DDR, SSR and political experts – in cooperation with key partners – maintain close dialogue and coordinate to
ensure that UN support is targeted at addressing structural risks within the security sector. For armed groups and their members, this will often be expressed in exclusion and underrepresentation in the security sector and lack of access to associated economic benefits.

Keeping with the principle that UN support must be guided by the primacy of political solutions when designing UN support strategies, the linkages between DDR and SSR will be presented in two large categories. First, section 5 will consider the issues that are most directly linked to the peace process and have the highest impact on advancing the political process, reconciliation and sustainable peace. These issues revolve around implementing provisions of the peace agreement and ensuring that the SSR process results in more inclusive, accountable and responsive institutions. The second set of issues, addressed in section 6, deals with programmatic tools and approaches (employed by DDR and SSR practitioners) that present important entry points for institutional reform and build trust as well as critical capacity for future peace.

4. Guiding principles

IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR sets out the main principles that guide all aspects of DDR processes. This section outlines how these principles apply to the linkages between DDR and SSR.

4.1 Voluntary

In contexts where a DDR programme is linked to SSR, the integration of former members of armed forces and armed groups into the security sector shall be voluntary.

4.2 People centred

The basis for the legitimacy, viability and sustainability of the reform and governance of the security sector in a specific national context lies in the expressed needs and visions of the people; this shall be the core driver of any SSR process. When a DDR programme is linked to SSR, male and female former members of armed forces and groups shall only be integrated into the reformed security sector if they are vetted and meet the designated integration criteria (see section 6.5). A former member of an armed force or group shall not be integrated into security sector institutions merely because of his or her status as a former member of an armed force or group.

It should be noted that integration is sometimes organized within the framework of broader recruitment campaigns, whereby certain quotas are assigned for those who are being integrated during each recruitment campaign. The criteria for those to be integrated in the framework of a recruitment campaign may differ from those of regular recruits. The primacy of politics and need to address the root causes of conflict, such as exclusion, should take precedence, and technicalities should not be cited to prevent the integration of former combatants that has been agreed to at the political level. Understanding the vital role that females can play in the security sector is paramount.
to successful, inclusive SSR processes, and to the full representation of women in the security sector in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). Integration processes should therefore ensure the eligibility of women, and include outreach and sensitization to ensure they are aware of their options and eligibility. SSR practitioners and support to SSR programs should ensure reformed security institutions provide fair and equal treatment to female personnel, including their special security and protection needs.

Security sector reform takeholders should pay particular attention to children. Children shall not be recruited into security sector institutions. When undertaking security sector reforms, States shall mainstream child protection, including through the inclusion of child protection in military training and standard operating procedures, as well as through the establishment of child protection units and focal points in their national security forces and the strengthening of effective age assessment mechanisms to prevent underage recruitment into security sector institutions (see IDDRS 5.20 on Children and DDR).

Members of armed forces and groups who have been involved in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and/or gross human rights violations shall not be eligible for recruitment into the security sector, including when DDR programmes are linked to SSR (see IDDRS 2.11 on The Legal Framework for UN DDR).

4.2.2 Unconditional release and protection of children

All child recruitment or use by armed groups is illegal under international law, as is all use of children in hostilities, conscription by State armed forces or voluntary recruitment under the age of 18 without minimum safeguards. The recruitment and use of children under 15 by armed forces and groups may amount to a war crime. There is significant international consensus that the recruitment of children under 18 years old is inconsistent with international standards on child protection. This is expressed in a comprehensive set of international legal instruments, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the Rome Statute, and is reinforced by a series of Security Council resolutions. For a detailed normative and legal framework, see IDDRS 5.20 on Children and DDR.

Efforts to prevent the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups should be a primary consideration during all DDR and SSR processes, irrespective of the stage of the conflict or status of peace negotiations. When a DDR programme is linked to SSR, children associated with armed forces and groups shall not be included in troop numbers because their presence is illegal, and including them may encourage further recruitment of children in the period before peace negotiations.

Negotiations on DDR, SSR and force reduction shall include the unconditional and immediate release of all children associated with armed forces and groups. Progress should be made by armed forces and groups on child release before SSR processes are initiated, and the requirement that children be released without precondition prior to negotiation on integration into armed forces and/or the security sector should be stipulated and enforced to discourage their recruitment.

The mechanisms and structures for the release and reintegration of children shall be set up as soon as possible. Children associated with armed forces and groups should be treated separately from adult combatants. They should benefit from special protec-
tion and assistance measures that are gender and age appropriate. They should be regarded and treated as victims, regardless of how they were recruited, and their best interests need to be a primary consideration. International legal standards pertaining to children shall be applied (see more in IDDRS 5.20 on Children and DDR).

4.3 Gender responsive and inclusive

Women and men have an equal right to participate in security delivery and oversight. Though men continue to be vastly overrepresented in security and oversight bodies (such as parliament and the judiciary), security sector institutions that reflect societies at large in terms of sex, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, religion and sexual orientation are more likely to be trusted and considered legitimate. Women’s presence will also increase the responsiveness to the concerns of the entire population. The increased participation of women in security sector institutions has been shown to improve these institutions’ functioning in areas such as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) reporting rates, intelligence gathering and the treatment of female witnesses, victims and suspects.

The involvement of women and women’s groups from civil society in the SSR processes that accompany and follow DDR should also be deliberately planned from the start. Gender-responsive DDR recognizes that women play a multitude of roles, including as combatants, advocates and caregivers, and that each of these roles has a direct impact on the success of DDR processes. Including women as participants and decision-makers in DDR and SSR processes ensures benefits to individuals, households and communities.

