

4.11 SALW Control, Security and Development

Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Summary | 1 |
| 1. Module scope and objectives | 1 |
| 1.1. References | 2 |
| 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations | 2 |
| 3. Introduction | 2 |
| 4. DDR and SALW control | 4 |
| 5. International and regional agreements | 5 |
| 6. SALW control measures | 6 |
| 6.1. Aim and operational objectives of SALW control programmes | 6 |
| 7. Guiding principles | 7 |
| 8. Types of SALW control programmes | 9 |
| 8.1. Directed programmes | 9 |
| 8.2. Co-operative programmes | 9 |
| 8.3. National control programmes | 12 |
| 8.4. 'Targets' for SALW control intervention programmes | 12 |
| 8.5. National ownership | 13 |
| 9. The components of an SALW control programme | 14 |
| 9.1. Formation of a national SALW commission | 14 |
| 9.2. Acceptability of weapons | 15 |
| 9.3. Assessment of the SALW threat | 15 |
| 9.4. Planning a national SALW control programme | 16 |
| 9.5. Planning a national SALW awareness programme | 16 |
| 9.6. Funding of an SALW control programme | 17 |
| 9.7. Development of an amnesty plan | 18 |
| 9.8. Development of national legislation | 18 |
| 9.9. Development of the collection and destruction plan | 19 |
| 9.10. Accounting for weapons | 20 |
| 9.11. Implementation of the collection plan | 20 |
| 9.12. Implementation of the destruction plan | 20 |
| 9.13. Monitoring and verification of the SALW programme | 21 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 9.14. Development of a cross-border SALW movement prevention programme | 21 |
| 9.15. Evaluation of the SALW programme | 22 |
| 10. SALW control and security sector reform (SSR) | 22 |
| 10.1. SALW control and SSR operational relationships | 23 |
| Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations | 26 |
| Annex B: Normative references | 33 |
| Annex C: Further reading | 34 |
| Annex D: SALW intervention process flow | 35 |
| Endnotes | 36 |

NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE

This document is an Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standard (IDDRS) and is copyright-protected by the United Nations (UN). Neither this document, nor any extract from it, may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, for any other purpose without prior written permission from UN DPKO, acting on behalf of the UN.

This document is not to be sold.

© UN 2006 – All rights reserved

4.11 SALW Control, Security and Development

Summary

Every year, hundreds of thousands of people die and millions more are left injured by small arms and light weapons (SALW). The wide availability of these weapons devastates the lives and livelihoods of people all over the world, whether they are in conflict situations or 'at peace'. In post-conflict situations, where weapons are often widely held by ex-combatants, civilians and criminals, the presence of SALW can severely hamper security, undermining the prospects of longer-term recovery and development. The immediate post-conflict environment therefore represents a vital window of opportunity to control the supply, demand and availability of SALW.

This module provides an overview of the issues that should be considered during the development and implementation of a comprehensive SALW control programme in countries where a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process is under way. It outlines the links and sequencing of DDR, SALW control and wider security sector reform (SSR). It further provides guidance on the principles on which SALW control and reduction are based, and outlines the regional and international SALW agreements that governments around the world have signed up to.

The module provides information on the range on SALW control and reduction measures that have been previously tried and tested in post-conflict environments, providing advice on the most effective approaches for different contexts. The links between the short-term activities performed by peacekeeping operations and the long-term requirements for sustaining security and development in post-conflict situations are emphasized. It further provides guidance on the development of longer-term SALW control programmes that should be planned and initiated *during* the DDR programme, to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping environment to a longer-term development context.

1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides an overview of the issues that should be considered during the development and implementation of a comprehensive SALW control programme in countries where a DDR operation is being implemented. It provides guidance on the principles, planning and long-term support operations required for integrated SALW control. The links between the short-term activities performed by peacekeeping operations and the long-term requirements for sustaining security and development in post-conflict situations are emphasized. A 'follow-on' SALW control programme should be planned, and perhaps initiated, *during* the DDR programme to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping to a development situation.

This particular module uses many normative references from the South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE RMDS/G). RMDS/G reflect the development of operational procedures, practices and norms that has occurred over the past four years in the area of SALW control. The RMDS/G provide a high proportion

of the technical and operational information necessary to enable a programme manager to plan and implement a safe, effective and efficient SALW control programme. As such, they are complementary to the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), and their use reduces unnecessary duplication of standards development work.

1.1. References

A list of normative references is given in Annex B. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this module, and which form part of the provisions of the standards laid down in the module.

A list of informative references, in the form of a bibliography, which provide valuable background information on SALW control operations in support of DDR programmes, is given in Annex C.

2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standard laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in International Standardization Organization standards and guidelines.

- a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications, which are to be adopted in order to satisfy the standard in full.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

3. Introduction¹

During the last decade, the rapid spread and misuse of SALW has resulted in the deaths of millions of people. Increasingly, these weapons are playing a large role in conflict and violence. SALW have a huge impact on society in general. It has been estimated that as much

During the last decade, the rapid spread and misuse of SALW has resulted in the deaths of millions of people. Increasingly, these weapons are playing a large role in conflict and violence. SALW have a huge impact on society in general.

as 40 percent of the global arms trade has been diverted to the illicit markets to fuel most of the regional conflicts that have erupted since 1990. Estimates also suggest that in the same period, more than 2 million children have been killed in wars, 6 million seriously injured or permanently disabled, and 20 million have become internally displaced or fled to neighbouring countries. People are terrorized, wounded, maimed or forced from their homes to live as refugees

or internally displaced persons. Private arms brokers have played a particularly negative role in supplying weapons to areas of actual or potential conflict.

The unregulated circulation of SALW to a wide range of unaccountable and untrained actors contributes to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It

also has a profoundly negative impact on development: in some countries, as much as 25 percent of annual gross domestic product is consumed in the treatment of armed violence survivors and increased policing, with firearms being involved in over 80 percent of all violent deaths. The full impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW on nations, communities and individuals is wide ranging and includes:

- undermining the rule of law and the ability to keep the peace;
- fuelling crime and instability;
- increasing tension within communities;
- negating confidence- and security-building measures;
- acting as an obstacle to development;
- encouraging violent rather than peaceful ways of resolving problems;
- contributing to human rights violations;
- discouraging external investment;
- committing resources to security rather than development;
- contributing to a 'gun culture';
- increasing the risk of terrorism;
- undermining the legal arms trade;
- presenting a physical risk to local communities due to the presence of unstable ammunition.

Although DDR and SALW control are separate areas of engagement, technically they work very closely together. DDR rightly focuses on ex-combatants, but during DDR operations, an SALW control component should be established to focus on wider arms control and reduction measures at the national and community levels. This will ensure that weapons and ammunition that are not under the control of armed groups (i.e., civilian and government weapons) are also dealt with during the DDR programme. The mechanisms established during the DDR programme should be designed to be applicable and sustainable in wider SALW control initiatives after the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR have been completed. The scope and scale of the SALW control activities as part of the DDR programme should be based on the threat that civilian and government weapons possession may present to a renewal of violence. It is essential that ALL weapons are considered during a DDR programme, even though the focus may initially be on those weapons in possession of the armed factions or groups entering the DDR process.

The rapid spread of SALW is influenced by a number of factors. Chief among them is the failure of the State to provide security to its citizens. This is one reason why high levels of gun-related violence do not always decrease when conflict ends. If individuals — usually men — arm themselves for 'self-protection', it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure civilian security. Economic factors such as high rates of unemployment and low wages may cause people to use weapons as a means of survival. In certain cultures, the tradition of men carrying weapons, and society's acceptance of violence, may also make the situation worse. The

Although DDR and SALW control are separate areas of engagement, technically they work very closely together.

The mechanisms established during the DDR programme should be designed to be applicable and sustainable in wider SALW control initiatives after the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR have been completed.

proliferation of weapons disproportionately affects the lives of women, who are subjected to more sexual violence both inside and outside the home, and children, who are either direct victims of gun-related violence, or, as recruits into armed or criminal gangs, are encouraged to become involved with criminality and violence.

