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Social and Economic Reintegration |
Summary
The sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants should be the ultimate objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). If reintegration fails, the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase are undermined, instability increases, and sustainable reconstruction and development are put at risk.
Successful reintegration is a particularly complex part of DDR. Ex-combatants and those previously associated with armed groups and forces are finally cut loose from structures and processes that are familiar to them, re-entering societies that are equally unfamiliar and that have often been significantly transformed by conflict. In some post-conflict countries, former combatants will have no experience, or memory, of pre-war peaceful patterns of life.
A key challenge that faces former combatants is that it may be impossible for them to reintegrate in their area of origin. Their limited skills may have more relevance and marketable value in urban settings, which are also likely to be unable to absorb them. In the worst cases, villages from which ex-combatants came may no longer exist after a war, or ex-combatants may be associated with groups that have committed atrocities in or near their own communities and may not be able to return home.
Community support is essential for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, but their presence may make worse the real or perceived vulnerability of local populations, which have neither the capacity nor the desire to assist a ‘lost generation’ of ex-fighters with little education, employment or training; war trauma; and a highly militarized view of the world. Unsupported former combatants can be a major threat to a community’s capacity to recover because of their lack of skills or assets, their tendency to rely on violence to get what they want, and their ignorance of or disrespect for local cultures, leaders and social habits.
To reduce their capacity for destabilization, ex-combatants will usually need specifically designed, sustainable support to help them with their transition from military to civilian life. Yet the United Nations (UN) must also ensure that such support does not mean that other war-affected groups are treated unfairly or resentment is caused within the wider community. The reintegration and reconciliation of ex-combatants must therefore be part of wider recovery strategies for all war-affected populations. Reintegration programmes should also aim to build local and national capacities to manage the process in the long term, as reintegration increasingly turns into reconstruction and development.
This module recognizes that reintegration challenges are multidimensional, ranging from creating microenterprises and providing education and training, through to preparing receiving communities for the return of ex-combatants, dealing with the psychosocial effects of war, and meeting the specific needs of different groups. It argues that ongoing inter-agency liaison is the best way for the UN to balance the specifically designed support offered to ex-combatants, which aims to increase security, with the wider support given to communities, which aims to bring about reconciliation and create the conditions for recovery.
This module outlines the basic principles that should guide UN reintegration programmes. It discusses the various pre-programme assessments that can be carried out in order to provide the information on which the reintegration strategy and programme will be based. It highlights the key elements of programme design that are necessary to keep the programme focused on its objectives and offers guidance for programme managers who have to make difficult decisions about directing support towards individuals or communities. Finally, the module outlines in detail the various components of reintegration assistance, from the moment of demobilization through to wider reconciliation and recovery programming.
1. Module scope and objectives
This module offers practical guidance on how planners might successfully deal with the challenges of reintegration within the context of a DDR programme. It highlights the key guiding principles that relate to reintegration, explains the pre-programme assessments that need to be carried out, and describes the main aspects of programme design and planning. Three context-specific approaches to ex-combatant reintegration are then presented, their selection being guided by the consultation and assessment processes that should take place before reintegration begins. The specific components of reintegration programming are then outlined. Given the complexity of reintegration, and the need to adapt it to a particular context, the guidance offered here is less prescriptive than in some other modules of the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS).
The objective of this module is to provide DDR practitioners with an overview of the issues that need to be taken into account when designing a reintegration programme, and to offer guidance on implementing such a programme.
2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations
Annex A contains a list of the abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.
In the IDDRS series, the word ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:
a) ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”
“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
3. Introduction
Sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants is the ultimate objective of DDR. Failure to reintegrate ex-combatants will undermine the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase, placing the DDR programme at risk and causing increasing instability. However, reintegration is a particularly complex challenge. Ex-combatants and their societies have often been significantly transformed by wars, especially when conflict has lasted a long time. In some post-conflict countries, ex-combatants will have no experience, or memory, of pre-war peaceful patterns of life. Reintegration is in some cases, therefore, the wrong word to use to describe what is happening.
