## Integrated Assessments for DDR

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1.1 Generic content of elements of pre-analysis and situational assessments 30
Summary

This module provides DDR practitioners with guidance on leading and participating in integrated assessments in DDR. In the IDDRS, the term ‘integrated’ is used to indicate the cooperative implementation of policies, structures and processes that support effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, recognizing common strategic aims.

Integrated assessments are any analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities and therefore requires participation by relevant UN entities. Like DDR processes themselves, integrated assessments are highly varied, have diverse stakeholders and often are implemented in complex and risky environments and in both mission and non-mission contexts. At the highest UN system level are Strategic Assessments, the analytical process used to undertake integrated assessment at the UN system-wide level. According to the Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) Policy, the purpose of integrated strategic assessments is:

- to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Ahead of Mission start-up planning or during the lifecycle of established integrated presences, the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consideration of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Council.1

While this level of integrated assessment is not discussed in detail in this module it is referenced in order to illustrate the success factors of Strategic Assessments that are relevant to inter-agency assessments conducted in preparation for and during implementation of DDR (see Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy Handbook for guidance on Strategic Integrated Assessments). These DDR-related integrated assessments are categorised as:

- Integrated Assessments for the DDR Strategic Planning Phase (such as Planning for Transition/Exit),
- Key DDR Process-Informing Integrated Assessments (such as profiling Non-State Armed Groups), and
- Linkage-Focused Integrated Assessments (intended to analyse linkages such as with SSR, Transitional Justice, Natural Resources, and Organised Crime).
As with DDR processes, integrated assessments should be informed by and conducted with full awareness of DDR cross-cutting issues (See IDDRS level 5 on Cross-Cutting Issues). In UN policy broadly these three categories of DDR-related integrated assessments may be considered ‘technical assessments’ however DDR practitioners shall be aware that there are upstream, downstream and lateral linkages between integrated assessments. Upstream linkages indicate that the integrated assessment may inform higher level strategic planning including that conducted outside of DDR. Downstream linkages indicate that some integrated assessments link to further analysis of more narrow technical issues such as logistics and budgeting. Lateral linkages are often mutually informing connections with assessments conducted for other aspects of DDR processes as well as with assessments in non-DDR but relevant sectors, namely; SSR, Transitional Justice, Natural Resources and Organized Crime.

These technical assessments shall be conducted in a participatory and gender-responsive manner. DDR practitioners should involve relevant stakeholders in assessments where there are implications for the stakeholders and where value can be added through their participation including as way to nurture a shared vision of the key parameters of the DDR process. The combination of participating entities and communities will vary depending on the type of assessment and the particular focus of the analytical work. Some combination of national authorities, inclusive representation from civil society (i.e. youth groups or organizations, women’s groups, etc.), research institutions other local representatives, affected populations, key international partners including donors, regional and sub-regional organisations, and key member states should be consulted.

Assessments should follow four stages in their lifecycle. For the first stage DDR practitioners should establish the rationale, objectives, participants, context, deliverables, timelines and budget for the assessment. Essentially this is the why, when, what, where, who and how of the assessment. It includes establishing the authorising framework for the assessment. Those elements should be included in one single Terms of Reference agreed by and available to all partners.

The second stage is the implementation of the integrated assessment. DDR practitioners should approach the implementation of the integrated assessment with full recognition that an integrated assessment may follow varied paths depending upon the rationale, objectives, participants, context, deliverables, timelines and the focus of the assessment including cross-cutting issues and DDR linkages, whether or not the assessment includes and Technical Assessment Mission, and whether or not the integrated assessment is being implemented in a mission or non-mission setting. At a generic level this implementation stage of the integrated assessment involves a situational assessment, stakeholder mapping, data collection, verification and analysis, identifying decision and action points and identifying existing capacities and weaknesses relevant to these decision and action points.

The third stage requires DDR practitioners to ensure that the integrated assessment informs and influences decision making. Involving relevant stakeholders in the previous phases should increase the likelihood that decisions about DDR are based on evidence.

The fourth stage requires DDR practitioners to ensure the monitoring and evaluation of decisions made on the basis of the analysis in the integrated assessment. As with all other aspects of an integrated assessment this may include participatory feedback mechanisms and fora.
1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides guidance for situations when two or more agencies are conducting an assessment together in relation to DDR processes, but does not include detailed discussions on DDR practitioners’ participation in Strategic Integrated Assessments as outlined by the Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy. The scope of the module is DDR in UN mission and non-mission settings, regardless of whether the preconditions for DDR programmes exist or not (see IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR).

Integrated assessments aim at creating a shared understanding the context, conflict and gender dynamics, the role of key stakeholders, and the different types of needs and capacities for planning a successful DDR process. Integrated assessments shall include risk assessment and shall lay the foundation for evidence-based DDR planning and implementation.

This module provides guidance on:

- Situating the role of integrated assessment in the DDR processes for the UN.
- The various types of integrated assessments in DDR.
- Success factors in integrated assessments in DDR.
- How to approach integrated assessments in DDR.
- Risk and security as part of integrated assessments in DDR.

DDR practitioners should be aware that the term ‘assessment’ can be applied to most analytical work required by and outlined in the IDDRS including cross-cutting issues and linkages. Cross-cutting issues are:

- Women, gender and DDR.
- Children and DDR.
- Youth and DDR.
- Cross-border population movements.
- Food assistance in DDR.
- HIV/AIDS and DDR.
- Health and DDR.
- Disability-Inclusive DDR.

While cross-cutting issues and gender analysis shall inform all integrated assessments they may also require stand-alone integrated analytical work.

For the purposes of the IDDRS, DDR linkages are:

- DDR and SSR.
- DDR and Transitional Justice.
- DDR and Natural Resources.
- DDR and Organised Crime.
- DDR and Armed Group Designated as Terrorist Organisations (AGDTO).

DDR linkages will arise in sectors other than those considered in IDDRS level 6. Many will have relevance to many aspects of planning and implementing DDR processes but, like cross-cutting issues they may require stand-alone integrated analytical work.
Of the IDDRS level 3, this module complements IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures, IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design, and IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation and is relevant to most modules in levels 2 through 6 inclusive.

2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘may’, ‘can’ and ‘must’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and guidelines:

a. ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard;
b. ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications;
c. ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action;
d. ‘can’ is used to indicate a possibility and capability;
e. ‘must’ is used to indicate an external constraint or obligation.

In this module ‘DDR’ is used as the comprehensive term to refer to integrated DDR processes, including DDR programmes, related-tools and reintegration support (see IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR). Any particular assessments may be relevant for DDR programmes and/or DDR-related tools and/or reintegration support.

3. Introduction

This module builds on IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures. It aims to provide further guidance on integrated technical assessments as the first step in the planning, design and implementation of DDR processes. IDDRS 3.10 stipulates that for the purposes of DDR strategic planning, DDR practitioners should conduct two types of integrated assessments: pre-analysis and situation assessment.

3.1 Purpose and rationale

The general objective of integrated assessments is to provide an accurate, shared and objective understanding of the context for DDR. This understanding should be shared among the UN entities and national and international stakeholders likely to play a role in the DDR process. In summary, as described in IDDRS 3.10 the purpose of the pre-analysis is to:

- Identify the reasons for DDR strategic planning at any given time, for example, a UNSC mandate, peace agreement or government request. It situates the decision to engage in DDR strategic planning in the given authorizing frameworks.
- Identify the scope of DDR strategic planning.
- Identify the stakeholders for the DDR strategic plan.
- Identify other plans with which the DDR strategic plan should be harmonized.

In summary, as described in IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated Planning: Processes and Structures the purpose of the situation assessments is to:

- Provide an in-depth understanding of the international, regional, national or local contexts for the design and implementation of DDR.
- Identify how these contexts should inform and shape the choice of DDR process for any given situation.

In DDR the pre-analysis assessments and situation assessments shall be integrated. By definition an integrated assessment is:

any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities. The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake integrated assessment at the UN system-wide level for the purpose defined in paragraph 28 of this policy. Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical assessment missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secretariat departments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system.3

Put simply, where planning has an implication for more than one UN entity the relevant assessment to inform that planning should be conducted in an integrated manner whereby the concerned UN entities participate. Integrated assessments in DDR will contribute data and analysis to relevant stakeholders including those outside the UN facilitating them to acquire a common understanding of issues relevant to DDR. Practitioners should decide whether or not to conduct the assessment in an integrated manner based on the principle that if the assessment has an implication for more than one UN entity then it should be integrated.

The process of engaging in an integrated assessment is also valuable. It may constitute the first time some key stakeholders meet and work together. The process sets the tone for cooperation needed during DDR. Inclusiveness in the integrated assessment process is important in order to foster ownership of the results of the assessment and to establish a shared vision for DDR.

A decision on how to involve stakeholders from outside the UN system should be based on answering a similar question about the implications of the assessment for the non-UN entity and the value added/value to be gained by having the non-UN entity involved. DDR practitioners shall engage in an inclusive approach that facilitates key stakeholders external to the UN such as government and donors to participate in the assessment process, to develop close working relationships and to collaboratively nurture evidence-based programming.

DDR practitioners shall involve national stakeholders in integrated assessments including those that will contribute to developing national DDR resources such as policies, strategies and programmes. The combination of participating entities and communities will vary depending on the type of assessment and the particular focus of
the analytical work. Some combination of national authorities, inclusive representation of civil society (i.e., youth groups, women’s groups, etc. depending on the context), other local representatives, affected populations, key international partners including donors, regional and sub-regional organisations, and key member states shall be, informed, consulted and involved as relevant. Local perspectives shall be taken into account in the analysis in the integrated assessment and in how it identifies action points. Clearly it is not necessary (and may not be possible) to involve all entities and communities in each and every integrated assessment. When deciding what/who participates DDR practitioners should use best judgement after considering many factors which may include the UN mandate, core values, how to strengthen partnerships, value added by participation and feasibility of participation.

At all times the involvement of national stakeholders shall be driven by the overarching guidance of IDDRS 3.30 on National Ownership and National Institutions in DDR. The participation of national stakeholders in relevant assessments should contribute to building their capacity to coordinate the participation of international partners to achieve common DDR objectives and contribute to the achievement of peace-building objectives. Where relevant, UN-led assessments should inform domestic planning and strategy for DDR and other aspects of conflict recovery and peace-building.

Integrated assessments in DDR will help provide information to inform the decision whether or not a DDR process is justified, to inform the decision regarding the type of DDR process suitable for the context and also the budget, engagement with stakeholders, sequencing between interventions, and synergies with other initiatives.

Integrated assessments in DDR will help provide information to inform the decision whether or not a DDR process is justified, to inform the decision regarding the type of DDR process suitable for the context and also the budget, engagement with stakeholders, sequencing between interventions, and synergies with other initiatives. They will contribute to ensuring that decisions specific to the type of DDR process being planned or implemented are evidence-based. Integrated assessments may provide baselines to define the specific objectives of the DDR process in each context, as well as the related M&E framework. Integrated assessments for the DDR process will feed into the broader stabilization, peacebuilding and/or recovery framework, with synergies throughout the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.