To effectively deal with these concerns, an integrated and holistic approach is required, one that responds to questions such as how and by whom are these weapons manufactured, marked, transferred,² stored and used; how best to deal with the factors that drive the demand for such weapons; and what action should be taken to deal with the humanitarian, health, social, developmental and environmental consequences of the possession and misuse of SALW.

The term ‘SALW control’ means those activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession. These activities largely consist of, but are not limited to:

- cross-border control measures;
- information management;
- legislative and regulatory measures;
- SALW awareness and communications strategies;
- SALW surveys and assessments;
- SALW collection;³
- SALW destruction;
- stockpile management.

However, SALW control and its activities cannot be dealt with in isolation, as there is a great deal of overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace support operations. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and involves international, regional, national, commercial, NGO and military stakeholders operating under a variety of conditions. Thus it is not possible, nor is it desirable, to establish a unique set of criteria that alone define standards and guidelines. Instead, it is necessary to identify a framework of standards and guidelines that, together, harmonize the way in which activities and tasks are carried out by the different organizations and agencies involved. This module provides this framework of applicable and appropriate international standards and guidelines.

4. DDR and SALW control

Sustainable peace requires an SALW control programme that attempts to achieve both short-term stability and long-term peace consolidation. Immediately after a conflict has

ended, the first objective may be achieved through the implementation of a comprehensive DDR programme. As the security situation in the country or region improves, a long-term SALW control strategy should be developed in collaboration with national authorities.

DDR and SALW control both deal with the problems faced by people in an insecure environment of SALW proliferation. They are not so much about the technical response to the presence and spread of weapons and ammu-

Sustainable peace requires an SALW control programme that attempts to achieve both short-term stability and long-term peace consolidation.

dition (survey, collection and destruction), as about individuals and communities, and their ability to lead normal and productive lives, free from the threats created by the uncontrolled presence of SALW. They are about the creation of an environment in which economic, social, political and health development can occur free from the limitations imposed by the spread and use of SALW.

The differences between disarmament within DDR and SALW control can be summarized in the following matrix:

| DDR | SALW CONTROL |
|--|---|
| Usually takes place 'post-conflict' | Can take place at any time |
| Can include all weapons and ammunition types | Usually restricted to weapons and ammunition of less than 100 mm calibre |
| Supports some form of peace process and broader recovery | Supports a national SALW control strategy as a part of recovery or development |
| Undertaken as a specific mandate in support of the 'peace process' | Supports SSR, and social and economic development |
| 'Participants' are normally armed forces, groups or factions and those associated with them. 'Beneficiaries' can be individuals, civilian groups, communities, governments | 'Participants' or 'beneficiaries' can be individuals, civilian groups, communities, governments, former warring factions, terrorists or criminals |

Despite these differences, there are important similarities at the operational level, and therefore the international and national policy in dealing with both areas should be coordinated.

The security situation on the ground, combined with the impact of civilian possession of weapons, will determine the detailed requirements for an SALW control component of a DDR programme. There are always risks involved in attempting to disarm armed forces, groups and factions as part of a disarmament component, while implementing a simultaneous voluntary surrender programme for the civilian population:

- civilians may attempt to surrender weapons at a pick-up point or weapons collection point (WCP) designed to deal with ex-combatants. This could result in increased tension and local outbreaks of violence;
- the sensitization and key messages of the disarmament and SALW control components will necessarily be very different. The risk of mixed messages should be avoided;
- disputes may arise over who is entitled to 'reintegration' or 'incentives';
- ex-combatants may attempt to 'integrate' with communities too early in the DDR process, with a potential destabilizing effect on those communities.

5. International and regional agreements

The international community, recognizing the need to deal with the problem and the grave consequences SALW pose to society, adopted the United Nations *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (A/Conf.192/15) in 2001 (UN PoA). In this programme, States committed themselves to, among other things, strengthening agreed norms and measures to help prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW, and agreed to mobilize political will and resources in order to prevent the illicit transfer, manufacture, export and import of SALW.

There has also been much activity at the regional level, where agreements, declarations and conventions often go further than the commitments contained within the UN PoA. These regional agreements include;

- *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium*;⁴
- *European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*;⁵
- *EU Joint Action on SALW*;⁶
- *EU SALW Strategy*;⁷
- *Nairobi SALW Protocol*;⁸
- *Organization of American States (OAS) Firearms Convention*;⁹
- *OAS SALW resolution AG/RES.1968 (XXXIII-O/03)*;¹⁰
- *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on SALW*;¹¹
- *OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition*;¹²
- *OSCE Decision on MANPADS*;¹³
- *Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on SALW*;
- *Stability Pact SALW Regional Implementation Plan*.¹⁴

6. SALW control measures

A range of measures should be introduced to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW. These fall into three main groups:

- reduction measures;
- preventive measures;
- coordination measures.

The activities that combine to form SALW control are:

- cross-border control measures;
- legislative and regulatory measures;
- SALW surveys;
- SALW awareness and communications strategies;
- SALW collection operations;
- SALW destruction operations;
- management of information;
- SALW stockpile management.

A number of other activities are required to support these components of SALW control, including capacity-building, management training, coordination measures, information management and exchange, project support and technical assistance, and resource mobilization. SALW control and its related activities should not be dealt with in isolation, as there is great deal of overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and with peacekeeping and peace support operations.

6.1. Aim and operational objectives of SALW control programmes

Confidence and security-building measures are vital to the success of a peace process, and SALW control is one of the most visible of measures. Therefore the overriding aim of any SALW control intervention programme should be to secure a safer environment and control

small arms and light weapons within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalisation.

From this aim, operational objectives to reflect the situation within the target community should then be developed as part of the programme planning process. Many of these objectives will be identical, similar or complementary to the operational objectives of the disarmament component of the DDR programme. Such objectives may include:

- a reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals, terrorists, armed forces and armed groups;
- a reduction in the number of weapons and ammunition accidents;
- the need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and the amount of violence in the society (by both national authorities and the civilian population at large);
- the requirement to build community awareness of the problem and develop community solidarity;
- the reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons on the black market;
- the control of legal weapons through national legislation and registration;
- the recovery of stolen weapons from the community;
- the reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and getting rid of the culture of weapons;
- the development of norms against the illegal use of weapons;
- the use of SALW control as a launch framework for future capacity-building and sustainable development.

7. Guiding principles

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are *safety, control, transparency, sustainability, replicability, impartiality* and *legitimacy*. They are to a certain extent interrelated, and can be adapted to fit any type of SALW control programme. These principles were developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in July 2001:¹⁵

- *Safety* is arguably the most important principle. The nature of SALW control programmes often requires that the local population or former warring factions surrender their weapons to some form of lawfully appointed national or international body. Inevitably, this also results in the movement of ammunition and explosives. It is necessary to emphasize the threat to human life posed by the movement and handling of potentially unstable or dangerous ammunition and explosives. The international community shall have a 'duty of care' to the local population to ensure that the programme is carried out as safely as possible, and that the risk to human life is reduced to a minimum. Any loss of life as a result of an internationally mandated or supported programme could be argued to be as a direct result of the establishment of that programme. Such a loss of life will inevitably have an impact on the way that the programme is perceived by the local population, without whose support the programme will fail. Should such a programme be carried out in an unsafe way, then it will lose credibility in the eyes of the local community, who may then reduce or withdraw their support. Therefore it is essential that the programme has safety as its highest priority. Any attempt to reduce programme operating costs by failing to employ the appropriate safety measures could prove to be a false economy;

