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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in response to the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/72/19, para. 206), in which the Special Committee requested a comprehensive review of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The present report provides an overview of United Nations engagement in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the field and at headquarters. It highlights the evolution of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in response to changes in the armed conflict landscape. Over the past five years, members of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration have provided support in contexts in which peace agreements are absent more often than in contexts in which peace agreements have been signed. While disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes remain essential to peacebuilding, other related tools, including community violence reduction and transitional weapons and ammunition management, have grown in importance. Support for the reintegration of former members of armed forces and groups is also provided along the entire peace continuum, not only in post-conflict contexts. These changes have been codified in the recently updated Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. The changes made to the Standards, including the revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, are outlined in the present report.
The report includes several recommendations to Member States on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in mission and non-mission contexts, including recommendations on local and regional dynamics, prevention of recruitment and re-recruitment, creation of enabling environments for reintegreation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support for mediation, and linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, climate change, transitional justice, organized crime and criminal justice. The report also includes specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration recommendations related to children, young people, women and persons with disabilities, as well as mental health and pandemics, and the actions to be taken by the Inter-Agency Working Group.
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I. Introduction

1. The previous report of the Secretary-General on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (A/65/741) was issued on 21 March 2011. In 2018, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested that the Secretariat conduct a comprehensive review of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and report back to it (A/72/19, para. 206). Given that it has been 10 years since the previous report and that Member States, through the Special Committee, have called for an update, the present report provides Member States with a review of the evolving nature of conflict and changing efforts in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

2. The global landscape of armed conflict has changed over the past decade. Armed conflicts have become increasingly protracted, and, in many conflict-affected countries, peace agreements are precarious or absent. Armed groups are increasingly fragmented, continuously proliferating as they identify new objectives, develop new capabilities and acquire new recruits. At the same time, localized violence between armed groups is often as pervasive as armed violence directed against central Governments. Some armed groups also have links to transnational organized crime and/or terrorism.

3. Because the very nature of armed groups has evolved, and their behaviour along with it, the United Nations has adapted its approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was synonymous with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, such as those in El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique. The programmes were sequenced and typically implemented in post-conflict contexts in which a peace agreement had been signed between national Governments and armed groups and a United Nations peacekeeping mission had been deployed. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as United Nations peacekeeping mandates began to expand, the United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration also broadened. Rather than focusing only on combatants in military structures, the approach began to focus on communities affected by armed violence. The shift from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to a community violence reduction approach in Haiti pursuant to Security Council resolution 1702 (2006) triggered a rethinking of such programmes across the United Nations system. At the same time, as it became increasingly linked with political negotiations, successful ceasefires and broader peace mediation and confidence-building efforts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was no longer perceived as merely an operational and technical exercise contributing to the implementation of peace agreements. Instead, it became widely acknowledged as a process that influences, and is influenced by, political dynamics.

4. Today, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes implemented after the signing of peace agreements remain an integral part of peacebuilding efforts, because they aim to address security problems that arise when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development. However, owing to the changing nature of armed conflict, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has also become synonymous with a much broader cluster of activities. While the mandates of four peacekeeping missions – the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan – initially focused on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, they
have increasingly included references, over the past decade, to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools, community violence reduction and transitional weapons and ammunition management (see figure I).

Figure I
References to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction and transitional weapons and ammunition management in Security Council mandates

Note: Based on data provided in the annex to the present report.

5. Security Council mandates on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have also integrated language explicitly related to gender (see figure II). For example, pursuant to its resolution 2531 (2020), the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSMA would include as priority tasks supporting the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups and the continued implementation of a community violence reduction programme, taking into account the particular needs of women and children. Similarly, in its resolution 2448 (2018), the Council urged the Central African Republic authorities to address the presence and activity of armed groups by implementing a comprehensive strategy that prioritizes dialogue and the urgent implementation of inclusive, gender-sensitive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

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1 For a definition of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools, see section III of the present report.

2 The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been mandated to support community violence reduction since 2014 (Security Council resolution 2164 (2014)) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan has been mandated to do so since 2019 (resolution 2459 (2019)). Community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management were first included in the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in 2014 (resolution 2149 (2014)) and in the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2017 (resolution 2348 (2017)).

3 Security Council resolution 2531 (2020), para. 28 (a) (iii). See also, for example, resolution 2612 (2021), para. 29 (ii) (g) and (i).
6. Today, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are no longer implemented exclusively in post-conflict contexts. Instead, they traverse the entire peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, to peacebuilding and sustainable development. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools, such as community violence reduction, are often implemented in countries where armed conflict is ongoing. Similarly, individuals who leave armed groups are provided with reintegration support irrespective of the presence or absence of a peace agreement. These disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in the context of ongoing conflict are as important as programmes delivered in post-conflict contexts, as they enable national authorities to pursue disarmament, demobilization and reintegration objectives even in the absence of the preconditions for the delivery of programmes (see sect. III). In contexts without peace agreements, for example, the aim of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is to contribute to stabilization, to make the return of stability more tangible and to establish environments conducive to local and national peace processes. As illustrated in figure III, over the past five years, the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration members have provided support in contexts in which peace agreements are absent more often than in contexts in which peace agreements have been signed.

**Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**

The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration was established by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security in 2005 and is mandated to work on improving the Organization’s performance in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In 2006, 15 departments, agencies, funds and programmes were represented in the Inter-Agency Working Group. Today, the Group has grown to include 27 members.

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4 The list of Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration members is available at [www.unddr.org/the-iawg/](http://www.unddr.org/the-iawg/).
7. Furthermore, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is no longer implemented only in contexts in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation is present. The United Nations has also supported disarmament, demobilization and reintegration through its special political missions, such as those in the Sudan and Haiti. In its resolution 2524 (2020), adopted on 3 June 2020, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) as a special political mission with a broader mandate than its predecessor, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In Haiti, after 15 years of peacekeeping missions (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)), there was a transition to a special political mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), which began work on 16 October 2019. As outlined in resolutions 2476 (2019) and 2579 (2021), respectively, BINUH is a special political mission mandated to support community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management, while UNITAMS is mandated to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction and transitional weapons and ammunition management. Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has also continued through special political missions in Colombia (United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia), the Great Lakes region (Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region), Iraq (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), Libya (United Nations Support Mission in Libya), Somalia (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and Yemen (Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen), as well as through the United Nations Office to the African Union. In special political mission settings, much like peacekeeping settings, the provision of support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration through an integrated approach with the United Nations country teams, underpinned by country-level coordination mechanisms, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration inter-agency groups and task forces, is key.
8. During the past five years, the Inter-Agency Working Group members, through United Nations country teams, have also supported national Governments to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes in contexts without United Nations peace operations, such as in Cameroon, Mozambique, the Philippines, the Congo and Rwanda.

II. Review of United Nations engagement in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

A. In the field

9. The present section is informed by analysis of progress and trends and is based on data provided by members of the Inter-Agency Working Group. It demonstrates the breadth of activities that members have supported in recent years and illustrates the diversity of potential programmatic and sectoral entry points for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes

10. Over the past five years, the United Nations has continued to support regionally and nationally led disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes implemented after the signing of peace agreements. In Sudan, between 2015 and 2017, the Sudan national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNAMID to disarm and reintegrate 3,000 former combatants in Darfur. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA and the World Bank supported the implementation of the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme, while UNDP focused on community-based reintegration support. From the official launch of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme in December 2018 to December 2020, 2,532 combatants were disarmed and demobilized, including 143 women. In Mali, MINUSMA supported the Government of Mali to undertake the accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of signatory armed groups and compliant armed groups in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in November 2018, April 2019 and June 2020. Between 2016 and 2020, MONUSCO, together with the World Bank, supported the national Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to disarm and demobilize 1,897 members of armed groups (1,843 men and 54 women). During the same period, MONUSCO also supported the Government to disarm, demobilize, repatriate and resettle 2,371 members of foreign armed groups and their dependants.

11. In non-mission settings, through Peacebuilding Fund support, UNDP and UN-Women have, since 2019, supported the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission to reintegrate 1,635 individuals repatriated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including 554 ex-combatants (553 men and 1 woman), 249 women dependants and 832 children (412 boys and 420 girls). In the Philippines, since 2017, UNDP has supported the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (which, in 2021, became the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity) in the decommissioning of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front through a project on support for peacebuilding and normalization, in close collaboration with the independent decommissioning body and the joint peace and security teams.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools

12. Members of the Inter-Agency Working Group have also supported disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools in a variety of contexts. Between 2016 and 2021, for example, MONUSCO supported local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement community violence reduction projects for 34,874 participants (including 13,570 women). In the Central African Republic in 2017/18, MINUSCA, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) supported community violence reduction programmes for 14,338 community members, including former members of armed groups who were ineligible for the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. In 2016, MINUSCA and UNOPS also supported members of armed groups, including women ex-combatants, who were willing to disarm as part of a preparatory programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In Iraq, beginning in 2019, IOM supported efforts to reduce violence in communities by providing support to 1,000 community members, including former members of armed groups who had fought against Da'esh. From 2014 to 2020, UNDP supported the Sudan national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission to implement a community security and stabilization programme in six states bordering South Sudan.