4.4 Conflict sensitive

SSR and DDR processes shall be undertaken in a conflict-sensitive manner, ensuring that, when DDR and SSR are programmatically linked, this linkage does not increase the risk of further conflict or the risk that DDR and SSR will jeopardize each other. As DDR and SSR impact local power structures, sovereignty and national security issues, practitioners shall understand, acknowledge and anticipate any possible adverse effects.

4.5 Context specific

Many contextual factors influence DDR and SSR, including local power dynamics, the way in which the armed conflict ended, and the nature and interests of central State authority. Given the context-specific ways in which DDR and SSR can influence each other, there is no ideal model for DDR and SSR processes. If and when DDR and SSR are linked, this linkage shall be tailored to the particular context. The politically sensitive nature of decisions relating to DDR and SSR means that external actors must pay particular attention to both the form and substance of their engagement. Close understanding of context, including identification of key stakeholders, is essential to ensure that support to national actors is realistic, culturally sensitive, inclusive and sustainable. Externally driven pressure to move forward on programming priorities will be
counterproductive if this is delinked from the necessary political will and implementation capacity to develop policy and implement programmes at the national level.

4.6 Flexible, accountable and transparent

4.6.1 Flexible, sustainable and transparent funding arrangements
Planning for DDR and SSR processes must be flexible and responsive to changing conditions on the ground, but should also keep in mind the need to balance funding for short-term programmes with the long-term costs of reforms required to sustain peace and facilitate development and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Simultaneous (yet separate) funding arrangements for DDR and SSR may be considered, although caution shall be taken to ensure that funding delays in one area do not lead to implementation delays in another. To avoid implementation delays, the use of multi-donor trust funds that address both DDR and SSR may be considered. Funding should ensure that the needs of women, children and youth are addressed to sustain the long-term success of DDR and SSR processes.

4.6.2 Accountable and transparent
DDR and SSR processes should contribute to accountable and transparent security sector governance, including transparency in security sector finances. They should not only focus on improvements to the operational capacity of security sector institutions, but also aim to reinforce the accountability of security-providing institutions to the executive branch, legislature and judiciary; independent oversight bodies; and civil society. Effective security forces, such as the armed forces and police, are accountable to the populations they serve and require staff that act with professionalism and integrity. To ensure this, vetting processes based on transparent criteria shall be conducted and constitute an important link between DDR programmes and SSR (see section 6.5 and 6.6).

4.7 Nationally and locally owned
Practitioners shall facilitate DDR and SSR processes that are nationally and locally generated through political consensus, rather than attempt to bring national actors into processes that are externally imposed. SSR and DDR processes should be underpinned by an inclusive national dialogue process in order to ensure that the needs and security perceptions of the State and its citizens are taken into account.

These consultations should be wide-ranging and include authorities at various levels, from all branches of Government and security sector institutions, as well as national human rights institutions and civil society – especially women’s and youth groups and child protection advocates. Such dialogue should take into account the fact that security and insecurity are often defined and experienced differently by women, men, boys and girls, as well as members of minority groups. The broader the national constituency engaged in SSR, the better the prospects for sustainability. To further support national and local ownership, where necessary and appropriate, DDR practitioners shall support activities that build the capacity of national and local authorities to manage, implement, monitor and evaluate DDR and SSR processes. National own-
ership should, where possible, also be demonstrated through commitments of human and financial resources from the State budget.

4.8 Regionally supported
Where appropriate, DDR practitioners shall account for regional dynamics in their planning and analysis. Many of the challenges that impact SSR and DDR in a country are transnational in nature, including trafficking in humans, drugs and weapons (see IDDRS 6.40 on DDR and Organized Crime). If armed conflict is ongoing in neighbouring States, (former) members of armed groups may cross international borders either to join a new armed group or to attempt to access ongoing DDR and SSR processes. While SSR and DDR are always guided by the principle of national ownership, practitioners should consider dedicated programmes to mitigate risks stemming from regional dynamics. For example, capacity-building in border management can support DDR and SSR processes through restricting the movement of combatants and arms across borders.

4.9 Integrated
Where possible and appropriate, DDR and SSR processes shall be integrated with complementary efforts to promote immediate and long-term improvements in security and security sector governance. DDR and SSR processes shall always be integrated into wider political processes and should also be integrated with arms control efforts, mine action and/or initiatives to redress past crimes and promote reconciliation through transitional justice (see IDDRS 4.11 on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management and IDDRS 6.20 on DDR and Transitional Justice). In countries emerging from armed conflict, linkages should also be made between national security policies and strategies (developed as part of an SSR process), support to reintegration (through a DDR process) and wider national-level development frameworks and priorities.

4.10 Well planned
Both DDR and SSR practitioners shall integrate concerns specific to their respective programmes within assessments, planning and process/programme design. In doing so, they are encouraged to use existing assessments (e.g., Joint Mission Analysis Centre products, an Integrated Strategic Framework or United Nations Development Assistance Framework, or Human Rights Due Diligence Policy risk assessments) and coordinate with relevant components in assessment, planning and process/programme design. They shall also clearly define the scope of activities that should link to a realistically achievable DDR/SSR end state. Planning should be participatory and engage a wide range of stakeholders. Monitoring and evaluation should provide an entry point for reviewing DDR and SSR processes to ensure that they are planned in a mutually supportive manner, and that unintended consequences are assessed and DDR/SSR objectives and priorities are adjusted accordingly. Baseline data should be collected and continuously updated and disaggregated by sex and age, where possible. Further gender and age analysis should be integrated into the monitoring and evaluation
strategy, where applicable. For further information, see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation.