- The second principle of *control* is also directly related to that of safety. The operational aspects of the programme (i.e., SALW collection and destruction) should be carried out in a planned and controlled way. The programme shall be properly managed to ensure a smooth, progressive, safe and secure collection and destruction plan. SALW collection and destruction operations require large logistic resources, and therefore the resources necessary to support them shall be controlled to ensure maximum effectiveness;
- *Transparency* is an important principle in order to gain and keep the support of the local population or former warring factions. They should be allowed complete access to the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They must be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. To ensure fairness and natural justice, it is important that all parties to the conflict are adequately represented in the decision-making process. Such involvement also helps to ensure that all interests and concerns are adequately dealt with. Transparency is also an important principle in the verification of the final disposal of the recovered weapons and ammunition;
- The *sustainability* of the programme is related to the principle of transparency. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at a specific place in the community and then expand into other areas. Sufficient financial and logistic resources should be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one part of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals in the region will not have to surrender theirs. The argument that it is better to get some weapons out of the community than none does not work, especially if it leaves one part of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. Unless a secure environment can be created and maintained, the SALW control operation will fail, as individuals will retain weapons for 'self-protection'. In the past, the lack of resources has been identified as a limitation in the weapons surrender process,¹⁶ which has placed programmes at risk. It is therefore important that programmes are ideally not started until all necessary resources have been, and have been seen to be, identified. This statement does not necessarily prevent 'pilot' projects or 'preparatory assistance' from taking place; but no firm commitments to support a national programme should be made until resources have been identified and are available;
- The principle of *replicability* (i.e., the capacity of a programme to be repeated in different contexts) ensures that similar operating methods can be used throughout the programme. This means improved training, better use of resources, safe collection and destruction, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting, and easily understood operating procedures. Because of this, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme;
- The final principle of *legitimacy* is important to the development of a secure environment and the provision of resources to support an SALW control programme. The organization responsible for the programme must be legitimate, and operate according to a national or international mandate given by an appropriate body. This mandate could come from the UN Security Council, a regional organization or the recognized national government of the country. An unmandated programme is very unlikely to succeed, as it will fail to attract the donor resources necessary, or the support of the community it is trying to disarm.

8. Types of SALW control programmes

The debate on how to categorize the different types of SALW control programmes is still in progress. Categorization has so far been based on the experience of programmes over the last 10 years, which have indicated that there is no one ‘template’ (i.e., standard way of carrying out a programme). For the purposes of IDDRS, it is suggested that there are three main types of programme (which can be based on the SALW collection incentive or concept used):¹⁷

- directed programmes;
- cooperative programmes;
- nationally controlled programmes.

The decision as to which type of programme to adopt will depend less on the political situation within a society than on the strength of the movement towards peace, the DDR operational plan, other peace support operations and the resources available. Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed, it should be designed to:

- *DETER* individuals, groups and organizations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW;
- *DENY* access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;
- *DISRUPT* criminal operations, and the movement and storage of SALW;
- *DESTROY* surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.

8.1. Directed programmes

The concept of a ‘directed’ SALW control programme allows more options for the way in which such programmes can take place. It covers the use of UN Security Council mandates, military technical agreements and legislation passed by UN transitional authorities or national governments to disarm warring factions, and is usually the concept behind the disarmament component of a DDR programme. It recognizes that the initial aim of an SALW control programme should be to assist in the establishment of a secure and safe environment, rather than political stability, which can only survive in a secure environment. ‘Incentives’ are not used under this type of programme, as in ‘cooperative’ programmes, although there are occasions when it may be possible to run a ‘directed’ programme in parallel with a ‘co-operative’ programme.

The danger with this approach is that without coordination among the different units carrying out the physical disarmament of the various warring parties there is a risk of creating a weapons imbalance. Should one party surrender a large proportion of their arms without the other doing the same, then it becomes highly vulnerable in the event of a breakdown in the peace process. This is particularly important if there are no external or international guarantors of security, as the role of such guarantors is very important in such situations (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

4.10 ◀▶

8.2. Co-operative programmes

This concept proposes the use of ‘incentives’ to disarm, and it can be operated in tandem with a ‘directed’ programme if the appropriate mandate exists. The concept accepts the complexity of operational environments in which SALW control takes place and therefore the potential future need to rapidly introduce a ‘directed’ programme if necessary.

A major issue affecting 'cooperative' or voluntary disarmament is the type of incentive to be offered in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons. It is now generally accepted that four criteria are important in this regard:

- the 'target' community (see section 8.4);
- the effectiveness of the incentives in achieving the immediate objective of disarmament or voluntary surrender;
- their contribution to long-term programme objectives;
- the cost and available resources.

Compromise among these four criteria is inevitable, but it is clear that incentives must be attractive to the target community in order to ensure the success of the programme; yet they shall always be less than the market value of the weapons themselves.

There are many examples of incentives used to support the voluntary surrender of SALW in cooperative-type SALW control programmes:¹⁸

- The '*buy-back*' concept, where SALW are returned in exchange for cash, has been used in at least nine previous programmes around the world, with at least two of these operated in tandem with a 'directed' programme. There are significant disadvantages to a 'buy-back' concept. Cash incentives can lead to increases in the numbers of arms, with the cash being used to buy other weapons at better prices elsewhere, encouraging an unwanted illicit trade in small arms. The economic effects of relatively large amounts of cash being injected into a fragile economy must also be considered. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs considers that the disadvantages outweigh the potential benefits, and does *not* therefore recommend 'buy-back' incentives in post-conflict environments. From March 2002, UNDP has decided that it will not support such programmes;
- Other programmes have used the 'guns for food or goods' concept, which is more popular with donors, who may feel that individuals should not be provided with cash 'rewards' for the surrender of weapons. This has a more moral and symbolic value than a pure cash incentive, can assist in ensuring that the community has the food and resources necessary for short-term survival, and can reduce the resources required by other humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme. Care must be taken when applying this concept; but, for example, the provision of tools to assist in the redevelopment of agriculture or housing is a very constructive approach. This type of approach is referred to as the '*weapons in exchange for incentives (WEI)*' concept;
- The evolution of the '*weapons in exchange for development*' (WED) concept has resulted in significant success when applied in the correct environment. This concept supports the community *as a whole* with a development project and an improvement in public security in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons by the community. Various models have been applied, and advice on the most appropriate one for a particular situation can be obtained from UNDP;
- A further development of the WED concept is that of '*weapons in competition for development*' (WCD). This is an innovative approach that uses the principle of conditionality, which until recently was not popular within the UN. Yet WCD has been effective in areas where significant development work is already taking place. Communities compete for smaller incentives, which are shared among communities in proportion to the number of weapons they have handed in. These have proved to be attractive to communities;

- A long-term concept has been proposed, but not yet implemented, which is '*weapons linked to development*' (WLD). This involves including SALW control measures in development projects that are already under way. This has the advantage of being cheaper than the other options, but problems such as negotiation with the local community who are already receiving development assistance and cooperation among a wide range of development agencies would have to be resolved before this concept could be effective. It is an area that requires more research, but could be the most promising long-term strategy as donor funding for the other options becomes scarcer.

Whatever approach or concept is used to support the programme, it will only succeed if there is a real desire on the part of the whole community to participate in the process. If the cooperation of the community can be gained and retained, then there is a real chance of success in this type of programme. While the aim should always be to remove or legally register all weapons in society, the reality of a gun culture and the desire for self-protection should always be recognized. In many societies, gun ownership has always been acceptable within the community, therefore perhaps a more realistic aim could be to recover the military-style weapons that create an imbalance with neighbouring communities, or those that could be used for trade. If the community could accept that weapons in open sight should be legally held and recorded, then ownership could be controlled, and criminal investigations into weapon misuse could be simplified.

A factor that must be considered during the planning phase of 'co-operative' SALW control programmes shall be what the affected country wants its national position towards weapons to be at the end of the programme. If there is a national move towards weapon control, e.g., by the framing and adoption of national legislation, this should be developed at the same time as the programme is in operation. The national legislation should ensure that the population fully understands the penalties for the unauthorized keeping of weapons at the conclusion of the SALW control programme.

While the aim should always be to remove or legally register all weapons in society, the reality of a gun culture and the desire for self-protection should always be recognized. In many societies, gun ownership has always been acceptable within the community, therefore perhaps a more realistic aim could be to recover the military-style weapons that create an imbalance with neighbouring communities, or those that could be used for trade.

8.2.1. Links to reintegration incentives and training

The incentives for voluntary surrender should not only be attractive to the particular individuals or community in order to ensure the success of any voluntary weapons surrender programme, but shall also be coordinated with reintegration incentives. The levels of incentives should be the same in order to ensure that there is not an imbalance between reintegration incentives provided to ex-combatant and incentives provided to civilians and communities for the surrender of their weapons. Any imbalance would be divisive and could compromise both the reintegration and SALW control components of a DDR programme.


