The first formal DDR request from a non-mission setting came in December 2017, when the Government of the Republic of Congo, via the Resident Coordinator, sought UN support to implement the Kinkala Agreement with the Ninja militia. In response, a joint UN technical assessment mission to Brazzaville in early 2018 provided context-specific recommendations in line with the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). These findings shaped a successful Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) proposal centered on DDR, dialogue, and human rights, enabling the deployment of a dedicated DDR Officer. 

Since then, the UN Secretariat has continued to provide strategic guidance, including during the review of the project’s first phase in 2019. As reintegration faced delays, the focus shifted to launching Community Violence Reduction (CVR) initiatives to address socio-economic drivers of conflict in the Pool region. These efforts aim to rebuild trust in state institutions, prevent remobilization, and ensure inclusive recovery, particularly for women and youth.  

Cameroon is a country facing overlapping crises: Boko Haram violence in the Far North, separatist conflict in the North-West and South-West, and a refugee influx from the Central African Republic. In response, a 2018 Presidential Decree established the National DDR Committee, which now operates transitional centers across affected provinces.  

As DDR is a new domain for Cameroon, support to building national capacity was essential. The UN Secretariat has supported the national authorities by providing strategic advice, training in DDR and CVR for stakeholders, and supporting the development of an Operational Manual. At the center of UN Secretariat support was strengthening the nationally led DDR process and fostering South-South cooperation whereby Cameroon exchanged with Colombia, learning from its experience.  

Since 2017, at the request of Chadian authorities and the UN Resident Coordinator, the DDR Section provided technical assistance for two critical processes in Chad: the reintegration of members from politico-military groups and the voluntary exit of individuals associated with Boko Haram. Building on a 2021 directive from the UN Executive Committee, the Section partnered with the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (Bicc) to conduct a comprehensive study of DDR efforts in Chad and deployed a DDR expert from late 2021 to early 2022 to support coordination on the ground. 

A major milestone came in April 2024, when the DDR Section, together with IOM and BICC, supported the development and adoption of Chad’s National DDRR Strategy. This nationally owned framework aims to provide sustainable reintegration pathways for former members of violent extremist organizations, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP). 

Yet, Chad’s experience also illustrates the inherent challenges of implementing DDR outside the framework of a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. Institutional fragmentation, lack of transparency, and competing mandates among national bodies have eroded trust in the process. The Special Technical Committee (CTS), tasked with overseeing DDR, has faced operational setbacks and credibility issues. These challenges have been further complicated by the transitional government’s fragile legitimacy, weak coordination with international actors, and the broader political-security landscape. 

Despite these obstacles, the case of Chad highlights the strategic importance of DDR support, strengthening international coordination while reinforcing national ownership of the process.  

After more than a decade of civil war, Sierra Leone emerged in the early 2000s with a fragile peace, and an urgent need to rebuild. The conflict, which began in 1991, left deep scars: thousands dead, entire communities displaced, and a generation of children torn from their families and forced into armed groups. In this context, DDR became one of the most vital tools for national recovery. 

The peace process gained momentum in 1999, when the Lomé Peace Agreement between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) laid the foundation for ending hostilities. The agreement called for a nationwide DDR programme to dismantle the fighting forces and reintegrate former combatants into civilian life, supported by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 

Over the course of the programme, which lasted until February 2004, a total of 72,490 combatants were disarmed and demobilized. Among them were combatants from all factions: the RUF, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the national army. Importantly, over 6,800 child soldiers were also identified, demobilized, and placed into specialized reintegration support programmes, often with the help of UNICEF and child protection NGOs. 

Women and girls, many of whom had been abducted, exploited, or forced into combat and support roles, were also included in the process. While many initially went unrecognized due to narrow entry criteria that defined “combatants” strictly, subsequent efforts expanded eligibility to include camp followers and women associated with armed groups. Roughly 5,000 women participated in various stages of the DDR programme.

The StopGap programme offered labour intensive, quick-impact community infrastructure and agricultural development projects which employed some 6,000 ex-combatants as well as 1,500 community members, thus facilitating the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities. Psychosocial support mechanisms contributing to better reintegration included communal work, dining and recreational activities. This programme was aimed at rehabilitation of not only the physical and economic infrastructure of communities but also their social infrastructure by rebuilding confidence. The innovative approach of this ambitious programme earned it the UN21 Award. 