4.11 Public information and community sensitization
The timing, sequencing and implementation of DDR and SSR processes should be supported by a public awareness campaign to build the confidence of all relevant stakeholders (see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR). In order to (re-)establish trust in public institutions, the public must be aware of and trust the institutional reform effort. Transparency about reform efforts and broad consultation about the objectives of the reform will help to build confidence in the impartiality and effectiveness of the process and reduce uncertainty among those affected by the reforms. In particular, public awareness can help to deter mis/disinformation campaigns hampering the reforms at their inception phase and pre-empt later attempts to cast doubt on the validity of the DDR and SSR processes and block it.

5. The primacy of politics in the SSR-DDR nexus
This section highlights areas where DDR and SSR processes link to highly sensitive political dynamics affecting the balance of power and distribution of resources among different actors in a given context. It is important that UN support to DDR and SSR is well integrated in these contexts and geared towards addressing structural risks and root causes of conflict that can be found in the security sector and its governance structures.

This section considers the context of peace processes and mediation and adopts a broad view that SSR and DDR should be designed and used to effectively end conflict and prevent its recurrence through political engagement and structural prevention that address deep-seated grievances related to the security sector.

5.1 Adequately reflecting DDR/SSR questions in mediation
Where possible, both DDR and SSR practitioners should be available to support mediators engaged in the negotiation of peace agreements. SSR and DDR experts should also advise mediators engaged in conflict prevention by highlighting structural risks within the security sector and supporting dialogue with armed groups.

5.2 Creating entry points that allow SSR/DDR processes to evolve beyond narrow provisions of the written agreement
The most impactful linkage between DDR and SSR in peace agreements often pertains to provisions that determine the scope, process and modalities under which former combatants will join statutory security forces that will emerge as a result of the peace agreement. Advice to mediation should highlight the importance of including inclusive as well as age- and gender-responsive DDR and SSR language in the peace agreement. When the integration of male and female former members of armed forces and groups into the security sector is being considered, mediators or those providing advice to
them should, if the political circumstances of the negotiations permit, encourage the inclusion of specific provisions in the peace agreement outlining the broad parameters of integration, including considering specific quotas for females and requiring vetting and personnel reform of the security sector. Such provisions place an unambiguous obligation on the negotiating parties that is difficult to later circumvent. Importantly, the explicit commitment to include women in the security sector may create an entry point to incorporate other underrepresented social groups and enhance the inclusivity of security institutions and their responsiveness to the needs of a diverse population.

5.3 Adopting a broad view of security sector governance
In his report on security sector reform (S/2022/280), the Secretary-General adopted a wide understanding of security sector governance that goes beyond State institutions. This is important for SSR and DDR practitioners who are assessing the security sector with a view to developing options for SSR and DDR in conflict settings. As the Secretary-General noted, armed groups need to be considered part of security sector governance alongside other actors, even though they are not part of the statutory security sector. Understanding the role of armed groups in local, regional and national security dynamics is critical to developing realistic and sustainable options for SSR. Where armed groups play a strong role in the protection of specific ethnic and/or religious communities, mediation should focus on political and economic governance issues and their intersection with the security sector. Focusing on the composition of security institutions alone may not address underlying drivers of insecurity and conflict.

Understanding the nature of insecurity and gaps in the overall institutional architecture is important and may facilitate agreements that go beyond the military and police. Considering the need for establishing people-centred security is important for strengthening the resilience of local communities and facilitating their capacity development to address fires, natural disasters, health emergencies, etc. Recognition of these needs may trigger the establishment of new institutions or lead to orienting existing ones towards peacetime tasks.

5.4 Bringing technical knowledge and concrete examples to the mediation process
SSR/DDR experts involved in mediation processes should have not only a deep understanding of the parties and their expectations, positions and demands, but also solid knowledge of technical details of comparable DDR/SSR processes, including their planning assumptions, planned versus real implementation timelines, assumed and real costs, gender mainstreaming, considerations related to unconditional release of children, and previous DDR and/or SSR processes in the given context. Injecting such technical expertise into the dialogue may assist the parties in reaching more realistic agreements and avoiding pitfalls typically experienced in other contexts. Within mediation processes, SSR and DDR issues will often be discussed in the framework of a security-related mediation track. While this is positive, it will also be important that DDR/SSR experts are aware of other mediation tracks, in particular those pertaining to political, economic, human rights and justice issues, as DDR- and SSR-related issues need to be integrated into such discussions to avoid contradictions that may frustrate implementation.
5.5 Ensuring that DDR/SSR questions are linked to political and economic chapters of the peace agreement

The key dilemma faced by parties when negotiating SSR provisions of a peace agreement in many cases has to do with the long-term nature of reforming and developing a new security sector architecture. DDR, on the other hand, typically has a shorter time horizon, and there may be pressure to implement DDR early on, even when necessary preconditions are not in place. Therefore, an important question for mediators is how much detail on SSR/DDR is sufficient to facilitate the transition from conflict to sustained peace, and if/how those processes should be sequenced, including in relation to broader political processes.

If we accept that an imperfect peace agreement is better than none, it is reasonable to omit specificities on SSR in favor of general commitments that reforms will ensure transformative outcomes, such as inclusiveness, democratic oversight and accountability. Increasingly, the practice has been that questions about the future of the security sector are assigned to technical bodies to deliberate and develop options, including on questions of integration of former combatants, for political leaders’ decision-making. While this may indeed be the only option available to mediators in some circumstances, it is important to consider possible challenges for the peace process.