8.3. National control programmes

'Directed' or 'cooperative' programmes do not take account of environments where political stability and local security exist, but there is still a large amount of illegally held weapons, or cases where the national government wishes to downsize its security forces. In these cases, the objectives that should be aimed at are either stockpile reduction or the prevention of crime.

National control programmes recognize the need for legislative support for an amnesty programme to include the use of punitive measures (i.e., punishments of some kind) for those failing to comply. In effect, this concept is a combination of the 'directed' and 'cooperative' concepts, which are more specifically targeted at immediate post-conflict environments.

National control programmes are aimed at criminal elements who try to keep weapons for criminal purposes. The development of legislative measures then allows for the implementation of 'search-and-seize' operations against criminal elements, while allowing people who legally hold weapons to keep them. Previous criticisms of voluntary surrender programmes were that they never target criminals; the development of the concept of this type of programme acknowledges this criticism and attempts to develop a framework to deal with the problem. Where strict national legislation is in place, and the local population is in no doubt of the legal consequences of illegal possession and use, the weapons will be either surrendered or less frequently used, and, most importantly, the public perception of safety will be improved.

Figure 1 **Matrix of SALW collection incentive options**



8.4. 'Targets' for SALW control intervention programmes


It is now accepted that there are five generic (general) 'targets' for SALW control interventions:

- individuals;
- governments;

- criminals and organized criminal gangs;
- armed groups
- terrorists.

The type of SALW control intervention, and the incentive or punitive option used to support the collection of SALW, will inevitably be different for each type of target group. The following matrix does not cover all possible aspects of a programme, and specifically does not deal with the treatment of armed forces and groups within the context of a DDR programme, but it does summarize some possible options for targeting SALW control.

Figure 2 Possible incentives for SALW control programmes



8.5. National ownership

Success in SALW control initiatives as part of a wider DDR programme, and beyond, requires the full cooperation of ex-combatants, non-combatants, political will and international support to be maintained throughout the process. The encouragement of national ownership of SALW control is one way of achieving this success. The planning of SALW control programmes should deal with both the supply and demand aspects of weapons possession. Care should be taken to include all stakeholders, even those who are not traditionally seen as weapons owners, such as women, children, and the elderly or disabled. Disarming combatants when community-level

Disarming combatants when community-level ownership of weapons is high does not solve the problem. Indeed, failing to provide former combatants with the security they need to return to civilian life might actually create new security concerns.

ownership of weapons is high does not solve the problem. Indeed, failing to provide former combatants with the security they need to return to civilian life might actually create new security concerns.

9. The components of an SALW control programme¹⁹

SALW control is a complex process, in which there are many components, all of which must interact correctly with each other. The components of this process should include:

- the formation of a national SALW commission to develop and implement a national SALW control programme. This should be a component of the national commission on DDR (NCDDR);
- an assessment of the risk of SALW, and their impact on the community. This should form part of the weapons survey (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);
- the operational planning of a national SALW control programme as a component of the wider DDR programme;
- the development of an SALW awareness campaign (see SASP 2, referred to in Annex B);
- the development of an amnesty plan for those illegally holding SALW;
- the development of national legislation to support the collection and destruction of weapons, and to develop policies for the period following the amnesty programme;
- the development of a collection and destruction plan;
- seeking/securing international funding and technical assistance for the SALW control programme;
- the implementation of the collection phase of the control programme;
- the selection and establishment of the destruction capability, and the implementation of the weapons and ammunition destruction phase;
- the development of a cross-border weapons movement prevention programme;
- carrying out an evaluation to assess the degree of SALW control achieved.

The components above should also include continuous monitoring, to assess the progress being achieved; to inform the government, population and donors to the programme about such progress; and to eliminate as far as possible any difficulties of implementation. A schematic diagram of an SALW intervention process is given in Annex D.

9.1. Formation of a national SALW commission

The primary responsibility for SALW control lies with the government of the affected state. This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission,²⁰ which should act as a national point of contact for all matters concerning SALW control. It

This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission, which should act as a national point of contact for all matters concerning SALW control. It should plan, regulate, manage and coordinate a national SALW control programme.

should plan, regulate, manage and coordinate a national SALW control programme. The national SALW authority is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management of SALW. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets of an SALW programme within its national boundaries, including the development and implementation of national

standard operating procedures and instructions. This body should form part of the national commission on DDR, although the SALW commission should continue to exist long after the DDR commission is disbanded.

In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and to fulfil some or all the functions, of a national SALW authority. In such cases, reference to a 'national SALW authority' throughout IDDRS shall be understood as applying to the UN or other recognised international body.

In countries with significant SALW control needs, local capacity should be developed from the very start of an SALW programme. Capacity development is the process by which individuals, institutions and societies (individually and collectively) are trained to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives, and increasingly take over these activities.²¹ More information on capacity development is available in RMDS/G 01.10.

9.2. Acceptability of weapons

In many societies, the ownership of SALW is commonplace, and is accepted by the community, as is the ownership of guns for hunting and sport. The situation changes in conditions following a civil war, regional conflict or proxy war, when large numbers of SALW of many types are introduced into the country. It should also be understood why members of the civilian population feel it necessary to protect themselves, and feel that possession of a weapon is necessary. Law and order may have broken down, leading to a situation that the police or national army cannot control, or where communities do not feel they can trust or rely on the national security infrastructure for protection. The level of crime or internal conflict resulting from large quantities of illegal SALW may become intolerable, and a nation, faced with such a situation, may decide to introduce control of weapons, by a form of voluntary disarmament within the civilian community in parallel to the disarmament component of a DDR programme. This national decision will need to be taken by the NCDDR.

9.3. Assessment of the SALW threat

Following the decision to implement an SALW control programme, the first stage shall be to assess the nature and scope of the situation and threats. This should be done by carrying out an SALW survey in order to gain information on the threat to the local community and national authorities. The aim of the survey is to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community, in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organization. This may be done as part of the DDR weapons survey (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament), although there are different information requirements.

There are four major components of a comprehensive SALW survey, which are explained further in the *SALW Survey Protocols* developed by the Small Arms Survey and SEESAC:

- *a small arms distribution assessment (SADA)* collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region, and analyses local resources available to respond to the problem;
- *a small arms impact survey (SAIS)* collects data on the impact of SALW on the community, and social and economic development;
- *a small arms perception survey (SAPS)* collects qualitative information on the attitudes of the local community to SALW ownership and possible interventions;

4.10 ◀▶

- *a small arms capacity survey (SACS)* collects information on the local capacity to conduct an appropriate, safe, efficient and effective SALW intervention.

Each national problem is different, and the methods for carrying out the surveys will have to be adapted accordingly. The data will vary in quantity and quality, but sufficient data must be gained to establish a picture of the threat that will allow a national programme of SALW to be established.

More information on SALW surveys is contained in RMDS/G 05.80, and information can also be found in a study on national assessment or 'mapping' carried out by Saferworld and SaferAfrica.²²

9.4. Planning a national SALW control programme

The planning of a national programme requires that the national SALW commission (or its equivalent) is in place, and can take the necessary planning action. The national control programme will have to cover all aspects of the programme, many of which are covered below. Four of the main priority topics are the provision of funds, the alerting of the public and government, effective border controls and the creation of a framework of national legislation, which is highly necessary not only during the actual SALW control programme, but after the programme is over, to prevent a rapid return of illegal weapons into the country.

As part of the planning process, the national SALW commission should initiate the political and diplomatic moves to gain consensus and get agreement on the disarmament process, and to establish an independent authority to monitor the fairness of the programme.

Above all, the national SALW commission will have to ensure that all parts of the programme are integrated with each other, and that the whole process can run without interruption. If there is public perception that the programme has stalled, the programme will be hard to restart, political initiative will be lost, and public goodwill and support will be put at risk.

