


# WFP Assistance to Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Programmes

## A Survey

*December 2004*



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## **ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**

ACF – Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)  
AMF – Afghan Militia Force in Afghanistan  
ANBP – Afghan New Beginnings Programme  
CAP – Consolidated Appeals Process  
CO – WFP Country Office  
DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency  
DDA – United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs  
DDRR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration  
DFID – UK Department for International Development  
DPA – United Nations Department of Political Affairs  
DPKO – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo  
DRP – Demobilization and Reintegration Programme  
ECHA – Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance  
EMOP – WFP Emergency Operation  
ES – Executive Secretariat  
FAB – Forces Armées Burundaises, government forces in Burundi  
FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization  
FFA – Food-for-Asset  
FFT – Food-for-Training  
FFW – Food-for-Work  
FLC – Front pour la Libération du Congo, rebels in DRC  
GTZ – German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)  
HIV/AIDS - Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
HQ – WFP Headquarters  
ICC – Interim Care Centre  
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross  
IDA – International Development Association (part of the World Bank)  
IDP – Internally Displaced Person  
IFRC – The International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies  
ILO – International Labour Organization  
MAP – World Bank Multi-country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa  
MDRP – Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Greater Lakes Region  
NCDRR – National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (Burundi)  
NGO – Non-governmental Organization  
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
ODAP – Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit  
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OSRSG/CAC – Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict  
PI – Public Information

PRAFORD – Participatory Rural Action for Development  
PRRO – WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation  
RB – WFP Regional Bureau  
RCD – Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie, rebels in DRC  
RUF – Revolutionary United Front, rebel group in Sierra Leone  
SACB – Somalia Coordination Body  
STI – Sexually Transmitted Infection  
TOR – Terms of Reference  
UN – United Nations  
UNCT – United Nations Country Team  
UNDG – United Nations Development Group  
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund  
UNHAS – United Nations Humanitarian Air Service  
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund  
UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, rebel group in Angola  
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia  
USAID – US Agency for International Development  
VCT – Voluntary Counseling and Testing  
WB – World Bank  
WfD – Weapons-for-Development  
WFP – United Nations World Food Programme  
WHO – World Health Organization

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Background and Approach:** In recent years, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has been increasingly engaged in assisting ex-combatants and their dependants in their demobilization and reintegration efforts, generally in the context of broader programmes of war-to-peace transition. Several new experiences have been gained at the field level in this area since 1998, when the current operational guidelines for WFP assistance to demobilization and reintegration programmes were written.

In order to take stock of lessons learned in the field and to strengthen WFP's approach in this area, a rapid survey was fielded to Country Offices (CO) that have recently supported, or are currently supporting, Demobilization, Disarmament, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) exercises, or are planning to undertake such efforts in the near future.

The survey aimed to collect information and data regarding WFP's activities supporting DDRR, including: programming, planning, coordination, funding, operational and thematic issues, and overall constraints and opportunities. To this end, ODAP fielded a questionnaire to focal points in 10 country offices where WFP has recently supported or plans to support the process of DDRR: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Uganda. Additional data was collected through project documentation from WFP DDRR programmes in DRC and Guinea.

**General Programmes Information:** Through the DDRR programmes taking place since 2000 that participated in this survey, WFP either assisted or plans to assist, a total of approximately 783,900 to 803,900 beneficiaries through 2005, of which approximately 320,000 to 340,000 can be categorized as ex-combatants and approximately 463,900 as dependants/family members. WFP has also given or will give assistance to over 33,000 children associated with armed groups through these programmes.

The programmes varied considerably in size and scope, ranging from 180 beneficiaries through limited DDRR activity in Somalia to over 325,000 beneficiaries assisted through the most recent demobilization in Angola. With the exception of Rwanda (5 years) and DRC (planned for two years), WFP DDRR related assistance programmes have lasted the recommended period of 12 months or less.

In a majority of cases, 'dependants' have not been included in the DDRR programme targeting. Only in the cases of Angola and Liberia were figures provided for 'Dependants/Families' of ex-combatants. Sierra Leone indicated that the need to include dependants in the programme was a major lesson learned from the CO's experience.

Demobilization is often carried out among multiple groups of armed forces that are both highly politicized and differing in nature, usually with a view to integrating these groups into a common national army or other security functions. In general, this can prove

challenging in the context of DDDR as distrust and suspicion amongst different armed groups can cause instability and tension.

Through its operational experience, WFP has developed competencies in activities relevant to DDDR, outside of providing food aid, including, inter alia, road repair, air services, humanitarian de-mining and logistical support. WFP has also engaged in other activities including Food-for-Work/Training/Asset programmes and Vulnerable Groups feeding.

Whereas in some cases data regarding dependants, women, child soldiers, and other Vulnerable Groups categories were available, in other cases this information was not captured at the CO level. A more systematic documentation and collection of beneficiary data in future programmes should take place, where possible, on a global HQ and country level in the context of DDDR.

**Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups:** With respect to beneficiaries that fall in the Vulnerable Groups categories, the survey found that in most cases WFP's role is one of support in addressing the specific needs of women, child soldiers and other children affiliated with armed groups, disabled ex-combatants, and populations affected by HIV/AIDS, with more specialized agencies taking the lead.

The survey found that UN partners are increasingly adopting an integrated, holistic approach to DDDR that includes the involvement of specialized actors and agencies to address some of the cross-cutting issues and the needs of vulnerable groups. This trend towards a fully integrated approach to addressing the military, political and humanitarian aspects of DDDR (though just beginning in real practice) is in line with recommendations from the literature of recent years. Whereas in the past, strategies to address the needs of vulnerable groups have been limited, the programmes in Burundi and Liberia, for instance, offer examples of robust, integrated DDDR programme plans to assist vulnerable groups. Continued monitoring and information-sharing should take place to understand the impact of these strategies geared toward vulnerable groups (women, underage combatants, disabled combatants, people affected by HIV/AIDS).

According to the survey, the demobilization of underage combatants took or will take place in nine of the twelve cases examined. This finding indicates WFP is being asked regularly to respond to the increased use of child soldiers as a strategy for encouraging societal stability as well as assisting in measures of child protection. Underage ex-combatants are particularly vulnerable to re-recruitment, and all actors assisting in the demobilization of child soldiers should be aware of this vulnerability. The survey also found that child combatants do not always receive benefits available to other combatants in DDDR programmes, and they are sometimes excluded from the programmes altogether. WFP, in some cases, has offered additional food aid support to child soldiers. Efforts to understand the needs and issues related to these groups should continue.

In many DDDR programmes, surrendering a weapon is a necessary step towards receiving the related documentation entitling an individual to DDDR benefits.

“Registered as ex-Combatant” was most often cited as the criterion that renders an individual eligible to receive benefits. The possession of a weapon or the requirement of recognition/validation from a fighting group commander can be problematic in the demobilization and reintegration of Vulnerable Groups.

**Disarming Civilians:** The structure and phases of the programmes in some cases did not follow the ‘model’ DDRR framework and were established in accordance to the needs and situation of the types of groups being demobilized. For instance, in Afghanistan, cantonment was deemed inappropriate as the troops to be demobilized were already living in their home communities. With armed civilians increasingly taking a role in recent conflicts, it can be expected that WFP will support programmes in the future that do not operate according to the standard four-stage process.

**Planning and Programming:** DDRR programmes are by nature dynamic, due to the complex and constantly changing situations in which they take place driven by political factors (such as developments in the peace processes, resumption of hostilities, resistance among commanders of fighting groups), coordination issues, changes in beneficiary numbers and groups to be targeted, natural events, access constraints, and delays in mobilizing funding to the programmes. The importance of anticipating various scenarios and maintaining flexibility in the programme implementation and resources is consistently reinforced in the findings of this survey.

In most cases WFP assistance to DDRR programmes is incorporated into a broader programme effort covered in either a country-level or regional PRRO, and the PRRO document is considered to be sufficiently flexible, appropriate programming approach. Incorporation into broader EMOPs has also been implemented; however in only one case was a separate EMOP launched for DDRR (in the case of Sierra Leone).

Advanced planning for DDRR programmes has been found to be beneficial, although there frequently remains a degree of tension between the socio-political uncertainty in a country emerging from conflict and the need and feasibility of early planning. Though it is accepted as a desired practice that early planning should take place at the interagency and the WFP levels, in some cases WFP’s involvement in the planning process is not taking place sufficiently in advance. Although coordinating bodies should act to involve WFP early on, WFP can do its part at the CO, RB, and HQ levels to proactively initiate involvement in the planning process following the ‘triggers’ for planning transition-related activities discussed in the report (progress to the advanced stages of peace negotiations, signing of ceasefire agreement/peace accord, a Security Council mandate (including the establishment of a UN peace operation or deployment of a peace-keeping mission).

**Regional Implications:** Conflicts that have taken place in recent years have been both intra-state and cross boundary, requiring that efforts to consolidate peace often must take place within a regional framework. Consequently, DDRR programmes factor prominently in the interagency strategies for fostering regional stability, especially those in the Great Lakes and West Africa sub-regions. Where applicable, a regional perspective

should be encouraged and reinforced with all partners at all stages of a DDRR programme and country level initiatives should regularly feed information back into regional level planning and coordination efforts, and vice-versa.

**Availability and Flexibility of Resources:** Because of their time sensitivity and unpredictability, DDRR programmes require the rapid availability of funds as well as flexibility in funding allocation. Like other initiatives in the context of transition, programmes are susceptible to changes in scope, protractions, and delays caused by factors often outside of WFP's control, and would benefit from funding mechanisms that could adjust, and 'see the course' of the programme through to successful, sustainable reintegration.

**Programme Coordination:** Most COs indicated that the governments took the lead in setting up the coordinating structure for demobilization and reintegration programmes, except in the case of Somalia where there is no central government and WFP worked with a national NGO charged with leading coordination of the demobilization effort.

Most COs reported working with Implementing Partners. The main concerns noted related to security concerns, coordination and weak capacity.

Close coordination between all parties involved in the DDRR process remains a key issue in securing staff safety when operating in the DD camps and preventing programmes from having a destabilizing effect. In Liberia, for example, the CO cited poor coordination as the cause of a hostage-taking incident in the DDRR camps. This lesson learned should be reinforced with the coordinating actors, especially those in charge of providing security for the sites, in most cases this is led by either the present UN mission present in the country or national governments.

When given the opportunity to provide input regarding WFP's experience coordinating with UN Peacekeepers, most COs didn't respond with specific input. However, in Liberia, the main constraints with regard to this issue were: the weakness of coordination, planning and consultation mechanisms in areas where humanitarian actors' involvement is required. There remains more to be learned in this area.

The Liberia CO also made a recommendation to enhance WFP's work on disarmament and demobilization by increasing cooperation at the HQ and Regional Bureau levels with the World Bank, DDA, DPKO and UNDP, and any other main body involved in disarmament.

**Guidance Materials:** In looking at the content of the current Operational Guidelines vis-à-vis the responses to the survey, overall the current guidelines are adequate in providing relevant information and guidance with respect to WFP assistance to DDRR. However, the document could benefit from minor revisions and updates. In general, illustrative anecdotal lessons learned in dealing with coordination and security issues (most notably in Liberia), innovative programme plans (Burundi), updated definitions and strategies, and updated information regarding the initiatives currently underway among UN

stakeholders to develop an integrated approach to DDRR, would be useful additions to the guideline document. As well, there is an opportunity for WFP to consolidate other sources of relevant guidance materials (such as project documentation, case studies, reports, programme evaluations/lessons learned) and to make those materials easily accessible to the COs engaged in planning and programming related to supporting DDRR.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** In addition to the standard WFP procedure for monitoring operations under a PRRO or EMOP, in the case of DDRR programmes it is particularly important for beneficiary data to be collected by category. To date, the specificity of the programme data is inconsistent from country to country. In many cases numbers were not available for different beneficiary categories. A more systematic procedure for reporting data should be implemented across WFP. The survey also has found that efforts of programme evaluation and documentation of lessons learned have been very limited and WFP should ensure that evaluations and documentation of lessons learned are conducted after the completion of every DDRR programme.

**Constraints:** When asked to indicate the greatest constraints in supporting demobilization and reintegration, five COs indicated “Insecurity”; five COs indicated “Resources” as a constraint (mostly in terms of resource availability, however Uganda noted a lack of donor flexibility with respect to resources), three COs indicated “Coordination Constraints”; four indicated “Incomplete Peace Process” (or delayed peace process); Liberia noted “poor interagency coordination”; and Somalia, in addition to indicating the need for more resources to be allocated to DDRR, also noted the need for capacity building among staff involved in the programmes.

### **Next Steps**

- Disseminate survey results to all stakeholders and solicit feedback
- Update WFP *Operational Guidelines* to reflect the DPKO-led interagency initiative to develop a UN approach to DDRR (currently underway) and incorporate content consistent with lessons learned in this survey report
- Release updated *Operational Guidelines* at CO, RB, and HQ levels
- Make available online reviewed resources relevant to DDRR

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Background and Purpose of DDRR Survey:**

In recent years, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has been increasingly engaged in assisting ex-combatants and their dependants in their demobilization and reintegration efforts, generally in the context of broader programmes of war-to-peace transition. Several new experiences have been gained at the field level in this area since 1998, when the current operational guidelines for WFP assistance to demobilization and reintegration programmes were written.

In order to take stock of lessons learned in the field and to strengthen WFP's approach in this area, a rapid survey was fielded to Country Offices that have recently supported, or are currently supporting, Demobilization, Disarmament, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) exercises, or are planning to undertake such efforts in the near future.