5.6 Defining the role and mandate of technical commissions and bodies with planning and mediation mandates in the peace process and beyond

Practice has shown that technical commissions created to develop proposals and reach agreement on outstanding questions of the SSR process often fail to deliver satisfactory agreements even after years of deliberations. The indication of clear timelines and targets for the work of SSR- or DDR-related technical bodies and committees should be included in the peace agreement, but even when included, it is often insufficient to push the process forward. The absence of a political agreement on security sector reform may also raise the stakes for the holding of post-conflict elections. It is therefore important to consider possible implications of sequencing different steps of the SSR and DDR processes and other major political and economic milestones in the peace agreement.

In some contexts, the warring parties may agree that assessments (such as a threat assessment and security sector review) and national dialogue should take place only after national elections have been held. In other contexts, the parties will demand that agreement on major security policy and architecture issues (type, size, hierarchy and governance arrangements) are agreed upon and possibly included in a new constitution before elections are held. The challenges and opportunities of both options should be presented to the mediator and carefully considered.

Once elected into office, new Governments will legitimately control security ministries and adopt strategies for security sector reform that may not sufficiently reflect former opponents’ security needs and interests, thus raising the risk of relapse into conflict. The existence of SSR/DDR commitments stemming from a peace agreement can serve to protect the interests of former members of armed forces and groups but may also lessen pressure on the new Government from security or political constituents who may oppose the implementation of challenging reforms, such as the integration of former combatants into the security sector. A possible way of addressing this risk is to ensure that progress on both DDR and SSR is kept high on the agenda of
senior UN leadership and partners, and that such progress is linked to international support for SSR and DDR, as these processes must be grounded in inclusive national agreements.

5.7 Risks of deferring agreements on future security governance architecture
Armed forces and groups often fuel their activities by assuming control over resource-rich territory or may have access to funding from taxing the local population or illegal cross-border trafficking (see IDDRS 6.40 on DDR and Organized Crime). Sources of income that are linked to control over territory present strong incentives to maintain the status quo and will impact the scope of realistic options that mediators can offer to armed groups. Current resource revenues can prove relatively more attractive than the benefits offered through a DDR and/or SSR process and, as a result, individuals and groups may opt not to join DDR. Similarly, armed groups may agree to integrate into the armed forces but only on the understanding that they will be deployed to a specific geographical area. If such details were not discussed during mediation, provisions on integration may be rejected in full once the time comes for implementation, potentially undermining years of progress.

Peace agreements that do not effectively address the role of natural resources risk leaving warring parties with the economic means to resume fighting as soon as they decide that peace no longer suits them. In contexts where natural resources fuel conflict, DDR and SSR processes should be planned accordingly. Where appropriate, DDR practitioners should advise mediation teams on the impact of militarized resource exploitation on DDR and SSR, and recommend that provisions regarding the governance of natural resources be included in the peace agreement and reflected in its political and economic chapters (see IDDRS 6.40 on DDR and Organized Crime and IDDRS 6.30 on DDR and Natural Resources).

Beyond mediation, the design of DDR processes in this context should be integrated with strategies that address the security governance of natural resources, as well as the economic reforms aimed at ensuring the transparent and accountable allocation of natural resource concessions and the transparent management of the revenues derived from their exploitation.7

5.8 Considering the role of the private sector
Former combatants are a natural target for private security companies. In some instances, members of armed groups leave to directly join private security firms, bypassing DDR. The line between a private security firm and an armed group is often blurry. Security sector reforms, such as the enactment of laws, can be useful to ensure that private security providers are regulated.

5.9 Supporting temporary and transitional security arrangements
Considering that temporary and transitional security arrangements are often largely composed of combatants and armed group members, support to such structures will typically be provided by DDR practitioners. It is important to always keep in mind that
the goal of such support must be to build trust and facilitate reaching sustainable political agreements that would allow such temporary arrangements to evolve into long-term and sustainable security governance structures. The Secretary-General has cautioned that UN support to temporary and transitional security arrangements should only be short-term in nature and that main efforts should focus on finding solutions that will underpin long-term security sector architecture at all levels.

Where temporary security arrangements are functioning well, it is critical that options for legitimizing and institutionalizing such arrangements is supported early on, including through their inclusion in national security policy and planning frameworks, and provisions in the national budget. The close cooperation between DDR, SSR practitioners and the political leadership of the United Nations is critical in ensuring a timely and sustainable transition from transitional arrangements to longer-term solutions that can sustain peace and prevent relapse into conflict.

If political and security-related demands by armed groups that were contained in the political and/or peace agreement that preceded the national SSR process are not sufficiently integrated into the SSR process, this may pose a significant risk for relapse into conflict. Therefore, even if temporary arrangements are working well as a “holding pattern” for former combatants, it is critical that UN DDR, SSR and political experts – in cooperation with key partners – maintain close dialogue and coordinate to ensure that UN support is targeted at addressing structural risks within the security sector. For former combatants, this will often be expressed in exclusion and underrepresentation in the security sector and lack of access to associated economic benefits.

6. Joint DDR and SSR support to the integration of former combatants into the security sector

The integration of former combatants into the security sector is a process that is complementary to DDR. It offers former members of armed forces and groups a path to becoming part of the State’s security apparatus. Integration is primarily a political process, and its success will often also determine the long-term success of SSR and peace-building efforts in the aftermath of conflict.

Integration brings with it complex technical questions and significant financial costs. Where an integration process is underway, it inevitably requires that the affected security forces, command, management and oversight bodies are adapted and restructured to deal with the inflow of new personnel. There are different models and approaches to integration, yet their success ultimately hinges on the degree to which a particular modality is aligned with underlying political, security and financial incentives of former combatants, while also preserving and strengthening the institutional integrity and effectiveness of security forces. This section addresses some overarching aspects of integration that should always be considered when planning and implementing a security sector integration process.