9.5. Planning a national SALW awareness programme

No SALW programme can succeed without the backing of both the people and the government. Where ownership of weapons has been a way of life, and there is a history of

No SALW programme can succeed without the backing of both the people and the government. Where ownership of weapons has been a way of life, and there is a history of armed factional strife in regions of the country, some communities will need convincing that the removal of weapons will not leave them defenceless against aggressors.

armed factional strife in regions of the country, some communities will need convincing that the removal of weapons will not leave them defenceless against aggressors. The programme should change any perception held by combatants, civilians and communities that only the possession of weapons can guarantee their safety and security. Peace education and disarmament education should be implemented from the very beginning of the DDR process and throughout the post-DDR process to help combatants and communities to learn a culture of peace and non-violence. SALW awareness is therefore

a major part of any SALW programme, and shall be coordinated with the DDR awareness campaign. It will often be difficult to gain the trust of isolated ethnic communities or factions

who may have no confidence in the military or police, and the organization running this component should have the support of a sufficient number of independent and trusted organizations, such as local and international NGOs or churches, who have many links with the people at local and regional levels. All should understand that the aim is to secure a safer environment and control SALW within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalization.

The SALW awareness programme should be put in place early, to build up the support needed to ensure acceptance of the programme. The gathering of such low-level support is relatively inexpensive, and probably within the financial and material resources of the country. It could help to attract external donors to fund the SALW programme.

The SALW awareness programme will also need the full support of government. This might be more difficult to achieve, as political power processes may not always think in humanitarian terms. But without full support from government, the SALW programme is unlikely to succeed.

The more people that are aware of the SALW collection programme, the better. Weapons and ammunition may be held unlawfully, but with no criminal intent. They may in fact be dangerous, especially if they are ammunition items rather than guns. They may also be badly stored and poorly secured. The SALW programme shall be used as the opportunity to educate the local population about the risks of holding such weapons, as well as provide risk reduction advice.

More information on the development and implementation of national DDR and SALW awareness campaigns can be found in IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR, and RMDS/G 06.10 and 06.20.

9.6. Funding of an SALW control programme

SALW control programmes can be expensive, depending on the scale of the weapons problem and the incentives offered to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons. Many governments believe that most of the funding should come from external donors, but, in reality, the in-country communities that benefit from the programme should also ideally contribute. Local and national government, and businesses should be encouraged to contribute resources to ensure the success of the programme. However, few nations who have recently suffered internal conflict can afford to run an SALW programme without external aid, and the UN, especially UNDP, has been active in a number of SALW intervention programmes.

Funding is always a difficult issue, because estimating the ultimate cost of a programme is highly complex, and not many past successful programmes are available from which to gain experience. The offering of incentives in exchange for weapons can raise the costs a great deal, and the numbers and types of weapons being surrendered may not be known until well into the programme. The main lessons that have so far emerged from past programmes are that sponsors, especially international donors, should be identified before the programme strategy is fully developed so that a programme is sustainable. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at a specific place in the community and then expand into other areas, but sufficient financial and logistic resources should be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one part of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals have not surrendered theirs. The argument that it is better

to get some weapons out of the community than none does not work, especially if it leaves one part of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. A partial programme based on insufficient funding will therefore probably fail, because it will not be possible to implement it in a way that ensures that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are removed from all factions, or that effective control of the illegal weapons situation can be achieved.

9.7. Development of an amnesty plan

To achieve the surrender of illegal weapons, it will be necessary to declare an amnesty for those who are returning them. In many countries, this will require a change in the law. If the open carrying of weapons is prohibited, the law also may need to be changed or suspended for the amnesty period. It will also be necessary to get the amnesty publicly declared, and information on the terms of the amnesty should be made known to all former warring factions, groups and communities. It shall also be made clear to the security forces, which may have been authorized to detain or shoot anyone openly carrying weapons. The amnesty should have a fixed time limit, to allow the declaration of penalties for owning or carrying illegal weapons after the end of the amnesty period.

Extensive consultation and advice should be taken when determining the period of the amnesty. It will take time to change the attitudes and perceptions of SALW holders, as they need to be convinced that the security situation has improved so much that they will voluntarily surrender their SALW. Previous experience has shown that short amnesties of a month are rarely successful, while longer ones are more effective, resulting in large numbers of weapons being surrendered. The success of the amnesty will be mainly influenced by:

- the active participation and support of the widest range of stakeholders (government, international organisations, NGOs and civil society organizations [CSOs]);
- the effectiveness of the sensitization phase of the SALW awareness component;
- improvements in community perceptions of the security situation;
- well-targeted incentives for voluntary surrender;
- timely delivery of incentives;
- a well-planned and non-confrontational collection operation;
- simultaneous destruction of SALW in support of the SALW awareness component.

9.8. Development of national legislation

Other national legislation may also be required as well as the amnesty. The collection of numbers of weapons in a single collection point may also be illegal, and will require legal authorization. Even the destruction of SALW may have legal implications, and the inspections and monitoring of weapons holdings, including those of national organizations such as the armed forces or police, may itself require an enabling legal framework. This framework should also make clear the areas of responsibility of all the agencies involved. The reimposition of new and possibly harsher penalties for illegal weapons after the amnesty period may also be an important legal step. National legislation may need to be extended to cover the import and export of weapons, to ensure that new weapons cannot lawfully be imported to replace those surrendered during the SALW programme.

More information on arms control legislation can be found in RMDS/G 03.20 and 03.30.

9.9. Development of the collection and destruction plan

The most important part of any SALW control programme is the collection and destruction of the SALW, and this shall be carefully planned. The sites for collection shall take into account the fact that many civilians may not wish to visit police posts or military barracks, and some 'neutral ground' may be needed, such as community centres or business premises. The collection plan shall include details of how SALW are going to be accounted for, stored and guarded before being moved to the destruction area. Above all, the programme shall be sufficiently transparent to gain and maintain the support of the local population or factions. They should be allowed controlled access to the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They should be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. The methodology developed for weapons collection during the disarmament component of the DDR programme (see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament) may be used as the basis for this phase of SALW control, although it is not recommended that 'joint' weapons collection points (WCPs) are used.

4.10 ◀▶

The planning of the methods for collection and destruction should allow for both collection and destruction to be repeated as often as is necessary. Replicability (i.e., the capacity for a programme to be repeated in different contexts) ensures that the same methods can be used throughout the programme. This means improved training, better use of resources, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting, and easily understood operating procedures. As such, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme.

If some incentive is being provided for weapon surrender such as development aid, food or goods, some method of handling and accounting for the incentives shall also be planned. Depending on the geographical area that the programme will cover, it may well be necessary to plan for a number of SALW collection points. Of particular importance are the personnel managing SALW collection points: the active participation of NGOs and civil society will improve transparency and reduce the 'confrontational' aspects of security force participation.

Information on SALW collection is found in IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and RMDS/G 05.10, and on weapons storage and security in RMDS/G 05.30 and 05.40.

4.10 ◀▶

Plans will also be needed for the destruction of the collected weapons. There are many different methods of destruction, such as crushing, cutting or burning. Different types of weapons may need different forms of destruction,²³ and ammunition will also have to be destroyed. Some forms of destruction are portable, but some are more efficient at fixed locations, which will in turn require planning of the movement of the weapons and ammunition from the collection point to the destruction area. Weapons are probably most vulnerable to theft when being moved, so some form of escorted transport shall be planned. Initial dismantling of the weapon (i.e., removal of the breech blocks) before they are moved may reduce the security risks. There may also be a move by the government to take the higher-quality surrendered weapons and ammunition back into the national police or army, or sell them.²⁴ UN practitioners should exercise caution when dealing with the issue of weapons retention or redistribution to security forces. Too often, in the absence of sufficient institutional capacity or stockpile control, collected weapons find their way back onto the streets and are used in armed violence and crime. Therefore, weapons collected should be destroyed in the absence of such capacity, particularly if their destruction will contribute to creating trust and confidence in a peace process. However, where the government has demonstrated a commitment to security sector reform, the issue of weapons retention is less of a cause of concern.²⁵

9.10. Accounting for weapons

The successful management of an SALW programme will require a high standard of accounting, which at the same time should be as transparent as possible. Receipts shall be given for weapons surrendered, and certificates shall be prepared at the moment of destruction. Plans shall be made to publicize the numbers of surrendered weapons, although publicizing detailed locations and community statistics may not be an appropriate measure, and the risks of such a move shall be taken into account. The accountancy process during a pure DDR programme, rather than wider SALW control intervention, shall be transparent enough for all factions to see that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are being surrendered by all parties. It also needs to be accurate enough to ensure that every weapon registered as handed in must also be registered as destroyed. Information on SALW accounting is given in RMDS/G 04.20.