13. In addition, members of the Inter-Agency Working Group have supported weapons and ammunition management, which can be used as a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tool to strengthen the oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure material acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal. Between 2016 and 2020, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducted weapons and ammunition management baseline studies in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria. In addition, and as a follow-up to a technical assessment mission on weapons and ammunition management deployed to Haiti in 2019, the Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs collaborated with BINUH, UNDP, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and UNIDIR to support Haiti in the establishment of a comprehensive arms control framework. Furthermore, the Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in collaboration with UNIDIR, facilitated a study on weapons and ammunition dynamics in the Sudan to support the beginning of UNITAMS operations in 2020.

14. Owing to the political nature of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, its practitioners have also been engaged in mediation efforts, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, the Philippines, the Congo and the Sudan. In addition, UNOPS provided support to the development of peace agreements (with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) in Yemen from 2015 to 2020.

Support for reintegration

15. In addition to being supported as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, reintegration has been supported when such programmes are not in place. For example, in 2018 and 2019, IOM supported the Government of Mozambique to provide reintegration support to former members of Mozambique National Resistance. During the same time period, UNDP and UNFPA, with financial support from the Peacebuilding Fund, supported the Government of the Congo in the reintegration of former Ninja combatants, their family members and other community
members in the Pool region. In addition, UNDP, IOM and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, through the Peacebuilding Fund, are currently supporting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide reintegration assistance to individuals who spontaneously demobilize in Kasai and Tanganyika. Since 2019, UNDP has been supporting community security and reintegration for former volunteer fighters who fought against Da’esh in Iraq.

16. Support has also been provided to national Governments dealing with former members of armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, beyond disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Department of Peace Operations, IOM, UNDP, the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have provided support in the Lake Chad basin, contributing to the implementation of the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region, drafted in 2018. In addition, IOM, UNDP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), together with the European Union, are supporting the reintegration of former members of Boko Haram and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force. IOM has also supported the Federal Government of Somalia in the implementation of projects for the return of former members of Al-Shabaab, including programmes specifically focused on women. Lastly, building on the work of the Funding Facility for Stabilization, UNDP is supporting community-based reconciliation and reintegration in Iraq for displaced persons, including families perceived by the population to be associated with Da’esh because their family members joined Da’esh or because they lived in territory controlled by Da’esh.

Cross-cutting issues

Gender

17. Many disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts have also included an explicit gender component. For example, UN-Women, together with UNDP and UNICEF, supported the Government of Colombia in the provision of gender-inclusive support for the socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) and their families, as well as grass-roots communities. The programme ensured the participation of women in productive projects. In 2019, IOM supported the Government in training former FARC-EP members (137 women, 103 men) and men and women community members on gender equality, the empowerment of women and the prevention of gender-based violence. In addition, UNDP and UNICEF supported the Government of the Central African Republic to socially and economically reintegrate adolescents associated with the anti-balaka and Séléka armed groups, including by providing support for the empowerment of vulnerable girls and women, in particular those who are survivors of gender-based violence.

Children

18. Much work has continued to focus on the release and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups and on the prevention of child recruitment. Between 2016 and 2020, UNICEF supported national Governments in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, among others. In Mali, UNICEF provided protection services and psychosocial support to 593 children (49 girls and 544 boys) in four transit and orientation centres between July 2017 and March 2020. Between 2016 and 2017, UNDP, in collaboration with UNICEF, UN-Women and the World Food Programme, supported the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the community reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups. The programme provided support to 748 children formerly associated with
armed forces and groups and other vulnerable children, 748 households (approximately 6,000 people) and 13,000 schoolchildren in North Kivu Province. Overall, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between 2016 and 2020, UNICEF provided socioeconomic reintegration support to 8,855 children formerly associated with armed forces or groups. Lastly, in 2019 and 2020, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research worked with the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia in San José del Guaviare to bring together the children of former FARC-EP members and civilian community members.

**Young people**

19. In accordance with the youth and peace and security agenda, young people have also featured prominently in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts over the past five years. Since 2016, young people have been included in United Nations-supported community reintegration programmes (in Colombia, the Central African Republic, Iraq, the Congo and the Sudan) and in community violence reduction programmes (in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali, the Congo and the Sudan). Community violence reduction has increasingly become a key tool in addressing the risk of recruitment of young people. Initially mandated in peacekeeping contexts, it was subsequently mandated in special political missions and is now also implemented in non-mission settings, such as the Congo. Between 2017 and 2019, IOM supported the Government of Colombia to implement a programme specifically focused on improving the digital employability of young people in order to prevent future association with new forms of urban violence.

**Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) response**

20. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted linkages between peace and security, peacebuilding, social cohesion and health. The onset of the pandemic in early 2020 significantly disrupted the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes experienced delays, and although MINUSMA, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNAMID continued to implement community violence reduction programmes, they faced significant restrictions in doing so, including protocols to prevent the transmission of the virus, restricted freedom of movement of personnel and limited monitoring of projects. For MONUSCO, which is mandated to support disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement, restrictions on travel between the countries of the Great Lakes region substantially hampered the repatriation and resettlement of demobilized members of armed groups.

21. To address these challenges, guided by the COVID-19 rapid self-assessment tool developed by the Inter-Agency Working Group, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners: (a) carried out programme criticality analyses, to determine operational and strategic priorities; (b) staggered disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, focusing on weapons collection; (c) stepped up political and good offices functions when operations were infeasible; and (d) took measures to ensure that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and personnel did not become vectors of transmission. Such processes were also repurposed to support the efforts of national Governments to fight the pandemic. In the Central African Republic and Mali, these efforts included the sensitization of conflict-affected communities. Through the repurposing of community violence reduction activities, by MINUSCA and MINUSMA in particular, former members of armed groups participated in the production of personal protective equipment, such as masks, and in building critical health and sanitation infrastructure, such as water wells and isolation centres. Similar initiatives were also undertaken as part of ongoing
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes by United Nations country teams and lead agencies, funds and programmes in non-mission settings.

B. At headquarters

22. At headquarters, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict continued to monitor and report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the recruitment and use of children by parties to conflict. She also continued to advocate the unconditional and immediate release of children from armed forces and groups and the prevention of child recruitment and use. In September 2018, UNICEF and the Special Representative launched the Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers to generate new thinking and action on ways to sustainably support reintegration programmes for children. In addition, the Department of Global Communications continued to support the public information components of field-based operations engaged in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa continued to advocate peace, security and sustainable development in Africa, including as part of the Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative of the African Union. The Office also convened the virtual Africa Dialogue Series on the theme “COVID-19 and silencing the guns in Africa: challenges and opportunities” in May 2020.

23. With the reform of the United Nations peace and security architecture, which came into effect on 1 January 2019, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peace Operations/Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions is now a system-wide service provider. Over the past five years, the Department of Peace Operations has provided technical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration assistance in non-mission settings, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, the Congo, Sierra Leone and Thailand, working in close collaboration with resident coordinators and members of the United Nations country teams. Support has also been provided to special political missions working at the regional level, such as the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. Regional engagements included Department of Peace Operations and UNDP support for the review of the European Union disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy. The Department of Peace Operations, the World Bank and the United Nations Office to the African Union also provided technical assistance to Member States, regional economic communities and peace support operations as part of the African Union disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity programme. Furthermore, in 2016, the Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs initiated a joint project on effective weapons and ammunition management in changing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration contexts. The project provides expert resources and guidance, training and technical assistance to practitioners in the design and implementation of disarmament operations and transitional weapons and ammunition management activities linked to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction programmes.

24. The Department of Peace Operations and UNDP also continued to co-chair the Inter-Agency Working Group, charged with policy development and the provision of integrated technical support to Member States. In 2017, the Inter-Agency Working Group took the decision to review the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. Introduced in the 2006 report of the Secretary-General on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (A/60/705), the Standards are a repository of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all relevant United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes. The rationale for the initial development of the Standards in 2006 was to address the previously fragmented
United Nations approach, which resulted in poorly planned resource mobilization activities and the duplication of administrative structures (ibid., para. 58). The Standards are designed to help practitioners to better plan, develop, implement and monitor disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes (as defined in sect. III of the present report) in both mission and non-mission settings, and are divided into 6 levels comprising 36 modules. A range of NGOs, regional organizations (including the African Union and the European Union), national commissions, independent researchers, academic institutions, training institutions and international organizations have provided inputs to the revision of existing modules and the development of new ones. Level two of the Standards, which outlines the revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, was officially adopted by the senior managers of all Inter-Agency Working Group members during high-level events held simultaneously in New York and Geneva on 19 November 2019.

III. Revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

25. In the United Nations revised approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, outlined in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration recognizes that, at its core, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. However, it also acknowledges that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes can contribute to stabilization efforts and to creating an environment in which a peace process, political and social reconciliation, access to livelihoods and decent work and sustainable development can take root. Such processes do not include all ongoing stabilization and recovery measures, but only those that respond to the presence of active and/or former members of armed forces and groups.

26. The revised United Nations approach also reframes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration under the sustaining peace approach and as a contributor to broader efforts to operationalize the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. In this approach, manifested in the General Assembly and Security Council twin resolutions on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, the Assembly and the Council recognize the need for the United Nations as a whole to work across the entire peace continuum. The implications of this are particularly important for the provision of reintegration support to former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups. This is because, under the sustaining peace approach, reintegration support can be provided not only in post-conflict contexts but also when armed conflict is ongoing. The revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is also very much in line with the priorities of Our Common Agenda (A/75/982) and the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

27. In view of the changes in the contexts in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration takes place, it appears timely to review current definitions of these processes, as stated by the Secretary-General in his note of 27 May 2005 to the General Assembly (A/C.5/59/31). The following definitions have been adopted by the United Nations entities through the Executive Committee.