6.1 The role of political frameworks and processes

Traditionally, peace agreements contained detailed provisions on DDR, transitional and permanent security arrangements, and the process and timelines of transitioning
to an agreed long-term security sector architecture. These provisions would guide the
design and implementation of DDR programmes that would typically precede SSR
processes. However, over the past two decades, as conflict dynamics have changed, the
United Nations is often involved in DDR and SSR processes in the absence of compre-
hensive peace agreements and while conflict is ongoing.

The absence of comprehensive peace agreements is, in many cases, manifested by
broad SSR and DDR provisions in peace agreements that are limited in scope and that
leave out important questions on which parties often continue to disagree. Over the
past decade, the United Nations has learned many lessons and developed new tools
and approaches, including pre-DDR, to engage with the parties in the absence of polit-
cal agreement on sensitive SSR/DDR topics and to support progress in dialogue while
preparing the ground for future programmes and reforms.

6.2 Understanding the scope of integration through a political lens

The peace agreement and/or subsequent negotiations will determine the quality and
quantity of elements to be integrated into the security sector. Typically, these agree-
ments are implemented over a long period of time and may be altered in the pro-
cess. Hence, practitioners may need to advise relevant national authorities and actors/
partners on practical questions of approach, sequencing and priorities, including gen-
der-responsive elements of these, that the peace agreement would not have addressed
in detail. The creation of a representative oversight body for integration, including male
and female representatives of all former warring parties, should also be considered.

It is, however, critical to highlight that the design and support to the integration
process, including agreement on ranks and numbers for integration, must be consid-
ered in light of the evolving political process (and security landscape) and keeping in
mind that ill-designed short-term projects and integration initiatives are likely to fail,
undermine trust in the peace process and inflict lingering damage to the prospects for
peace and security. Importantly, where national legal and regulatory frameworks per-
taining to the security sector may need to be adjusted through further laws or decrees
in line with provisions in the peace agreement, it is important to adequately reflect the
issue of integration. Where negotiations are ongoing, laws may refer to the primacy of
agreements reached by designated bodies and political processes. This should prevent
a situation where legislation is used as an “argument” against integration.

6.3 Integrating gender in integrated DDR/SSR support

Gender-transformative practices should begin as early as possible during the peace
process to ensure representation of women and women’s organizations in the national
dialogue that feeds into negotiations. All participants in negotiations, as well as those
crafting DDR and SSR provisions and frameworks, should be sensitized to the exist-
ence of, and prevention of, gender-based and sexual violence. Increasing the number
of women in security sector institutions has been shown to increase their ability to
effectively respond to sexual and gender-based violence. It is also important that the
specific protection concerns for women integrating into the security sector be assessed
and inform the training curriculum and rollout, infrastructure for staff facilities, and
reporting within the security sector.
Including women in peace processes at the decision-making level can broaden national ownership of post-conflict reforms, reinforcing the credibility of the process. This should also set the tone for a post-peace process society that is sensitive to gender issues. Where possible, the peace agreement should outline specific provisions on the integration of both males and females into representative and inclusive security sector institutions. It is important to ensure there is not a tokenistic process for the inclusion of women; rather, these approaches should be implemented in a considered and systematic manner. For example, merely including one or more women on the negotiation team, or having one woman at the negotiating table, is not a substitute for ensuring women’s meaningful engagement in peace and security, nor for conducting and utilizing systematic assessments of the security needs and concerns of women.

Women and women’s groups must also play a role in implementing peace agreements and in carrying out DDR and SSR processes, ensuring that women have equal opportunities to benefit from DDR/SSR, as appropriate to the situation and the role that they held during conflict. Gender-responsive budgeting throughout the DDR and SSR process should also be implemented in order to fully integrate women and ensure their needs are addressed in a sustainable manner. The capacities of women’s groups should also be built, where necessary, so that they may be enabled to advertise opportunities to women and girls, address their mental and physical health needs, and provide them with other gender-responsive DDR/SSR opportunities.

### 6.4 Registration of individuals joining the integration process

DDR practitioners conduct the registration of former members of armed groups, including biometric registration, for the purpose of DDR programmes. Where appropriate and possible, DDR practitioners will undertake and/or be involved in the registration of eligible individuals who want to join the security sector through the DDR process. Also, where appropriate, the biometric registration process used during DDR programmes may be expanded to the security sector (see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization).

During the registration process, DDR practitioners will collect basic information about the individuals, such as name, age, gender, profession, geographic origin, ethnicity, armed group affiliation, wartime activity, etc. The registration process, or the related counselling and referral questionnaires, may provide evidence of the total number of combatants interested in integration. It will also serve as an additional safeguard against including children in the integration process.

Furthermore, where statutory security institutions are required by the peace agreement to submit numbers/profiles of security personnel, these numbers are unlikely to be accurate. SSR assessments and reform programmes that produce real numbers of security personnel, as reflected on the payroll, are typically undertaken at later stages of the SSR process, as they require a high level of cooperation and trust among parties and with international partners.

### 6.5 Vetting as a step in the integration process

Vetting is the formal process of assessing suitability for public employment with a focus on individuals’ human rights records. Former members of armed forces and groups who enter formal employment in the security sector shall be vetted. The vet-
The vetting process will vary depending on the context and resources available to conduct it. It can range from a full vetting process—which reviews legal and financial records and collects statements from witnesses, etc.—to a lighter process suitable for the specific context, factoring in overall timelines and resources available. The vetting process is often the first step in determining eligibility to join the security sector.