Not all ex-combatants can or will reintegrate in their area of origin. Their limited skills may have more relevance and marketable value in urban areas (i.e., towns or cities). It is in such settings that male former combatants, at least, are more likely to use the skills they learned in war-time as security guards, mechanics, drivers or similar positions. Women are likely to have few marketable skills, especially in those places where the knowledge they acquired as combatants or while associated with armed forces and groups is considered inappropriate for women in civilian life. Combatants who have been with an armed force or group since childhood may have no memory of the place of that they came from. Villages from which ex-combatants came may no longer exist after a war, or ex-combatants may be associated with groups or forces that have committed atrocities in or near their own communities and may not be able to return home. Many former combatants, women in particular, may find it difficult to return because they fear being stigmatized for belonging to an armed force or group.
The return of ex-combatants can also worsen the real or perceived vulnerability of local populations. Ex-combatants may be seen as a ‘lost generation’, having been deprived of education, employment and training during the conflict period. Often they are left traumatized by war and can only understand the world from a military perspective. Their lack of civilian skills or assets, combined with their habit of relying on violence to get what they want, may result in their becoming involved in predatory behaviour against communities, such as banditry and theft; or they may turn once more to organized armed violence in a group.
Returning ex-combatants are potential ‘spoilers’ of peace. This is why, while other war-affected groups such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) may far outnumber them, ex-combatants will usually need focused, sustainable support if they are to succeed in making the transition from military to civilian life. However, when designing and implementing DDR programmes, a key challenge is to fulfil the specific and essential needs of ex-combatants without turning them into a privileged group within the community. The reintegration support for ex-combatants should therefore be planned to avoid creating resentment and bitterness within the wider community or putting a strain on a community’s limited resources. The reintegration and reconciliation of ex-combatants needs to be part of wider recovery strategies for all war-affected populations.
Many different activities combine to make up the process of reintegration, ranging from creating microenterprises, and providing education and training, through to preparing receiving communities for the return of ex-combatants, dealing with the psychosocial effects of war, and meeting the specific needs of different groups — men, women, girls and boys, persons with disability, and so on. UN DDR programme managers will need to carefully liaise with other agencies to balance the targeted support offered to ex-combatants, which aims to increase security, with the wider support given to communities, which aims to bring about reconciliation and create the conditions for recovery.
4. Guiding principles
IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR sets out the main principles that shall guide all aspects of DDR planning and implementation. They shall all be taken into consideration when designing reintegration programmes. Outlined below are key principles that are particularly important for ex-combatants’ reintegration.
4.1. Clarify objectives and expected results with all parties
The objectives and expected results of the reintegration programme shall be clearly defined from the start, particularly with regard to the number of beneficiaries, their composition (e.g., men, women, youth, etc.), and the criteria for their selection. All parties to the conflict shall commit themselves to accepting an agreed framework, together with a timetable for carrying out activities.
4.2. Start planning for reintegration as soon as possible
Frequently, disarmament and demobilization are carried out very effectively, but then reintegration fails, jeopardizing the DDR programme and the wider security situation. A variety of factors can contribute to this failure, including: lack of recognition by key stakeholders of the importance of reintegration; lack of resources; lack of community involvement; or loss of confidence in the reintegration process by demobilized ex-combatants after long delays in implementation. These failures often point to a lack of adequate and timely planning and budgeting. UN practitioners shall therefore begin preparing for reintegration at the very start of any future DDR intervention.
4.3. Ensure national ownership
National ownership is essential to the success and sustainability of DDR programmes. The primary responsibility for the outcome of DDR programmes rests with the national and local actors who are ultimately responsible for the peace, security and development of their own communities and nation. National ownership includes much more than just central government leadership: it requires the active participation of a range of state and non-state actors at national, provincial and local levels. It is important to ensure the participation of groups traditionally marginalized in DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes, in particular representatives of women’s groups, youth representatives, children’s advocates, people living with disability and chronic illness, and minorities.