### 3.2 Frequency

Depending on the conflict context, the category of integrated assessment, the nature of the data, the information and analysis contained in the initial assessment and the function of the data, for example; if the data constitutes or informs DDR monitoring and evaluation, integrated assessments may need to be updated, revised or re-run during the lifespan of DDR including until impacts are fully understood (see also IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures, IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design and IDDRS 3.50 on DDR Monitoring and Evaluation).
3.3 Ownership
Integrated assessments involve multiple organizations with specific interests in the process but incentives to share data can be limited. Decisions should be made early on the ownership of the assessment and how and with whom it will be shared to avoid tensions around distribution and use. Integrated assessments are a first step to coordinated efforts for a collaborative and coordinated response to a conflict situation, which considers short-term and long-term perspectives. The level of involvement and role of the national authorities can also vary but the process should be designed to nurture national ownership to the extent possible including using the assessment to develop national capacities. There can also be a differentiated engagement strategy between national political and technical services. The overall process will benefit from the strong involvement of national stakeholders at central and/or local levels.

4. Guiding principles
IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR sets out the main principles that guide all aspects of DDR processes. This section outlines how these principles apply to planning for DDR processes.

4.1 People-centred
Assessments shall consider the needs and positions of all stakeholders (Government, armed forces and groups, unarmed opposition, the population and the international community) in a sensitive manner, taking into account that the DDR process will be designed to address the specific needs of different categories of participants and beneficiaries.

4.2 Gender responsive and inclusive
Gender expertise should be considered an essential element of any assessment mission carried out by the UN, specifically those teams with DDR-related mandates, ensuring conflict analysis is gendered and intersectional, taking into account masculinities, femininities, gender roles, age (with a particular focus on youth), and be informed by sex and age-disaggregated statistics. If the national DDR Commission has been formed, the assessment team should include assessment of their skills and capacities related to gender expertise and recommendations for a Gender Advisor and gender capacity development.

Equitable access shall be ensured to all those participating in integrated assessments and in how integrated assessments consider the role, needs, assets and situation of each population group with regards to the planning for and implementation of DDR. A special emphasis should be on women and girls and on ensuring that assessments provide equitable analysis and recommendations that adhere to the principle of equitable access to opportunities and equal opportunities to speak and be heard. To ensure this, dedicated technical expertise, and budget shall be allocated. Women and gender is a cross-cutting theme of DDR but gender analysis in DDR in a given context should have a dedicated stand-alone integrated assessment. Data collected shall always be sex and age disaggregated to enable analysis and informed decision-making on programme design.
See IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR for comprehensive guidance on assessments, in consultation with the IASC Guidance Note for the Gender Marker.

4.3 Conflict sensitive
Assessments shall consider the conflict dynamics in which they will be conducted, including how the assessments can be biased, as well as the fact that the interventions will operate in a conflict setting as well as on the conflict setting. Potential negative effects shall be anticipated at this stage, including what and how will change regarding power and conflict dynamics. More specifically, no individuals or groups of individuals shall be put at risk because of their participation in assessments or sharing of data. The approach to the assessment shall ensure security of the transportation and confidentiality/anonymity of the data recording, sharing and analysis.

4.4 Context specific
While adhering to the standards outlined in this module, the design and implementation of assessments shall be adapted to each context.

4.5 Flexible, accountable and transparent
Assessments shall consider the volatile nature of the context and the dynamics in place, to be able to anticipate and follow up on any changes that may affect data collection and the reliability of the data collected. Assessments shall be implemented in a transparent manner, to build trust and buy-in by national and international actors and ensure that objectives and potential challenges are clear for all relevant actors.

4.6 Nationally and locally owned
National and local structures and stakeholders shall be consulted in UN internal DDR assessments, directly engaged in data collection for integrated assessments for the formulation of national DDR documents, and participate in the validation of the results and in the monitoring of the process as appropriate.

4.7 Integrated
Assessments shall support integration and unity of effort within the UN system, including humanitarian and development actors, and with national players and coordinate the participation of international partners to achieve common objectives. The integrated approach to assessments shall develop a shared understanding which shall then become the basis for continuous assessments of the context.

4.8 Well planned
Given that DDR processes are implemented in fragile security environments, both risks and operational security and safety protocols shall be decided before any inter-
vention. Regularly updating the information collected, as well as population-specific surveys (e.g., with women associated with armed forces and groups), allows for DDR practitioners to adapt to changing circumstances (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures, IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design and IDDRS 3.30 on National Ownership, National Institutions and Processes in DDR).

5. Categories and types of integrated assessments in DDR

Understanding the two generic categories of assessments (Integrated Strategic Assessments and Integrated Technical Assessments) will guide DDR practitioners leading or participating in implementing analytical work and planning. For all integrated assessments the following is mandatory:

1. All assessments, regardless of title, level of focus and institutional leadership (mission or United Nations agency, fund or programme) must be conducted in an integrated manner if they have operational implications for multiple entities.
2. The requirement (point 1 above) applies throughout the life-cycle of the integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation, political mission and/or good offices engagements.
3. Risk analysis constitutes an essential dimension of all integrated assessments.

5.1 Integrated strategic assessments

The IAP notes that Integrated Assessments and planning processes must take into account relevant UN policies in gender, human rights and children, including integrating a gender analysis. Integrated Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission or field-based Special Political Mission (SPM) is being considered. Where there is no integrated UN presence in place, a Strategic Integrated Assessment is undertaken by a headquarters based Integrated Task Force (ITF) which may already exist or may need to be established. Integrated assessments will include the participation of the UNCT.4

Where DDR is a component of such peacekeeping operations, political missions and/or good office engagements DDR practitioners will participate in Strategic Integrated Assessments. This participation may include providing analysis on all DDR-relevant aspects of the context. The output of the assessment should be a multidimensional and multi-level (regional, national and local) analysis that establishes a basis for planning DDR in the given context or for considering alternatives to DDR where DDR processes are not considered appropriate or feasible.

A DDR Gender expert should be part of the assessment team, unless the broader assessment team has a Gender Advisor who is able to provide technical advice in the design and implementation of gender-responsive assessment, including training as outlined below. In line with the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR ‘DDR Gender How to Guide,’ guidance, ensuring there is adequate gender expertise in the assessment team should be done through:
- Including international/national gender experts in the assessment team;
- Deploying DDR experts together with gender specialists;
- Training statement takers, information gatherers and interpreters on gender concepts and gender-specific methodology;
- Ensuring that adequate funding is available in order to allow participation of relevant experts and informants;
- Involving international, national and local experts and practitioners working on gender equality and women’s empowerment through key informant interviews and validation sessions with stakeholders.

To an integrated strategic assessment DDR practitioners will contribute at least an analysis of the place of DDR in the conflict context, its potential to contribute to meeting the challenges to peace consolidation, the UN’s role in possible DDR in the given context and the UN’s comparative advantage in DDR. This along with other relevant analysis may be translated into an Integrated Strategic Framework that when endorsed with will serve as a regular reference for an on-going field-based process of joint analysis and review of the UN-wide strategies and arrangements for peace consolidation. Under the guidance of the Secretary General and in coordination with field leadership, the Task Force and Task Force partners DDR practitioners may be called upon to contribute data and analysis normally gathered in the pre-analysis and situation analysis phase of planning DDR (see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures and as identified in point 4 above). Pre-analysis and situation analysis are steps in the DDR strategic planning process but DDR planners should not confuse these integrated assessments with the higher level Integrated Strategic Assessment required in the context outlined above and lead by the ITF.

5.2 Integrated technical assessments

Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical assessment missions (TAMs) and sector assessments (such as governance, social sectors and economic sectors) initiated by either Secretariat departments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system. In DDR, Integrated Technical Assessments include:

**Integrated assessments for the DDR strategic planning phase (pre-analysis and situation assessments)** conducted as part of the DDR Strategic Planning Process. These are comprehensively addressed in IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures and are mentioned here in this module as a re-cap and to illustrate the kind of data, information and analysis DDR practitioners may be required to provide that is relevant upstream to integrated strategic assessments and downstream to planning a DDR process. The evolving nature of DDR and the evolution of DDR from sequentially implemented phases to complex interventions in fluid and changing environments and with complex stakeholders means that the methodological boundaries between assessments for strategic planning and integrated assessments for technical aspects of DDR are blurred.
The pre-analysis assessment will provide the overarching baseline data for a DDR process, considering that the process is not necessarily totally sequential, linear and clear cut. The baseline will be used afterwards to measure strategies and changes that would be directly attributable to the planned DDR process or to which the DDR process could contribute. Baseline data should be refined in the subsequent specific assessments used to plan the different interventions selected.

When assessing which type of DDR process is appropriate, the initial assessment should examine whether certain preconditions are in place, including:

- the signing of a negotiated ceasefire and/or peace agreement that provides the framework for DDR.
- trust in the peace process.
- willingness of the parties to the armed conflict to engage in DDR.
- a minimum guarantee of security.

The situation assessment shall always contain the elements described in Annex A of this module covering the following sections:

- Conflict analysis
- Profile of armed forces and groups and their individual members.
- Weapons circulation, possession, and use.
- Political situation and governance.
- Regional and international dynamics.
- Security.
- Social dynamics
- Gender analysis
- Economic, role of the private sector, infrastructures and services provided
- Local capacities for DDR (capacity of communities to absorb ex-combatants, availability of social services)
- National DDR capacities
- DDR relevant programme and peacebuilding interventions

**Process-informing integrated assessments** are tailored to the planning for and implementation of specific DDR processes.

**Linkage-focused integrated assessments** are intended to analyse DDR linkages; namely, SSR, Transitional Justice, Natural Resources, and Organised Crime.

**Risk assessment** may be integrated into other assessments and may be stand-alone for the purposes of creating a risk matrix and mitigation strategy.