◀▶ 4.10

IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, section 8.8, provides information on the DREAM management information system, which should be considered for use in a voluntary surrender component of SALW control. This will ensure effective management information throughout the entire DDR process, and will form the basis of any future national weapons accounting or registration system.

9.11. Implementation of the collection plan

When the actual collection process starts, the programme managers should ensure that it is witnessed by national and international media, and the results should be publicized, in order to encourage other members of the communities to participate in the voluntary surrender process. This means that collection points shall be correctly staffed and accommodated, with adequate security for recovered weapons and ammunition. There shall also be adequate space for the storage of different kinds of weapons and ammunition. Programmes often receive large amounts of ammunition, grenades and even landmines. Some of these can be actively dangerous if stored incorrectly, and the assistance of EOD-qualified staff will be necessary to advise on correct methods of short-term storage. Collection sites shall have secure storage facilities, possibly in steel shipping containers, which may have to be double locked, with appropriate stakeholders holding the keys to ensure transparency of the process. This will ensure that all stakeholders accept that the weapons are not removed and transferred to armies, police or other factions.

The collection sites should have suitable facilities for the loading of weapons and ammunition into secure transport for movement to the destruction area, or a site near the collection point where mobile weapons destruction equipment can be used.

9.12. Implementation of the destruction plan

Where possible, the destruction of the weapons and ammunition should be public and symbolic. Where the weapons are to be destroyed by burning, the actual burning can be observed by independent and local NGOs, politicians and the media. Explosive items such as grenades, ammunition, anti-tank rockets and landmines may also be destroyed in symbolic explosions, in the same way as landmine stockpiles are currently publicly destroyed under the Mine Ban Convention. This shall be done under carefully controlled conditions, which will certainly require specialist EOD advice, and destruction certificates shall be made available to show what weapons have been destroyed.

Following the destruction of the weapons, they shall be inspected to ensure that they cannot be repaired, or that parts of them cannot be rebuilt into complete weapons, or used again as spare parts. This again will initially require specialist expertise. More information on SALW destruction is given in IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, Annex M, and also in RMDS/G 05.20.

The end result of the destruction process will be large amounts of scrap metal and possibly wood, if burning is not used. Metal scrap can be sold,²⁶ or recycled into useful tools. This could also have a symbolic effect — in both the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo, steel from destroyed weapons is turned into inspection hatch covers, and this sort of activity can be used to support community awareness programmes.

Where possible, the destruction of the weapons and ammunition should be public and symbolic. Where the weapons are to be destroyed by burning, the actual burning can be observed by independent and local NGOs, politicians and the media.

4.10 ◀▶

9.13. Monitoring and verification of the SALW programme

A programme as politically sensitive as SALW control will require active independent monitoring to ensure that the programme is running satisfactorily, and above all is being applied in an even-handed way. For the programme to be successful, there should be continuous feedback to the government, the community, the donors and sponsors stating how many weapons have been collected and destroyed. This assessment should be made by independent verification and monitoring teams. Where possible, these teams need to be able to give some estimates of the proportion of weapons held illegally that have been surrendered. The verifying agencies will need to have the technical expertise to assess the completeness of destruction, not only of weapons, but also of explosive items. More information on the verification and monitoring of SALW programmes can be found in RMDS/G 04.30 and 04.40.

9.14. Development of a cross-border SALW movement prevention programme

An SALW intervention programme should not be carried out in isolation, but should be seen as part of a broader disarmament strategy in support of security sector reform — in particular, in the areas of cross-border controls and stockpile destruction. The SALW intervention programme may be needed as part of a peacekeeping or peacemaking strategy, it may assist in creating stability following the restructuring of armed forces, or it may be elevated to become a regional peace initiative. In any of these cases, the good effects of the SALW programme can only be sustained if active measures are taken to prevent weapons coming back into the country to replace those surrendered. Prevention of cross-border weapons movement can only be done by mutual co-operation between the nations on either sides of the border, but it is generally in the interests of both nations

Conflicts can quickly flow across borders unless they are prevented from doing so, and the supply of weapons follows the conflicts. To build a sustainable disarmament programme, groups of nations need to be persuaded to support each other in the establishment of SALW control or other disarmament programmes, and this is one of the keys to success of such programmes.

to work together. Conflicts can quickly flow across borders unless they are prevented from doing so, and the supply of weapons follows the conflicts. To build a sustainable disarmament programme, groups of nations need to be persuaded to support each other in the establishment of SALW control or other disarmament programmes, and this is one of the keys to success of such programmes.

Information on cross-border controls is available in RMDS/G 05.70.

9.15. Evaluation of the SALW programme

At the end of the SALW programme, it will be necessary to carry out an evaluation of the results, and the number of weapons handed in compared with the estimated numbers in circulation before the programme started.

An SALW programme is not only a matter of weapons, but the creation of an environment where the government can govern, where the police and armed forces can be trusted, where different communities can live alongside each other and where sustainable development can take place in a secure environment. The socio-economic aspects of an SALW programme are equally as important as the number of weapons recovered.

More importantly, it will be necessary to evaluate as far as possible what effect the reduction of weapons, and the associated SALW awareness programme, has had on the attitudes and way of life of the local people. An SALW programme is not only a matter of weapons, but the creation of an environment where the government can govern, where the police and armed forces can be trusted, where different communities can live alongside each other and where sustainable development can take place in a secure environment. The socio-economic aspects of an SALW programme are equally as important as the number of weapons recovered.

It is also important to evaluate what further steps in disarmament and cross-border co-operation have been taken following the SALW programme. An SALW programme is only one step on the road to disarmament and the creation of national and regional stability.

10. SALW control and security sector reform (SSR)²⁷

There is much evidence to suggest that a weak security sector creates demand for SALW. Weak security sectors also tend to be highly politicized.²⁸ This leads to a lack of accountability, increased corruption, lack of coordination, limited professional competence and inter-agency rivalries. This in turn can lead to a security vacuum that may be filled by warring factions or organized criminal groups, resulting in greater insecurity, which leads to an increase in the demand for and use of weapons by the community, as *the demand for weapons is directly related to the perception of threat*. The laws of supply and demand are as equally valid for weapons as anything else, and the lack of a credible security sector makes the supply of weapons to meet this demand relatively easy.

The direct links between SSR and SALW control are an area in which little detailed research has been done so far.

Yet recent operational experience has identified a range of links, and these are identified in this section. SSR covers a wide range of activities, and the need to ensure coordination

and cooperation among many stakeholders is widely acknowledged. Turning this into action at the operational level, however, remains difficult. The spread and unlawful use of weapons is one of the most important security problems in many of the world's poorer countries. Law enforcement agencies in these countries often lack the capacity to investigate and prosecute offenders, or even to collect and secure illegal arms. In some cases, they may even make the problem worse themselves by committing serious abuses against civilians, driving up the demand for illegal weapons.²⁹

Links between SSR and SALW at the technical level should be clearly identified and strengthened. The spread of weapons in one country or region improves the capabilities of criminal or warring factions and fuels their activities, which has a possibility of creating instability in neighbouring countries or regions.³⁰ Therefore the following should be examined during the planning of SALW control interventions in an environment of SSR:

- analysis of SSR within a country should include an SALW control component;
- the functional areas of SALW control should be considered when examining intervention options for SSR;
- SSR interventions should be coordinated with SALW control interventions;
- information on community perceptions of security and the security architecture shall be obtained before resources are committed, to assist in the development of a credible national SSR plan;³¹
- SSR activities should be supported by an SALW awareness campaign to improve community perceptions of improved confidence in the national security architecture.