### **Approach and Methodology:**

The survey aimed to collect information and data regarding WFP's activities supporting Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, including: programming, planning, coordination, funding, operational and thematic issues, and overall constraints and opportunities. To this end, ODAP fielded a questionnaire to focal points in 10 country offices (COs) where WFP has recently supported or plans to support the process of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, Reintegration (sometimes Rehabilitation) (DDRR): Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Uganda.

In addition, project documents (Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation [PRRO], Emergency Operations documents [EMOP], programme briefs, and other supporting materials) were used to develop partial profiles for an additional two countries where the CO has been engaged in recent planning or implementation of demobilization activities (DRC, Guinea). The report also incorporates materials taken from a review of the current literature on DDRR, security sector reform, and issues related to post-conflict humanitarian assistance. All programmes included in the survey have been in implementation or planning stages since 2000 (although in two cases, the initiation of the programme precedes 2000).

# WFP DEMOBILIZATION FEEDBACK REPORT

## I. General Approach, Overview, Context of WFP and DDDR

**1.1 War-to-Peace Transition:** It was found that the factors in place at the time of post-conflict DDDR programmes describe the conditions and events that generally precede or fall within the horizon of a country or sub-region's transition from conflict to peace. When asked to indicate the conditions that describe the socio-political context in which the demobilization programme took or will take place, countries participating in the survey responded as follows:

- Ceasefire in place - 7 cases
- Formal peace agreement has been/will be signed - 8 cases
- Approved UN peacekeeping mission - 4 cases
- Complex emergency - 7 cases
- Initial phases of a peace process - 7 cases
- In transition from conflict to peace - 5 cases
- In recovery/development - 6 cases
- Following previous failed/postponed attempt(s) at demobilization - 4 cases

### *Definition of Transition*

According to the *Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues*, the adoption of the following definition of **transition** should be shared among UN actors to guide their efforts:

*“For the UN, post-conflict transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still-fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, justice and social equity.”<sup>1</sup>*

**1.2. WFP's Objectives:** When asked to indicate the goals of WFP assistance to DDDR programmes, most COs listed objectives that are consistent with WFP's role in supporting the integrated efforts to consolidate peace. Among the most frequent responses provided as primary objectives of WFP's DDDR programme were “Supporting the Peace Process” “Social and Economic Reintegration” and “Promoting National Reconciliation”.

Notably, “Demobilization of child soldiers” was also mentioned as a programme objective in nine of the cases examined (Afghanistan; Angola; Burundi; DRC; Liberia; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Uganda). This finding indicates that WFP is being asked regularly to respond to the increased use of child soldiers in armed conflicts, and that the

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<sup>1</sup> UNDG/ECHA. December 2003. Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues: p.12.

organization plays a role in the international community's efforts to demobilize child soldiers as a strategy for peace-building and child protection. The findings and data relating to child soldiers will be discussed further in the section of this report that discusses *Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups* (p.34).

Finally, "Reduction of Small Arms" was also noted as a programme goal in four cases (Angola; Burundi; Liberia; Sierra Leone) and a brief discussion of this related issue is included in the *Planning and Programming* section of this report (p.24).

**1.3. WFP's Experience with DDDR Programmes:** WFP's first experiences in demobilisation programmes were in connection with DDDR programmes implemented in Namibia (1989-1990), Angola (1991-1992) and Cambodia (1992-1993). Subsequently, WFP directly participated in DDDR programmes in the context of UN monitored peace processes in Mozambique (1993-1994), Liberia (1996-1997) and Angola (1995-present).

From the data gathered for this report from more recent programmes, WFP's involvement with DDDR has varied in terms of duration, although a majority of programmes appear to adhere to the recommended length of 12 months or less, noted in WFP's *Operational Guidelines*. Seven of the programmes included in the survey lasted, or are planned to last, for a year or under. The most notable exceptions include the Rwanda programme, which lasted over five years, and a two-year programme currently taking place in DRC to support a UNICEF-led initiative towards the demobilization of underage combatants.

(Table 1) WFP DEMOBILIZATION TIMETABLE – PROGRAMMES taking place since 1990s

- = Recent programme, included in survey analysis
- = Previous attempt at demobilization
- = Likely future demobilizations

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Afghanistan																	
Angola																	
Burundi																	
Cambodia																	
Congo																	
Cote d'Ivoire																	
DRC																	
Guinea																	
Liberia																	
Mozambique																	
Namibia																	
Rwanda																	
Sierra Leone																	
Somalia																	
Sudan																	
Tajikistan																	
Uganda																	

**1.4. Scope of Programmes/Numbers of Beneficiaries:** Through the DDRR programmes taking place since 2000 that participated in this survey, WFP either assisted or plans to assist, a total of approximately 783,900 to 803,900 beneficiaries through 2005, with approximately 320,000 to 340,000 categorized as ex-combatants and approximately 463,900 as dependants/family members. WFP has also given or will give assistance to at least 33,000 children affiliated with armed groups through these programmes.

The programmes under analysis vary considerably in size and scope, ranging from 180 beneficiaries in Somalia to over 325,000 beneficiaries assisted through the most recent demobilization in Angola. In some cases, planned beneficiary numbers have had to be adjusted when faced with the realities of the various situations.

(Table 2) WFP DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMME NUMBERS OF BENEFICIARIES

	Dates	Ex-combatants	'Dependants'/Families
<b>Afghanistan</b>	September 2003 to March 2005	40,000 – 60,000 (revised from 100,000 planning figure)	N/A
<b>Angola</b>	October 2002 to June 2003	54,986	270,248
<b>Burundi</b>	September 2004 to No end date	55,000 (expected) ex-combatants, 5,000 Child Soldiers	N/A
<b>Congo, Republic of</b>	2001 (no specific dates provided)	2,071	N/A
<b>DRC</b>	January 2004 through December 2005	30,000 (Underage combatants)	N/A
<b>Guinea</b>	Late 2004 and for 3 months in 2005	4,000	Yes "plus families", no figure provided
<b>Liberia</b>	21 November, 2003 to 31 December, 2004	64,540	193,620
<b>Rwanda</b>	August 1997 to December 2002	16,125	N/A
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	April 2000 to October 2001	45,000	N/A
<b>Somalia</b>	January 2004 through October 2004	180	N/A
<b>Tajikistan</b>	May 2001 through September 2003	In total 731; Ex-combatants Males 402; Ex-combatants Females 329	N/A
<b>Uganda</b>	April 2002 to December 2002	1,930	N/A

For example, in Liberia the planning figure was set at 38,000; however as of August 2004, 65,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed and the programme was still ongoing. In Burundi, the initial planning figure was set at 14,000 whereas the current expected number of beneficiaries has been increased to 55,000. In Afghanistan, the Afghan New

Beginnings Programme had originally planned to demobilize an estimated 100,000 Afghan Militia Force (AMF) troops (and some consultative early estimates had placed the recommended number upwards of 200,000)<sup>2</sup>. However, following the initiation of the programme, the estimated number of ex-combatants to go through the process was revised down to 40,000-60,000.

As well, in the majority of cases, ‘dependants/families’ are/were not included in the DDRR programme targeting. Only in the cases of Angola and Liberia were figures provided for ‘Dependants/Families’ of ex-combatants.

Variation in scope and levels of centralization of DDRR programmes was also seen with respect to the implementation of cantonment/assembly in the different programmes. For instance, Angola noted use of 37 cantonment sites within 14 provinces for assembly of approximately 325,000 beneficiaries. In Liberia, nine sites were used for assembly of 65,000 beneficiaries (thus far). Burundi’s plan indicates the anticipated use of three sites.

**1.5. Types of Troops/Fighting Factions:** Demobilization is often carried out among multiple groups of armed forces that are both highly politicized and differing in nature, usually with a view to integrating these groups into a common national army or incorporating them into other security functions. In general, this can prove challenging in the context of DDRR as distrust and suspicion amongst different armed groups can cause instability and tension.

WFP was most often found to be involved with DDRR programmes assisting multiple categories of ex-combatants. Specific types of troops or fighting factions that received assistance from WFP include: in six cases, “Government Ex-combatants”; seven cases “Ex-combatants from Rebel Group(s)”; five programmes assisted “Ex-combatants from Paramilitary Groups”; in four cases “Civilian Ex-combatants (insurgency/counter-insurgency)”; and among the “Other” categories listed were: “A breakaway faction of the Army,” “Armed groups”, *Guardian de la paix*, and Underage Combatants primarily from *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD), and the *Front pour la Liberation du Congo* (FLC).


**1.6. Adherence to the ‘Model’ DDRR Programme:** The structures and phases of the programmes in some cases do not follow the ‘model’ DDRR framework which is found in the current WFP *Operational Guidelines* and supported in the majority of the literature on military DDRR (see Figure 1 below on p. 16). The survey found that in some cases programme phases were established in accordance to the needs and situation of the types of groups being demobilized. For example, in many cases cantonment sites have not been or were not used, and in only three of the countries that participated in the survey, cantonment sites were specifically appointed for DDRR purposes.

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<sup>2</sup> Bhatia, M., Lanigan, K. & Wilkinson, P. June 2004. Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan. *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper*: p.16.

In Afghanistan, for instance, the use of cantonment was deemed inappropriate, as 95% of soldiers are serving in their home communities, therefore, the majority of the ex-combatants being demobilized already live at home.

(Figure 1)



Graphic from the *Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (DRPs) in Countries Emerging from Conflict Situations*.

This example indicates that in some cases, especially when the lines between “military” and “civilian” are blurred with respect to the categorization of ex-combatants, the four-stage process normally implemented in “model” military demobilizations—namely *cantonment and disarmament* (also called assembly or quartering), *discharge and demobilization*, *reinsertion* (or resettlement), and *reintegration* (and/or rehabilitation)—may not be appropriate. In the case of Afghanistan, the DDRR programme followed a framework of overlapping activities of *registration*, “*symbolic*” *discharge and reinsertion*, and *recognition* in line with an approach outlined in the literature discussing practices in the demobilization of armed civilians.<sup>3</sup> With armed civilians frequently taking a role in recent conflicts (three WFP programmes have supported the demobilization of civilians since 2000), it can be assumed that WFP will be asked to support programmes that will not adhere to the phases of a model DDRR programme. This reinforces the value of understanding the socio-political situation in programme planning.

<sup>3</sup> Jensen, S. & Stepputat, F. December 2001. Demobilizing Armed Civilians. *CDR Policy Paper*, Centre for Development Research.

Another example of a deviation from recommended practice was found in the case of Burundi. Prior to the demobilization process, upon insistence by the donors, WFP was asked and has exceptionally agreed at the executive level to be a transfer institution for funds between donors and the implementing agency (GTZ) during the so-called pre-disarmament or pre-cantonment process. Armed soldiers of the rebel groups that signed the peace agreement have been cantoned in certain areas where they have been provided regularly with food in exchange for their support of the political process of consolidating the peace agreement and further political discussions. This experience is new to WFP, and could be considered contradictory from previous perspectives (including the principles in the current WFP *Operational Guidelines*, which caution against giving aid to armed soldiers). The implications of such practice should be studied further.

Other factors that could lead to possible deviation from the standard model of DDRR include adjusting the programme implementation based on specific programme objectives. In DRC, for instance, WFP will provide on-site feeding for the demobilization of child soldiers in a UNICEF training center. Departure from a model programme might also be necessary when working within the constraints of resource issues or operating in conditions of insecurity.

## **II. Planning and Programming**

**2.1. Programme Planning and Context:** Through past experience, advanced planning for DDRR programmes has been found to be beneficial, although there frequently remains a degree of tension between the political uncertainty in a country emerging from conflict and the need for, and feasibility of, early planning.<sup>4</sup> According to the past practices assessed in this survey, in some cases WFP has anticipated demobilization programmes early on in the interagency process of developing a framework for supporting country-level or regional post-conflict transition.

### ***Triggers for Planning DDRR***

The undg/ECHA Working Group provides a list of “triggers” that should prompt the UN to reassess a given situation to determine if opportunities to consolidate peace are manifest and if the UN has a comparative advantage in support of the transition process. By extension, at the UNCT and WFP levels, these triggers can be useful in considering revisiting existing plans in place for DDRR in a country and/or region, or developing a new plan:

- A ceasefire agreement, a peace accord, and or an advanced stage of peace negotiations
- A Security Council mandate (including the establishment of a UN peace operation or deployment of a peace-keeping mission)
- A peace process often shepherded with active engagement of one or two Member States, a regional body or a combination that includes the UN.

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<sup>4</sup> Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. *BICC Conversion Survey 1996*: p. 156.

Four cases mentioned contingency planning for DDRR while the conflict was ongoing, while two cases started planning directly following a ceasefire. Other COs however started planning later, as in Afghanistan where WFP began planning after the initiation of the DDRR programme by the Afghan New Beginnings Programme coordinating body.

With respect to planning, the Liberia CO noted it would have been better if WFP were involved in the initial stages of the coordinated planning and design of the implementation framework “to ensure that WFP is prepared for the DDRR programme in the early stages and plans resources accordingly.”

**2.2. Government Role:** When asked to indicate the government’s role in the demobilization activities, most COs indicated that the governments took the lead in setting up the coordinating structure for demobilization and reintegration programmes, except in the case of Somalia where there is no central government and WFP worked with a national NGO charged with leading coordination of the demobilization effort. This finding is consistent with the recommended emphasis in the literature and the view shared among UN actors that the approach to recovery efforts in situations of transition should encourage government capacity building and ownership of humanitarian and administrative activities.<sup>5</sup>

Among key government tasks related to DDRR that were mentioned among the CO experiences are: negotiation of ceasefire and/or peace agreement, establishment of DDRR coordination structure, overall programme oversight, provision of basic facilities/cantonment sites, coordination of and primary responsibility for security activities, registration/identification of ex-combatants and their families, sensitization of the warring factions and civilians to support the disarmament process, provision of demobilization packages, and programme monitoring and evaluation.