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5 General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016), reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 75/201 and Security Council resolution 2558 (2020).
28. **Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes** are multi-stakeholder efforts comprising different, interlinked combinations of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools and reintegration support. They are part of the United Nations system multidimensional approach, which contributes to the entire peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, to peacebuilding and development.

29. **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes** consist of a set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with common results frameworks. Such programmes are viable only when certain preconditions are in place:

   (a) The signing of a negotiated ceasefire and/or peace agreement that provides a framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;

   (b) Trust in the peace process;

   (c) Willingness of the parties to the armed conflict to engage in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;

   (d) A minimum guarantee of security.

30. They must be part of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as follows:

   (a) **Disarmament.** Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives voluntarily handed over by combatants, persons associated with armed forces and groups, and sometimes also the civilian population. The aim of disarmament is to reduce the number of illicit arms, ammunition and explosives in circulation and/or prevent their diversion to unauthorized users.

   (b) **Demobilization.** Demobilization is the separation of members of armed forces and groups from military command and control structures and their transition to civilian status. The first stage of demobilization includes the formal and controlled discharge of members of armed forces and groups at designated sites. A peace agreement provides the political, policy and operational framework for demobilization and may be accompanied by a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy document. When the preconditions for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme do not exist, the transition from combatant to civilian status can be facilitated and formalized through different approaches by national authorities.

   (c) **Reinsertion, the second stage of demobilization.** Reinsertion is transitional assistance offered for a period of up to one year and prior to reintegration support. Reinsertion assistance is offered to combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups who have been formally demobilized.

   (d) **Reintegration.** Reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups transition sustainably to live as civilian members of society in communities of their choice. Reintegration takes place at the individual, family and community levels and has social, psychosocial, economic, political and security dimensions. Reintegration processes are part of local, national and regional recovery and development, with the international community playing a supporting role if requested. Where appropriate, dependants and host-community members may be provided with reintegration support.

31. When the preconditions for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are not in place, support for reintegration may still be provided to those
leaving active armed forces and groups. In this case, the definition of reintegration stated above still applies. This support may complement broader security sector reform or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools.

32. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools are immediate and targeted measures. They include pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional weapons and ammunition management, community violence reduction, initiatives to prevent individuals from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support for mediation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support for transitional security arrangements. The specific aims of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools vary according to the context and can contribute to broader political and peacebuilding efforts in line with Security Council and General Assembly mandates and broader strategic frameworks, such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, the humanitarian response plan and/or the integrated strategic framework.

33. The different options for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners, which vary according to whether the preconditions for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are in place, are illustrated in the figure. It should be noted that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners should always encourage the release and reintegration of children without precondition. A number of key principles also underpin the United Nations revised approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These are outlined in detail in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

**Menu of options for the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process**

![Diagram showing menu of options for integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process]

**IV. Challenges and recommendations**

34. Given the changing nature of armed conflict and the evolving nature of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, there appear several current and future challenges, as set out below.

**Special political missions and non-mission settings**

35. A major challenge is linked to the fact that, in recent years, the United Nations has increasingly been called upon to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes in non-peacekeeping settings. In recent years, some
peacekeeping operations transitioned to special political missions and more requests for support have arrived from non-mission settings. This reflects the link between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and larger peacebuilding and development goals, in particular as reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals. Despite the increase in requests from non-peacekeeping settings, the challenge that the United Nations faces is the lack of funding and capacity in these settings to engage in adequate and necessary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. I therefore encourage Member States to ensure that adequate capacity and resources are directed to address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related requests from special political missions and non-mission settings.

36. The transition of a peacekeeping mission to a special political mission, while a positive signal of progress on the host country’s pathway to sustainable peace and development, may bring challenges for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. During transition settings – which are already complex political processes, involving a substantial reconfiguration of the United Nations presence, strategy and footprint in a country – mission closures can lead to a loss of political leverage and waning attention from the international community. When mission closures and transitions coincide with shrinking and less predictable aid flows, major achievements in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are at risk of being lost. I therefore encourage Member States to ensure that political attention on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is maintained until the reintegration of former members of armed forces and groups is sustainably established.