The content of integrated technical assessments will vary depending on the rationale for and the focus of the assessment as well as depending on the limitations posed by the environment within which DDR will be implemented. The following presents a brief overview of some main integrated technical assessments. DDR practitioners should be flexible in how they approach technical integrated assessments and be prepared to combine foci from different assessments or use data collected in one assessment to inform or elaborate on data in a different assessment.
### DDR STRATEGIC PLANNING PHASE (INCLUDING PLANNING FOR TRANSITION/EXIT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>RATIONALE FOR ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>OUTPUT FROM ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>LINKAGES WITH OTHER ASSESSMENTS AND DDR PROCESSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRE-ANALYSIS</strong></td>
<td>To situate the DDR planning process.</td>
<td>Report identifying the why, when, and scope of the proposed DDR process. Also identification of the audience for the DDR strategic plan</td>
<td>Up-stream to the Integrated Strategic Assessment. Down-stream to all subsequent assessments and to the DDR strategic plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SITUATION ASSESSMENT</strong></td>
<td>To gather a comprehensive understanding of the context within which DDR will be implemented.</td>
<td>Report identifying the international, regional and local dynamics of the context in which DDR will be implemented.</td>
<td>Up-stream to the updates of the Integrated Strategic Assessment. Down-stream to all subsequent assessments including conflict assessments and to the DDR strategic plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSITION/EXIT PLANNING</strong></td>
<td>To identify the steps relevant to transitioning out of DDR and scenario plan around outcomes and options for transitioning.</td>
<td>Report identifying strategic context and policy landscape for a DDR transition, the options for transitioning out of DDR including maintaining national engagement and financing, relation to integrated transition planning, timelines the risks of transitioning, the operational and policy coherence and implications of transitioning, the UN-centric institutional arrangements for transitioning (for example, UN Mission to UNCT-only presence) and the linkages with other current and proposed sustaining peace interventions.</td>
<td>Laterally to monitoring and evaluation of DDR. Downstream to focused integrated technical assessments including logistics and budgeting.</td>
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**TABLE 1: Overview of Main Integrated Assessments in DDR**
### KEY DDR PROCESS-INFORMING INTEGRATED ASSESSMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>RATIONALE FOR ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>OUTPUT FROM ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>LINKAGES WITH OTHER ASSESSMENTS AND DDR PROCESSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profiling armed forces and groups to be included in DDR</td>
<td>To categorise the armed forces and groups and gather comprehensive data on the entities being engaged via the DDR process. Identify conflict actors and potential spoilers.</td>
<td>Categorisation of the armed forces and groups and an analysis of DDR-related dynamics and traits.</td>
<td>Laterally to assessments for Demobilisation and Disarmament. If the assessment includes a focus on members then also laterally to reintegration and community based reintegration. Relevant to linkages with Transitional Justice, Organized Crime and Natural Resources. Particular relevance for DDR-SSR linkages if armed forces are to be included in DDR. Also relevant to linkages to with Transitional Justice and Organized Crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profiling potential participants and beneficiaries of DDR processes</td>
<td>To understand the needs of individuals, groups, relevant demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration dynamics and to anticipate road-blocks for delivery of services and benefits. Identify conflict actors and potential spoilers.</td>
<td>Data on populations integrated with conflict analysis. Often strongly linked to profiling specific needs groups</td>
<td>Laterally to other assessments informing Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reinsertion, Reintegration and DDR related tools. Relevant to linkages with Transitional Justice, Criminality and Natural Resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender analysis</td>
<td>To understand gender roles and identities and how they have been impacted by the conflict, including development of militarized or violent versions. Enables gendered perspective of the drivers</td>
<td>Gender analysis</td>
<td>Conflict analysis, profiling potential DDR participants and armed forces and groups, community assessment, SALW/Weapons survey, DDR and SSR, DDR and Transitional Justice,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### KEY DDR PROCESS-INFORMING INTEGRATED ASSESSMENTS - CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>RATIONALE FOR ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>OUTPUT FROM ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>LINKAGES WITH OTHER ASSESSMENTS AND DDR PROCESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community assessment including areas of return and resettlement</td>
<td>To understand conflict-related dynamics in communities, assess capacity for reintegration if relevant, analyse armed actors’ relationship with/ perception by the community, identify needs for mediation, counselling, identify opportunities/leverage points for DDR as well as potential spoilers. Reintegration opportunity mapping.</td>
<td>Assessment of community dynamics as relevant to DDR.</td>
<td>Laterally to other assessments informing Reinsertion, Reintegration and DDR tools particularly CVR. Relevant to linkages with Transitional Justice, Criminality and Natural Resources. Relevant also to understanding community perceptions of DDR generally and the political economy of DDR in any given community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons survey/SALW survey</td>
<td>To ascertain a baseline of weapons and ammunition proliferation, capacity for management, relevant institutional capacity and policies in order to build capacity for continuous data gathering and analysis, as well as to establish baseline indicators to support monitoring and evaluation.</td>
<td>Assessment of and dataset on the nature and extent of weapons and ammunition, management capacity and policy frameworks. Identification of impact on civilians and public perception of weapons issues.</td>
<td>Laterally to Disarmament and to Weapons and Ammunition Management. Laterally to DDR tools particularly CVR and TWAM. Relevant to linkages with Transitional Justice, Criminality and Natural Resources. Downstream to engagement with national institutions, logistics, budgeting and staffing capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>RATIONALE FOR ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>OUTPUT FROM ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>LINKAGES WITH OTHER ASSESSMENTS AND DDR PROCESSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic opportunity mapping</td>
<td>Contributes to matching the needs of DDR participants</td>
<td>Assessment of community dynamics as relevant to DDR.</td>
<td>Lateral to other assessments informing Reinsertion, Reintegration and DDR tools particularly CVR. Relevant to linkages with Transitional Justice, Criminality and Natural Resources. Relevant also to understanding community perceptions of DDR generally and the political economy of DDR in any given community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Mapping and Capacity</td>
<td>Comprehensive mapping of the availability/gaps and capacity of local and national services relevant to DDR.</td>
<td>Assessment of services, access, location, capacity restraints and financing. This includes health (mental health, reproductive and maternal health, sexual and violence recovery). Strongly linked to profiling.</td>
<td>Lateral to Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration. Lateral to DDR tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Analysis</td>
<td>Mapping of the nature of the national and local labour market</td>
<td>Assessment of the labour market at national and local levels including worker composition, opportunities, remuneration levels, skills shortages and self-employment, micro and SME opportunities</td>
<td>Laterally to Reintegration. Upstream to national strategies for conflict recovery and reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Technical Analysis</td>
<td>Targeted integrated assessments of the fundamental mechanics of process implementation such as budgeting, staffing logistics, and monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Assessment of the relevant data and technical approaches to DDR processes depending on the scope of the analysis</td>
<td>Upstream to all DDR processes. Upstream to the DDR strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>RATIONALE FOR ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>OUTPUT FROM ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>LINKAGES WITH OTHER ASSESSMENTS AND DDR PROCESSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR and SSR linkages</td>
<td>To identify and assess the programmatic linkages between DDR and SSR. To engender mutually reinforcing outcomes where the DDR and SSR are implemented with or without programmatic linkages.</td>
<td>Assessment of the security sector. Assessment of eligibility and selection of members of armed forces and groups or other civilian bodies parallel to the national armed force but considered for DDR, for example: police, national park rangers, and fire service. Identification of the military integration modality if relevant.</td>
<td>Laterally to profiling beneficiaries and participants, and to other key linkage focused integrated assessments. Potential linkage to all DDR processes, SPM and support to mediation. Laterally to general risk assessments and to security risk assessments. Upstream to mediation and drafting CPAs and in SPMs. Upstream to national budgeting for security sector expenditure and other aspects of public expenditure reform. Downstream to engagement with national institutions, logistics, budgeting and staffing capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR and Transitional Justice linkages</td>
<td>To identify and assess the programmatic linkages with distinct parallel TJ and/or with TJ concerns arising within a DDR process. To engender mutually reinforcing outcomes that overall contribute to peace and security.</td>
<td>Assessment of the TJ systems and needs in a given context, opportunities to leverage outcomes from DDR and TJ to contribute to peace-building and security.</td>
<td>Laterally to profiling beneficiaries and participants. Linkage to Reintegration and DDR-related tools such as CVR particularly where they contain truth seeking elements or officially endorsed traditional judicial practices to compensate for lack of capacity in the mainstream judicial system. Laterally to general risk assessments and to security risk assessments. Upstream to mediation and drafting CPAs and to SPMs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Key Linkage-Focused Integrated Assessments - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrated Assessment</th>
<th>Rationale for Assessment</th>
<th>Output from Assessment</th>
<th>Linkages with Other Assessments and DDR Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DDR and Natural Resources linkages</strong></td>
<td>To identify and assess the role of natural resources in the given context and conflict.</td>
<td>Assessment of the role of natural resource and environmental pressures in the given context and conflict. Analysis of the risks to natural resource management posed by the DDR process and how these can be mitigated.</td>
<td>Upstream to the criminal justice system and prosecution of war crimes (see IDDRS 2.11 on The Legal Framework for UN DDR). Also policing and SSR. Laterally to profiling armed forces and groups, beneficiaries and participants, and communities. Linkage to risk assessment and risk management. Linkage to conflict assessment, labour market assessments and services mapping as well as assessments in SSR and TJ. Linkage to Reintegration and CVR. Upstream to mediation and drafting CPAs and to SPMs. Upstream to policies encompassing natural resource management and broader peace-building and conflict recovery. Downstream to engagement with national institutions, logistics, budgeting and staffing capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DDR and Organised Crime linkages</strong></td>
<td>To identify and assess the impact of and linkages between key aspects of crime in conflict and post-conflict settings on DDR and the achievement of DDR objectives.</td>
<td>Assessment of the factors in organised crime that have a bearing on DDR. An identification of the risks posed by these factors and potential steps toward mitigating these risks.</td>
<td>Laterally to profiling members of armed forces and groups, beneficiaries and participants, and communities. Linkage to risk assessment and risk management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Guidance for DDR practitioners for integrated assessments

The guidance for DDR practitioners presents the potential success factors for an integrated assessment, the logical approach to structuring an assessment and the generic main elements of an assessment that can then be applied to the specific areas outlined in Table 1 above.

6.1 Success factors of integrated assessments

DDR practitioners engaged in integrated assessments should consider the factors that contribute to successful integrated strategic assessments and apply these factors when participating in, conducting or guiding assessments in DDR. When applied to integrated assessments for DDR these include:

- DDR practitioners should ensure analysis is needs-driven rather than supply-driven. Any discussions about how DDR should be designed and implemented and how this impacts on UN presence on the ground should be driven by this analysis (form has to follow function). In integrated DDR the primary needs are those of participants and latterly, beneficiaries. Even where a DDR activity may target an institution (for example, capacity building national institutions with responsibility for DDR) this is done to improve the impact of DDR on participants and beneficiaries.
DDR practitioners should ensure that coordination of the assessment includes close collaboration between relevant UN entities and this may include Headquarters and UN agencies in the field/UNCTs.

Dedicated funding for gender expertise in assessment mission and required female personnel should be allocated at the start of planning. DDR practitioners and gender practitioners should work together to ensure design and implementation is gender-responsive and includes gender analysis. Assessments should ensure training on gender for all interviewing and documenting.

DDR practitioners should ensure that when they are the lead department for the assessment that DDR staff involved clearly understand that the process of the integrated assessment shall be inclusive, transparent and conducted in a manner that fully takes into account the views expressed by all participants.

DDR practitioners should ensure that they and all participating parties understand that while the assessment is a joint product and should contribute to building a shared vision and understanding, the assessment process is not necessarily intended to generate consensus or an output such as a report or position paper that incorporates everybody’s inputs in verbatim form. An integrated assessment can reflect substantive disagreements.

DDR practitioners should ensure that their team and at least the other UN entities involved but where possible also the external participants contain the best possible experience for the particular assessment. This includes expertise in facilitating the participation of participants and beneficiaries in DDR. Where relevant DDR practitioners should take particular care to ensure facilitation expertise includes expertise in ensuring the equitable participation of women children and persons with disabilities.

DDR practitioners when leading an assessment should ensure that the lead staff have extensive and successful experience with running inter-departmental/agency processes and be highly regarded by the main entities involved. The leader should also be well versed in the principles of integration and its supporting guidance.

DDR practitioners should enter any integrated assessment with the understanding that it may involve a critical and honest analysis not just of ongoing UN activities in the country but also current and past efforts in DDR. This should be made evident to all participating UN entities. This aspect of the analysis should include consultations with non-UN stakeholders including government, inclusive representation of civil society (i.e. youth groups, women’s groups, etc. per context), donors, international organisations and DDR participants and beneficiaries.

DDR practitioners should ensure that any field mission in support of an assessment including Technical Assessment Missions are small and tightly managed so as to not overburden stakeholders on the ground. Furthermore, any assessment should leverage existing expertise and capacities on the ground including in the UNCT.