In Angola, it was noted the government faced criticism for “not doing enough.” During the first phase of the demobilization (a period during which UN involvement, and the involvement of the broader international humanitarian community, was essentially limited to monitor status) it was reported that the Angolan Government had “underestimated the enormous challenges” of providing for ex-combatants and their families. After a period of delay and negotiation, coordination between the government and humanitarian actors reportedly improved under an OCHA-organized framework of coordination, with WFP participating significantly in the second phase of DDRR.<sup>6</sup>

**2.3. Beneficiary Participation:** Three of the 12 programmes that participated in the survey cited specific areas of beneficiary participation in the planning process and/or programme design. The Burundi and Congo programmes both engaged with the leaders of the factions of beneficiary groups to be involved in all DDRR coordinating structures.

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<sup>5</sup> UNDG/ECHA. 2003. *Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues*: p.17.

<sup>6</sup> Action for Southern Africa. 2002. *Angola Peace Monitor*.  
<http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0809.htm>.

Sierra Leone also engaged the fighting factions in planning, coordination and public awareness activities. In all other programmes, beneficiary involvement in planning and programme design was limited or did not take place. The appropriate degree of beneficiary participation should be considered on a case-by-case basis, especially when WFP support to DDRR programmes includes a Food for Work/Food for Training component and it should be determined whether opportunities exist to enhance the DDRR programmes through beneficiary participation. It was noted that when appropriate, such participation could build confidence among ex-combatant groups, improve the programme's ability to address the needs of vulnerable groups, and help strengthen ties to the receiving community.

### ***Beneficiary Participation: Lessons from the ILO***

While beneficiary participation in the program design process can be valuable, especially in planning activities relating to long-term reintegration, in areas such as Food for Work/Food for Training, it has been found that it is also important to balance participation with a demand-driven approach, appropriate to the context of the given socio-economic situation. The International Labor Organization (ILO), an organization that offers specialized services to ex-combatants in the context of DDRR, asserts that ex-combatants who go through training and who then fail to find jobs express severe frustration, which can cause social or security problems.<sup>7</sup> For this reason, the ILO cautions against tendency towards programmes becoming overly ex-combatant-focused, emphasizing that those initiatives involving work skills training among ex-combatants should be driven by conditions of the local market, rather than driven primarily by the interests and aspirations of the individual, in order to achieve sustainability.

**2.4. Programming Approach:** It was found that 10 of the 12 WFP demobilization programmes were incorporated into an ongoing PRRO, one into a broader EMOP programme framework, and only in the case of Sierra Leone was a new EMOP launched specifically for demobilization and reintegration. This confirms that WFP's involvement with DDRR most often takes place within a broader framework of WFP assistance, often with other IDP/Refugee Resettlement programmes and other recovery activities. The PRRO document has been cited as a reasonably flexible mechanism for programming in these contexts requiring a variety of relief and recovery activities.

**2.5. Beneficiary Eligibility:** Standard practice for identifying eligible beneficiaries often takes place through a process of registration that involves commanders of armed groups identifying and validating the ex-combatant status of individuals to be demobilized. For programmes that provide support to the 'dependants' of ex-combatants, usually those dependants accompany the ex-combatant to the assembly site. In many DDRR programmes, surrendering a weapon is a necessary step towards receiving the related documentation entitling an individual to DDRR benefits. "Registered as ex-Combatant"

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<sup>7</sup> Specht, I. Jobs for Demobilized Rebels and Soldiers: Early Preparedness and Sustaining Capacities. International Labour Organisation InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction: p.7.

was most often cited as the criterion that renders an individual eligible to receive benefits; however, the specific processes of obtaining registered ex-combatant status in each country were not established through the survey.

In Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, possession of a gun or some other form of weapon was cited as part of the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries to receive DDRR assistance, although the Liberia CO also noted that the DDRR programme does not require a gun from every ex-combatant. Specifics regarding when it is required for a weapon to be surrendered and when it is not required, were not provided. The Liberia CO noted that to date, approximately 70,000 ex-combatants have entered the programme, but only 20,603 arms have been collected.

Requiring possession of a weapon or the recognition or validation from a fighting group commander in order to receive benefits can be problematic in the demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable groups. Women combatants, abducted girls, child soldiers, disabled combatants, and other ex-combatants who sometimes face discrimination, often after having “spontaneously demobilized” prior to the initiation of the DDRR programme, can be disenfranchised from receiving benefits from the DDRR process. Often these criteria can preclude vulnerable-group beneficiaries from accessing benefits as commanders have the authority to administer and withhold benefits according to their own personal discretion. Pertinent issues of beneficiary eligibility with respect to vulnerable groups will be discussed in further detail in the *Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups* section of this report (p.29). However it can be noted here that Liberia is the only programme to use the criterion of “Vulnerability” (for child combatants and female beneficiaries) as one that qualifies an individual for receiving WFP assistance in a DDRR programme.

Granting eligibility to DDRR benefits for other individuals (non-combatants) affiliated with armed groups has also been a question in the past. Many armed groups are served by different types of individuals acting in non-combatant roles such as cooks, porters, sexual servants, etc. In Angola, for example, WFP decided to incorporate into the DDRR programme, individuals working in the UNITA rebel group’s “civil administration,” despite the fact that these individuals were not combatants.

**2.6. Rations and Distribution:** WFP’s primary function in most DDRR programmes is that of providing food aid as an incentive for ex-combatants and other beneficiaries to participate, which places key importance on the value of the rations offered and the appropriateness of the duration of assistance. Through the survey the following was learned;

- Only the Rwanda CO specified distributing below-standard rations to ex-combatants and/or dependants (multiple distributions of 545g rations were provided).
- Vulnerable Groups including (in some cases) distributions to Women, Children Affiliated with Armed Groups/Underage Combatants, Disabled Combatants, HIV/AIDS affected populations, were specifically targeted in three programmes.

- In five of the 12 cases examined, the rations were established in cooperation with the government and/or parties to the conflict and in these cases, rations were either standard or above standard.
- With respect to the food basket it was found that, during the demobilization phase, WFP is distributing standard rations in most cases, instead of a more valuable, varied food basket recommended in the *Operational Guidelines*. However, in line with recommendations in the guidelines, only one case (Rwanda) reported distributing below-standard rations.

(Table 3) WFP RATIONS and DISTRIBUTIONS

	Rations
<b>Afghanistan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants Only</li> <li>▪ 126kg per person</li> <li>▪ One-off distribution</li> </ul>
<b>Angola</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants and Dependants</li> <li>▪ Standard 2,100 Kcal for both categories</li> <li>▪ Family rations to last for two harvests</li> <li>▪ Multiple versus One-off distribution not specified in response</li> </ul>
<b>Burundi</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants and Demobilized Child Soldiers</li> <li>▪ Standard 2,100 Kcal for all Ex-combatants</li> <li>▪ Additional 2 Standard 2,100 Kcal take-home rations for the family members of Demobilized Child Soldiers</li> <li>▪ Multiple versus One-off distribution not specified in response</li> </ul>
<b>Congo, Republic of</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants Only</li> <li>▪ Standard 2,100 Kcal ration</li> <li>▪ Multiple versus One-off distribution not specified in response</li> </ul>
<b>DRC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Demobilized Child Soldiers Only</li> <li>▪ Daily on-site ration of 400g Maize Meal, 120g Pulses, 30g Oil, 5g Salt</li> <li>▪ Multiple distributions</li> </ul>
<b>Guinea</b>	"General Food Ration" followed by FFW/FFT and family food ration to support reintegration according to PRRO – no additional information provided
<b>Liberia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants, Dependants, and Vulnerable Groups</li> <li>▪ Ex-combatants receive a one-off distribution of 18.736kgs, Standard 2100kcal</li> <li>▪ Dependants receive one-off distribution of 16.06 kgs, Standard 2100kcal</li> <li>▪ Vulnerable Groups receive a one-off distribution of 19.06kgs, Above Standard ration</li> </ul>
<b>Rwanda</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants and Dependants</li> <li>▪ 545g, Below-Standard Rations distributed to both beneficiary categories</li> <li>▪ Multiple distributions</li> </ul>
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants and Dependants</li> <li>▪ Ex-combatants received 50.85kgs, Standard 2100kcal, Multiple Distributions</li> <li>▪ Dependants received Standard 2100kcal, Multiple Distributions</li> </ul>
<b>Somalia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants Only</li> <li>▪ 104.4 Kgs per person/month, Standard 2,100 kcal</li> <li>▪ Multiple versus One-off distribution not specified in response</li> </ul>
<b>Tajikistan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants Only</li> <li>▪ Received 1.5 kgs, Above standard rations</li> <li>▪ Multiple distributions</li> <li>▪ Each ex-combatant received 1.5 kg of WHF per working day during 3- and 9-month project durations.</li> </ul>
<b>Uganda</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Targeted Ex-combatants and Vulnerable Groups</li> <li>▪ Ex-combatants received Standard 2100kcal rations, multiple distributions</li> <li>▪ Vulnerable Groups received Standard 2100 kcal rations, one-off distribution</li> </ul>

**2.7. WFP's Related Activities Outside of Food Aid:** Through its operational experience, WFP has developed competencies in activities relevant to DDDR, outside of providing food aid, including, inter alia, road repair, air services, humanitarian de-mining and

logistical support. The survey found that in six cases, WFP implemented or planned the implementation of infrastructure rehabilitation activities. Four cases mentioned WFP's provision of Common Air Services (UNHAS). Six cases noted WFP's role in leading logistics or offering logistics support, with Burundi noting WFP's in-country logistics strength as a key asset to the overall programme efforts. There was also mention among respondents of other activities including Food-for-Work/Training/Asset programmes in several cases. In Burundi, WFP will be engaged in vulnerable groups feeding, targeting people living with HIV/AIDS. In DRC, the current DDRR programme provides on-site feeding of former child soldiers in training centers.

Several COs also noted the opportunity for WFP to use activities related to the DDRR programme to address other needs and concerns present in the country. In Sierra Leone, for example, the CO found that it is more appropriate to provide assistance that covers not only the main WFP food items but also condiments and utensils. In Angola, the CO noted that the DDRR programme presented an opportunity for WFP to decrease the high malnutrition rates among ex-combatants and dependants. And the Liberia CO suggested that WFP could coordinate more closely with arms control efforts.

Other possible areas of intervention were identified by the Afghanistan CO. It was noted that potential food-for-work activities, or food as a supplementary program benefit were discussed, but not pursued and the CO indicated that there is potential for additional WFP involvement in this area. Additionally, the Afghanistan CO noted there could be additional provisions by WFP of logistics services to other agencies as a way of creating cost savings on the DDRR side.

### ***Interagency Coordination: Division of Labor***

Post-conflict demobilization is a complex logistical exercise involving many actors carrying out a multitude of interrelated tasks. Effective division of labor among actors is critical to efficiency, and a report issued by the ECHA Working Group on DDRR suggests assigning tasks among UN system agencies should be based on each agency's "comparative advantage" in each specific situation (taking into consideration in-country presence, available resources, capacity, etc.)<sup>8</sup>

**2.8. Coordination with other assistance:** Most often, DDRR is a component of the same national or regional (such as in the case of West Africa) PRRO programme framework covering IDP and refugee resettlement or repatriation, demobilizations in neighboring countries, and other initiatives directed towards assisting war-affected populations. As a result, the demobilization programmes take place in parallel with other programmes, or as a precondition for these activities (e.g. demobilization might set the conditions for safe returnee resettlement).

<sup>8</sup> ECHA. 2000. ECHA Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Background Paper to Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants: p. 34.

From a programming perspective, in some cases during the reintegration phase, demobilized ex-combatants and their dependents have been or will be absorbed into the other programmes under the PRRO as beneficiaries to help address the food-related aspects of their longer-term reintegration requirements. The Angola CO emphasized that specific targeting of ex-combatants should end at the earliest possible opportunity and that a strategy for this is to absorb beneficiaries of the demobilization programmes into the ongoing activities under the PRRO. This approach supports efforts to encourage ex-combatants to begin to self-identify as part of the broader community. In addition, from a logistical and cost standpoint, this approach becomes necessary as continuing to engage in specialized targeting of ex-combatants as they relocate to more diffuse areas of resettlement is not usually feasible.

Guinea's DDRR programme, which is also seen in terms of a West Africa strategy, will plan to address the needs of demobilized soldiers returning from Liberia (although there has been discussion of the need for greater harmonization of country level initiatives in contingency planning, programme planning and implementation of demobilization in the sub-region).<sup>9</sup>

**2.9. Regional Implications and Strategies:** Conflicts that have taken place in recent years have been both intra-state and cross boundary, requiring that efforts to consolidate peace often must take place within a regional framework. Experience has shown that often there are foreign fighters present in the troops to be demobilized. As well, if a DDRR programme fails, instability or renewed fighting can ensue, possibly involving neighboring countries. Even "successful" DDRR programmes at the country level can potentially have the effect of building peace and security in one area while unleashing increased banditry and an influx of arms into other parts of a given region. Consequently, DDRR programmes factor prominently in the interagency strategies for fostering regional stability, especially those in the Great Lakes and West Africa sub-regions.