Despite numerous logistical and political challenges, including resurgences of violence in the early stages, the Sierra Leone DDR programme is often cited as one of the most successful post-conflict demobilization efforts in Africa. It played a crucial role in stabilizing the country and laying the groundwork for long-term peace and development. 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has long faced the challenge of managing multiple, overlapping armed conflicts, many of which involve foreign armed groups operating within its borders. In this context, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) programme, the UN’s longest-running, largest, and most complex programme to repatriate foreign combatants, became a central pillar of the peace consolidation process. 

Initially launched in 2002 under the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), DDRRR was continued and expanded by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) after its establishment in July 2010. The presence in the DRC of foreign armed groups from its eastern neighbors, particularly the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) from Uganda, and armed groups from Burundi, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, became a persistent source of instability. 

Alongside these foreign armed groups existed a wide array of Mai-Mai or local Congolese self-defense groups, estimated at 20,000–30,000 combatants in 2002. These Congolese groups both fought against and, at times, collaborated with foreign armed groups. While Congolese armed groups were to be addressed through a separate Congolese national DDR process, their presence not only heightened instability but also provided a pool of potential recruits for foreign forces. 

Over the next 23 years, DDRRR worked systematically to whittle away at foreign armed groups, combining sustained field engagement with robust logistical support. The programme established an extensive field presence throughout eastern DRC, capable of maintaining direct communication with foreign combatants and encouraging their voluntary return to their countries of origin. Partnerships with humanitarian agencies ensured that women and children associated with armed groups received specialized protection and support. 

Although instability still prevails in parts of eastern DRC, the results of the UN DDRRR programme are impressive. Between 2002 and 2024, DDRRR repatriated 32,818 members of foreign armed groups, of which 18,307 were combatants and 14,511 were dependents. In addition, between 2009 and 2024, the programme extracted 14,267 Congolese combatants, of which 5,232 were associated with foreign armed groups. In both categories, the majority were linked to the FDLR, whose numbers declined sharply to an estimated 500–600 combatants between 2015 and 2021. These figures do not include the tens of thousands of refugees transferred to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) for protection, nor the thousands of Congolese combatants handed over to the national DDR process. 

The second Liberian civil war, which lasted from 1999 to 2003 took a devastating human toll. According to several reports, between 250,000 and 270,000 people lost their lives, while 850,000 were forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries, and another 500,000 were displaced within Liberia. In addition, a 2004 study revealed that 60 to 70 percent of the population experienced some form of sexual violence during the conflict, underscoring the deep trauma inflicted on civilians, especially women and girls. 

In the wake of this devastation, a fragile hope began to take shape. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003, the parties to the conflict appealed to the United Nations for support. In response, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was launched in September 2003, tasked with helping the newly formed National Transitional Government restore stability and implement the CPA. A cornerstone of UNMIL’s mandate was to design and implement a Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) programme for Liberia’s tens of thousands of ex-combatants. 

In less than two years, the DDRR programme marked a major milestone: by October 31 2004, 101,496 combatants and their “associates” had been disarmed and demobilized. Recognizing the specific roles and needs of women in the conflict, the programme also introduced group disarmament criteria that helped ensure their inclusion. As a result, 22,370 women were successfully disarmed and demobilized, a significant achievement in Liberia’s post-conflict recovery. Eligibility criteria were loosened, expanding the programme’s reach from 30,000 to 100,000 beneficiaries, and including Women Associated with Armed Groups for the first time. To support sustainable reintegration, the programme also partnered with the private sector, creating employment pathways for both former combatants and women participants. 

Another major focus of the DDRR strategy was the plight of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG), who had been used extensively by all factions. With the active involvement of UNICEF, the programme prioritized the demobilization and protection of child combatants. In total, 10,972 children, 8,532 boys and 2,440 girls, were disarmed and reintegrated into society. 

But demobilization was only the beginning. The next crucial phase, rehabilitation and reintegration, aimed to transform ex-combatants into citizens. Approximately 90,000 ex-combatants enrolled in programmes offering formal education, vocational training, and apprenticeship opportunities, helping them rebuild their lives and contribute to a peaceful, post-war Liberia. 