4.4. Ensure community participation
The success of reintegration programmes depends on the combined efforts of individuals, families and communities. Reintegration programmes shall be designed through a participatory process that involves ex-combatants and communities, local and national authorities, and other non-government actors in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages.
4.5. Develop national capacity
Reintegration programmes shall try to develop the capacities of receiving communities, as well as local and national authorities. In contexts where national capacity to implement DDR is weak, it is important to ensure that the UN does not act as a substitute for national authorities in the management and implementation of DDR, but instead temporarily fills the capacity gap, under strong national policy oversight, while also working to improve and strengthen national capacities.
4.6. Consider regional implications
Successful national capacity-building for the reintegration of local combatants may become more complex when the conflict has affected more than one country in a region. Careful assessments in the planning stages shall be carried out to determine whether foreign combatants and/or mercenaries will have to be repatriated to their country of origin, and to develop ways of doing this if these are not specified in the peace accord. Inter-agency cooperation is essential in cases of cross-border repatriation. Particular care shall be exercised when repatriating foreign combatants and/or mercenaries with families so that accompanying wives, husbands and children are registered and given official forms of identification that will protect and assist them in the country to which they relocate. Women in marriages recognized by customary or national law who wish to remain with their husbands will need particular assistance to integrate into their new country (also see Annex B, as well as IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).
4.7. Engage donors
As outlined in section 4.2, the lack of timely and adequate resources has in the past hampered the ability of the UN to implement sustainable reintegration programmes. DDR programme managers shall therefore engage donors in discussions on the scope and focus of the reintegration programme as early as possible.
4.8. Engage potential ‘spoilers’
Management of the interests and expectations of key warlords and military leaders is often essential for the establishment of sustainable peace processes and agreements. However, a certain number of military leaders/warlords, especially mid-level commanders, may end up being left out of the incentive structure agreed to in the peace agreement. Buy-in to the process by these key participants shall therefore be one of the first priorities of DDR planning and programme design.
Either the national government, supported by the national commission on DDR, should deal with their concerns directly, which is by far the preferable option, or the DDR programme should include a two-tier system of reintegration support, one for these commanders, whose expectations are usually quite high, and another for the rest of the combatants.i Failure to deal with this issue may lead to these key stakeholders acting as ‘spoilers’, which could jeopardize the entire DDR programme and undermine wider peace and security. Attention must also be paid to foreign combatants and mercenaries (also see Annex B and IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).
4.9. Make reintegration part of a wider recovery strategy
DDR is carried out primarily to improve security, in order to allow for post-conflict recovery and development to take root. DDR alone, however, cannot be expected to prevent further conflict and restore stability. DDR is a precondition, and not a substitute, for recovery interventions aimed specifically at vulnerable groups like IDPs, returnees and other victims of the conflict. It should be accompanied by other economic, political and social reforms, as well as wider development and recovery initiatives. Reintegration programming shall therefore be conceptualized, designed, planned and implemented as part of, or at least in very close cooperation with, the wider recovery strategy, which often includes post-conflict rehabilitation, resettlement of displaced populations, reconciliation efforts, respect for human rights, rule of law, and improved governance (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building & Recovery Frameworks).
4.10. Balance equity with security
Non-discrimination and equitable (fair) treatment are core principles in the design of UN-supported DDR programmes. The principle of equity shall be applied when establishing eligibility criteria for entry into DDR programmes (see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament). However, this principle should also be applied to all war-affected populations. In most conflicts, IDPs and refugees far outnumber ex-combatants. All three groups face similar reintegration problems and, in principle, they should be given equal access to reintegration opportunities. Offering special treatment to ex-combatants may cause resentment among other groups who may view special or unique benefits to ex-combatants as an unjustified reward to the perpetrators of conflict.