DDR practitioners should ensure that if, as part of their mandate, they are undertaking technical assessments relevant to their legal mandates that they communicate to other UN entities the resulting information as appropriate and with due consideration for confidentiality including to national counterparts. In fact, while individual entities may conduct DDR-specific assessments or their mandate-
specific thematic assessments may include DDR-relevant sections, the information sharing is critical for all stakeholders to build a common understanding of the operational environment and its DDR-specific aspects.

- DDR practitioners should ensure that any risks associated with the assessment are mitigated and that the assessment is conducted in accordance with Do No Harm principles and affording protection to participating stakeholders.

### 6.2 An approach to integrated assessments in DDR

DDR practitioners should apply a logical approach to planning and implementing integrated assessments. This applies to setting the TOR of the assessment which essentially, is the scope of the assessment and the composition of the participating UN and non-UN entities and, where relevant, conflict affected populations. The text below presents the different stages to planning assessments.

**Stage 1. Establish the rationale, objectives, participants, context, deliverables and timelines for the integrated assessment and summarize it all in Terms of Reference**

**Why.** DDR practitioners shall clearly explain the rationale (the why) for the integrated assessment.

**When.** While establishing why the integrated assessment is being done DDR practitioners shall provide a clear explanation of the importance of conducting this integrated assessment at this particular point in the life-cycle of integrated DDR.

**Authorising Framework.** DDR practitioners shall establish the authorising framework for the assessment: an outline of the UN policy documents (this may include decision of the Security Council, Secretary-General, Strategic Assessments, Integrated Strategic Framework) and the mandate of the lead UN entity.

**What.** DDR practitioners shall establish the objectives of the integrated assessment. Where relevant this may refer to specific requests made by governing bodies but regardless should clearly identify what the integrated assessment is intended to achieve. This includes defining how the content of the assessment will fit with other assessments already conducted or planned for this context. Clearly establishing the objectives will normally result in DDR practitioners identifying the outputs of the assessment. For most DDR integrated assessments this is likely to be technical and analytical reports including recommendations regarding the DDR process or linkages with other stabilisation and peace-building interventions and sectors.

**Who.** DDR practitioners leading on the integrated assessment shall establish the list of participating UN-entities (as distinct from the wider mapping on stakeholders who will participate in and be sources of data for the assessment) and where relevant other stakeholders clearly identifying the role of those who will participate in the assessment. Which entities participate will depend on which will be involved in the DDR process. Decision on which entity(ies) shall lead will be determined based on discussion with all of those involved. Terms of Reference for the mission will be established jointly.
What Context. DDR practitioners shall establish the context for the inter-agency assessment. The context will vary depending on the objectives of the assessment and establishing the context will feed into or overlap with Stage 2, the implementation of the assessment. Initially it includes the policy context and the operational context for the DDR process. DDR practitioners should establish what aspects of the DDR process and DDR process implementation are relevant to the assessment and map the connections with cross-cutting issues and DDR linkages. Practitioners shall take into consideration gender dimensions. Where relevant DDR practitioners shall identify the logistic and budgetary implications of implementing an integrated assessment.

How. DDR practitioners shall establish a proposed methodology for the assessment. The methodologies used in the assessment may vary considerably depending on such factors as the rationale, the objectives and the context for the assessments as well as any risks including security risks that may impact the utilisation of particular research tools, such as; community consultations or interviews with prospective DDR participants including members of armed forces and groups.

When. DDR practitioners shall establish an efficient and realistic timeline for the implementation and completion of the assessment. This shall include the delivery of outputs from the assessment.

What Cost. DDR practitioners shall establish a budget for the assessment and ensure that the objectives of the assessments are in line with the resources available. In some cases, financial partners might need to be identified to support the assessment. Practitioners shall be aware that assessments may require expertise from outside the UN and the DDR partners such as through consultancies or think-tanks. This shall be factored into budgeting for integrated assessments.

Stage 2. Implement the Integrated Assessment

Implementing an integrated assessment may follow varied paths depending upon the rationale, objectives, participants, context, deliverables, timelines and the focus of the assessment including cross-cutting issues and DDR linkages, whether or not the assessment includes a Technical Assessment Mission, and whether or not the integrated assessment is being implemented in a Mission or non-Mission context. DDR practitioners must use good judgement and guidance from their mandate as to how the following steps are taken in any given assessment.

Situational assessment. While a situational assessment is part of the strategic planning for DDR (see IDDRS 3.10 Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures) most assessments will require establishing the context within which the assessment and the DDR process is being implemented. DDR practitioners will determine to what extent this includes the conflict context, an analysis of other peace-building interventions and programming and relevant comparable DDR, and a mapping of previous and existing project portfolios in the country or region by UN and non-UN entities. Situation assessments should identity data gaps and potential strategies to fill relevant data gaps during implementation of the assessment.
Stakeholder mapping. DDR practitioners should ensure a mapping of all relevant stakeholders not just those who will be directly consulted for the assessment. Mapping stakeholders may include mapping the political economy of participant groups and beneficiaries including conflict-affected communities and communities where reintegration activities are planned. This aims to identify the stakeholders playing a role in peace and security dynamics, either positively or negatively. Stakeholders include national/subnational government, institutions, political parties, donors, United Nations, NGOs, international and national civil society groups, women’s groups, youth groups, regional and international actors, corporate sector, customary and religious leaders, armed forces and groups, conflict actors and others. The relation to and (potential) influence on DDR should be considered (see IDDRS 3.21 on DDR Process Stakeholders). Stakeholder mapping should be tailored to the rationale and objectives of the integrated assessment.

DDR practitioners should identify whether stakeholder mapping includes preparation to establish working committees, steering committees or consultative fora. In conflict contexts communities may be resistant to DDR and/or to the UN and so consultations and community relations may need to be managed not by UN staff but by another neutral agency or an expert with skills in conflict management.

Data collection including stakeholder consultations. DDR practitioners should be aware of the many sources of data (see IDDRS 3.50 on DDR Monitoring and Evaluation) and identify the relevant sources for the integrated assessment as well as the means to maintain channels of data communication for the lifetime of the assessment or for the lifetime of DDR (as assessments may need to be repeated, updated or the data channels may be relevant for other integrated assessments). DDR practitioners should namely be aware of other assessments that have been made for this specific context and which may be relevant for obtaining data relevant for the assessment’s ToR. DDR practitioners should be aware of the challenges of collecting data in environments impacted upon by fragility, conflict and violence (see IDDRS 3.50 on DDR Monitoring and Evaluation). In summary, these include:

- Limitations in data availability that in part arise from insecurity, the sensitive nature of the data, and the operational challenges of both mission and non-mission contexts.
- Particular difficulties collecting data on illicit weapons and ammunition flows and on illicit economic activities. A weapons survey is the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data about weapons and ammunition, which is conducted within a specific geographical area and used to provide evidence upon which to design tailored, safe and effective arms control interventions (for further information, see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).
- There are challenges to integration arising from the data management practices in UN entities. UN entities apply divergent approaches to data collection and management and so there is a high risk that data and analysis can become siloed within and between UN entities working in DDR even if collected for an integrated assessment.
DDR practitioners should ensure that data collection should be backed-up by on-going consultation with stakeholders who may also participate in the analysis and management of data. The cost of using primary data collection over secondary data collection should be factored into the planning of the integrated assessment.

DDR practitioners shall be aware of how DDR and DDR integrated assessments involve a wide variety of stakeholders. Integrated assessments in DDR involve consultations with stakeholders from a cross-section of the DDR ‘ecosystem’ that may range from specific needs groups (such as children associated with armed forces and groups) to technical and thematic experts (such as in logistics and budgeting technicians) to members of armed forces and groups whether signatories of peace agreements or not, to domestic and international political decision makers and influencers). DDR practitioners should be aware of how some stakeholders and implementing partners may have different and also conflicting expectations of DDR and of the integrated assessment. DDR practitioners should be aware that different stakeholders will require different approaches to consultation and so the team implementing an integrated assessment shall have the expertise to identify and, where relevant, apply the appropriate methodology to any particular consultation including participatory data collection and mapping.

Triangulation of data is essential to ensure robust and credible evidence. This triangulation should be at various levels, between data sources, data collection methods, and specific expertise of the consultant or staff conducting the analysis. DDR practitioners shall ensure that all data collected on individuals is sex, age and where possible, disability disaggregated.

The following criteria ascertain the quality of the data:

- Validity (level of capacity of the persons in charge of collection, accuracy of the data collection protocol and level of operationalization, identification of limitations, identification of mistakes and inconsistencies).
- Reliability (coherence of the process through time and geographical areas, review of the collection and analysis systems, neutrality, formalization and documentation of the process).
- Opportunity (timeliness, accessibility, storage of the data).
- Accuracy (identification of missing data including sex or age, duplications).
- Integrity (mechanisms to limit interference, bias, data modification).

**Identity decision points and action points.** DDR practitioners should ensure that wherever possible integrated assessments include the identification of decision points that are relevant to the design and implementation of DDR processes or that are relevant to the technical scope of the assessment. Similarly, if relevant, the assessments should include actions points and the identification of opportunities to improve the planned results of the DDR process in question. Where potential courses of actions are mapped, integrated assessments may include scenario planning to identity possible outcomes resulting from taking or not taking the mapped actions.
Identify existing capacities and weaknesses relevant to decision points and action points. Where relevant DDR practitioners should ensure that integrating assessments include an analysis of existing capacities (within the UN system and external to it) that are relevant to taking any recommended course of action. For example, if an assessment recommends providing support to government to establish a new national institution with responsibility for DDR then the assessment should identify capacities, assets, opportunities and weaknesses relevant to such a course of action. Weaknesses may include potential spoilers to DDR more broadly or to the recommended course of action.

Stage 3. Inform and influence decision making

Regardless of the focus of any integrated assessment an objective shall always be to inform and influence decision making. DDR practitioners shall ensure that this objective follows a logical pathway from data (evidence) to decision. This means that data gathered during the assessment is clearly and transparently developed to identify factors that need to be considered in the course of decision making and then distilled further into explicit recommendations on the DDR process that is the focus of the integrated assessment or on the technical scope of the assessment. Informing decision making may include a participatory element where key stakeholders are involved in formulating recommendations.

Stage 4. Monitor and evaluate

In order to ensure the uptake of the recommendations of DDR integrated assessments and to collate learning from this uptake DDR practitioners may establish a participatory multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation framework and forum. Such frameworks and fora shall be complementary to and integrated with the monitoring and evaluation of DDR processes (see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation).

Where relevant DDR practitioners may use an integrated assessment to establish participatory feedback mechanisms that allow them and other relevant decision makers to reassess DDR processes, the analysis in an integrated assessment and/or the findings and recommendations contained in any particular integrated assessment. Monitoring from such mechanisms shall contribute to the decisions on whether and/or how to revise and adjust DDR.

7. Risk and security assessments

7.1 General risk assessment of a DDR process

Risk is the effect of uncertainty on organizational objectives, which can be positive, negative or both. It can address, create or result in opportunities and threats. There is no risk-free pathway to achieving programmatic objectives, including in DDR. In DDR ‘uncertainty’ relates to our limited understanding of the future. Therefore, the identification of risks considers potential change from the expected or planned future event that might have an impact on DDR objectives.
Most UN entities will have a formally defined internal organisational structure for Enterprise Risk Management with assigned roles and responsibilities. The role of an ERM unit/or staff member dedicated to ERM (“risk owners”) is to coordinate and facilitate risk management processes across the UN entity, ensuring a harmonized approach to risk management. UN entities with extensive field presence often have a network of risk focal points across their organization at field level and in HQ. The identification and managed of risk in DDR may be informed by the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) policy or framework that the participating UN entities have at the organisational level. As with ERM, in DDR responsibility for risk identification and management should be situated at a rank at which it is possible to address senior management and have the authority to communicate across the UN entities involved in DDR.