In a post-conflict situation, vetting for the purpose of integration will typically focus on the respect of human rights. Consequently, perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and/or gross human rights violations shall be excluded from the integration process and referred to the justice system. Similarly, DDR/SSR practitioners should be aware of a Member State’s obligations under applicable sanctions regimes and the international counter-terrorism legal framework, including bringing terrorists to justice (see IDDRS 2.11 on The Legal Framework for UN DDR and IDDRS 6.20 on DDR and Transitional Justice). Former combatants who committed such crimes or violations are not likely to inspire the trust of the population. In particular, victims of abuse are unlikely to trust and rely on a public institution that hires individuals with serious integrity deficits, which would fundamentally impair the social contract. It is important to keep in mind that there is, in principle, no time limit on prosecuting serious crimes under international law and that individuals who may have passed vetting may be prosecuted and removed from the security sector at a later stage if evidence of such crimes comes to light.

6.6 Vetting of former combatants against professional eligibility criteria

If individuals pass the human rights/criminal-focused vetting process, they will be vetted against professional eligibility criteria for integration into the security sector. Those who are found to be ineligible based on professional criteria may receive DDR support to reintegrate back into civilian life in line with their overall eligibility for DDR.

Typically, professional integration criteria will be determined during the peace process and may be part of the peace agreement or technical agreements reached at a later stage. They include criteria such as citizenship, language, minimum/maximum age, level of education, professional skills and experience, physical and mental aptitude, etc. It is important to keep in mind that integration is different from recruitment. Whereas integration is primarily a political process designed to address root causes of conflict and reduce structural risks within the security sector, recruitment is a purely technical human resources process. If discriminatory regulations or practices are used during mediation or during the implementation of the integration process to exclude minorities, including women, then SSR, DDR and political experts should work closely together to align messages and adapt support strategies to ensure more inclusive integration.

Even where exclusionary agreements were reached during the mediation process, DDR/SSR practitioners and political/legal experts in the United Nations should carefully devise strategies to address these structural risks through programmes, legislative changes, national policies, etc. For example, if language was included as a criterion for integration but members of armed groups primarily speak a different language than the administrative/majority language, the United Nations may seek to amend
this provision or seek an agreement whereby national authorities provide language training to former combatants who are otherwise eligible to be integrated.

6.7 Recognizing risks during the design and execution of integration processes

To avoid harm and support sustainable peace, it is essential that integration is put in the wider political and security context and with an understanding of its potential impact in the medium and long term. Integration has to be considered part of a sequenced rightsizing and restructuring process of the security sector. Integration and SSR should not be approached through a project lens, as even a perfectly successful project may ultimately lead to damaging outcomes. DDR and SSR practitioners should avoid contributing to the risks discussed below and actively work with national counterparts and partners to address them.

6.7.1 Neglecting the link between military and police integration and reform

The military and police are typically the largest security institutions and therefore the main recipients of former combatants. It is important that integration into the security sector is not approached from the perspective of individual security agencies. The historical role and background of various security agencies is different in each context, and so is the role of these institutions in relation to conflict drivers. Moreover, an approach that looks only at security agencies without understanding the governance and economic dynamics in which they are embedded may entrench conflict drivers, exclusion and marginalization and pave the way for relapse into conflict. Therefore, understanding how integration affects the wider security governance architecture and political economy of the security sector is vital to designing conflict-sensitive and sustainable integration options.

6.7.2 Undermining the development of people-centred policing

Where the military has been the main and dominant security force, and has been used to perform internal protection functions, armed groups may favour military integration, as it is linked to a higher social status and access to more resources and political influence. This may mean that only those not deemed “qualified enough” to join the military will be channeled to the police. As the stated objective of many post-conflict SSR processes is to strengthen people-centered policing, it is important that the integration process does not undermine this objective.

6.7.3 Contributing to a security vacuum

Where traditionally the police service has been understaffed and underresourced, it may be necessary to staff the police with personnel, both men and women, who have the experience and skills to provide security effectively. This is particularly important when integration and reform are taking place in an environment where the security forces and the civilian population continue to face significant security threats, including from non-State armed groups. If former military personnel and/or special forces are integrated into the police service as a deliberate strategy, it is critical to accompany such integration with adequate training and enhanced capacity for civilian and judicial accountability mechanisms. Additionally, as part of the peace process, strategies for internal security services to take over security functions in the areas previously controlled by armed groups should be devised.
6.7.4 Increasing protection risks to communities
Integration of armed groups into the security sector should also be considered in light of the planned modalities for their organization and deployments that will be determined as part of SSR strategies and plans. From the perspective of peaceful and diverse societies, it is preferable that integrated combatants are mixed up and deployed across the country, regardless of ethnic, religious and other political considerations. While this should be the aspiration for reform and integration, the reality may be that the deployment of certain individuals and groups may result in increased tensions and insecurity for local communities. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider possible unintended effects of integration and advise that the process is designed and executed in stages and adjusted when negative consequence are observed. Making everyone, including donors and partners, aware of these risks and agreeing on joint response and mitigation measures is a crucial step in the design and implementation of integration processes.

6.7.5 Integration as a political bargaining chip
Integration, beyond serving to “unite” former adversaries into a single security apparatus, effectively also serves as a security guarantee and security power-sharing mechanism. The political aspects are particularly prominent in the number and rank of senior military positions assigned to former combatants, and also in the command and oversight functions assigned to politicians affiliated with the different warring camps, including regional and local administrators on whose territory security forces are or may in the future be deployed. A key component of successful integration is the clarity of the political agreement on senior appointments and civilian command and oversight functions. A pattern of defections/renegotiated entries into security forces (a “revolving door” syndrome) is a strong indication that a unified control and command chain is not present. This can present a serious risk to the peace process and a protection risk to civilians.