Of the COs that participated in the survey, regional implications were, or are currently, addressed to varying degrees. In Burundi, coordination and funding of the planned DDRR programme is being lead by the World Bank (WB) through a regional multi-donor reintegration programme (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region, which builds on country level initiatives, in consultation with governments, donors, and UN partners. Within the framework of the MDRP, the Government of Burundi asked the WB to provide financial assistance and coordinate external partner support for the DRRP. The WB initiated a project preparation in February 2003, and established the Coordination Committee consisting of interested MDRP partners present in Bujumbura, as well as a technical working group to elaborate a Joint Operations Plan for disarmament and demobilization activities.

With respect to regional stability, the Burundi CO notes that failure of the demobilization programme in Burundi would have a negative impact on the peace process, which in turn

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<sup>9</sup> IASC Sub-Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning. 2004. Report of the Sub-Regional Humanitarian Contingency Planning Meeting Dakar, 23-24 February: p. 4.

could potentially lead to renewed fighting, which would be likely to involve other countries in the region. The CO noted that WFP's strategy to address the regional dimension of the DDRR programme entails working within the UN interagency framework through emergency response planning, updating the CO Contingency Plan and participating fully in the regional contingency planning initiatives being proposed by ODK.

In Liberia, the CO acknowledges links between the peace process and DDRR in Liberia, and broader sub-regional stability in West Africa. The DDRR programmes in the West African sub-region are seen as complimentary and coordinated activities, with DDRR beginning in Sierra Leone, then taking place in Liberia and once it is complete there, it is expected to start in Guinea and Ivory Coast. Sustainable DDRR in Liberia holds implications for regional stability, and currently there have been reports in the Liberian frontier town of Ganta that for the past two months, Liberian ex-combatants and fighters have been given cash incentives to be sent into Guinea by an ally of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, in order to launch an insurrection in the neighboring country.<sup>10</sup>

The Liberia CO also noted that there have been reports of re-recruitment of demobilized child soldiers in Liberia who are then being sent to organize in neighboring countries. Developments such as these can pose significant threats to regional peace and stability, and underscore a needed emphasis on sustainability in DDRR programmes, namely a focus on the long-term reintegration component. Liberia's CO emphasized that WFP should support all DDRR programmes in the region to ensure continued stability and full recovery, and implement a regional response in coordination and collaboration with other UN agencies.

Also part of the efforts to consolidate peace in West Africa, the Guinea component of the West Africa Coastal PRRO for 2005/2006 recognizes the regional dimension in its programme planning and notes that with the ongoing disarmament process in Liberia, Guinean ex-combatants may return to Guinea, despite the government's position that it does not recognize this group as Guinean natives. The PRRO also notes the presence of youth militias or "volunteers" in the border areas with Liberia and Sierra Leone, and is anticipating their reintegration as a strategy for avoiding the creation of new armed gangs and militia groups.<sup>11</sup>

**2.10. Small Arms Control/Reduction:** Although a thorough discussion of the related issues of small arms and light weapons control is outside of the scope of this survey report, it is important to note some of the problems of the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms that takes place in post-conflict situations and their relationship to DDRR. In four of the cases examined, "Reduction of Small Arms" was

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<sup>10</sup> Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 23 September 2004. LIBERIA: Taylor loyalist recruits Liberians to fight in Guinea - ex-combatants. [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43308&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43308&SelectRegion=West_Africa).

<sup>11</sup> World Food Programme (WFP). 2004. Guinea Component of the West Africa Coastal Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation Document.

listed among WFP demobilization programme objectives, and strategies for addressing the issue should be discussed further at all levels (HQ, RB, CO). Transparency and precision with regard to arms collection and storage are crucial factors in a DDRR programme. There remains a risk that arms may ‘disappear’ or be transferred into conflict areas.<sup>12</sup> Afghanistan’s CO, for example noted as a key lesson learned from its experience in the ANBP that, “weapons [surrendered upon disarmament] should be publicly destroyed.”

Another issue related to arms control that complicates DDRR and requires careful consideration is that many combatants may own more than one weapon, meaning that turning in one weapon does not preclude the possibility that the soldier has other weapons kept elsewhere. While not normally directly involved in this process of arms collection, WFP as a partner, could play a role in the overall planning of the disarmament phase to encourage due diligence in considering the risks associated with small arms and light weapons accumulations.

Liberia’s CO emphasized arms control as a key area of opportunity for WFP involvement, and recommended that WFP examine possible cooperation with agencies and donors involved in small arms reduction programmes, to “compliment massive disarmaments and consequently reduce crime and poverty.” In the past, WFP’s limited experience in pure “food-for-weapons” initiatives has inspired caution against participation in programmes strictly focused on arms reduction,<sup>13</sup> however there have been recent development-oriented programmes to address arms accumulations that have reportedly achieved positive results and future partnerships could benefit from lessons learned from these experiences.

### ***Weapons-for-Development in Cambodia***

A programme highlighted by the OECD as an example of best practices in arms reduction is the comprehensive, community-based Weapons-for-Development (WfD) programme, implemented by the government of Japan in Cambodia. The report notes the programme has achieved positive results in “addressing the causes of conflict,” promoting sustainable development, and raising public awareness of the dangers and social consequences the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. The programme serves as a weapons reduction mechanism in affected areas, collecting weapons from communities in exchange for assistance in improving their social infrastructure, *e.g.* repair and construction of roads, wells, bridges, etc. This project consists of four pillars, namely “weapons for development”, “weapons destruction”, “weapons registration” and “public awareness”.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. BICC Conversion Survey 1996: p. 159.

<sup>13</sup> World Food Programme (WFP). 1998. Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (DRPs) in Countries Emerging from Conflict Situations.

<sup>14</sup> Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2004. Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice: p. 38.

### **III. Operational and Implementation Issues**

DDRR programmes are by nature dynamic, due to the complex and constantly changing situations in which they take place driven by, inter alia,: political factors (such as developments in the peace processes, resumption of hostilities, resistance among commanders of fighting groups, etc), coordination issues, changes in beneficiary numbers and groups to be targeted, natural events, access constraints, and delays in mobilizing funding to the programmes. The importance of anticipating various scenarios and maintaining flexibility in the programme implementation and resources is consistently reinforced throughout the literature on DDRR, and in the findings of this survey.

**3.1. Delays and Programme Changes Caused by Socio-Political Developments:** Delays in the peace processes and renewed fighting often cause postponements in DDRR. In Uganda, a planned one-off distribution of assistance became protracted due to delays in the peace process, which was not planned for in the PRRO and resources were re-allocated to address the situation. In Sierra Leone for example, the DDRR programme was designed to start immediately after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord on the 7 July 1999, however it did not start until 17 April 2000. A resumption of hostilities in May 2001 also disrupted the Sierra Leone programme, slowing down the demobilization and reintegration process. In Burundi, the DDRR programme has been delayed from its latest planned start in September and the CO has not yet been able to provide a starting date, although WFP has been informed the delays are temporary and the initiation of the programme is not far in the future. The Burundi CO also noted that one of the warring parties is not a signatory to the ceasefire and anticipates that if they eventually sign the agreement, this could have an effect on the caseload and/or implementation modalities. The Afghanistan CO also experienced a six-month delay, noting that DDRR has proved more difficult and costly than expected, owing to frequent changes in the implementation plan, and the “political realities” of the situation, including resistance among commanders of the forces to be demobilized.

**3.2. Delays Caused by Coordination Issues:** The Liberia CO noted that the lack of information and sensitization of parties involved, and the lack of proper coordination between policy, military, and programming levels during phase one of the programme resulted in postponement of DDRR, delaying WFP food support until the programme resumed in April 2004. The Liberian CO also emphasized the importance of sustaining a healthy food pipeline throughout the programme to enable WFP to respond to changes in the situation. In Angola, the CO also faced delays due to difficulties experienced negotiating an appropriate framework for humanitarian assistance with the government, as mentioned previously.

**3.3. Delays Caused by Resource Mobilization Factors:** DDRR, as with many activities of transition, are time-sensitive exercises and this underscores that once an appropriate strategy is in place, there is a need for quick, flexible, timely disbursement of funding for programmes. In Burundi, several self-imposed deadlines by the national counterpart were

not met due to delays in meeting the WB's conditions of effectiveness. In Rwanda, the programme was delayed from March 2002 to September 2002, due to a lag between the approval and effectiveness of a WB International Development Association (IDA) credit.

**3.4. Issues Caused by Natural Events and Other Access Constraints:** In Angola, WFP also experienced delays due to problems accessing cantonment sites. During Angola's rainy season, access roads were in "very bad condition," and there were also broken bridges and mines to contend with, which caused some cantonment sites to be moved and caused the distribution of benefits to be suspended. Especially during the initial phases of the DDRR in Angola, constraints in accessing the camps were reported from UN agencies and NGOs.<sup>15</sup>

**3.5. Changes in Numbers of Beneficiaries and Targeting:** Unforeseen adjustments in the numbers of beneficiaries to participate in DDRR also carried implications for the programmes and required flexibility on the part of WFP. In Sierra Leone, WFP had to adapt the programme when the family members/dependants of the ex-combatants unexpectedly arrived at the DDRR camps to participate in the programme. In Liberia, WFP reported issues relating to the accommodation and feeding problems faced when women arrived in the disarmament camps with their young infants.

In Angola, the PRRO covering WFP assistance to Angola's DDRR programme was designed while the war was ongoing, and did not originally plan to target ex-combatants or their dependants specifically. Consequently re-categorization of beneficiaries and re-allocation of resources were needed in order to implement the programme, and WFP assisted approximately 55,000 ex-combatants and 270,000 dependants through the DDRR programme.

Conversely, the Afghanistan programme reduced planning figures from 100,000 troops to be demobilized at the outset of the programme to 40,000 to 60,000 currently.

**3.6. Public Information:** Public Information (PI) campaigns took place in a majority of cases. Most were led by the coordinating bodies and involved the other agency partners and communities. Only the Uganda CO explicitly noted WFP's role as a coordinating partner for Public Information initiatives. Broad-based PI campaigns took place in Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Media used to deliver the DDRR message include television, radio, leaflets, speeches, and in the case of Liberia, public figures/comedians were cited as an especially effective way to spread the message for the second phase of the programme. Word-of-mouth has also been a component in several programme strategies. In Sierra Leone, demobilized ex-combatants who had gone through the programme played a role in generating interest in the programme among other combatants. In some cases, such as in Rwanda, specific PI initiatives were targeted to address vulnerable groups and the dependants of ex-combatants.

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<sup>15</sup> Action for Southern Africa. 2002. *Angola Peace Monitor*.  
<http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0809.htm>.

Issues related to PI were raised in Afghanistan where military commanders, who were charged with informing their troops about the ANBP, used misinformation to stall the DDRR process. And in Burundi a persistent lack of information was found, and a new, targeted strategy to reach the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) government soldiers and other combatants was initiated and Terms of Reference (TORs) for strengthening outreach were agreed to.

Effective PI can also play an important role in managing security and reducing tensions. Expectations of ex-combatants and their dependants should be set according to the realities of the programme to avoid possible instability caused by resentment or disappointment. Reports of a disconnect between the explanation of the benefits to be received in Liberia as communicated in the Public Information campaign, and the actual distribution of benefits during the first phase of the DDRR programme reportedly created frustration for the ex-combatants and the situation during the first phase was volatile.

**3.7. Re-recruitment:** Re-recruitment of ex-combatants into fighting groups has been reported in some cases, however most WFP COs did not indicate that they have witnessed or learned of re-recruitment taking place in the DDRR camps. The survey responses suggest that more often, ex-combatants who again take up arms are doing so after they have passed through the demobilization programmes. In Sierra Leone, the CO indicated that during the resumption of hostilities some ex-combatants went back to join rebel movements, in some cases switching alliances from the government army to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel movement and the technical coordination committee led efforts to address the issue. In Liberia, as previously mentioned, there have been reports of the movement of re-recruited ex-combatants into Guinea. As well, the Liberian CO indicated reports of the re-recruitment of child soldiers and their movements into neighboring countries. Child combatants are especially vulnerable to re-recruitment and specific issues related to the re-recruitment of children affiliated with armed groups are discussed later in this report under the *Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups* section (p.34).

**3.8. Security:** Normally, demobilization and reintegration programmes take place in the context of unstable socio-political situations. Peace remains fragile, dangerous accumulations of weapons are often present, and a relapse into violence remains possible. This volatility makes security a main area of priority in running DDRR programmes. Security, at a basic level, must be present to ensure that the programme can operate and that beneficiaries receive their benefits. When asked about the main constraints faced by WFP in supporting DDRR, five COs indicated ‘Insecurity’ as a main constraint. Security mechanisms in place in a DDRR programme should be prepared to address various types of security incidents, including, inter alia, rioting, hostage-taking, banditry and looting.

In Uganda, no major issues related to security were noted, however the CO reported incidences where slight delays in food deliveries “raised sentiments” among the ex-combatants and WFP staff had to pacify the situation before being able to leave the designated camp. In Sierra Leone, the CO also cited an increase in hostilities in the

functional DDRR camps, which resulted in restricting WFP's implementation of food distribution and the monitoring of its use.

In Liberia, the CO reported that WFP faced serious security threats, for example, during the first phase of the DDRR in December 2003, WFP staff among other UN staff (UNDP, UNICEF, and UNMIL) and NGOs were taken as hostages by ex-combatants in the cantonment site and held for three and a half hours. The ex-combatant hostage-takers said they were under the impression that they would get the \$150 transitional allowance, but instead they only received food (as previously discussed in the *Public Information* section). Additionally, because the DD camp was not ready to receive them, they "revolted," which temporarily halted to the disarmament (first phase).