10.1. SALW control and SSR operational relationships

The matrix below identifies those SALW control interventions that are directly related to, or highly complementary to, SSR activities. It is not complete, and further research and operational experience will inevitably result in it being expanded.

| SECURITY SECTOR | OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY | SALW CONTROL FUNCTIONAL AREA | REMARKS |
|-----------------|--|---|---|
| Government | Development and implementation of national SSR plan. | Management Information | The National SALW control strategy should be a component of any national SSR plan, with cross links clearly identified. |
| Armed forces | Armed forces capacity-building and restructuring | SALW destruction SALW stockpile management | The security and destruction of surplus stocks of SALW are fundamental requirements of the logistic component of any armed forces' restructuring. |
| | Counter-terrorism operations | SALW collection SALW stockpile management | There are links in terms of denying the terrorist access to illegal weapons hides or theft from government facilities. |

| | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Police | Police capacity-building and restructuring | SALW destruction | This will occur on a much smaller scale than the military requirements, and should be coordinated as a central destruction programme. |
| | Offensive search and seizure operations | SALW collection | Links exist in terms of denying criminal access to SALW. |
| | Defensive search and seizure operations | SALW collection | |
| | Counter-terrorism operations | SALW collection SALW stockpile management | Links exist in terms of denying the terrorist access to illegal weapons hides or theft from government facilities. |
| | Community-based policing (CBP) | SALW awareness | An SALW awareness component should be included in any CBP programme. |
| | Critical incident scene examination (CISE) | Management information | Development should take place of technical methodologies and protocols for dealing with SALW of evidential value. |
| | Countering organized crime | SALW collection SALW stockpile management | Disruption and denial of criminal access to SALW should be a priority. |
| Intelligence services | Post-incident analysis | Management information (SALW survey) | See 'Police, CISE'. |
| | Weapons intelligence | Management information (statistics) | Weapons intelligence agencies must maintain close links with any SALW control operation. |
| Paramilitaries | See 'Armed forces'. | | |
| Judiciary | Development of legislation | Legislative and regulatory issues | Legislation, guidelines and monitoring of SALW exports, transfers and internal civilian possession and use should be put in place. |
| | | Marking and tracing | |
| | | SALW production restrictions | |
| Border and customs agencies | Physical export controls | Cross-border controls | |
| | Anti-trafficking operations | | |
| Private security companies | Commercial operations | Legislative and regulatory issues | Appropriate legislation to control SALW carrying and use of weapons must be developed and implemented. |

Also the development of the oversight mechanisms (parliamentarians, journalists, NGOs and CSOs) should include an SALW awareness component to enable them to become actively involved in the SALW control issue, as part of SSR, from a basis of sound knowledge.

Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Terms and definitions

Arms control: The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.

Arms exports: The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.

Border controls: The existence of checks and regulations between countries that control access to and from the country of people, goods and services.

Broker:³² The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity; anyone who directly performs an activity defined as a brokering activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal relations. The acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to the legal entity.

Brokering:³³ Activities that serve to facilitate the transfer of arms between persons in different third countries, insofar as such transfer is furthered through the assistance of a so-called broker. Core brokering activities include:

- acquisition of SALW located in one third country for the purpose of transfer to another third country;
- mediation between sellers and buyers of SALW to facilitate the transfer of these arms from one third country to another;
- the indication of an opportunity for such a transaction to the seller or buyer (in particular, the introduction of a seller or buyer in return for a fee or other consideration).

Buy-back: The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives in return for cash. Buy-back schemes have been practised in the past, but the concept is often unacceptable to international donors.³⁴ There is a perception that such schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide the opportunity for an individual to conduct low-level trading in SALW.

Capacity: The strength and ability, which could include knowledge, skill, personnel and resources, to achieve desired objectives.

Capacity-building: Used as a noun, refers to processes and programmes that empower and enable the recipients' independent development. Can also be used as an adjective (capacity-building activity).

Ceasefire agreement: A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting parties.

Civil society organization (CSO): Non-state organization composed of voluntary participants.

Community-based policing (CBP): CBP involves the police participating in the community and responding to the needs of that community, and the community participating in its own policing and supporting the police. It can further be explained as: the police working in partnership with the community; the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting public safety over the longer term rather than the police, alone, reacting short term to incidents as they occur.

Community involvement: In the context of SALW, the term refers to a process designed to place the needs and priorities of affected communities at the centre of the planning, implementation and monitoring of SALW control and other sectors.

Community involvement is based on an exchange of information and involves communities in the decision-making process in order to establish priorities for SALW control. In this way, SALW control aims to be inclusive, community focused and ensure the maximum involvement of all sections of the community. This involvement includes joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Community involvement also works with communities to develop specific interim safety strategies that encourage individual and community behavioural change. This is designed to reduce the impact of SALW on individuals and communities until such time as the threat is removed.

This shall be one of the major strategic principles of SALW control.

Conflict prevention: Taking measures to try and prevent violent confrontation.

Conflict reduction: Process employed by States with the aim of diffusing tensions and building sustainable peace.

Conflict reduction strategies may include programmes designed to build national and local capacity to settle disputes; encouraging the establishment of coordinated conflict prevention policies among international actors; and assisting countries in reducing the spread of arms.

Conflict resolution: Efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and strengthen their relationships by building or deepening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.

Conflict resolution is used to reduce the possibility of violence, or to consolidate the end of a violent conflict in an attempt to prevent its re-escalation.

Cooperation: The process of combining separate actors (States/members/armies) to work together as a cohesive unit in attaining pre-defined goals.

Crisis management: Actions undertaken by governments and non-governmental agencies in an attempt to respond to security problems, identify their root causes and build international capacity to prevent conflicts from recurring.

Demilitarization: The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose.³⁵

Demilitarization not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as essential to achieving the final result.

Demobilization: “Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

Destruction: The process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state so that they can no longer function as designed.

Evaluation: Evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed

programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.

Incentives: Acts or conditions that encourage the achievement of a goal.

Indicator: Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a given development or aid factor.

Intervention: A process in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or without the consent of the other.

Monitoring: Monitoring is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies. In the context of SALW control, the term refers to the authorized observation by qualified personnel of sites, activities or processes without taking responsibility for what is being observed. This is usually carried out to check conformity with undertakings, procedures or standard practice and often includes recording and reporting.

National plan: A comprehensive, short, medium or long-term strategy to bring about the development of a specific issue in a country.

Operational objective: Specific target set by an organization to achieve a mission. Operational objectives should be precise, ideally quantifiable, and should be achievable with the resources that are likely to become available.

Organized crime: Widespread crime carried out in an organized fashion by criminal organizations, or groups of criminals where the group has a recognizable structure.

Policy: A set of statements that define the purpose and goals of an organization and the rules, standards and principles of action that govern the way in which the organization aims to achieve these goals.

Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience. In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and how resources are mobilized and applied. Policy is prescriptive and compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.

Policy development: The process whereby many academic, international and non-governmental organizations provide assistance to governments in developing their strategies and managerial approaches to particular issues, problems or events.

Political stability: A situation where the political system and its actors, rules, cultures and institutions achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of order.

Post-conflict: Can describe the time, period or events taking place in a given state or region that had experienced an outbreak of violence or conflict in its recent past.

Public information: Information that is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. The objective of public information within SALW control is to raise general awareness. It is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW problem. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and accurate data, it is the most practical means of communicating safety information. In other situations, public information can support community liaison/involvement.

Reconstruction: The process of rebuilding the institutions of state that have failed or are failing due to circumstances of war or to systematic destruction through poor governance.

Recovery: A restorative process in relation to the situation prior to the distress. It might entail 'healing', reparation, amelioration and even regeneration.

Reintegration: "Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance" (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

SALW advocacy: A programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues with the general public, the authorities, the media, governments and their institutions to achieve changes at both institutional and/or individual levels. These types of activities also include campaigns highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally carried out to support weapons collection programmes.

SALW awareness programme: A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns, which together work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative ways attitudes over the long term. Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW awareness activities. SALW awareness is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.

SALW control: Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management.

SALW risk education: A process that encourages the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links among affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors. SALW risk education can be implemented as a stand-alone activity, in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place. If an amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education programme and adapting the content accordingly.

SALW risk education is an essential component of SALW control. There are two related and mutually reinforcing components: (1) community involvement; and (2) public education.

Generally, SALW risk education programmes can use both approaches, as they reinforce each other. They are not, however, alternatives to each other, nor are they alternatives to eradicating the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of those approaches will also depend on whether a weapons collection programme is taking place or not.