7. DDR-related tools as an entry point and catalyst for SSR
DDR-related tools are immediate and targeted measures that can be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place (see IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR). Many DDR-related tools, such as community violence reduction (CVR) and transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM), can contribute to a more people-centred approach to SSR. Although the precise linkages between a DDR programme and SSR will vary in different contexts, DDR practitioners should be aware of the need to plan for the following.

7.1 Transitional WAM and SSR
Transitional WAM measures are implemented as part of a DDR process, either as stand-alone measures or as part of CVR programmes, and can complement top-down SSR programmes (see IDDRS 4.11 on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management).

    DDR-related transitional WAM may be implemented at the same time as the UN is providing support to SSR. The UN may support national authorities in the rightsiz-
ing of their armed forces. Such reforms include the need to adapt national arsenals to the size, needs and objectives of the security sector of the country in question. This requires an effective needs assessment, strategic planning, and the technical capacity and support to identify surplus or obsolete materiel and destroy it.

When SSR is ongoing, DDR-related transitional WAM may be used as an entry point to align national WAM capacity with international WAM guidance and international and regional legal frameworks. For instance, storage facilities built or refurbished to store DDR materiel could then be used to house stockpiles for security institutions, and as a proof of concept for upgrading of facilities. All WAM activities shall be designed and implemented in line with international technical guidance, including MOSAIC Module 02.20 Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in the Context of Security Sector Reform and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

7.2 Weapons and ammunition integration

While destruction shall be the preferred method of disposal of materiel collected during the disarmament phase of a DDR programme, national authorities may insist that serviceable materiel should be incorporated into national stockpiles. Before transferring arms and ammunition to national authorities, DDR practitioners shall take account all obligations under relevant regional and international instruments as well as potential UN arms embargos and should seek legal advice. If the national authority in question is prohibited from using or possessing certain weapons or ammunition (e.g., mines or cluster munitions), such materiel shall be destroyed. Furthermore, in line with the UN human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-UN security forces, materiel and other types of support that fall under the policy shall be transferred only after adequate risk assessments are done and mitigation measures for the identified risks are developed and implemented. Where there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk that the intended recipient is committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, such support should not be provided.

The potential negative consequences of incorporating DDR weapons and ammunition into their stockpiles should be explained to national authorities. These consequences not only include the symbolic connotations of using conflict weapons, but also the costs and operational challenges that come with the management of materiel that differs from standard equipment. The integration of ammunition into national stockpiles should be discouraged, as ammunition of unknown origin can be extremely hazardous. A technical inspection of weapons and ammunition should be jointly carried out by both UN and national experts before handover to the national authorities. Finally, weapons handed over to national authorities should bear markings made at the time of manufacture, and best practice recommends the destruction or remarking of weapons whose original markings have been altered or erased. Weapons should be registered by the national authorities in line with international standards.

All stages of disarmament or other arms control initiatives must integrate gender and age considerations, including the differing impacts and perceptions of such processes on women, men, boys and girls. In addition, women’s roles in the conflict and within armed forces and groups may have given them specific knowledge of weapons caches and trafficking routes. For further guidance, see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament.
7.3 Integrated DDR and SSR assessments at the local level
Many DDR-related tools, such as CVR and transitional WAM, are implemented at the local level and require local-level gender- and age-sensitive assessments. When CVR programmes and/or transitional WAM are planned alongside SSR, these local-level assessments should be considered alongside broader SSR assessments. For example, bottom-up weapons surveys can contribute to assessments concerning security threats and public perceptions of security. Furthermore, while SSR programmes require a threat assessment that may potentially include a public perception survey to determine the key security concerns of the population, CVR programmes require a comprehensive and gender-responsive baseline assessment of local violence dynamics as well as an assessment of the capacities, interests and strengths of the communities to engage in and support CVR. Furthermore, if different local assessments reveal similar patterns or trends, this may signal a systemic problem requiring effort to be channelled through more municipal or national reforms of the security sector. For further information on the assessments required for CVR and transitional WAM, see IDDRS 2.30 on Community Violence Reduction, IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, and IDDRS 4.11 on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management.

7.4 Community violence reduction
Where conditions for SSR and/or DDR are not present, support to local security arrangements should foster trust building with the statutory security sector and create entry points for SSR in the future. SSR processes can be a platform to recognize local security arrangements consisting of diverse actors as part of legitimate State authority and thus contribute to a more inclusive national security architecture that advances diversity and representation. In all of these cases, it is important to understand the distribution of political power and economic resources and to consider how SSR and DDR support options will impact this distribution.

Although SSR is people centred, SSR policies and strategies are typically developed top-down. In contrast, CVR is a practical approach that focuses on the reduction of armed violence at the local level by fostering improved social cohesion and providing incentives to resist recruitment, including recruitment of children (see IDDRS 2.30 on Community Violence Reduction). By drawing on these different vantage points, SSR and CVR programmes can be linked in mutually reinforcing ways.

7.4.1 Concurrent SSR and CVR programming
Concurrent programming should be mutually reinforcing. For example, awareness-raising campaigns on domestic violence and sexual and gender-based violence as part of a CVR programme can be combined with SSR programming initiatives such as legal reform relating to SGBV/domestic violence; capacity-building of security institutions in the area of gender and procedures for dealing with victims of SGBV; ensuring fair representation of men and women in security bodies; and leveraging the knowledge and skills of women for broader peace and security, including in supporting community security. To ensure that programmes are mutually sensitive, communication between the different programmes is important.
7.4.2 Sequential CVR and SSR programmes
Where conditions for SSR don’t exist, it may be helpful to start with local-level CVR programmes. Building local-level security initiatives as well as working with local/non-State security and justice actors can provide a basis for discussing reforms of the security institutions and foster the trust required to enhance governance where the State previously had no access.