These examples underscore that close coordination between all parties involved in the DDRR process remains a key issue and a necessary component to ensuring staff safety when operating in the DD camps and to preventing programmes from having a destabilizing effect. These are lessons learned, which should be reinforced with the coordinating actors, especially those in charge of providing security for the sites. In most cases this responsibility is held primarily by either the UN mission present in the country or national governments.

#### **IV. Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups**

The process of collecting data through the survey regarding beneficiaries recently targeted by WFP in the context of DDRR suggested that, where possible, more systematic documentation and collection of beneficiary data in future programmes should take place on a global HQ and country level. Where in some cases data regarding dependants, women, and child soldiers categories were available, in other cases this information was not captured by the CO. The data available on WFP beneficiaries assisted through DDRR is as follows (see table below):

(Table 4) BENEFICIARY INFORMATION

<b>Afghanistan</b>	40,000-60,000 male adult ex-combatants
<b>Angola</b>	In total Ex-combatants 54,986; Dependants 270,248
<b>Burundi</b>	14,000 Ex-combatants in the first year, 55,000 total planning figure
<b>Congo, Republic of</b>	2,071 Male Ex-combatants
<b>DRC</b>	15,000 Child Soldiers Per Year (30,000 over 2 years according to PRRO)
<b>Guinea</b>	4,000 ex-combatants (men and women) plus families, however no figure given for this group
<b>Liberia</b>	In total 64,540 assisted at the time of the survey; Ex combatants Males 52,789; Ex combatants Females 11,751*(part of them were abducted during the war and acted as "bush wives"); Dependants Total 193,620 (each adult ex-combatant has 3 dependant beneficiaries); Children affiliated with armed groups 1,183; Disabled Combatants 323
<b>Rwanda</b>	In total 16,125; Ex-combatants Males 13,650; Ex-combatants Females 111; Underage combatants 2,364
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Ex-combatants/militaries 45,000
<b>Somalia</b>	In total: 180; Ex-combatants Males: 150; Ex-combatants Females: 30
<b>Tajikistan</b>	731 combatants and civilians resettled
<b>Uganda</b>	In total 1,930; Ex-combatants Males 1,800; Children affiliated with armed groups 130

**4.1. Gender:** Incorporating a gender perspective in DDRR should be a priority in programme planning and the lessons learned from cases studied can offer guidelines for addressing the needs of women and girls affiliated with armed groups. Although most often targeting and registration is handled through the national coordinating structure for DDRR, it is important that, when possible, WFP advocate for addressing the particular issues facing women and girls in the context of DDRR and plan programmes accordingly.

An illustrative case study of gender issues related to DDRR is offered in the experience of the national programme in Sierra Leone. In the first stages of the programme, an individual was required to surrender a weapon in order to obtain ex-combatant status and demobilize through DDRR. This requirement caused many women, girls, and other young people to be ineligible to participate in the formal process. During the period between the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement and the official start of the programme, many women and girls (as well as male child soldiers) “spontaneously demobilized” in order to get away from the armed forces and/or their “bush husbands.”

When they returned to obtain formal support, women and girls faced exclusion from the formal process as commanders collected weapons and redistributed them to selected individuals. Later, when adjustments were made to the programme, commanders were asked to name and attest to an individual’s status as a combatant/former combatant. In both cases, women were often the subjects of discrimination, which made it difficult for them to find reintegration support. Also an issue with respect to ensuring the inclusion of women affiliated with armed groups in the formal DDRR process is the common practice of excluding women who did not actually fight but served other roles in the fighting groups. The Sierra Leone programme distinguished between “ex-combatants” and those who had been recruited into armed groups to serve in various functions. Consequently many individuals who served as cooks, porters, or sex slaves, for example, were classified as “dependants” making them unable to participate in the demobilization and excluded many women and girls from receiving benefits given to ex-combatants.<sup>16</sup>

Due to increased advocacy efforts within the international humanitarian community and field experience gained in DDRR, programmes are mainstreaming a gender perspective in their programming. In WFP’s recent experience, either WFP or programme partners were involved with addressing the needs and rights of female combatants to some extent, namely in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Somalia.

In Somalia, the DDRR programme offered separate housing and toilet facilities and targeted specific sensitization messages to women. While in Liberia, female ex-combatants and women associated with, or abducted by, the armed groups were screened and received counseling by NGOs to identify who had been abducted, raped, or suffered any form of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV).

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<sup>16</sup> Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. 2002. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and Gender Based Violence in Sierra Leone. Excerpts from *Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone*: p. 3.

Both the Uganda and Liberia COs felt there was, in each case, an opportunity for WFP to increase support to gender-based programmes for abducted female ex-combatants, female child soldiers, and other vulnerable groups and that further cooperation with specialized agencies dealing with these categories would ensure that WFP support is properly provided.

As well, Burundi's programme plan, although not yet implemented, offers a good example of a robust interagency plan with various measures in place to address the needs of women and girls affiliated with armed groups including:

- Information and training to Joint Liaison Teams and UNOB concerning eligibility of female ex-combatants for assistance;
- Sensitization of armed groups about the eligibility of female ex-combatants for DRR assistance;
- Ensuring that benefits for ex-combatants are equally accessible to men and women;
- Encouraging implementing partners to facilitate participation of female ex-combatants;
- Encouraging female ex-combatants to participate in women's associations
- Including partners of ex-combatants and women in communities of return in community-level counseling;
- Strengthening gender awareness and capacity of the staff of the Executive Secretariat (ES) of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) and authorities of the communities to which a significant number of returning female ex-combatants;
- Monitoring the impact of the programme on partners of ex-combatants and women in communities of return and bringing emerging problems to the attention of relevant authorities.

After the completion of the Burundi programme, knowledge from this more robust programme strategy should be gained through evaluation and lessons learned initiatives in order to inform future integrated DDRR initiatives.

**4.2. Disabled Combatants:** Disabled soldiers need special assistance and support in the context of DDRR. In the cases of Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Rwanda, the COs mention initiatives built into programmes to address, to some degree, the particular needs of disabled combatants, though most activities give primary attention to their medical needs versus long-term integration into society.

In Burundi, the plan anticipates that the DDRR programme will seek to systematically address the medical and economic rehabilitation needs of disabled ex-combatants. The programme plans to finance medical rehabilitation assistance for disabled combatants and reinforce key medical facilities to provide prosthesis and physiotherapy. In cases where ex-combatants are unable to pursue economic activities, the plan anticipates that the programme will facilitate the deferral of benefits to a family member.

In Liberia, disabled, or amputee ex-combatants were screened by the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs and then referred to specialist clinics for further care. At the time of the survey, 323 disabled combatants had been identified as disabled and treated through the programme. In Rwanda, a three-year operational plan is in place for the medical rehabilitation and treatment of various categories of handicapped and chronically ill ex-combatants.

Though not mentioned in the cases studied here, agencies such as the ILO focus on longer-term reintegration support and advocate for mainstream assistance services to adopt the capacity to include people with disabilities. For example, the ILO developed a manual in Cambodia on the adaptation of construction tools so that amputees could engage in infrastructure work, and afterwards use these tools in their agricultural labor.<sup>17</sup> WFP should consider where synergies might exist with these kinds of projects, such as in FFW/FFT initiatives.

**4.3. People Living with HIV/AIDS:** In many countries, HIV/AIDS is a salient issue in the context of DDRR, as potentially high rates of infection among the fighting groups have serious implications for combatants and their livelihoods, their families, and the receiving communities. Of the programmes examined in this survey, those in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone incorporate an HIV/AIDS strategy specific to DDRR.

In Burundi, the programme plan, although not yet implemented, offers some model strategies for addressing the needs of HIV/AIDS affected groups. The demobilization will seek to coordinate closely with the existing national AIDS programme to handle counseling and treatment of ex-combatants and their families in communities of settlement. Specific activities that will be conducted for all ex-combatants during the demobilization process include:

- Initial sensitization
- Pre-test counseling
- Voluntary testing (every effort would be made to have facilities available to run the confirmatory test in the field for ex-combatants who test positive on the first screening test)
- Post-test counseling

Ex-combatants who test negative will be given an individual counseling session and receive the standard information, education and communication material and condom package. Ex-combatants who test positive undergo confirmatory testing, receive intensive post-test counseling, are given condoms, and are referred to a local hospital for management and support for potential opportunistic infections.

During the reintegration phase in Burundi, in collaboration with activities envisaged under the national AIDS programme, the following activities will be considered in the reintegration phase:

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<sup>17</sup> Specht, I. Jobs for Demobilized Rebels and Soldiers: Early Preparedness and Sustaining Capacities. International Labour Organisation InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction.

- Referring HIV positive ex-combatants to the organizations responsible for implementing the national AIDS program;
- Encouraging HIV-positive ex-combatants to join or establish support groups of people living with HIV/AIDS;
- Utilizing ex-combatant networks to disseminate HIV/AIDS sensitization in communities of settlement; and
- Transferring economic reintegration assistance of HIV/AIDS affected ex-combatants who are unable to resume economic activities to a family member.

The Burundi CO however reinforced that these strategies, while valuable, are still in the preliminary stages and might not be undertaken as planned. Therefore the inclusion of these measures in this report should be seen primarily as a possible model for future DDDR programmes.

In Liberia, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is implementing an HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) awareness campaign in the demobilization sites, including the distribution of condoms and the partial treatment of STI. The programme also focuses on adolescent female ex-combatants, pregnant women, and any other vulnerable group.

In Rwanda, ex-combatants have been provided with counseling services, including Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) and those found to be HIV positive are provided with medical rehabilitation services. Long term treatment would be under the World Bank funded Multi-country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa (MAP).

In Sierra Leone, the CO noted that HIV/AIDS infection rates were relatively low and that HIV/AIDS was “not much of an issue.” The programme was, however, set up to address the medical needs of ex-combatants and follow-up programmes have been put in place to support the re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life through the food support and suitable training programmes and sensitization activities.

**4.4. Underage Combatants and Children Affiliated with Armed Groups:** UNICEF currently estimates that approximately 300,000 underage combatants have active roles associated with armed groups worldwide.

In relation to DDDR, child soldiers face many of the same discrimination issues discussed previously with respect to gender. Defining an “ex-combatant” through possession of a weapon or through a process of verification by a fighting group’s commander can, in some cases, exclude children affiliated with armed groups from receiving benefits from the process of formal demobilization. Moreover, without sustainable strategies for lasting reintegration targeted to these underage combatants, former child soldiers remain especially susceptible to re-recruitment.

According to the WFP survey, nine of the programmes cited “Demobilization of Child Soldiers” as a main goal of the demobilization programme. According to the beneficiary information provided, WFP has or will give assistance to over 33,000 children associated

with armed groups through the programmes included in this survey (the actual number is likely to be higher, as several programmes citing activity in this area, did not have numbers available for this beneficiary category). WFP's role in the demobilization of child soldiers has been mainly one of support, with UNICEF taking the lead in these programmes in seven of the eight countries assisting with the demobilization of child soldiers. The CO in Angola notes that an NGO will be addressing the needs of this group in cantonment areas.

### *Definition of a Child Soldier*

As defined by UNICEF, in accordance with the Cape Town Principles set down in the Cape Town Action Plan (1997):

“A child soldier is any child—boy or girl—under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition therefore does not refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried, weapons.”<sup>18</sup>

According to the 2004-2005 PRRO for DRC, WFP's support to demobilization activities focuses exclusively on children affiliated with armed groups. The WFP programme currently underway plans to provide daily rations to 30,000 beneficiaries (15,000 each year) at UNICEF training centres.

In Afghanistan, underage soldiers are immediately introduced to a parallel program run by UNICEF. Likewise, in Uganda, underage ex-combatants were, through UNICEF, relocated to a training center operated by a local community based organization, Participatory Rural Action for Development (PRAFORD), where they received skills training and counseling.

In Burundi, child soldiers represent a significant target group (an estimated 8,000 beneficiaries) and the DDRR programme plan includes family tracing and unification, trauma counseling and psycho-social care, and the facilitation of access to education and recreation in communities of settlement. Children older than 15 may have different needs and receive appropriate support (e.g. vocational training). In Burundi, child soldiers also receive an extra ration for family members, mainly because child soldiers do not benefit from the cash demobilization grant offered to other programme beneficiaries.

In Rwanda, the programme is in a longer-term reintegration phase and a study will be launched to assess needs of many of the child ex-combatants who have already

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 1997. *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices*, [http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Cape\\_Town\\_Principles.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Cape_Town_Principles.pdf).

demobilized, followed up by the development of an actionable plan. Many of these beneficiaries have either been reunited with their families, or have found foster homes.

In Liberia, child ex-combatants are screened at the demobilization sites, and moved to Interim Care Centers (ICCs) specializing in counseling and reunifications of child ex-combatants managed by child protection agencies, with the overall support of UNICEF. WFP is providing wet feeding and dry take-home rations to ex-combatants in the ICCs. The CO in Liberia noted several issues related to the demobilization of child soldiers. In Liberia, there have been reports of commanders “recruiting” children, who presumably were not previously involved in the fighting, to the demobilization camps, and demanding from them \$40 to enter the DDRR process. Also, it has been reported by some child protection and human rights groups, that some of the child ex-combatants are being recruited back to armed groups and being sent to neighboring countries. This is a worrying development not only from a protection perspective, but it could also suggest further instability in the sub-region.