However, although applying the principle of equity will increase the chances of reconciliation and sustainable reintegration, the security situation often demands that, in the short term at least, a specific focus on ex-combatants is required to increase security. The important thing is to ensure that the receiving communities are adequately consulted, and that they understand and accept that specifically designed support given to ex-combatants will increase their own security. In this sense, reintegration support for ex-combatants is not to be regarded as special treatment for ex-combatants, but rather as an investment in security for the population as a whole.
4.11. Ensure a timely transition from supporting individuals to supporting communities
Despite concerns that ex-combatants receive disproportionate benefits during post-conflict reconstruction, there is a growing consensus that a focus on former combatants within DDR programmes is necessary and justified in order to build confidence and security in war-torn societies. To achieve the security objectives of a DDR programme, support should be given for the full initial reintegration of ex-combatants. However, in the context of longer-term reintegration, a balance must be struck between supporting ex-combatants’ specific needs and the needs of the wider community in order to prevent resentment and a continued sense of difference between civilians and former military. Any focus on the longer-term reintegration of ex-combatants must be accompanied by interventions that focus on both the families of ex-combatants and their respective communities, without whom sustainable reintegration cannot succeed. Emphasis shall therefore be placed on moving quickly from programmes specifically designed for ex-combatants to community-based and national development programmes. Failure to do so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a special group outside society, which slows down their reintegration into local communities and undermines reconciliation and restitution processes.ii
4.12. Be ‘people-centred’
The primary focus of any UN-supported DDR strategy shall be on people and communities. A ‘people-centred’ approach recognizes that there will be differences in the support required by both sexes and those of differing ages and physical ability. Designing culturally relevant and appropriate reintegration activities for each group, and offering specifically designed health and psychosocial services, as well as training and support for microenterprises, will break down violent structures that exclude certain social groups and ensure the sustainability of the reintegration programme.
5. Pre-programme assessment
Decisions on the scope and focus of reintegration assistance shall be based on a thorough analysis of the beneficiary groups and the context into which they are (re)integrating. Local actors with strong knowledge of the political, economic and social contexts should be involved in this assessment process and DDR programme planners should draw on the knowledge of the UN country team. In some circumstances, the security situation may limit the range and scope of assessments. Political factors may also limit the time available. UN DDR programme managers should carry out assessments and analysis in the areas outlined in this section as early as possible in order to improve programme design.iii
5.1. Conflict and security analysis
The nature of the conflict will determine the nature of the peace process, which in turn will influence the objectives and expected results of DDR and the type of reintegration approach required. An initial conflict and security analysis should be carried out in order to clarify the nature of the conflict and how it was resolved, and to identify the challenges facing a DDR programme. A holistic analysis (i.e., looking at the situation as a whole) of conflict and security dynamics should inform the development of the objectives and strategies of the DDR programme. There are certain conflict analysis tools that can assist the UN and its local counterparts (i.e. local government departments, agencies, NGOs, etc,) in understanding conflict causes and dynamics, and the impact of current policies and programmes, in order to design conflict-sensitive interventions (see Annex C). The following table suggests questions for this analysis and assessment.
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5.2. Pre-registration survey of beneficiaries
The registration of ex-combatants during the demobilization phase will give a picture of their social and economic expectations, as well as their capacities and resources. However, by the time this registration takes place, usually during demobilization, it is already too late to begin planning the reintegration process. A profile of potential beneficiaries of the DDR programme should therefore be developed before disarmament and demobilization begins.iv Early information should be gathered about the issues listed in the following table:
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5.3. Identification and assessment of areas of return or resettlement
Based on the information gathered from the initial pre-registration survey of beneficiaries, an assessment should be made of the economic and social potential of the areas that ex-combatants are expected to return to or resettle in. This assessment should take into account the availability of natural resources, the economic infrastructure (such as access to markets, and the availability of communications and services), and the security situation in the area. It should also map (i.e., list and survey to gain an overall impression of) local social services and institutions.v Key issues for this analysis and mapping exercise are as follows:
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5.4. Reintegration opportunities and services mapping
The post-conflict economic environment can be extremely problematic. Armed conflicts invariably damage or destroy productive assets and weaken the labour market. Conflict can also cause considerable damage to physical, social and economic infrastructure, which may further reduce productive employment and income-generating activities. Trading networks are disrupted and public and private sector investment declines. Working conditions tend to deteriorate, while violations of workers’ rights, especially those of women and youth, and the potential for inequitable employment practices increases.