Identifying and navigating through uncertainties is central to risk management. Uncertainties may impact many aspects of planning DDR including budget and timeline. By mapping, analysing and strategizing around potential uncertainties, integrated risk assessments enable DDR practitioners to understand risks and manage them.

DDR risk management shall enable DDR practitioners to anticipate the future of their DDR process by:

1. Understanding the context.
2. Thinking about what might happen,
3. Understanding the scope and scale of the consequences of an event in the future.
4. Making decisions that will minimize negative impacts and maximize positive ones.

UN entities categorise risks differently. Usually this is done in the entity’s ERM or Risk Register. While there are differences between UN entities, generally, risks can be grouped into a combination of the following categories that in turn may be disaggregated into various sub-categories. Risks may be interrelated; for example, an operational risk such as inadequate record keeping may have associated financial and reputational risk.

- **Operational Risk.** Operational risks include the variety of uncertainties that may arise from planning and implementing DDR. Operational risk may include sub-categories such as: financial risk, cost recovery, corruption and fraud, flexibility and opportunity management, reporting and communication, engagement of national partners in decision making, transition and exiting, and organisational risk.

- **Strategic Risk.** Strategic risk includes the variety of uncertainties linked to the DDR strategy and the issues that may arise from the strategic aspects of the operational environment in which DDR will be implemented. This may include sub-categories such as: alignment of operations with UN entity strategic priorities, roles and responsibilities among partners, public option and risks associated with the DDR Theory of Change and its assumptions.
- **Security Risk.** Security risks are managed via the UN’s Security Risk Management (SRM). This is a United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) tool to identify, analyse and manage safety and security risks to United Nations personnel, assets and operations. The SRM process is guided by a UNSMS Policy, which provides guidance to security personnel on the process. Security risk management may include sub-categories such as: armed groups, terrorism, crime, civil unrest, weapons proliferation, natural hazards, manmade hazards.

- **Social and Environmental Risk.** Social and environmental risks are potential impacts from DDR on the natural environment or communities. Social and environmental risk may include sub-categories such as: human rights, gender, community health and safety, displacement and resettlement, sexual exploitation and abuse, pollution and resource use, biodiversity and use of natural resources, built environment and heritage, and climate change.

- **Reputational Risk.** Reputational risk is the potential negative impact on the UN ‘brand’ or reputation. Reputational risk can have follow-on impacts on security risks and strategic risks and may arise from most categories and sub-categories of risk.

Examples of common risks often identified in DDR processes include:

- DDR is mandated by UN Security Council resolutions and initiated by UN peace operations despite lack of preconditions for such a programmes;
- The UNCT is blamed for not fully engaging in the DDR process and in particular on the reintegration component;
- The UN integrated approach fails to materialize on DDR; there is lack of coordination and competition for funds;
- Conflict between signatory and non-signatory armed groups escalates and spreads;
- The UN-designated lead agency(ies) on DDR in the UNCT cannot provide reintegration support in the time frame planned by the Mission responsible for disarmament and demobilization;
- National actors take limited or no national ownership over DDR;
- Implementation of DDR impacts negatively on reconciliation and justice;
- Ex-combatants enter illicit activities or join criminal groups instead of participating in DDR;
- Participants in DDR are not provided with adequate reintegration support to transition into civilian life due to lack of funding and interest of donors to invest in reintegration;
- National implementing partners capacity is insufficient to implement DDR;
- Funds are not used for planned DDR interventions (fraud, re-distribution of funds).

The risk assessment process appears relatively straightforward but it is founded upon sound knowledge of the operational environment, with clear steps in risk analysis and must be undertaken in an environment where there is an understood, prescribed risk management escalation process. The risk management escalation process ensures that the risk is treated. Where the risk owner is accountable for ensuring risk is identified and managed appropriately, each treatment is assigned a Treatment Owner, the individual
who is responsible for executing the activity agreed by the team to address the risk (risk treatment). The risk owner and treatment owner may be the same person.

When a risk is analysed it should be given a score linked to the likelihood of realisation and the severity of possible impact. This may help gauge the severity of the risk and the urgency with which the risk should be mitigated. DDR practitioners who are assessing risk may use numerical scales to rate not just likelihood and possible impact but also the effectiveness of internal control. UN entities may have varying versions of risk registers used to document risk and risk treatment strategies. A DDR practitioner will be guided by the risk register adopted for a particular DDR process but such a register is likely to contain some of the following components.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK HEADING</th>
<th>RISK CATEGORY</th>
<th>IMPACT (1-5 SCALE)</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD (1-5 SCALE)</th>
<th>INTERNAL CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS (1-5 SCALE)</th>
<th>RESIDUAL RISK (1-5 SCALE)</th>
<th>RISK OWNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Significant</td>
<td>5 Expected</td>
<td>1 Effective</td>
<td>4 High</td>
<td>Name and Role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK DEFINITION</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DRIVERS OF RISK</th>
<th>INTERNAL CONTROLS</th>
<th>RISK RESPONSE</th>
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</table>
7.2 Risk and security analysis in the conduct of integrated assessments

Integrated assessments should include an analysis of security conditions assumptions for the implementation of the assessments and related mitigation measures. This will serve as a basis for the broader risk management system to be implemented as part of DDR. It aims to identify threats to the DDR process and its personnel, as well as to participants and beneficiaries.

The assessment should identify the tolerable risks, protective or risk mitigation measures and define the expected residual risk after mitigation. Risks should be measured according to their severity and likeliness. This should cover security risks (attacks, abductions, robberies, threats), operational and technical risks depending on the specificities and sensitivity of the armed groups, and related to weapon management.

In developing this ‘safe’ working environment, it must be acknowledged that there can be no absolute safety and that many of the activities carried out in conflict settings and related to a potential DDR process have a high risk associated with them. More specifically, the limitations and potential biases to the assessment process should be anticipated and acknowledged and addressed via broader triangulation or identification or proxy indicators while planning for integrated assessments.

Immediate risks for the conduct of the assessment would usually include volatility of the context, security of the stakeholders involved, including protection and confidentiality of the sources, logistics, notably access to rural areas, access to geographical areas and to key stakeholders, and reliability of the data, implying the need for triangulation and an evidence-based approach (see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation).

Interests of the armed groups, lack of neutrality and specific interests of international stakeholders, politicization and hidden political economy, overfocus on armed combatants versus other members of the armed groups and communities which have been victims. This type of limitation may imply that future programming could have reverse effects and favour some armed groups, or support indirectly the armed groups agenda, versus others. This is the case notably if a DDR process, for various reasons, only covers some armed groups while some other remain active.

Security risks to the safety of personnel including external personnel or participants to the assessments. Ad-hoc security and safety protocols should be established to access to some data. The use of armed escorts can be necessary but may lead to biases of various types depending on their type. Local relays can also facilitate the data collection process but may also have their own biases or may be subject to specific local political or social constraints.
# Annex A: Pre-analysis and situational assessments

## 1.1 Generic content of elements of pre-analysis and situational assessments

### 1. CONFLICT ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History of the area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources, causes and triggers of violence, including their gender dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict drivers including key events and trends, structural drivers and gender analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact of the conflict (the key elements could be in a distinct section while further details could be included throughout the analysis on the different sections hereunder):

- Military and civilian casualties since the start of the conflict: number and trends of death and injuries (including sexual violence or Gender Based Violence) per location, profiles of the victims and abusers
- Evolution of political, social, gender and economic dynamics
- Further identification of the various groups of population concerned by the conflict and who should benefit from various types of assistance

### 2. ARMED GROUP PROFILING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed forces and groups profiling, including</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age, origin and gender disaggregated information force/group strength, including associated members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location and territorial control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization and structure, command chain, leadership structures, key leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group cohesion, level of homogeneity, potential sources of dissensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political affiliations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender norms and identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivation for picking up arms and the gender dimensions, including greed-grievance orientation and role of ideology ideology-driven or extremist tactics, social and gender dynamics related to masculinities and femininities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modus operandi: intensity and use of violence level of community linkages and support, legitimacy throughout social groups and territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potential role as a proxy to a transnational/external actor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of sexual violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience of sexual violence within armed forces and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involvement in organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potential involvement in socio-economic activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type of weaponry: number, type of weapons, ammunition and explosives, patterns of weapons possession among men, women, girls, boys, and youth, locations and access routes to materiel and potential caches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>other related stakeholders, international outreach</td>
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<tr>
<td>enrolment trends and strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>willingness of and incentives for armed forces and groups to participate in DDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>presence of armed groups not involved in DDR and the possible impact these groups can have on the DDR process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of and incentives for armed forces and groups to participate in DDR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. WEAPONS CIRCULATION, POSSESSION AND USE

This section of the assessment should contribute to determining whether disarmament or any T-WAM interventions are desirable or feasible in the current context, as well as identifying the potential positive and negative impacts of any such activities. The section should include an analysis of:

- Arsenals of armed forces and groups (estimated size and type of weapons, ammunition and explosives)
- Patterns of weapons possession among men, women, girls and boys
- Sources of illicit weapons and ammunition and trafficking routes
- Power imbalances and disparities in weapons possession between communities.
- Use of weapons in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as well as crime, including organized crime.
- Cultural and gendered attitudes towards weapons
- Estimated price and societal value of arms and ammunition locally
- Willingness of and incentives for armed forces and groups to participate in disarmament or T-WAM activities,
- WAM capacity of armed forces and groups

Finally, this section should identify the key aspects to be developed further in the weapons survey.