Local, national and regional dynamics

37. Another challenge that the United Nations faces when supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is that the drivers of conflict stem from various levels. Local agendas – at the level of the individual, family, clan, municipality, community, district or ethnic group – can at least partly drive the continuation of armed violence. National-level peace agreements do not always address local-level violence. Likewise, local-level disarmament, demobilization and reintegration interventions such as community violence reduction may not always create conditions conducive to national-level peace processes. Furthermore, regional dimensions and causes of conflict and the political, social and economic interrelationships among neighbouring States sharing insecure borders also present challenges for the planning, design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, including challenges related to repatriation and the cross-border movement of weapons and ammunition.

38. Where appropriate, I urge support from Member States including through regional organizations and other intergovernmental bodies for the negotiation and implementation of local peace agreements in addition to national agreements, such as local non-aggression pacts, deals regarding access to specific areas (herders-farmers, exploitation of natural resources), ceasefires and gun-free zones and community violence reduction agreements.

39. Furthermore, I encourage Member States engaged in mediation efforts alongside the United Nations to include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration experts in mediation teams working towards the negotiation of peace agreements (both national and local). Such experts play a critical role in mediation efforts, including at the local level and between armed groups. They engage in efforts that assist in building trust and confidence. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is therefore not merely a technical tool but a political one as well.

40. Finally, I call on Member States to ensure that linkages between the national, local and regional levels are addressed, including through the
formulation of multi-level strategies and regional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandates. Further exploration of the use of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related tools, and how these tools may generate conditions conducive to local- and/or national-level peace processes, warrants further attention in this regard.

Ongoing armed conflict

41. In contexts of ongoing armed conflict, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners must contend with complexities marked by proliferation of armed groups, their fragmentation, splintering and changes in allegiance. In these contexts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners are also increasingly confronted with the need to address ongoing recruitment by armed groups. Prevention is a cornerstone of all United Nations efforts. Providing support only to those leaving armed groups in a bid to prevent re-recruitment, while neglecting those who continue to join, has often meant that the overall impact of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is undermined. In these contexts, the United Nations is committed to continuing to ensure that prevention is at the forefront of our responses and that great care is taken to ensure that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration benefits do not incentivize first-time recruitment. In this regard, I urge Member States to further explore and support the use of community violence reduction and reintegration support to prevent recruitment and re-recruitment.

42. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations may take place in contexts of ongoing armed conflict, where armed groups are designated as terrorist organizations either by the host Member State, donor States or regional organizations, or by the Security Council. These designations often come with legal proscriptions related to engagement and the provision of support. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners need to be aware of how these proscriptions impact their work and should be mindful of the other complementary frameworks addressing groups listed as terrorist organizations by the United Nations, including prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration, which is implemented in accordance with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, relevant Security Council resolutions and relevant international instruments related to counter-terrorism. The international counter-terrorism framework and strategies to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism must be implemented in the case of terrorism designation through prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration, as well as the commission of acts of terrorism by armed groups or its members participating in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes in compliance with other relevant international standards, in particular international humanitarian law, international refugee law and international human rights law.

Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes

43. The importance of seamlessly linking the disarmament and demobilization components with the reintegration component of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes has long been recognized by national and international actors. However, as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is now associated with a cluster of different activities (e.g., community violence reduction, transitional weapons and ammunition management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, reintegration, etc.), coordination between the different entities working on the different components of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is even more essential. To this end, I encourage Member States to actively ensure that, to the extent possible, different but related disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-activities in the same
country context are aligned. This can be facilitated by harmonized and clear public information and strategic communication campaigns. I also recommend that Member States promote and support joint planning and assessments between different entities engaged in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In addition, to ensure that a common language is spoken between different disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners, I have presented in section III of this report the revised definitions of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration that were adopted by United Nations entities through the Executive Committee and are being used by the entities. I also ask Member States to support the members of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training Group in their efforts to provide further training on the revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in order to ensure that the new approach is sufficiently socialized.

44. Experience has shown that armed groups are often reluctant to disarm because they believe that, if the other side reneges on the peace agreement, they are vulnerable to attack. This may lead to considerable delays in the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. I am committed to enhancing the use of transitional weapons and ammunition management within disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and encourage Member States to further examine how transitional weapons and ammunition management may be used as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to overcome implementation delays related to the reluctance to disarm. I also encourage Member States to explore how transitional weapons and ammunition management may be streamlined into their national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, including their national community violence reduction strategies and activities, as well as community-based reintegration approaches.

45. Community violence reduction has benefited many communities in various contexts such as the Central African Republic, Haiti and Mali. This notwithstanding, when short-term community violence reduction programmes are used to prevent first-time recruitment, or as a form of reinsertion for former members of armed forces and groups, a particular challenge is ensuring that community violence reduction is linked to longer-term reintegration support, or other recovery and development programmes. If this linkage is not made, recruitment and/or re-recruitment may begin as soon as community violence reduction ends. In order to build towards sustainable peace, I encourage Member States to explore and strengthen the linkages between short-term community violence reduction programmes, reintegration support and longer-term recovery and development programmes.