### *Child Soldiers and Re-recruitment*

Underage ex-combatants are particularly vulnerable to re-recruitment, and all actors assisting child soldiers should be aware of this vulnerability. According to a study conducted by Save the Children on the demobilization of child soldiers in DRC between 1999 and 2002, analysis suggests that re-recruitment results more from harassment and force by local military authorities than from the child’s choice. The report sites that as an estimate, only five percent of cases are voluntary, 85 percent are re-recruited by force, and 10 percent by harassment or incitement. This suggests re-entry into the armed forces is less likely to be driven simply by poverty, although a significant number of underage combatants join armed groups because of promises of money.<sup>19</sup>

**4.5. Receiving Community Needs:** The receiving community should be seen a key actor in DDRR. Their relationship to the ex-combatants can be complex. Not always are the communities where ex-combatants will reintegrate, the ex-combatant’s community of origin. Tensions in relations can persist. This is particularly true under conditions of armed conflict, when processes of ‘cleansing’ and displacement may have broken previous alliances and relationships of trust and cooperation.<sup>20</sup> To understand the needs and dynamics of the receiving community, it is beneficial that agency staff working on the demobilization understand its socio-political context.

Overall, programme activities should aim to foster reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in the communities of settlement and to strengthen the social cohesion, not create further destabilization. It is important to consider whether benefits offered to ex-

<sup>19</sup> Verhey, B. (Save the Children). 2003. Going Home: Demobilising and reintegrating child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo: pp.54-55

<sup>20</sup> Jensen, S. & Stepputat, F. 2001. Demobilizing Armed Civilians. Centre for Development Research. CDR Policy Paper - Centre for Development Research.

combatants might cause resentment among these populations, which are also most often war-affected with significant humanitarian, economic, and social needs. Actors contributing to DDRR programmes have adopted different strategies for addressing these issues. The ILO, for example, advocates for the earliest possible end to differentiation between the assistance offered to ex-combatants and members of the receiving community, in order to assist with the reintegration process.<sup>21</sup> In line with this approach, WFP Angola noted that specific targeting of ex-combatants was not the best way to reintegrate former soldiers of UNITA. Once possible, these beneficiaries were integrated in the category of IDPs and were no longer differentiated and to date. Some of these individuals are still benefiting under FFW/FFA programmes.

In the cases examined in the survey, the DDRR programmes often provided a component of assistance to the receiving community, and in some cases, WFP contributed directly to these efforts. In other cases, the programmes have been focused exclusively on the ex-combatants. As previously mentioned, in Afghanistan, the national DDRR programme focused on the individual soldier rather than on the community, mainly because ex-combatants are already integrated in their communities and most are living at home with their families. Even so, ANBP and other actors have taken some steps to include a community element in their programs, such as providing on-the-job construction training to ex-combatants while rehabilitating community priorities like schools, clinics and roads. In some regions, community members are welcome to join in the literacy classes offered to ex-combatants. ANBP also offers a demining program, where ex-combatants clear a community priority piece of land. The CO also reported programme integration with a national road-building program. It was also noted that while the CO would like to expand this community element of the program, currently there is no funding allocated to these activities. In Angola, insecure populations and vulnerable groups were assisted by WFP through Community Kitchens, Nutritional Programmes and Therapeutic Feeding Centres.

In Burundi, an assessment will take place to identify and mitigate social and environmental impacts of the DDRR programme, outline targeted monitoring and evaluation activities, and propose institutional capacity-building activities. Facilitators working with ex-combatants will undertake activities and public information campaigns to promote the social reintegration process, including sensitization and confidence building, information and counseling on STI, HIV/AIDS, health and sanitation, conflict analysis and reconciliation in areas of real or potential conflict.

In Liberia, the main focus of programmes directed at the receiving communities will be restoring basic health and education facilities, access to safe water, and livelihoods.

In Sierra Leone, communities that volunteered to receive the ex-combatants participated and received special government assistance.

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<sup>21</sup> Specht, I. Jobs for Demobilized Rebels and Soldiers: Early Preparedness and Sustaining Capacities. International Labour Organisation InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction.

## **V. Funding and Resources**

The main lesson learned from the survey in the area of funding and resources is that demobilization and reintegration programmes, because of their time sensitivity and unpredictability, require the rapid availability of funds as well as flexibility in funding allocation. Like other initiatives in the context of transition, programmes are susceptible to changes in scope, protractions, and delays caused by factors often outside of WFP's control, and would benefit from funding mechanisms that could adjust, and 'see the course' of the programme through to successful, sustainable reintegration. When asked to provide main constraints experienced relating to the programmes, five COs indicated "Resources" as an issue (mostly in terms of resource availability, however Uganda noted a lack of donor flexibility with respect to resources).

Specifically, funding of reintegration efforts has been of concern in recent DDRR programmes, and the Rwanda CO noted that with additional resources, WFP could provide further assistance to the reintegration process by providing a 'reintegration package' and 'start-up' programmes. The Liberia DDRR programme also faces a significantly under-funded appeal, raising concerns about the sustainability of successful reintegration.

In Afghanistan, the CO noted that the United States government prohibited the use of their commodities in the DDRR programme and that WFP was required to 'repay' with other food commodities to projects in which US commodities were originally intended.

**5.1. Budgets and Programming:** In the countries participating in the survey, the majority of the WFP demobilization programmes have been funded as part of a broader PRRO or, in the cases of Sierra Leone and Republic of Congo, an EMOP. The DDRR programmes themselves, in most cases; required budgets of less than 10 million dollars, with only Angola's programme falling in the 10-30 million dollar range.

**5.2. Funding:** While most programmes did not note specific funding issues, Liberia's PRRO is only 60 percent funded and the CO has voiced concerns regarding funding for the Reinsertion and Reintegration portion of the DDRR programme (and the long-term sustainability of the demobilization).

**5.3. CAP and Special Appeals:** Most DDRR programmes were not part of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) or part of any special appeal. The Liberia CO noted that a number of agencies participating in the CAP felt that the process of producing one related document did not add value, and that only a few donors have made reference to the CAP in pledging commitments. This suggests the appeal process doesn't necessarily drive the allocation of resources, and perhaps rather can be seen primarily as a way to demonstrate to donors a high level of interagency coordination and integrated needs assessment. The CAP can also be viewed as a powerful advocacy tool.

**5.4. Donors and External Funding Sources:** The most frequently mentioned main external partners/donors for demobilization among the programmes examined were:

- World Bank – 7
- DFID/UK – 6
- ECHO/EU – 6
- ICRC/IFRC – 3
- USAID – 3
- Japan – 2
- National Committee / Government Body – 2
- Canada - 1
- DANIDA -1
- Ireland - 1
- Portugal – 1
- UNDP Trust Fund - 1

## **VI. Coordination Among Partners and Peacekeepers:**

**6.1. Implementing Partners:** Overall, most of the WFP demobilization activities were executed through implementing partner organizations, and this approach was considered advantageous. NGOs can offer local knowledge, connection to the communities, and areas of specialized competence that enhance the effectiveness of the programmes.

(Table 5) WFP's IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

<b>Afghanistan</b>	Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)
<b>Angola</b>	Oxfam- Water and Sanitation; Save the Children- Distribution of commodities; CARE- Distribution of food; World Vision- Distribution of food
<b>Burundi</b>	National Committee for DDR (govt body)
<b>Congo, Republic of</b>	BIT
<b>DRC</b>	No response provided
<b>Guinea</b>	No response provided
<b>Liberia</b>	Premiere Urgence and Norwegian Refugees Council, implemented the wet feeding and dry rations distribution programmes
<b>Rwanda</b>	Rwanda Demobilization Commission
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Oxfam; Save the Children; IRC
<b>Somalia</b>	Elman Peace Center
<b>Tajikistan</b>	None
<b>Uganda</b>	ACF-USA

Of all programmes considered for the survey, only the WFP Afghanistan demobilization programme did not, or was not planning to, work with an implementing partner. It was also found that in some cases, the national DDRR commission (such as in the case of Rwanda) implemented or will implement the food assistance directly.

Overall, the main concerns noted regarding working with Implementing Partners related to security concerns, coordination and capacity. Rwanda cited poor coordination among partners as an issue, and Somalia cited issues of weak capacity on the part of the local partner. Of those COs that shared positive comments, Liberia noted that the international NGOs implemented the programmes well, despite security, logistical and coordination constraints. Sierra Leone cited as a lesson learned from their experience, that delivering

food assistance through implementing partners proved more effective [than direct implementation by WFP]. The Uganda CO found that working with ACF-USA was largely positive and the CO noted that the implementing partner's "flexibility, commitment and local/cultural knowledge proved crucial for handling the DDRR, especially when sentiments went high during the process."

**6.2. Coordination with UN Peacekeeping:** In about half of the cases, an official UN peacekeeping mission was present. When given the opportunity to provide input regarding WFP's experience coordinating with UN Peacekeepers, most COs didn't respond. However, in Liberia, the main constraints noted were the weakness of coordination, planning and consultation mechanisms in areas where humanitarian actors' involvement was required. In Rwanda, it was mentioned that there was no direct coordination with peacekeepers.

It is relevant to note the challenges relating to humanitarian activity coordinating with peacekeeping operations, especially in the context of transition where there is often a host of humanitarian, political, and military actors working under different or overlapping mandates in a given situation. However essential the process, and however appropriate participation by humanitarian actors in transition may be, these intersections will continue to raise questions regarding the relationship between humanitarians and peacekeepers.

### ***Humanitarians Principles and Peacekeeping***

Humanity, Impartiality, and Neutrality remain the fundamental organizing principles for humanitarian organizations, and require that assistance be delivered on the basis of need rather than to serve political ends. However in transition situations, the overarching goal of the integrated UN response goes beyond emergency relief to the consolidation of peace. As an actor in the space, WFP as an agency with a predominantly humanitarian mandate, should consider each situation carefully and navigate coordination with non-humanitarian actors in such a way so as not to compromise its image as a neutral actor. Adherence to humanitarian principles remains an invaluable operational asset, which is leveraged in securing access to vulnerable populations and plays an important role in supporting the safety of its staff.

**6.3. Interagency Coordination:** DDRR programmes are complex exercises that require a significant degree of coordination between all relevant departments, funds, programmes and agencies to ensure that humanitarian and political efforts compliment and reinforce one another. Effective coordination among actors is essential in achieving success in every aspect of demobilization and reintegration and maintaining the security of staff.

According to the survey, most frequently (in five cases), the demobilization activities were/are led by a government appointed National Coordinating Structure. The second most frequently mentioned body taking the lead in DDRR coordination is the UN Mission present in the country (three cases). It was also mentioned that UNDP has led

coordination in two cases, and the World Bank and OCHA were also mentioned as having a leadership role.

### *A Shared Strategy*

“A single coherent strategy for all UN System actors is imperative in transition contexts and should undergird political and operational synergies, though the strategy need not imply the operational integration UN system actors.”

- *Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues*

The partners involved in the demobilization programmes included in the survey are numerous. The main UN partners, those involved a majority of the time, are UNDP and UNICEF (which primarily addresses the demobilization of child soldiers and other protection activities). Also frequently mentioned are: the UN Missions, OCHA, WHO, and IOM. Noted in certain examples are other actors: DDA, DPA, FAO, ILO, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict (OSRSG/CAC), UNFPA, and UNHCR. With main external partners including ICRC/IFRC.

Overall, most COs emphasized that while the experience of coordinating with partner agencies was largely positive, and crucial to the success of the programme, issues existed and opportunities for better coordination were identified.

In Uganda, the CO notes that planning and coordination was effective with high levels of commitment seen from all parties. Relatively much time is needed for the planning and coordination of such an exercise from a WFP perspective in relation to WFP resources involved. WFP comparative advantage in terms of being a neutral, effective and responsive agency was well recognized by all parties (government, implementing partner, donors, local community and ex-combatants).

Angola noted that “The coordination was well-organized and the information flew around the partners.”

In Burundi, the CO noted that there are several coordination mechanisms in place at the UN Interagency and World Bank levels, donor, as well as government levels; however there are “fears of a coordination overload” since the establishment of the UN mission.

In Rwanda, the CO noted good planning between UNICEF and WFP, but indicated that the World Bank had failed both organizations, as all the funding was handed over to the government of Rwanda at their request and to avoid duplication and WFP ended assistance to the programme.

In Liberia, WFP’s interagency coordination experience has been positive to date, with the CO noting that the Joint Implementation Unit was an adequate mechanism of

coordination, planning and implementation. However, Liberia also noted that it would have been better if WFP were involved in the initial stages of the implementation framework, to ensure that WFP be prepared for the disarmament in the early stages and plan resources accordingly.

In Sierra Leone, interagency coordination enhanced the programme experience and showed that no single agency would have achieved as much without joint efforts. They added that it is more effective to collaborate with stakeholders in planning and implementation, and that “good coordination requires constant contacts and effective planning—and that with DDRR, a dynamic plan is required for the ever-changing scenarios.”

The Liberia CO noted that with respect to interagency coordination, it was “a good experience to exchange with partners through meetings, presentations, weekly technical coordination meetings, forum meetings, operational meetings, and joint missions in the field.”

The Rwanda CO found that WFP was not a major partner in the DDRR programme there, and that food assistance was used only as an incentive during sensitization, which was more important than other assistance such as FFW for infrastructure rehabilitation.

In the case of Somalia, the CO noted that, even if the roles are clearly identified and agreed upon, interagency coordination in the context of DDRR is an issue to be carefully considered, particularly in the case of Somalia where there is no national coordination body but instead interagency coordination takes place at the level of the Somalia Coordination Body (the SACB), led by a national NGO.