SALW survey: A systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation. The following terms have been used in the past, though the preferred one is as indicated above: 'national assessment', 'base-line assessment' and 'mapping'.

Security: An individual or states feeling of safety or well-being, protected from attack or violent conflict.

OR

The control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response capability.

Security sector reform (SSR): A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of a strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private-military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society 'watch-dogs'.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW): All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability. There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above definition will be used.

Small arms capacity assessment (SACA): The component of SALW survey that collects data on the local resources available to respond to the SALW problem.

Small arms distribution assessment (SADA): The component of SALW survey that collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region.

Small arms impact survey (SAIS): The component of SALW survey that collects data on the impact of SALW on the community and social and economic development.

Small arms perception survey (SAPS): The component of SALW survey that collects qualitative and quantitative information, using focus groups, interviews and household surveys, on the attitudes of the local community to SALW and possible interventions.

Stakeholder: A broad term used to denote all local, national and international actors who have an interest in the outcome of any particular DDR process. This includes participants and beneficiaries, parties to peace accords/political frameworks, national authorities, all UN and partner implementing agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, and regional actors and international political guarantors of the peace process.

Standard: A documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. IDDRS aim to improve safety and efficiency in DDR operations by encouraging the use of the preferred procedures and practices at both Headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

Transfer: The import, export, trans-shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, licensed movement during production, brokering and transport of SALW.

Transparency: Free and open access to information that enables civil society to perform its regulatory function. Transparency is sometimes used as a synonym for accountability in governance.

Verification: Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled (ISO 9000:2000).

Violence: The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.

Voluntary surrender: The physical return on their own accord by an individual(s) or community of SALW to the legal government or an international organization with no further penalty.

Weapon: Anything used, designed or used or intended for use:³⁶

- (1) in causing death or injury to any person; or
- (2) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

Weapons in competition for development (WCD): The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

Weapons in exchange for development (WED; WfD): The indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organization or NGO.

Weapons in exchange for incentives (WEI): The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.

Weapons linked to development (WLD): The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.

Abbreviations

| | |
|------------|---|
| DDR | disarmament, demobilization and reintegration |
| IDDRS | integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards |
| NCDDR | national commission on DDR |
| SALW | small arms and light weapons |
| SEE RMDS/G | South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines |
| SSR | security sector reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN PoA | UN <i>Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects</i> , A/Conf.192/15 of 20 July 2001 |

| | |
|------------|--|
| WCD | weapons in competition for development |
| WCP | weapons collection point |
| WED | weapons in exchange for development |
| WEI | weapons in exchange for incentives |
| WLD | weapons linked to development |

Annex B: Normative references

The following normative documents (i.e., documents containing applicable norms, standards and guidelines) contain provisions that make up the norms, standards and guidelines that apply to the processes dealt with in this module. In the case of dated references, later amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on standard laid down in this module are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies. Members of ISO keep registers of currently valid ISO publications.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC), *SALW Awareness Support Pack 2005 (SASP 2)*, <http://www.seesac.org/resources/sasp>.

—, *South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE RMDS/G) Series*, SEESAC, Belgrade, March 2004, http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng.

Small Arms Survey and SEESAC, *SALW Survey Protocols*, <http://www.seesac.org/resources/surveyprotocols>.

UN DPKO holds copies of all references used in this module. UN DPKO maintains a register of the latest version/edition of the IDDRS, and these can be read on the IDDRS Web site: <http://www.unddr.org>. National authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organizations should obtain copies before starting DDR programmes.

Annex C: Further reading

The following informative documents contain useful background information concerning SALW control.


Gleichman, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Swedish National Defence College, Norwegian Defence School, GTZ and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 2004, <http://www.unddr.org>.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, September 2003, <http://www.osce.org/item/12525.html>.

UN, *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, A/CONF.192/15 of 20 July 2001.

—, *Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Trans-national Organized Crime*, A/55/255 of 8 June 2001.

Annex D: SALW intervention process flow



Endnotes

- 1 Drawn from the Co-ordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) Mechanism Statement, Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects, New York, 9 July 2001.
- 2 The import, export, trans-shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, licensed movement during production, brokering and transport of SALW.
- 3 The functions of SALW collection, SALW destruction and stockpile management are sometimes collectively known in the small arms community as weapons collection, management and disposal (WCMD). The term WCMD is deliberately not used in IDDRS to avoid confusion with the military and official NATO abbreviation for wind corrected munitions dispensers (WCMD).
- 4 ECOWAS, *Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa*, 31 October 1998 and subsequent reaffirmations, <http://www.sec.ecowas.int>.
- 5 EU, *EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*, 5 October 2000, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_178/c_17820010622eno2730278.pdf.
- 6 Council of the EU, *Joint Action on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2002/589/CFSP, 12 July 2002.
- 7 Council of the EU, *EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition*, Council of the EU 5319/06 of 13 January 2006, adopted 15–16 December 2005.
- 8 *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, 21 April 2004.
- 9 OAS, *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials*, 14 November 1997, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html>.
- 10 OAS, *OAS Resolution on Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in SALW*, 10 June 2003, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1968.htm.
- 11 OSCE, *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 24 November 2000, <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231.htm>.
- 12 OSCE, *OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*, 19 November 2003, http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379_en.pdf.
- 13 OSCE, *OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)*, http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965_en.pdf.
- 14 Stability Pact, *Combating the Proliferation of SALW: Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe*, 28 November 2001 (revised May 2006), <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.
- 15 Wilkinson, Adrian and John Hughes-Wilson, *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures*, UNDP, New York, July 2001.
- 16 In Mozambique the disarmament mandate placed all weapons under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed, as “the mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor could be found to fund the programme” (Herbert Wulf, Bonn International Center for Conversion Workshop on Small Arms, 18–20 February 1999, Geneva).
- 17 It must be recognized that SALW control is about a lot more than SALW collection, but as this is the component of the intervention with the most direct contact with communities, it is the component that generally dictates the progress of the rest of the programme.
- 18 There has been a tendency to label the whole SALW control programme by the type of incentive concept used to support the programme. This should be discouraged, as the success of a programme is not necessarily dependent on the success of the voluntary surrender component. For example, weapons registration may be just as effective as collection and destruction, as at least the weapons are under some form of legislative control.
- 19 Further detailed information can be found in RMDS/G 04.10: ‘Management of SALW Control Programmes’.

- 20 RMDS/G 03.10 provides guidance on the establishment of national SALW commissions, and the distinction between an authority and a commission.
- 21 Taken from the UNDP definition at <http://www.magent.undp.org/cdrb/techpap2.htm>.
- 22 *Resolving Small Arms Proliferation: The Development and Implementation of National Action Plans on Arms Management and Disarmament*, Saferworld and SaferAfrica, 2003.
- 23 See OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, OSCE, 2003, <http://www.osce.org/item/12525.html>.
- 24 UNDP assistance to SALW interventions will normally be conditional on the physical destruction of all weapons destroyed.
- 25 UNDP, *Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, November 2005, p. 40.
- 26 See OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices*, op. cit., chapter VII, 'Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons'.
- 27 Developed from the *Cranfield University Compendium of Good Practices on SSR*, http://www.gfn-ssr.org/good_practice.
- 28 Donald, D. and F. Olanisakin, *Security Sector Reform and the Demand for SALW*, Project PLOUGHSHARES Briefing 01/7, <http://www.ploughshares.ca>.
- 29 <http://www.nisat.org/security>.
- 30 A classic example of this can be found in the events in Albania during 1997, which led to over half a million weapons being stolen from state armouries. These weapons found their way to criminal groups and warring factions in the region, and have made a significant contribution to both the increase in organized crime violence and the events in Kosovo since 1999 (Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004).
- 31 The *SALW Survey Protocols* cover the methodologies to obtain much of the necessary information.
- 32 OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices*, op. cit.: 'National Control of Brokering Activities'.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 As of March 2002, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery will no longer support such schemes.
- 35 IMAS 11.10.
- 36 Criminal Code of Canada, sec. (S) 2: 'Interpretation', para. 2.