46. As outlined in the previous report of the Secretary-General on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (A/65/741), support for the social, political and economic reintegration of former members of armed forces and groups poses particular challenges. The reintegration of former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups is a long-term activity and linkages to long-term development plans are critical. In conflict-affected countries, however, governance institutions are often weak, and economies may barely function, in particular if the conflict has been protracted. As protracted conflict is increasingly common, reintegration back into civilian life may be particularly difficult in the future, especially for individuals who have spent many years of their life in armed groups. This difficulty may be compounded by the fact that funding for reintegration programmes lasting three years, as recommended in the previous report, remains difficult to obtain (ibid., para. 26).

47. Armed conflict has severe implications for the delivery of essential public services and the availability of paid employment and the quality of jobs available. Furthermore, vocational training as part of a reintegration programme is successful
only if linked to broader programmes to generate decent employment, including private sector development. I therefore encourage Member States to create enabling environments for reintegration, in particular in settings of protracted armed conflict. This includes support for policies that encourage the use of local labour and goods in infrastructure development and maintenance; national policies supporting labour intensive work; strengthened partnerships with international financial institutions; and renewing and supporting national policies and legislation, including the formalization of informal economic sectors, to create an enabling environment for the national and international private sector and small and medium-sized enterprise development in rural and urban areas, including incentives for local companies to hire former members of armed forces and groups and promotion of financial inclusion.

48. Monitoring and evaluation is critical to assess the impact of the revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Initiatives such as the initiative on managing exits from armed conflicts, supported by United Nations entities, have the potential to be scaled up to systematize tools and demonstrate results. For this reason, I encourage Member States and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration to work together to strengthen data collection to effectively monitor and evaluate trends, progress and the outcomes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes in order to generate empirically grounded best practices, in particular in collaboration with academic researchers.

Cross-cutting issues

49. Despite ongoing efforts, armed forces and groups still recruit and use children. An increasing number of children are deprived of their liberty owing to alleged or actual association with armed groups. In addition, persistent funding deficits hamper programmes supporting the sustainable reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups (see A/74/845-S/2020/525). For these reasons, I encourage Member States to redouble their efforts to prevent the recruitment of children.

50. I also support establishing standard operating procedures for the handover of these children to relevant civilian child protection actors\(^6\) and to support their release and reintegration, including through the provision of psychosocial and mental health services. I reiterate that children should never be detained solely for their or their families’ association with armed groups.

51. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are often implemented where the majority of former combatants are youth from 15 to 24 years of age. Individuals in this age bracket have a unique set of needs and do not easily fit into predetermined categories. Those under 18 are regarded as children associated with armed forces and groups. Those above the age of 18 are treated as adults in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, despite the fact that, if recruited as children, their emotional, social and educational development may have been severely disrupted. In line with the youth and peace and security agenda, it is essential that youth are enabled to meaningfully participate in the planning, design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. Where appropriate, I encourage Member States to support national authorities to design and implement youth-specific strategies so that the particular needs of youth are met.

52. Although efforts have been made to enhance the participation of women associated with armed forces and groups in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, more technical, political and financial support for the implementation

of the Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security is needed.\(^7\) In line with the women and peace and security agenda, I call upon Member States to continue to support and bolster the meaningful participation of women in the design, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. This includes the collection of gender-disaggregated data and support for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

53. Potential disarmament, demobilization and reintegration participants may have physical, sensory, cognitive or psychosocial disabilities, including those acquired during armed conflict. In particular, survivors of sexual violence (both community members and former members of armed forces and groups) are at risk of psychosocial disability, physical disability related to violence and/or HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. I urge Member States to take steps to ensure that persons with disabilities are enabled to fully participate in inclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and that their specific needs are met. Separate and segregated programming may lead to further marginalization and exclusion.

54. The COVID-19 pandemic has reaffirmed the challenges associated with communicable diseases, in particular when disarmament, demobilization and reintegration participants are housed together at residential sites, when these individuals leave such sites to return to their communities and when communities come together to participate in joint activities, such as education or training. In the light of the recent pandemic, I encourage Member States to enhance and financially support the health aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, ensuring that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration participants, beneficiaries and personnel are healed and do not become vectors of transmission. In addition, where planning and other assessment processes are moved online for any reason such as the global COVID-19 pandemic, I urge Member States to bridge the digital divide to ensure the inclusion of those whose Internet connectivity may be limited, and to demonstrate flexibility by allowing entities to reprogramme activities.