The Liberia CO also made a recommendation to enhance WFP’s work on DDRR by increasing cooperation at the HQ and Regional Bureau levels with the World Bank, DDA, DPKO, UNDP, and any other main body involved in disarmament.

## **VII. Guidance Materials, Data, and Baseline Information**

One goal of the survey was to take stock of the available resources for, and gaps in, data and guidance available to support COs during the planning and implementation of demobilization and reintegration programmes. The findings of the survey indicate that there are a variety of sources from which to draw relevant information, data, and case studies; however there is an opportunity for WFP to enhance currently available guidance, and consolidate additional relevant materials and make those materials easily accessible to the COs engaged in planning to support DDRR.

**7.1. Guidance Materials:** Overall, the survey found that COs used a variety of guidance materials from a host of different sources (including, inter alia, government data, data obtained from UN Agencies, and data from the World Bank. Often guidance materials used were often developed at the country or regional level. In five cases, COs used the

*Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (DDRR programmes).*

- WFP Afghanistan used lessons learned and case studies from other programmes and material from experts in DDRR, but also noted a survey of the combatants was not conducted due to time and estimates were taken from data provided by the Ministry of Defense.
- In Burundi and Sierra Leone, the COs used materials from the website for the *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Greater Lakes Region* (<http://www.mdrp.org>).
- In Angola, lists of former combatants were issued and coordination documents were distributed by OCHA while Nutritional Baseline surveys were done by the UN Agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO).
- In Liberia, the CO used the “Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program, Strategy and Implementation Framework” and WFP’s current operational guidelines.
- In Rwanda, information from the World Bank was used and the government of Rwanda provided information on demobilization numbers.

When asked to indicate what types of information and data would be most useful in the planning of future DDRR programmes, seven COs indicated “Baseline data on combatants,” six noted “Vulnerability profiles,” three COs noted “Government data,” and Sierra Leone noted “Socio-economic, cultural situation, and operational context.”

**7.2. Operational Guidelines:** When asked to provide information with regard to the utility of the current WFP Operational Guidelines, most COs did not provide input however the Liberia CO noted that the WFP guidelines were “very useful in the implementation of Food Aid Component in the DDRR. However, there is a need to adjust these guidelines in each context of ongoing DDRR programmes.”

In looking at the content of the current Operational Guidelines vis-à-vis the responses to the survey, overall the current guidelines are adequate in providing information and guidance with respect to WFP assistance to DDRR and in most cases effectively reflect the current reality of DDRR programmes. However, there were instances where practice continues to diverge from recommendations in the guidelines. As well, several areas could benefit from minor revisions and additional content.

In general, illustrative anecdotal lessons learned in dealing with coordination and security issues (most notably in Liberia), innovative programme plans (Burundi), updated definitions and strategies, and updated information regarding the initiatives currently underway among UN stakeholders to develop an integrated approach to DDRR, would be useful additions to the guideline document.

With respect to context, the guidelines generally situate DDRR in the context of an official peacekeeping mission. In about half the cases, a peacekeeping mission was present, attributing many of the administrative functions and support activities to UN actors. However, the guidelines should account for cases where the national government is acting as the lead coordinating agency.

The guidelines also consistently reinforce the four-stage process for DDRR (as previously discussed), however, as seen in the case of Afghanistan, when disarming civilian ex-combatants living in their home communities, phases of the programme differ (registration, symbolic demobilization, and recognition). The guidelines would benefit from a brief discussion of how programme design can differ based on the types of combatants being demobilized.

Currently the discussion of underage, female, and disabled combatants is treated in a very limited way. As well, there is no discussion of how the issue of DDRR relates to HIV/AIDS or strategies to address this population. In the Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups section of the operational guidelines, readers of the document could benefit from an expanded discussion of issues relating to vulnerable groups to be included in programme, the specific challenges posed, and the strategies available to address their needs.

Finally, with many DDRR exercises occurring in a Regional framework, there could be more discussion around the roles of the Regional Bureaux and HQ in the context of DDRR.

## **VIII. Reporting and Programme Evaluations**

An important practice recommended in the *Operational Guidelines* relates to beneficiary data reporting and post-programme evaluation. Overall the survey found that very limited efforts have been taken to capture and share lessons learned through WFP's experience assisting DDRR programmes. As well, very little evaluation has taken place both internally and externally.

**8.1. External Evaluation:** Three cases mentioned external evaluation activities including: Congo which listed evaluation by auditors, donor governments, and recipient governments evaluations; Liberia which indicated evaluation by auditors; and Sierra Leone, which indicated a WFP report review.

**8.2. Country Office Evaluation:** Most WFP COs have not conducted, or are not planning to conduct, internal reporting or lessons learned exercises regarding the DDRR programmes. Somalia CO's, exceptionally, noted that monthly reporting is currently taking place and the programme completion report will be created.

## **IX. Constraints and Accomplishments**

**9.1. Main Constraints:** When asked to indicate the greatest constraints in supporting demobilization and reintegration, five COs indicated “Insecurity”; five COs indicated “Resources” (mostly in terms of resource availability, however Uganda noted a lack of donor flexibility with respect to resources), three COs indicated “Coordination Constraints”; four indicated “Incomplete Peace Process” (or delayed peace process); Liberia noted “poor interagency coordination”; and Somalia, in addition to indicating the need for more resources to be allocated to DDDR, also noted the need for capacity building among staff involved in the programmes.

**9.2. WFP’s Main Accomplishments:** Five of the COs responded when asked to provide WFP’s most significant accomplishments with respect to the DDDR programme.

In Afghanistan, the CO noted that WFP, through its flexibility, has been able to respond to the constantly changing implementation plan. The CO indicated that “it is very difficult to be a partner of ANBP, as the implementation plan is constantly changing. WFP has been extremely supportive by its flexibility, such as numbers of soldiers changing or the location of the distribution changing.”

In Liberia, the CO noted that WFP has contributed significantly to support the peace process, social and economic reintegration, and the resettlement plan (for IDPs and returnees).

In Rwanda, the CO listed the following main accomplishments:

- Food for training at the Veterans Vocational Training center
- Food for training during residential orientation periods
- Food-for-Work for infrastructure rehabilitation at demobilization centers
- Food-for-Work in support of projects for disabled combatants
- 3-month food reinsertion package

The Sierra Leone CO found the following accomplishments to be most significant:

- WFP provided the stipulated food and successfully linked the DDDR programme with reintegration food support.
- WFP was able to maintain effective coordination with all stakeholders.
- Even with resurgence of hostilities food stock were adequately controlled and maintained beyond the original planned dates of implementation.
- Contingency plans were utilized and ensured no disruptions to programme.
- Leftover food stocks were utilized at the end of programme ensuring minimal losses.

The Uganda CO indicated that all ex-combatants have been reintegrated and hostilities have ceased in Yumbe district and that WFP assistance proved crucial for confidence building.

## **X. Conclusions, Recommendations and Next Steps:**

Through the survey it has been confirmed that WFP has assisted a significant number of beneficiaries through DDRR programmes in past post-conflict situations and will likely continue to support future programmes. In light of this, efforts to assess WFP's experiences and optimize the execution of future programmes should continue, and information should be shared at all levels (CO, RB, and HQ) to support initiatives in DDRR. The following conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings of the survey as well as on the review of the current literature on DDRR.

### Funding and Resources

Resources were noted by a majority of WFP COs as a primary constraint in DDRR programmes. The findings of the survey reinforced the view that, like other initiatives in the context of transition, DDRR programmes are susceptible to changes in scope, protraction, and delays caused by factors often outside of WFP's control, and would benefit from funding mechanisms that could adjust, and 'see the course' of the programme through to successful, sustainable reintegration.

### Interagency Planning

Though it is accepted as a desired practice that early planning should take place at the interagency and the WFP levels, in some cases WFP's involvement in the planning process is not taking place sufficiently in advance. Liberia, for example, had noted that earlier planning would have better allowed WFP to obtain and allocate resources. As well, early planning would allow WFP to act as a partner supporting the adoption of measures of success—such as the inclusion of strategies to address the needs of vulnerable groups. Although coordinating structures should act to involve WFP early on, WFP can do its part at the CO, RB, and HQ levels to proactively initiate involvement in the planning process following the 'triggers' for planning transition-related activities discussed in the report (progress to the advanced stages of peace negotiations, signing of ceasefire agreement/peace accord, a Security Council mandate, the establishment of a UN peace operation or deployment of a peace-keeping mission). These lessons should also be reinforced in the current interagency efforts to develop an integrated UN approach to DDRR being led by DPKO.

### Security, Coordination and Public Information

'Insecurity' was cited by a majority of COs as a key constraint in DDRR programmes. The environment in transition situations is often inherently insecure, however close coordination between all parties involved in the DDRR process can support staff safety when operating in the DD camps and prevent programmes from having a destabilizing effect. In Liberia, for example, the CO cited poor coordination as the cause of a hostage-taking incident in the DDRR camps. This lesson learned should be reinforced with the coordinating actors, especially those in charge of providing security for the sites, in most cases this is led by either the UN mission present in the country or national governments. Effective Public Information can also play an important role in managing security and reducing tensions. Expectations of ex-combatants and their dependants

should be set according to the realities of the programme to avoid possible instability caused by resentment or disappointment.

#### DDRR within Regional Frameworks

The findings of the survey suggest that recent DDRR is being viewed increasingly within regional frameworks, acknowledging links between activities related to the DDRR programme and the efforts to maintain and/or build peace and stability in neighboring countries. This perspective should be encouraged and reinforced with all partners at all stages of a DDRR programme. Country level initiatives should regularly feed information back into regional level planning and coordination efforts.

#### Monitoring and Evaluation

In addition to the standard WFP procedure for monitoring operations under a PRRO or EMOP, in the case of DDRR programmes it is particularly important for beneficiary data to be collected by category. For programme planning and coordination, it is important to understand the assistance that is being given to ex-combatants and dependants, by gender and by vulnerable group categories. It is also valuable to understand the phase during which the beneficiaries receive the benefits (during cantonment, in family areas, areas of resettlement). To date, the specificity of the programme data is inconsistent from country to country. In many cases, numbers were not available for different beneficiary categories. A more systematic procedure for reporting data should be implemented across WFP.

The survey also found that post-programme evaluation and efforts to capture and share lessons learned through WFP's experience in assisting DDRR have been very limited. Lessons-learned initiatives and evaluation of the short and long-term impacts of the programmes would be invaluable in continually optimizing the WFP/UN interagency approach to DDRR. WFP should ensure that an evaluation is conducted after the completion of every DDRR programme and that lessons learned are documented and shared within the organization to inform future policies and to enhance the value of guidance materials.

#### Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups

Although WFP rarely has a direct role in determining the eligibility of beneficiaries or categorizing ex-combatants in DDRR programmes, the findings of the survey suggest that during the planning process WFP should advocate for criteria that would prevent exclusion of vulnerable groups in the DDRR process. Some recent programmes have required individuals to surrender weapons in order to receive benefits through DDRR and this practice can exclude key groups, most commonly women and underage combatants who often "spontaneously" disarm/demobilize prior to the formal DDRR process. Often, underage combatants and women do not retain possession of such weapons and must rely on identification by their commanders. In addition, as previously mentioned, some programmes have not considered the dependants/families of ex-combatants or non-combatants affiliated with fighting groups as eligible for benefits. Experience has shown, such as in the case of Sierra Leone, that failure to anticipate the inclusion of dependants/families in the programme has required that the programme expand its

targeting during the operational phase. It would be advisable that WFP actors involved in the interagency planning process aim to reinforce with the national government and/or coordinating body, eligibility criteria that will support the success of DDRR and encourage the inclusion of vulnerable groups and the dependants of ex-combatants.

Progress seems to have been made in the efforts to address the needs of vulnerable groups through recent programming. In general, the survey found that the UN system agencies are adopting an integrated, holistic approach to DDRR that includes the involvement of specialized actors and agencies to address some of the cross-cutting issues and the needs of vulnerable groups. This trend, although just beginning in practice, is in line with recommendations in the literature from recent years as well as the current DPKO-led initiative to develop a UN integrated approach to DDRR. Whereas in the past, strategies to address the needs of vulnerable groups have been limited, the programmes in Burundi and Liberia, for instance, offer examples of robust, integrated DDRR plans to address the requirements of vulnerable groups. Continued monitoring and information sharing should take place to understand the impact of these strategies geared toward vulnerable groups (women, underage combatants, disabled combatants, people affected by HIV/AIDS).

In particular, the approach to the demobilization of child soldiers should be looked at carefully. The results of the survey show that WFP is assisting regularly with the demobilization of underage combatants and in some cases, WFP is starting to adopt specific strategies for dealing with these beneficiaries. For example, in the case of Burundi, WFP offers extra rations to the family members of child soldiers, as these beneficiaries are not eligible for the cash grants distributed to adult ex-combatants.

The demobilization of child soldiers is viewed as both a strategy for the consolidation of peace, as well as a measure of child protection. Although WFP does not specialize in issues of child protection, the organization should consider what, within its mandate, WFP can do to encourage lasting demobilization and long-term integration of these beneficiaries who are especially vulnerable to re-recruitment. In most cases, UNICEF and other specialized partner agencies are leading the programmes aimed at the demobilization of child soldiers, however WFP could make special efforts to understand the issues and needs of this group, and identify where WFP can play a role in ensuring that those needs are addressed. As well, future learning from programmes geared exclusively toward the demobilization of child soldiers, such as the programme currently taking place in DRC, should be collected and shared among actors for optimization of future programmes.