4. POLITICAL SITUATION AND GOVERNANCE

Recent evolution, current political arrangements and dispensation, and near-term milestones (e.g. elections)

- Level of legitimacy of the political system and governance structures
- Level of political representation of the different social groups and gender ratio of representation
- Risks to political stability that may impact DDR processes
- Level of coverage of the various administrations on the national territory

5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS

Influence of the regional and international environment

- External forces in support of conflict actors
- Relationships between the country and its neighbors and their level of capacity
- Relationships between the country and international stakeholders and their level of capacity
- Regional and international dynamics that may influence DDR responses, including migration and organized criminal networks

6. SECURITY

Security situation overall and the, with data on levels of armed violence, organized crime, sexual violence, gender based violence, levels and types of victimization disaggregated by sex and age

- Types, composition (including social representation), coverage and mandate of the various security and defence forces
- Interactions of the security and defence forces with the population and various types of communities (legacy and level of abuses including sexual or gender based violence, level of information sharing)
- Women’s specific security threats, including, but not limited to sexual and gender based violence, presence and use of sexual violence within or by armed forces and groups, threats to women’s security in the community, potential risks to women returning to communities.
# 7. Social Dynamics

Demography, key social groups roles and connections including gender dimensions, power structure by social group and gender, and specific challenges and practices in interacting with other communities

Human rights situation, based on disaggregated data on patterns of political and socio-economic exclusion and discrimination, and relevant institutional capacities and legal frameworks (see below on cross-cutting issues)

Gender analysis, including understanding gender identities in the armed forces and groups as well as the community, with regards to political and socio-economic equality and opportunities, sexual violence and Gender Based Violence statistics and patterns, and relevant institutional capacities and legal frameworks

National infrastructure for social services, including measures of access across vulnerable populations (notably in health, psychosocial support, education, vocational training)

# 8. Economic, Role of the Private Sector, Infrastructures and Services Provided

Employment levels and opportunities depending on the different social groups

Basis for livelihoods in the formal and informal sector

Sources of economic growth and labour demand, recent evolution and level of structuration

National resources management and access

Regional and local disparities (including most deprived areas, connectedness, road network, access to food, water and energy)

# 9. Local Capacities

Capacity of communities to absorb ex-combatants, associated groups and their dependents and/or to support community-based responses

Level of availability of basic services (health including mental health and reproductive health, sexual violence recovery) in the various communities and financial structure in order to define the appropriate transfer modality (cash-based transfers, commodity vouchers, in-kind support and/or public works programmes)

# 10. DDR Capacities

Current DDR responses and existing DDR frameworks (e.g., provisions in peace accord, national strategies, gender-responsiveness of frameworks, etc.) and all relevant laws, treatises and conventions in force in the country that have a bearing on potential DDR responses

Existing national and local capacities for DDR processes (e.g., Disarmament/Weapons control, Demobilization, Reintegration, Community Violence Reduction), with a focus on DDR specific institutions (e.g., National Commissions) as well as other relevant institutions (e.g., Ministries of Health, Education, etc.)

National and local budgetary allocations for DDR responses (past and present)

# 11. DDR Relevant Programme and Peacebuilding Interventions

(In addition to the overall context, in first place peace and security dynamics, and DDR specific dimensions, the assessment must cover additional elements to which DDR responses may be connected)

Local and national peace mediation efforts

Reconciliation and transitional justice frameworks and initiative

Status of Security Sector reform

Peacebuilding, recovery and reconstruction plans
3.11 Level 3  Structures and Processes
Integrated Assessments for DDR

Women, peace and security initiatives; existing of national action plan on 1325
Any other Sustaining Peace initiatives of potential relevance

DDR funding and donor strategies, past and present, and level of support to fund new, additional or expanded DDR efforts.

Previous DDR efforts. The objective is to understand achievements and challenges and extract lessons that can inform future responses. This should also include a critical examination of the role and track record of UN and other international actors in previous DDR processes. This assessment should inform the determination of roles and responsibilities.

1.1.1 Armed Group Typologies: Assessing Armed Groups and Armed Group Membership.

Analysing armed groups and the membership of armed groups is an evolving area of assessment. The following approach contains matrices for assessing the entity and the members. The matrices are underpinned by certain axioms as follows.

a. The matrices and subsequent typology are not comprehensive; they provide lenses through which the structure and functioning of the armed group can be defined and through which the factors immediately relevant to the membership can be understood.

b. The matrices and subsequent typology should be utilized repeatedly in the course of designing and implementing DDR. Armed groups are not static entities, they change over time in response to many different factors including both external and internal pressures and day-to-day conflict dynamics. The picture one obtains (and provisional categorization of the armed group that one makes) may change and so the typologies (or parts of them) should be repeated during DDR and any provisional categorization of the armed should be interrogated.

c. The data collected by applying the matrices is inter-related. For example, data on foreign fighters will be connected to data on the finance of the armed group as, often foreign fighters are a source of financing or a route to raising finance for armed groups.

d. The data collected is also related to community profiling, profiling of local and transnational patronage, profiling of conflict actors and of course the routine data normally collected in preparation for and during implementation of DDR. Our presentation of decision maps teases out these connections.

e. All data collection and use should adhere to the Guiding Principles of the IDDRS as outlined in Module 2.10 the UN Approach to DDR and as deemed applicable to the various stages of data collection, analysis and use.

The core matrix clusters the more structural aspects of an NSAG as follows:

- Structure
- Strategy
- Objectives
- Operations
- Tactics
- Ideology
- Geography
Leadership and Command
Additional roles
Relationship to Community
Communication
Finances
Historical/Cultural Importance
Relationship with Criminality

The matrix is read left to right, beginning with the aspect and including rationale, guide questions, potential data sources and the relevance this aspect has to DDR Processes. When concluding a provision categorization of the NSAG, the main conclusions from what the DDR practitioner identifies as key sections of the matrix should be included to form a descriptive categorization. For example:

The armed group is a hierarchy structured cellular entity, with both political and military wings. The military and political wings have shared objectives. It behaves in a tactical rather than strategic manner targeting host and non-host communities through a variety of actions including IED/suicide attacks, terrorism and drones. It has international support for its use of drones as well as a foreign regional investor contributing conditional financial support. Conditional support relates to the targeting by the armed group of sites in a neighboring state that are of mutual interest to it and the foreign regional investor. It has a mix of predatory and defensive relationships with the host community and has institutionalized formal additional roles in the security sector, judiciary as well as through the war economy including the provision of social protection to some sections of the host community.

Refined:

on this descriptive categorization, the armed group is likely to be a hierarchically structured cellular organization with regional backing. It is socially and economically embedded. It has a divisive relationship with host communities and utilizes complex actions against host and non-host communities.

And reduced:

An armed group is a hierarchically structured entity, targeting host and non-host communities with backing from international actors. It is formally institutionalized in the territories under its control.

Any provisional categorisation should be triangulated with national and regional frameworks including domestic legislation and policy. It should be triangulated with the relevant modules of the IDDRS and with an UN designation such as a Security Council designation and the UN mandate. Information may then be utilised during planning and implementing (if such a mandate exists) or supporting DDR Processes in the given country.
### TABLE 6: THE CORE MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASPECT</th>
<th>RATIONALE (Why do we need to know this?)</th>
<th>SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK (Guide questions that should be augmented)</th>
<th>WHERE TO SOURCE THE INFORMATION (where can the data be acquired or through what means)</th>
<th>RELEVANCE TO DDR (where the information will be useful)</th>
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<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE</td>
<td>Knowing the general structure of the armed force or group supports accurate assessment of many different relevant aspects. This adapts the traditional approach to analysing the Order for Battle (traditionally, the hierarchical organization, command structure, disposition, strength and equipment). In the mainstream analysis of the Order of Battle the key aspects reviewed tended to be: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time and Equipment (SA-LUTE). Disposition (geographical locations) is dealt with in this matrix separate to the structural indicators.</td>
<td>Is the armed force or group structured as a hierarchy? Is the armed force or group structured as a network? Is the armed force or group structured as an alliance of different organisations? Is there a trans-organisational coordinating committee or structure for cooperation? • Is this structure robust, functional, ad hoc? • How does the armed force or group relate to other NSAGs in the network (hostile, tolerant, convenience)? Is the armed force or group structured on a cellular basis? Does the structure of the armed force or group change in response to external pressures? Is the armed force or group structured</td>
<td>Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Independent assessment based on field observation.</td>
<td>Understanding the structures of the armed force or group is important for understanding how the armed force or group maintains coherence, how the interface with DDR will be communicated and managed vis-à-vis the members and to identify the sub, mid and upper level commanders/figures of control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPECT</td>
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<td>so that there is a military branch and a political branch?</td>
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<td>• Does the military and political branches have shared objectives?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the command and control relationship between the two branches (does one have authority over the other, is there a unifying command structure?)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• How is military and political strategy decided?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• How do the strategies of the military and political branches correspond/relate?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Do key decision makers have roles in both the military and political command and control structures simultaneously /concurrently or not at all? What are these roles?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Who are the key Individuals in the armed force or group structure, their roles and biographies (see leadership below)?</td>
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</table>

**ASPECT:**
- Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards

**RATIONALE:**
- (Why do we need to know this?)

**SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK:**
- (Guide questions that should be augmented)

**WHERE TO SOURCE THE INFORMATION:**
- (where can the data be acquired or through what means)

**RELEVANCE TO DDR:**
- (where the information will be useful)
### ASPECT (Why do we need to know this?)

### RATIONALE (Guide questions that should be augmented)

### SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK (Guide questions that should be augmented)

### WHERE TO SOURCE THE INFORMATION (where can the data be acquired or through what means)

### RELEVANCE TO DDR (where the information will be useful)

| STRATEGY | Knowing the strategy of the armed force or group implies that one understands the objectives (ends), the means (the instruments to be employed by the armed force or group) and the tactics (the ways, the course of action). In this matrix objectives and tactics are discussed below. | Generally, what is the strategy (objectives, means and tactics)? What is the externally communicated strategy of the armed force or group? What is the internally communicated strategy (to members, supporters)? Where are the divergences between external and internal strategy and any other communication such as to external supporters? How has the strategy been developed and is it regularly revised? Who (within the armed force or group) drives the strategy? | Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Analysis of actions during active conflict, communications, and positioning. Open Source Intelligence Toolkits. | The strategy of an armed force or group at pre-DDR or during DDR complements the data collected on the structure. It is important as it reflects external and internal positioning, providing a full understanding of the objectives and tactics thus giving more data on how the armed force or group has pursued the strategy. |

**DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of how to engage the armed force or group in DDR Processes, Risk Management.**
<table>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>The objectives of an armed force or group are the ends/that towards which an armed force or group works. They may include overarching objectives such as political objectives, economic objectives and military objectives. Any identification of objectives should include obtaining an understanding of how different kinds of objectives interrelate and align under an overarching goal. Objectives are one part of the Strategy of an armed force or group. The others are the ways (course of action including tactics) plus the means (the instruments by which some objectives (ends) can be achieved).</td>
<td>What are the political objectives of the armed force or group and to whom and what territory do they relate? What are the military objectives of the armed force or group? What are the economic objectives of the armed force or group? How do the various categories of objectives interrelate? As part of these objectives are there additional long, medium and short term goals? Are these goals tied to geographic territory or other parameters (for example, to control a particular territory, to control passage).</td>
<td>Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Analysis of actions during active conflict, communications, and positioning. Geospatial mapping, Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.</td>
<td>To understand the progress the armed force or group has made towards the achievement of objectives and the extent to which it is wedded to achieving its objectives and how this may impact on planning DDR. To understand where entering a DDR processes may be of strategic value to the armed force or group.</td>
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**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of how to engage the armed force or group in DDR Processes, Risk Management.
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<td>OPERATIONS</td>
<td>The operational aspects of an armed force or group is the how, where and when of its campaigns. It includes the planning and conducting of military engagements and how they are sustained. It is closely tied to tactics particularly in hybrid conflict.</td>
<td>What are the operations of the armed force or group? Are all operations paused or cancelled? Does the armed force or group have the means to sustain or (if the case may be) resume operations? What impact has operations had on key stakeholders such as members, impacted communities, ethnic groups, international supports, foreign armed fighters, and others.</td>
<td>Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Systematic assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Analysis of actions during active conflict, communications, and positioning. Geospatial mapping. Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.</td>
<td>To understand where entering DDR processes may be of strategic value to the armed force or group. To understand the progress the armed force or group has made towards the achievement of objectives and the extent to which it is wedded to achieving its objectives and how this may impact on planning DDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS</td>
<td>The tactics of armed force or group can be highly diverse. The tactics of government (such as counter-guerrilla tactics) can have or exacerbate the negative impacts of armed force.</td>
<td>What action have been used by the armed force or group, with what resources, with support from what persons/organisation outside the armed force or group and against whom? For example,</td>
<td>Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior Systematic assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic</td>
<td>To understand the behaviour of the armed force or group. To flag legacy of tactics and any potential barriers presented</td>
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**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of how to engage the armed force or group in DDR Processes, Risk Management.
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<td>or group tactics on communities. Similarly contemporary tactics such as drones that were used to combat armed force or groups are now equally utilised by armed force or groups. In some situations armed force or groups can be more ‘tactical’ than strategic. This can indicate a possible lack of unified command, lack of political leadership and lack of strategy. Often tactics are linked to ideology such as where fundamental ideologies legitimise extreme brutality (public executions for example).</td>
<td>ambushe, raids, hit-and-run, drones, IEDs, suicide attacks, remote attacks, terrorism /brutalisation (see IDDRS 2.11 on The Legal Framework for UN DDR). Does the armed force or group act tactically rather than strategically? What impact has tactics had on key stakeholders such as members, impacted communities, ethnic groups, international supports, foreign armed fighters, and others.</td>
<td>assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Analysis of actions during active conflict, communications, and positioning. Geospatial mapping. Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.</td>
<td>DDR Component/ Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of how to engage the armed force or group in DDR Processes, CVR, CBR, Transitional Justice, Reconciliation and Reintegration design, Risk Management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>Ideology can have a significant role in attracting and retaining members. It may also dictate the kind of members (those driven by belief in a cause vs. those with radical ideological conviction for</td>
<td>What is the ideology of the armed force or group? How does the ideology of the armed force or group as it is externally communicated compare to what is communicated internally, to members?</td>
<td>Intelligence including military intelligence Testimony from former members including mid and senior Systematic assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the</td>
<td>Understand ideological dynamics between the armed force or group, members and conflict-affected communities.</td>
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<td>example) that make up part of an armed force or group.</td>
<td><strong>To what extent is ideology a driver of the armed force or group?</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>To what extent does ideology enable or legitimize violence by members?</strong></td>
<td>strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes.&lt;br&gt;Geospatial mapping.&lt;br&gt;Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.</td>
<td><strong>DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of how to engage the armed force or group in DDR Processes. Design of Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, CVR, and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISMs).</strong></td>
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| GEOGRAPHY | Geography includes territory under control by an armed force or group, territory under contestation and locations where members will be reintegrated or where other component of DDR processes will be implemented. If they control territory many armed force or groups do so only on a small scale. | **What territory is under armed force or group control/influence?**<br>**What is the nature of the control or influence?**<br>**What territory is neutral?**<br>**Are there governance and/or administration structures in territory under control?**<br>**Does the territory cross international borders?**<br>• Is it in multiple countries? | Intelligence including military intelligence.<br>Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels.<br>Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes<br>Geospatial mapping.<br>Open Source Intelligence Toolkits. | Understand the geographical areas of influence including areas where DDR activities will need to be implemented. |

|        | **Geospatial mapping.**<br>**Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.** | **Intelligence including military intelligence.**<br>**Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels.**<br>**Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes**<br>**Geospatial mapping.**<br>**Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.** | **DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, CVR, and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISMs), Risk Management** |  

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**Example** that make up part of an armed force or group. Ideology must be managed to align with the objective/cause of the armed force or group campaign. Failure to align ideology and objective/cause can result in some ideologically driven members challenging leadership, defecting or becoming potential spoilers to DDR.

**To what extent is ideology a driver of the armed force or group?**<br>**To what extent does ideology enable or legitimize violence by members?**

**What territory is under armed force or group control/influence?**<br>**What is the nature of the control or influence?**<br>**What territory is neutral?**<br>**Are there governance and/or administration structures in territory under control?**<br>**Does the territory cross international borders?**<br>• Is it in multiple countries?
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</table>
| LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND | Leadership can be difficult to ascertain in any given context. However, leadership will influence all the strategic engagements of the armed force or group including with DDR Processes. | **What structural characteristics does the armed force or group command have?**  
**How are mid-level and senior leadership chosen?**  
**Is there corruption in choosing mid-level and/or senior leadership?**  
**Is it focused on a particular leader?**  
**What is the biography of the leader(s) and/or the main senior commander?**  
**Is the organisation leaderless?**  
**Is the leadership embedded with combatants?**  
**Is the leadership in exile?** | **Intelligence including military intelligence.**  
**Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels.**  
**Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes.**  
**Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.** | **Understand leadership across all relevant vectors not just characteristics. This includes location, tensions, and corruption.**  

**DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, PI And CE, CVR, and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISMs), Risk Management.** |
| ADDITIONAL ROLES | Additional roles of the armed force or groups are important drivers of connections between members, communities and support bases. Armed forces or groups can have critical positions in the welfare economy, trade and in | **What additional roles does the armed force or group have in territories it controls or that are under its influence?**  
**Are these roles military, social, judicial or others?**  
- Have these roles involved establishing formal |  | **Better understanding the extent that armed force or group is embedded in communities, economies and other social, economic, political and security structures is critical when assessing the environment for DDR and for** |


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<td>the illicit war economy. All of these additional roles have far reaching implications for a variety of situational analyses, including the strategic assessment phase of DDR. It is critical to understand to what extent armed force or groups are facilitating access to social protection, justice and other mechanisms and how these roles are perceived by the communities in which they are implemented. Roles fulfilled by armed force or groups may have roots in the established roles of clans and tribes as well as historical relevance to how communities cope in times of stress.</td>
<td>• military, social and judicial structures such as courts and welfare systems that are under some form of centralised authority?  • Do these systems involve devolved responsibility (such as to local conflict actors)?  • Are these systems largely informal and not under any centralised oversight by the armed force or group or its command and control structures? To what extent are these roles reliant on the support or participation of other conflict actors? Are these roles embedded in the perceived traditional roles of clans and tribes as providers of protection, services, employment and social goods?</td>
<td>DDR programming and processes. Community surveys Service provision surveys. Economic analysis (trade and distribution of goods). Open Source Intelligence Toolkits.</td>
<td>designing many aspects of DDR programmes and processes. DDR should do no harm – including not unduly stress or disrupt the coping economy. Understanding the role of armed force or groups and linked conflict actors in providing various social services (and security) is critical to managing this risk.</td>
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<td>DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, CVR, and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISMs), Risk Management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP TO COMMUNITIES</td>
<td>Members, armed force or groups and Communities are interrelated in complex ways. Understanding the relationship of members to communities (communities of origin, communities affected by violence, communities of return/reintegration) can contribute to an understanding of armed force or group cohesiveness, internal control, strategy, tactics and roles. It can also inform the design and implementation of all DDR activities including the preparation of communities for CBR, peacebuilding and reintegration activities.</td>
<td>Is there contingency planning to ensure no harm is done if these roles are diminished during the implementation of DDR processes? What are they?</td>
<td>Intelligence. Anthropological, cultural and historical analysis. Political economy analysis. Community engagement. Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.</td>
<td>Understanding the basic relationship between armed force or group and communities should inform the design and implementation of all DDR activities including the preparation of communities for CBR, peacebuilding and reintegration activities.</td>
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</table>
| RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS TO ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS | Armed forces or groups can have complex ties to international actors and vice versa. International actors can be allies, supporters, source of finance and resources, enemies and brokers or combination of same. Armed forces and groups can be involved in exchange of skills and data with other armed forces and groups in other countries including those that may have apparently incompatible ideologies. | What/Who is the international actor?  
• Government?  
• Transnational organisation?  
• Armed groups?  
• Armed Forces?  
• Commercial Entity?  
• Other?  
What is the nature of the relationship?  
• Alliance?  
• Supportive (If so, in what way)?  
• Coercive? (If so, in what way)?  
• Enmity? (If so, in what way)?  
• Limiting?  
• Directive?  
At what levels in the armed force or group structure does the relationship exist? | Intelligence  
Political economy analysis  
Mapping of conflict actors | Understanding the basic relationship between armed forces and groups and international actors will inform the design and implementation of all DDR processes and may have particular relevance to the tracking of weapons and resources flows as well as understanding the role of the international community in the peacebuilding process.  

**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, PI and CE, CVR, and Risk Management, SPMs.
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<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>Armed groups may have official and unofficial connections to national government and national Armed Forces. Government can be ally, supporters, source of finance and resources, enemy and target for military actions. Similarly government via the AF can be a source of command and control of armed groups – overtly or covertly.</td>
<td>Are armed forces controlled by the national government? Do the armed groups have ties to national government? - Government? - Transnational organisation? - Armed groups? - Armed Forces? - Commercial Entity? - Other?</td>
<td>Intelligence - Political economy analysis - Mapping of conflict actors</td>
<td>Understanding the basic relationship between armed forces and groups and government can inform the design and implementation of all DDR processes and may have particular relevance to linkages with SSR</td>
</tr>
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**DDR Component/Activity: Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, PI and CE, CVR, and Risk Management, SPMs.**
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<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS</td>
<td>Armed forces and groups can be highly skilled in communications. A broad selection of media may be utilised and messaging may be tailored to both internal and external audiences.</td>
<td>How do the armed forces and groups communicate to its audiences? Who are these audiences? What means are utilised for communications (traditional, digital)? What is the core messaging? What is the identity of the armed force and armed groups as it is constructed in external communications and internal communications and how accurate are these two versions of the organisation? Will the armed forces and groups attempt to utilise communications strategically to discredit international actors including those involved in DDR?</td>
<td>Media and communications analysis. Open Source Intelligence Toolkits. Community surveys.</td>
<td>Support a consistent understanding of messaging. Improve targeted outreach to potential recruits. Plan for how the armed forces and armed groups will communicate participation in DDR to members and supporters. Understand means to reach defectors and members. Inform DDR sensitisation campaigns. Understand what messages must be countered/managed promptly.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### ASPECT  |  RATIONALE (Why do we need to know this?)  |  SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK (Guide questions that should be augmented)  |  WHERE TO SOURCE THE INFORMATION (where can the data be acquired or through what means)  |  RELEVANCE TO DDR (where the information will be useful)
---|---|---|---|---
FINANCES  |  Armed forces and armed groups can have diversified financing sources often highly integrated into official economies on national, regional and global scales. At DDR level it is important to understand the level of financing utilised to compensate members.  |  How is the armed force or group financed? Does it utilise any of the following (and if so to what extent):  
- Savings  
- Fundraising  
- Taxation  
- Profit-generating activities  
- Looting  
- Extractives  
- Investors (Domestic and Foreign)  
- Remittances  
- What is the value of that finance?  
- How are members compensated?  
- What are the ‘pay scales’?  
- What are the vested interests of key actors in the conflict economy?  
- How does financing tie with ideology and strategy?  
- If foreign finance is involved what is the relationship between the financer and the armed force or group?  
- Conditional?  
- Unconditional?  
- Financial + Other?  |  Intelligence including military intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Community engagement. Economic analysis (trade and distribution of goods).  |  At DDR level it is important to understand the level of financing utilised to compensate members particularly when designing compensation packages and reintegration supports. Conflict actors with vested interests in the conflict economy can pose spoiler threats to DDR. It is important to be aware of these dynamics and to plan to manage these risks accordingly.  