8. Reintegration of former combatants into civilian life and linkages to SSR
Reintegration support, which is designed to help individuals leave armed groups and rejoin civilian life, can be offered at different phases of the conflict but is most prominently linked to the implementation of peace and political agreements. In this context, reintegration support may be provided to members of armed forces and groups who are not eligible or able to join newly formed security institutions.

8.1 Reintegration assistance for individuals found to be ineligible for integration against professional eligibility criteria
In some contexts, the peace agreement in place may state that reintegration support should be provided to those who demobilize and return to civilian life (as part of a DDR programme), but also to those who apply for integration into the security sector but fail to meet the professional eligibility criteria. DDR practitioners should ensure that considerations for those who are ineligible for integration are factored into the assessments conducted as part of the planning for reintegration support (see IDDRS 4.30 on Reintegration, IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, and IDDRS 5.20 on Children and DDR). In particular, DDR practitioners should ensure that the necessary preparations are in place and that sufficient funding is available to handle this additional caseload. Individuals who are excluded from integration because of serious crimes (see section 6.5) shall be referred to appropriate justice mechanisms and not offered reintegration support.

8.2 Reintegration programmes in support of government-led efforts to decommission security personnel following wartime military mobilization
It is important to highlight that support may also be provided to serving security personnel who may be decommissioned from the security sector as part of a rightsizing process. Separation of serving security personnel is typically under the umbrella of the national SSR process and led by national institutions, and may include pensions, separation packages and/or other benefits in the framework of the national budget.

However, following wartime military mobilization, States may take a reintegration support approach during and following wartime military mobilization to meet the needs and harness the capacities of the large numbers of men and women mobilized who will need assistance to transition into civilian life. Many will require reintegration assistance while conflict is still ongoing as a result of becoming unfit for service (e.g.,
because they have acquired a disability or psychosocial or mental health impairment). Decisions on adopting a reintegration support approach are guided by political strategies and informed by domestic fiscal realities.

While the security sector in most contexts may be overly large and costly, it is often not possible to reduce its size in the immediate period following conflict. Also, a formal launch of “downsizing” exercises may create unsustainable political pressures and increase insecurity in a fragile post-conflict environment.

8.3 Reintegration assistance versus separation benefits and pensions

Reintegration assistance should not be confused with pension schemes. Pensions are a long-term entitlement provided by the State, whereas reintegration support is provided for a finite, predetermined period of time, such as two to three years, through external financial assistance or the State budgets (see IDDRS 4.30 on Reintegration).

SSR and DDR practitioners should pay special attention to the eligibility of women for pensions and/or disability benefits, as frequently they can be purposely or inadvertently left out of such processes because of strict criteria that do not recognize their specific roles in the conflict and their eligibility for such processes where the State has extended this eligibility (see IDDRS 5.80 on Disability-Inclusive DDR).

While former members of armed groups are not typically eligible to receive separation benefits like those that may be provided to serving security personnel, a Government may decide to extend eligibility to them and/or to include other benefits as part of the peace agreement. In some cases, former combatants may receive such support from other State programmes as well as through the DDR programme.

DDR practitioners should also be aware of relevant reintegration services that are available and be sure to factor them in their planning. They should also take into account how well these services are resourced to avoid tensions among eligible recipients. Where possible, public information campaigns accompanying DDR and SSR should help to make individuals aware of what they are eligible for (see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR and IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

9. DDR, SSR and cross-cutting issues

The topics and questions outlined in this module present issues that cut across DDR and SSR processes and link them in different ways. In addition to the topics outlined, there are considerations that are not specific to either SSR or DDR, but that should be considered in an integrated manner to manage risks and ensure the highest impact of UN and international support to SSR/DDR.

9.1 Adopting a national funding lens for DDR and SSR programmes

DDR and SSR are expensive processes drawing on limited domestic and foreign funding. Traditionally, donors have invested solidly in DDR processes, as they were comprehensive and signaled a reliable transition from conflict to peace. As Governments and donors face growing demands for funding of development, humanitarian and se-
security needs, it is crucial that SSR and DDR experts design programmes and strategies that can be sustained on realistic national budgets. Linking support to DDR and SSR to reforms and public finance including security sector planning, budgeting and financing can be a sign of commitment by national authorities to DDR and SSR processes (see also IDDRS 3.41 on DDR Budgeting and Financing). The incorporation of SSR/DDR commitments into national development funding frameworks is critical for ensuring the long-term commitment and progress on gains supported by the United Nations.

9.2 Integrated approach to partnerships
The landscape of international partners and donors for DDR and SSR has changed considerably over the past decade. More actors, often with differing approaches and priorities, may offer more support but may also pull in opposite directions and allow national stakeholders to shop for partners, thus avoiding difficult decisions and seeking support for short-term solutions that may undermine the DDR/SSR process. It is therefore critical that the United Nations takes an integrated approach to partnerships on SSR/DDR – ensuring joint strategic priorities and coordinated messaging and approaches to funding for DDR/SSR.

Annex A: Abbreviations
CVR community violence reduction
SGBV sexual and gender-based violence
SSR security sector reform
WAM weapons and ammunition management
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 35.
5 Ibid., p. 13.
6 For more details on how to identify and assess structural risks within the security sector as part of prevention strategies, see the [AUTHOR AGENCY?], “SSR in the Prevention of Violent Conflict”, UN Policy Note, forthcoming.
7 Ibid.
9 For a detailed overview of rightsizing, including the role of integration, see the UN Policy Note on Rightsizing of the Security Sector, forthcoming 2022.