#### Reintegration Support

To date, WFP's primary role in DDRR programmes tends to be focused primarily on providing food aid in the demobilization and reinsertion phases of the programme. Food aid is a critical input during these phases, however it is widely held that in order for DDRR programmes to have the desired effect of encouraging peace and stability, successful long-term reintegration of ex-combatants is most essential. Reintegration support, from a WFP perspective, is generally offered to ex-combatants after social

reinsertion through absorption into the broader resettlement programmes for war-affected populations, aside from some targeted FFW/FFT initiatives. Although this approach is economically viable, and in line with recommended strategies to encourage reintegration in terms of social identity, WFP should continue to evaluate its potential role in encouraging lasting conversion to civilian life among ex-combatants on a case-by-case basis. WFP should also consider the overall commitment to reintegration present in the design of the DDRR programme at the interagency level, and advocate for sufficient allocation of resources to this critical phase during interagency planning.

### Guidance Materials

In looking at the content of the current *WFP Operational Guidelines* vis-à-vis the responses to the survey, overall the current guidelines are adequate in providing relevant information and guidance with respect to WFP assistance to DDRR. However, the document could benefit from minor revisions and updates. In general, illustrative anecdotal lessons learned in dealing with coordination and security issues (most notably in Liberia), innovative programme plans (Burundi), updated definitions and strategies, and updated information regarding the DPKO-led initiative currently underway among UN actors to develop an integrated approach to DDRR, would be useful additions to the guideline document. As well, there is an opportunity for WFP to consolidate other sources of relevant guidance materials (such as project documentation, case studies, reports, programme evaluations/lessons learned) and make those materials easily accessible to the COs engaged in planning and programming related to supporting DDRR.

### *Next Steps*

- Disseminate survey results to all stakeholders and solicit feedback
- Update *WFP Operational Guidelines* to reflect the DPKO-led interagency initiative to develop a UN approach to DDRR (currently underway) and incorporate content consistent with lessons learned in this survey report
- Release updated *Operational Guidelines* at CO, RB, and HQ levels
- Make available online reviewed resources relevant to DDRR

## ANNEX I : Sample Questionnaire

### WFP DDRR Questionnaire

Name:

Title:

Country of Reference (in which DDRR programme has taken/will take place):

Approximate Time Period/planned time period of WFP's involvement in the demobilization programme: dd/mm/yy to dd/mm/yy to

#### **I. General Information/Context**

1. What were/are the overall objectives of the demobilization and reintegration programme (Check **ALL** that apply)
  - Support Peace Process
  - Social and economic reintegration
  - Demobilization of Child Soldiers
  - Promote national reconciliation
  - Reduce small arms
  - Other (please specify)
2. How many beneficiaries has/will WFP target? Please provide numbers for each:  
TOTAL  
Ex-combatants/militaries  
Other groups/civilians
3. What kind(s) of troops **and** how many were/are to be demobilized/assisted by WFP. Please check and provide numbers for ALL categories that apply:
  - Ex-combatants Government
  - Ex-combatants Paramilitary
  - Ex-combatants Rebel Group(s) (specify name and number)
  - Ex-combatants Civilian (insurgency/counter-insurgency)
  - Other (please specify)
4. Were cantonment sites were used/planned? If so, how many?
  - Yes (if yes, please specify)
  - No
5. Please check **any/all** of the following conditions that describe the context in which the programme took/will take place:
  - Ceasefire in place
  - Formal peace agreement has been/will be signed
  - Approved UN peacekeeping mission
  - Complex emergency
  - Initial phases of a peace process
  - In transition
  - In recovery/development
  - Following previous failed/postponed attempt(s) at demobilization
  - Other (please specify)

6. What was/will be the government's role in developing and implementing the demobilization and reintegration programme?

## II. Planning and Programming

7. At what stage in the transition process from conflict to peace did/will WFP begin programme planning?
- During the conflict (contingency planning)
  - Directly following ceasefire
  - Following Security Council peacekeeping resolution
  - Other (please specify timeframe)
8. Please describe any activities that were used/will be used to involve target beneficiaries in the planning process/programme design, if applicable.
9. What programming approach was (or will be) used (Mark **ALL** that apply)
- Incorporation of DDRR component into ongoing programmes (EMOP/PRRO)
  - Expansion of on-going programmes
  - Borrowing resources from existing development programmes
  - Launching of new programme (PRRO or EMOP)
  - Other
10. What were/will be the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries to receive DDRR assistance (Mark **ALL** that apply)?
- Food insecurity
  - Vulnerability
  - Possession of a weapon
  - Registered as "ex-combatant"
  - Other
11. What was the average food aid package received by each of the following categories of beneficiaries? Please fill in average, and tick information regarding the rations (standard 2100 kcal, below/above), and number of distributions (one-off versus multiple, etc.)

	Total average package (Kgs/person)	Standard 2,100 Kcal	Below standard	Above standard	One-off distribution	Multiple distributions
Ex-combatants		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dependants		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vulnerable Groups		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. Did WFP (will WFP) establish the above rations through coordination with the government and/or parties to the conflict?
- Yes  
 No
13. Please indicate, as applicable, any other related programs or activities implemented by WFP associated with the demobilization and reintegration programme: (Mark **ALL** that apply)
- Infrastructure rehabilitation  
 Logistics support  
 Humanitarian de-mining  
 Common air services (UNHAS)  
 Joint Logistics Services (UNJLC)  
 Other (please specify)
14. How did/will WFP coordinate the reintegration programme for ex-combatants with any other assistance programmes (e.g. for populations affected by the conflict, IDPs and/or refugees) that may have been/will be ongoing?
15. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned related to planning or programming in the context of DDDR assistance.

### III. Operational and Implementation Issues

16. Overall, how did/will the implementation of the program differ from what had/has been originally planned? In what ways did/will the program have to be adjusted?
17. Were the DDDR-related activities postponed or suspended at any time? Or if the programme is in planning phases, are any delays foreseen? Please provide the approximate dates of the programme's planned versus the actual duration. And if there were delays, or if delays are foreseen, please provide some information regarding the causes.
18. Did (or will) the disarmament and reintegration process have regional implications? If so, what strategies did/does WFP have in place to address this?
19. What strategies were used (or are planned to be used) to generate awareness among the combatants to be demobilized and their dependants regarding participation in and requirements of the program? Was a PI campaign carried out? Was it effective?

20. Please describe, if applicable, WFP's experience with the issue of re-recruitment of (ex-) combatants into armed groups during the course of the DDRR programme. Please provide information regarding measures that were taken (or are planned) to address this, highlighting any issues or lessons related to this subject.
  
21. Did WFP encounter any major security problems or constraints? Please specify the lead agency/organization in charge of security for the DDRR programme and provide any thoughts on the security context in which WFP operated (or will operate).
  
22. Overall, what opportunities were identified for improving WFP's role in supporting the DDRR programme operationally? What has the CO learned from the experience(s)?

#### **IV. Vulnerable Groups and Other Beneficiaries**

23. If applicable, please provide numbers for **EACH** category of beneficiary that WFP assisted (or plans to assist) as applicable:
  - In total
  - Ex-combatants Males
  - Ex-combatants Females
  - Widows of ex-combatants
  - Dependants Total
  - Underage combatants
  - Children affiliated with armed groups
  - Abducted female children
  - Disabled Combatants
  - Orphans
  - People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA)
  - Other beneficiary profiles (number and please specify)
  
24. If applicable, please describe any measures that were taken (or are planned) to address the issues related to and specific needs of female combatants (e.g. lodging, staff training, gender specialists, etc.).
  
25. If applicable, please describe any measures that were taken (or are planned) to address the issues related to and specific needs of disabled combatants?
  
26. If applicable, please describe any measures that were taken (or are planned) to address the issues related to and specific needs of beneficiaries of the DDRR assistance who living with HIV/AIDS?
  
27. If applicable, please describe any measures that were taken (or are planned)

to address the issues related to and specific needs of underage combatants and other children affiliated with armed groups in the context of the DDRR programme?

28. If applicable, please describe any measures that were taken (or have been planned) to address the issues related to and specific needs of the resident/receiving community?
29. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned related to vulnerable groups and other beneficiaries as they relate to DDRR assistance.

## V. Funding and Resources

30. What has been/will be the overall budget/cost of WFP's programmes and operations in support to the DDRR exercise?
- USD 0-10 million
  - USD 10-30 million
  - USD 30+ million
31. To what category was the demobilization activity assigned?
- EMOP
  - PRRO
  - Special Operation
  - Other (please specify)
32. Was the funding for the DDRR activities part of a special appeal process, a CAP (Consolidated Appeal Process) or drawn from UN assessed contributions?
- Special Appeal
  - CAP
  - UN assessed contribution (from peacekeeping mission)
  - None of the above
33. Approximately what percentage of the WFP appealed resources was actually donated? (Please provide approximate numbers or percentage if available)
34. If applicable, please share any information or lessons from WFP's participation in the special appeal or CAP process.
35. If applicable, please specify approximately what percentage of the WFP programme resources were allocated/will be allocated toward each of the following phases of the programme (if not applicable in terms of WFP participation, enter zero)
- Disarmament Phase
  - Demobilization Phase
  - Reinsertion Phase
  - Long-term Reintegration

36. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned regarding WFP's funding for DDDR programmes.

## VI. INGO Implementing Partners

37. Did WFP, or does WFP plan to, work with an implementing partner?
- Yes  
 No
38. If so, please specify who were/will be the main implementing partner(s) and indicate their primary responsibility. (Please mark and fill in text form for **ALL** that apply)
- Oxfam  
 WCC  
 Save the Children  
 CARE  
 World Vision  
 IRC  
 Other (please specify)  
 None
39. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned related to implementing partners in the context of DDDR assistance.

## VII. Peacekeeping Operations

40. Was there/will there be an official UN peacekeeping mission in place at the time that WFP was/will be supporting the DDDR programme?
- Yes  
 No
41. Please provide short inputs on WFP's experience with planning and/or coordinating the DDDR programme with the UN Peacekeeping mission? What main constraints or issues emerged?
42. Please share any examples of key constraints emerging from implementing humanitarian assistance in the context of a peacekeeping mission.

## VIII. Interagency Coordination

43. Who was the lead coordinating body/agency on the DDDR exercise?
- United Nations Mission/Office of SRSG  
 UNDP  
 OCHA  
 National Coordinating Agency  
 Other (please specify)  
 None

44. Who were the main UN partners? (Check **ALL** that apply)
- UNDP
  - OCHA
  - DDA
  - DPA
  - FAO
  - UNICEF
  - UNHCR
  - UNFPA
  - ILO
  - WHO
  - IOM
  - UNOPS
  - OSRSG/CAC (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict)
  - Other (please specify)
  - None
45. Who were the main external partners/donors? (Check **ALL** that apply)
- World Bank
  - USAID
  - DFID
  - ECHO/EU
  - ICRC/IFRC
  - Other (please specify)
  - None
46. Please assess WFP's experience with interagency planning and/or coordination for this programme, highlighting any issues, or lessons learned from the experience. Specifically do you feel the interagency team successfully leveraged WFP's comparative advantage(s), and the strengths of other agencies, when assigning DDRR-related tasks? Any other issues or lessons learned?
47. Please describe WFP's experience with planning and/or coordinating with national institutions for this programme highlighting any issues or lessons learned from the experience.
48. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned related to interagency coordination in the context of DDRR assistance.

## **IX. Guidance Materials and Baselines**

49. What kinds of guidance materials, tools or data were used/are being used for planning purposes in advance of the DDRR-related work?

50. What kinds of guidance materials, tools or data would be most helpful to have access to in the planning/programme design phase for future initiatives?
- Baseline data on combatants
  - Vulnerability profiles
  - Government data
  - Other
51. Did WFP use (or is WFP using) the current operational guidelines for demobilization and reintegration assistance (*Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (DDRR programmes) in Countries Emerging from Conflict Situations*)
- Yes
  - No
52. If the guidelines were used or are being used, please feel free to provide any specific feedback regarding their utility.

## X. Measurement and Reporting

53. What, if any, external or internal evaluation of WFP's DDRR-related work has taken place/will take place?
- WFP report review
  - Auditors
  - Donor Governments
  - Recipient Government
  - UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)
  - Other (please specify)
54. Please describe any evaluation and reporting the WFP CO has done or plans to do pertaining to evaluating the DDRR-related work?
55. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other issues or lessons learned related to measurement and reporting in the context of DDRR assistance.

## XI. Other Lessons Learned

56. What have been the greatest constraints in supporting demobilization and reintegration? (Please mark **ALL** that apply)
- Resources
  - Incomplete Peace Process
  - Insecurity
  - Lack of capacity
  - Poor planning at the interagency level
  - Poor planning at the WFP level
  - Coordination constraints
  - Other (please specify)

57. If the programme has been completed, or if it is underway, please share in the space below what you feel are/were opportune areas where WFP could improve in supporting DDDR programmes.
  
58. If the programme has been completed, or if it is underway, please share in the space below what you feel are/were WFP's most significant accomplishments and achievements in supporting the DDDR programme.
  
59. Please feel free to use the space below to highlight any other lessons learned, issues, or insights related to WFP's involvement in demobilization and reintegration programmes that have not yet been sufficiently covered by the survey.

You have reached the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your valuable input. Please return via email to Meagan Greenberg, WFP Emergency Preparedness and Response (ODAP) Unit.

## **ANNEX II: Results Matrix**



"Results Matrix.xls"

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