**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, ISMs, Risk Management.
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<tr>
<td>HISTORY/ CULTURAL IMPORTANCE</td>
<td>The historical and cultural significance of an armed forces and groups includes the extent to which it traces a lineage usually in opposition to an enemy or force that has persecuted the State or its community support base.</td>
<td>What are the historical narratives utilised by the them to construct its image or justify its strategy? To what extent do members and the community accept/support the historical aspects of the armed forces or group’s identity? Are armed forces and groups connected to particular groups through its historical narratives? If so what are they? What is the relevance to DDR and peacebuilding?</td>
<td>Intelligence. Anthropological, cultural and historical analysis. Political economy analysis. Community engagement. Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.</td>
<td>Understanding the historical and cultural significance (as well as the ideological and other aspects) can enhance how engagement with the armed forces and groups are framed and how engagement and communications with communities, patrons and conflict elite are managed.</td>
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</table>

*DDR Component/ Activity: Strategic Assessments, Reinsertion and Reintegration, activities, PI and CE, ISMs, Risk Management.*
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<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH CRIMINALITY</td>
<td>The conflict-crime nexus is an important area of focus in Peacebuilding. Caution should be exercised and assumptions avoided when examining the relationship of armed forces and groups to criminality. Due attention must be paid to the political economy of ‘criminalising’ groups and combatants. Assessments of criminality should be realistic and based in evidence.</td>
<td>Are the armed forces or groups directly involved in criminal activities (such as smuggling)? If so, specifically what activities, with what domestic and transnational partners? Are the armed forces or groups benefiting from criminality such as smuggling but not directly involved? How? If so, specifically from what activities is it benefiting and what domestic or transnational partners are engaged in the criminal acts. What are the factors limiting the armed forces and groups involvement in criminality?</td>
<td>Intelligence including military and police intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior levels. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Community engagement. Economic and financial analysis. Transnational analysis. Political economy and governance analysis. Rapid deep dives (border areas/neuralgic zones).</td>
<td>As an emerging focus in DDR the more information in the hands of DDR practitioners the better. This should help avoid basing judgement on assumptions. Rather emphasis should be on clearly identifying roles and issues and implications for designing DDR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This Armed Group Membership Sub-Matrix below is the first sub-matrix developed for the analysis of armed forces and groups. It is expected that more sub-matrices will be developed as learning is gathered from the review and use of this suite of analytical tools.

The Sub-Matrix sheds light on the nature of membership of the armed groups under the following headings:

- Overview.
- Recruitment and Management of Special Category Members.
- Support or Compensation Provided to the Membership.
- Loyalties.
- Motivations and Decisions.

As with the Core Matrix, the Armed Group Membership Sub-Matrix is read left to right, beginning with the aspect and including rationale, guide questions, potential data sources and the relevance this aspect has to DDR processes. When concluding a provisional categorization of the armed group the main conclusions from what the DDR practitioner identifies as key sections of the typology should be included to form a descriptive categorization.

The Armed Group Membership Sub-Matrix sheds light on the relationship of the armed group with its members as well as the more difficult to assess relationship of members with the armed group. This encapsulates an effort to better measure and understand the complex factors informing the motivation of armed group members as well as an effort to better rationalize why an armed group may attract and motivate different classifications of members. Essentially the sub-typology is an effort to view the armed group through the lens of membership and to begin to consider the varied biographical factors that influence members of armed groups to make the decisions they do. Consequently, the data collected through the application of the Sub-Matrix will have deep relevance for understanding the recruitment and retention strategies of the armed group. It will be relevant for tailoring DDR public information and community engagement and to designing ISMs and activities aiming to increase defections as well as the broader suite of activities under reinsertion and reintegration.
### TABLE 7: NSAG MEMBERSHIP SUB-MATRIX

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<tr>
<td>OVERVIEW</td>
<td>Ascertaining as accurate as possible overview of the membership of armed groups</td>
<td><strong>What is the size of the armed group(s) membership?</strong>&lt;br&gt;From where have the membership come?&lt;br&gt;How is the membership internally organised in the armed group(s) (command, structure, units, cellular, etc.?)?&lt;br&gt;What are the observable signs of discipline (professionalism in uniforms, saluting routines or imposed via violence or threats of violence)?&lt;br&gt;Are members separated from civilian life when active?&lt;br&gt;Are members embedded in communities when active?&lt;br&gt;Do members include families?&lt;br&gt;Do members include foreign fighters and/or mercenaries?&lt;br&gt;What is the proportion of membership that are female?</td>
<td>Intelligence including military and police intelligence.&lt;br&gt;Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.&lt;br&gt;Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes.</td>
<td>While more granular data will be gathered during profiling and preparation for demobilisation and disarmament it is useful to have an understanding of the core dynamics of the human capacity of armed groups. It can verify analysis of the armed group(s) (2.1 above) particularly ideology, structure, discipline, communications and relationship with communities.</td>
</tr>
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**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, PI and CE, CVR, and Risk Management.
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<tr>
<td>• Composition, roles and responsibilities.</td>
<td>Intelligence including military and police intelligence.</td>
<td>While more granular data will be gathered during profiling and preparation for demobilisation and disarmament it is useful to have an understanding of the core dynamics of the human capacity of armed groups. It can verify analysis of the armed group(s) (2.1 above) particularly ideology, structure, discipline, communications and relationship with communities.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the gendered needs and exceptions?</td>
<td>Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the proportion of membership that are children?</td>
<td>Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Composition, roles and responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there a commitment not to recruit further?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the needs and expectations?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the proportion of membership that are youth?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Composition, roles and responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Is there a process of release?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the youth-specific needs and expectations?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the proportion of membership that have disabilities?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Composition, roles and responsibilities</td>
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**ASRR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, PI and CE, CVR, and Risk Management.
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</table>
|        | • Is there a commitment not to recruit further?  
• What are the disability-specific needs and expectations? | How does the armed group(s) recruit members?  
What discourses are utilised?  
Religion? Ideology? Other?  
What tools are used? Social media? Recruiters? Other?  
What are the recruitment and management approaches to different categories of recruits, for example, domestic vs. foreign fighters? Ultra-radicals?  
Are any internal policies for managing cell/unit cohesion that manages groups like foreign fighters?  
Are recruitment forced, voluntary, both? For what categories?  
• Are children recruited? | Intelligence including military and police intelligence.  
Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.  
Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Community engagement.  
Open Source Intelligence Toolkits. | Delving into how and armed group(s) manages various categories of combatants can provide insight not only into the armed group(s) but also into the prospective case load for DDR and any legal, deportation or repatriation challenges with foreign armed fighters in the context of DDR.  
Provide insight into recruitment and recruitment channels.  

**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, PI and CE, CVR, and Risk Management.
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<tr>
<td>SUPPORT OR COMPENSATION PROVIDED TO THE MEMBERSHIP</td>
<td>From what communities do recruits originate? Does recruitment target overseas volunteers? What are the communication channels (or personnel) used for recruitment?</td>
<td>How does the group compensate/support members? • Food • Weapons • Medical Care • Financial • Other?</td>
<td>Intelligence including military and police intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior members, Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes, Community engagement.</td>
<td>Understanding compensation and supports given to members can help inform the design of economic and other supports (including extension to the families of combatants in DDR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOYALTIES</td>
<td>The loyalties of members of armed groups can lie to them, to particular leaders, to other conflict</td>
<td>Are the members loyal to the armed group? Are the members loyal to particular leaders in the group?</td>
<td>Intelligence. Testimony from former members including mid and senior members</td>
<td>Member loyalty can impact on a range of DDR objectives including preventing re-recruitment. It is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASPECT:** Level 3 Structures and Processes

**RATIONALE** (Why do we need to know this?)

- Integrated Assessments for DDR

**THE QUESTIONS TO ASK**

- From what communities do recruits originate?
- Does recruitment target overseas volunteers?
- What are the communication channels (or personnel) used for recruitment?

**WHERE TO SOURCE THE INFORMATION** (where can the data be acquired or through what means)

- Intelligence including military and police intelligence.
- Testimony from former members including mid and senior members.
- Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes.
- Community engagement.

**RELEVANCE TO DDR PROCESS** (where the information will be useful)

- Understanding compensation and supports given to members can help inform the design of economic and other supports (including extension to the families of combatants in DDR).

**DDR Component/Activity:** Strategic Assessments, Design of Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reinsertion and Reintegration activities.

**LOYALTIES**

- The loyalties of members of armed groups can lie to them, to particular leaders, to other conflict.
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<tr>
<td>Actors outside the group</td>
<td>It is important to understand loyalties when joint DDR-SSR strategies are being proposed such as incorporation of armed group(s) in the AFs.</td>
<td>Are the members loyal to other authorities, conflict actors or prominent clan/tribal figures?</td>
<td>Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Profiling (DDR).</td>
<td>Important for DDR-SSR interfaces where NSAGs are to be absorbed into AFs – a process that can be significantly compromised by loyalties to conflict actors outside the regular armed forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MOTIVATIONS AND DECISIONS**

The motivations and the decisions made by members of NSAGs can provide insight for the design on DDR, and the management of risk/potential spoilers. It may also contribute to tailoring communications directed at combatants to encourage defection, spontaneous demobilisation.

- What motivated the membership to take up arms?
- What motivated the membership to join a particular NSAG?
- What has driven the decision of members to remain with the NSAG?
- What has driven the decision of defectors/those who have spontaneously demobilised to leave the NSAG?

Testimony from former members including mid and senior members. Independent assessment prior to the design of DDR as part of the strategic assessment phase of planning DDR programming and processes. Community engagement. Profiling (DDR).

Understanding the motivations and decision making of members can assist the design on sensitisation campaigns (PI and CE) and inform the design and implementation of reinsertion/reintegration to better address the drivers of decision making and promote resilience (where possible).
1.1.2 Peace, conflict and security analysis or conflict and security analysis for sustaining peace
Conflict analysis provides insights into the causes and consequences of violent conflict, the dynamics supporting or undermining peace efforts, and the needs and interests of diverse stakeholders. It provides a solid framework to engage with both volatile political situations where a conflict prevention lens is required and post-conflict settings where the consolidation of peace is the priority.

In mission context, strategic assessment: a form of integrated assessment with the specific aim of identifying key challenges, strategies and options for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation priorities, as well as proposals for United Nations (re)configuration in a given context. Strategic Assessments should be undertaken whenever there is a need to formulate (or reformulate) the UN’s strategy for engagement on peace consolidation priorities in a particular country. Several factors trigger it, including a dramatic change in the conflict or post-conflict crisis situation, and/or significant progress towards peacebuilding objectives. Strategic Assessments may also be undertaken as part of a broader United Nations transition triggered by a surge, drawdown or withdrawal of a Security Council mandated presence, in order to determine the most appropriate configuration for a follow-on United Nations presence. To this end, the Strategic Assessment is designed to:

a. Present a shared analysis of the conflict situation including its key factors and dynamics including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios, gender dimensions of the conflict and risks;
b. Identify the main priority objectives to address those key factors;
c. Identify the strategic options for the United Nations in order to respond to the situation on the ground (and potentially revisit the United Nations configuration);
d. A risk assessment for each strategic option, with references to challenges and potential risks to affected populations and United Nations partners.

The IAP handbook includes templates for ToRs and report for the strategic assessments.
Endnotes

1 United Nations, Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning approved by the Secretary General on 9 April 2013, Definitions, para 28, p. 6.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, para 33, pp. 6-7.
4 Ibid, para 33, pp. 6-7.
NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on this page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: http://www.unddr.org.

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