In Haiti, the United Nations’ approach to DDR had to be fundamentally reimagined considering the country’s unique security dynamics. Unlike conventional post-conflict environments characterized by organized armed forces or rebel groups, Haiti’s instability was rooted in pervasive community violence and the dominance of armed gangs. Recognizing this reality, Security Council Resolution 1702 (2006) explicitly noted that conditions for DDR did not exist in Haiti and that alternative initiatives were required to address local conditions. In response, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) launched a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) strategy, thus marking a significant shift in how DDR was conceptualized and operationalized. 

First initiated in 2006, CVR became the centerpiece of the UN’s engagement to reduce violence and promote reintegration in Haiti. In 2007, MINUSTAH formally re-oriented its DDR strategy, prioritizing CVR to address the major root causes of violence such as poverty, social exclusion, and the absence of the rule of law. Rather than focusing on traditional disarmament or cantonment, CVR emphasized community-level stabilization and socio-economic recovery. Initial CVR interventions were labor-intensive projects and temporary work programmes, designed to offer immediate alternatives to gang involvement and criminality for youth at-risk and vulnerable populations. As the programme evolved, more targeted activities included vocational training, small enterprise development, and private-sector apprenticeships, aiming to build durable livelihoods and foster long-term reintegration. 

Beyond employment, CVR in Haiti also addressed broader dimensions of violence and fragility. Legal aid centres were established to increase access to justice, particularly for marginalized groups. Community-based policing initiatives sought to restore trust between local populations and security actors. Social reinsertion projects supported former inmates, including women and minors, helping them reintegrate into their communities with dignity and purpose. These interventions reflected a holistic understanding of DDR, one that went beyond weapons collection to focus on prevention, resilience, and community transformation. 

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed in 2006 between the Government of Sudan and a major rebel faction, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), with the support of the African Union (AU), the United Nations, and other partners, marked the first major milestone in Darfur’s long and complex peace process. DDR was placed at the core of the DPA’s final security arrangements. UN DDR advisors played a direct role in the Darfur peace talks, providing technical assistance to the parties and supporting the drafting of the agreement to ensure DDR provisions were practical, implementable, and aligned with international standards. 

In 2008, as anticipated in the peace framework, the UN and AU deployed the unprecedented hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), established under Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007). Recognizing the limitations of implementing formal DDR in Darfur’s volatile context, UNAMID’s DDR Section adapted the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) approach to local realities, creating Community-based Labor-Intensive Projects (CLIPs) as a distinctive violence reduction and stabilization tool. Operational by mid-2012, CLIPs bridged the gap between unemployed youth and the lack of vocational opportunities by offering high-demand skills training, such as welding, metal work, carpentry, and computer literacy, enabling participants to later establish their own businesses. In parallel, at-risk youth were engaged in short-term employment through construction projects, learning on the job while building vital infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. 

Much like the CVR experience in Haiti, CLIPs proved highly successful in Darfur. In October 2014, the programme received the UN21 Award for Outstanding Vision, recognizing its tangible contribution to peace and stabilization. The impact was substantial: 98% of participating youth reported gaining essential livelihood skills for securing employment, nearly 70% expressed confidence in finding jobs post-training, and 67–68% stated the programme had a strong positive effect on community cohesion and peacebuilding in their areas. Environmental benefits also emerged, as some participants were trained in producing environmentally friendly soil-stabilized blocks and fuel-efficient stoves, adding a sustainability dimension to the programme’s achievements. 

In early 2015, CLIPs evolved into Community Stabilization Projects (CSPs), expanding the scope from economic reintegration to a more comprehensive approach aimed at promoting community security, strengthening governance and institutional development, enhancing access to basic services, and creating durable solutions for conflict-affected communities. These CSPs operated until 2019, directly contributing, though not always officially acknowledged, to the fulfillment of UNAMID’s DDR-related mandate. 

When UNAMID’s DDR programme in Darfur concluded in May 2019, it left behind a proven model of community-centered stabilization. By the time UNAMID’s overall mandate ended on 31 December 2020, the mission’s CVR-type activities had demonstrated that in contexts where formal DDR is constrained; targeted, locally owned, and skill-oriented community projects can both reduce violence and lay the foundations for sustainable peace. 