55. The long-term exposure of former members of armed forces and groups to armed conflict and violence, separation from their families and communities, low standards of living, possible social exclusion and community stigma (in particular towards women and girls) directly affects their mental health and psychosocial well-being. Combatants may still experience distress or develop mental health and substance use conditions long after demobilization and reintegration. Communities living in fragile and conflict-affected settings are also at increased risk of anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, harmful use of alcohol and drugs and suicide. Past experience shows that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes which include mental health and psychosocial support have better outcomes, including a reduction in re-recruitment. However, greater efforts, capacities and resources are needed. I urge Member States to take concrete steps towards recognizing the importance of mental health to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes by, inter alia, integrating mental health services into primary and general health care for former members of armed forces and groups, and providing effective mental health and other community-based services for conflict-affected communities.

### Linkages to justice, security sector reform, organized crime, environmental sustainability and climate change

56. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes should not enable impunity for serious crimes and human rights violations. A current and future

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\(^7\) Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), para. 13; see also S/2021/827, para. 36.
challenge is to ensure the complementarity of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and criminal justice, and, where applicable, broader transitional justice processes. Such linkages present opportunities to comprehensively address lingering grievances and meet justice demands, as well as to strengthen community receptivity of former members of armed forces and groups. One such linkage is a screening and referral process whereby suspected perpetrators of serious crimes and human rights violations are identified. For these reasons I encourage Member States to closely coordinate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and criminal justice, and, where applicable, broader transitional justice efforts, and to further explore how disarmament, demobilization and reintegration can support reparations programmes, how community violence reduction programmes have the potential to contribute to Sustainable Development Goal 16 on peace, justice and development and how transitional justice elements can be linked with reintegration support.

57. Many disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are linked to broader processes of security sector reform. However, delays in one process can lead to delays in the other. A related challenge is to ensure that adequate vetting procedures are in place to ensure that individuals who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, gross violations of human rights and/or terrorist acts are not integrated into the security sector. Vetting processes are often long, complicated and contested, and information on the criminal history of individuals can be difficult to find. I therefore encourage Member States to strengthen their technical and financial support for vetting.

58. In many contexts, armed conflict is linked to organized crime, the exploitation of natural resources and/or climate change. In some cases, the short-term rewards available through organized crime may exceed incentives to participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Illegal natural resource exploitation by armed forces and groups may also prolong the conflict and deter willingness to disarm and demobilize. Climate change is also increasingly linked to armed conflict, for example, when desertification, soil erosion and drought push herders to venture into new areas to seek pasture for their herds. Armed groups also target for recruitment individuals whose livelihoods have been lost owing to climate change. It is imperative that Member States recognize and plan for the linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and organized crime, natural resource management and/or climate change to identify not only risks to the success of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration but also potentially new and innovative reintegration opportunities. I strongly encourage Member States to advocate for the inclusion of these issues (e.g., natural resource management, impact mitigation of climate change in communities, etc.) in peace agreements, where necessary and possible.

Actions to be taken by the United Nations, including by the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

59. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will endeavour to sensitize practitioners and those involved in the negotiation of peace agreements to the revised United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. To this end, and where possible, the Inter-Agency Working Group will enter into partnership with the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training Group.

60. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will continue to support a One United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration by supporting joint assessments, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration processes among the members of the Inter-Agency Working Group.

61. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration through an integrated approach between special political missions or peacekeeping operations and United Nations country teams, underpinned by country-level coordination mechanisms such as inter-agency disarmament, demobilization and reintegration groups and task forces. The Inter-Agency Working Group will also continue to promote adherence to the common standards contained in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, including through their application in common country assessments in support of country-specific United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks.

62. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will seek to create and further strengthen partnerships, including through promoting South-South cooperation between national Governments, civil society, women leaders and their grass-roots networks, youth representatives, organizations of persons with disabilities, the private sector, regional and subregional organizations, research organizations and training institutions, including the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training Group.

63. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will continue to seek and incorporate feedback from field practitioners, academics, think tanks and other subject matter experts into the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. The Inter-Agency Working Group should continue to address potential gaps in policy guidance as and when they arise and ensure that standard operating procedures developed for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes in the field are in line with the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. The Inter-Agency Working Group will endeavour to complete the revision of all Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards modules and will establish a mechanism through which these modules are regularly reviewed and updated. 8

64. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will continue to maintain and develop the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre (www.unddr.org) as a useful tool for policymakers and practitioners at both the headquarters and country levels. In addition to providing easy access to the standards and related material, the Resource Centre provides a user-friendly way for practitioners to assess their adherence to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

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8 The following Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards modules have not yet been revised: module 3.11 on integrated assessments for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, module 4.30 on reintegration, module 5.10 on women, gender and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, module 5.40 on cross-border population movements, module 5.70 on health and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, module 6.10 on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, module 6.20 on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and transitional justice and module 6.50 on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and armed groups designated as terrorist organizations.