The Colombian peace process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) marked a turning point in the way DDR is conceived and implemented. Colombia’s DDR process was nationally owned and politically negotiated, with the United Nations providing verification, accompaniment, and advisory support rather than acting as a direct implementer.  

The process was formalized with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2261 (2016), which created the UN Mission in Colombia to verify the ceasefire and the laying down of arms. A tripartite mechanism, involving the UN, the FARC-EP, and the Government, registered, stored, and destroyed more than 8,000 weapons. By September 2017, the FARC had completed its disarmament and formally transformed into a political party. 

To support the longer-term reintegration of ex-combatants, Resolution 2366 (2017) established the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, which focused on monitoring socioeconomic and political reintegration efforts and ensuring security guarantees for ex-FARC members and conflict-affected communities.  

At the center of the Colombian model was the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization (ARN), which led the DDR process. Its programs notably focused on rural development, community initiatives, and political participation, seen to build long-term legitimacy. 

Despite these achievements, challenges persist. Security threats from criminal groups, FARC dissidents, and other armed actors continue to endanger former combatants and communities, particularly in remote rural areas. Many ex-combatants still struggle with limited access to land, livelihoods, and basic public services, while social acceptance remains inconsistent. The UN Verification Mission’s mandate has been extended multiple times, underlining the ongoing nature of reintegration and the need for continued international support. 

Yet Colombia’s DDR remains a landmark example of nationally owned peacebuilding. By empowering national institutions like the ARN, the DDR process fostered national and local ownership and laid the groundwork for a more sustainable peace. 

The first formal DDR request from a non-mission setting came in December 2017, when the Government of the Republic of Congo, via the Resident Coordinator, sought UN support to implement the Kinkala Agreement with the Ninja militia. In response, a joint UN technical assessment mission to Brazzaville in early 2018 provided context-specific recommendations in line with the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). These findings shaped a successful Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) proposal centered on DDR, dialogue, and human rights, enabling the deployment of a dedicated DDR Officer. 

Since then, the UN Secretariat has continued to provide strategic guidance, including during the review of the project’s first phase in 2019. As reintegration faced delays, the focus shifted to launching Community Violence Reduction (CVR) initiatives to address socio-economic drivers of conflict in the Pool region. These efforts aim to rebuild trust in state institutions, prevent remobilization, and ensure inclusive recovery, particularly for women and youth.  

Cameroon is a country facing overlapping crises: Boko Haram violence in the Far North, separatist conflict in the North-West and South-West, and a refugee influx from the Central African Republic. In response, a 2018 Presidential Decree established the National DDR Committee, which now operates transitional centers across affected provinces.  

As DDR is a new domain for Cameroon, support to building national capacity was essential. The UN Secretariat has supported the national authorities by providing strategic advice, training in DDR and CVR for stakeholders, and supporting the development of an Operational Manual. At the center of UN Secretariat support was strengthening the nationally led DDR process and fostering South-South cooperation whereby Cameroon exchanged with Colombia, learning from its experience.  

Since 2017, at the request of Chadian authorities and the UN Resident Coordinator, the DDR Section provided technical assistance for two critical processes in Chad: the reintegration of members from politico-military groups and the voluntary exit of individuals associated with Boko Haram. Building on a 2021 directive from the UN Executive Committee, the Section partnered with the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (Bicc) to conduct a comprehensive study of DDR efforts in Chad and deployed a DDR expert from late 2021 to early 2022 to support coordination on the ground. 

A major milestone came in April 2024, when the DDR Section, together with IOM and BICC, supported the development and adoption of Chad’s National DDRR Strategy. This nationally owned framework aims to provide sustainable reintegration pathways for former members of violent extremist organizations, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP). 

Yet, Chad’s experience also illustrates the inherent challenges of implementing DDR outside the framework of a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. Institutional fragmentation, lack of transparency, and competing mandates among national bodies have eroded trust in the process. The Special Technical Committee (CTS), tasked with overseeing DDR, has faced operational setbacks and credibility issues. These challenges have been further complicated by the transitional government’s fragile legitimacy, weak coordination with international actors, and the broader political-security landscape. 

Despite these obstacles, the case of Chad highlights the strategic importance of DDR support, strengthening international coordination while reinforcing national ownership of the process.