In this degraded environment, it is essential that UN DDR programmes avoid creating unrealistic expectations among beneficiaries. Expectations can best be managed if programme managers have a clear understanding of the actual economic opportunities available to those being reintegrated. DDR programme planners should prioritize the development of a countrywide systematic mapping to identify existing and potential employment opportunities, whether in existing business enterprises, in self-employment and/or through creating microenterprises. Attention shall be paid to different groups so that the employment, education and training needs and opportunities of women and men, youth and children are understood (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR). This analysis will define the nature of the situation that reintegration will have to take place in and be at the core of the reintegration strategy.
Relevant education and training, microcredit services, and other employment and business development services (i.e., technical advisory, information and counselling services) should also be mapped. The survey should include other development programmes (both existing and planned) within the national recovery effort, as well as those of international and national development organizations. Other social support services, such as support for people living with AIDS; trauma and drug abuse counselling; and/or disability rehabilitation services should also be identified. This mapping should take place as early as possible to ensure that training programmes are ready when ex-combatants need them, and should reflect an understanding of local norms and standards about sex- and age-appropriate labour, as well as changes in gender roles that may have occurred during conflict.
In most post-conflict countries, little labour market information is available, and both collection and analysis are difficult tasks. Preliminary labour market surveys should be conducted to make data and analysis available quickly. The adaptation and use of existing questionnaires developed in other post-conflict contexts can speed up this research.vi Rapid assessments can be carried out by the public employment service or by using key informants at the community level. Data on both labour supply and demand should be built into the overall management information system (MIS) (see section 6.8). The reintegration opportunities mapping exercise should attempt to answer the following questions:
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An early survey of existing education and training providers and their training courses should also be carried out. This survey should include information on which sectors they cover; which age groups they can teach or train; their capacity, equipment, teacher and trainer resources; and what they need to be able to provide training. On the basis of this assessment, the DDR programme can: select training providers; develop programmes designed to meet the needs of disabled, young, male and female ex-combatants; assess costs; and provide support to trainers.
Opportunities for apprenticeships and on-the-job training should also be identified. All labour-related assessments should take place as early as possible, as it takes a long time to upgrade training infrastructure and services, and these usually make up the first component of economic reintegration. However, as will be stressed in section 9.2, training should be seen only as a tool for reintegration, not as reintegration itself. DDR programme managers should avoid training ex-combatants in skills or economic fields that the ex-combatants might identify as their preference, but that are not needed in the labour market. The feeling of frustration and helplessness that caused people to take up arms in the first place only increases when they cannot find a job after their training, making them more open to re-recruitment.
6. Programme design and planning
Once the pre-programme assessments have been carried out, planning for reintegration can begin. As outlined in section 4.2, this should take place together with planning for disarmament and demobilization, as part of an integrated DDR programme. This section outlines key issues to consider when planning for reintegration.
6.1. Ensuring that planning is participatory
One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a lack of local ownership, resulting in the perception that DDR is imposed from outside. The participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define a role for all parties in the decision-making process. These actors should be fully involved in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages. A participatory approach will significantly improve the DDR programme by:
providing a forum for testing ideas that could improve programme design;
enabling the development of strategies that respond to local realities and needs;
ensuring local ownership;
encouraging DDR and other local processes such as peace-building or recovery to work together and support each other;
encouraging communication and negotiation among the main actors to reduce levels of tension and fear and to improve human security;
recognizing and supporting the capacity of women, especially in security-related matters (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR);
building respect for women’s and children’s rights (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and 5.30 on Children and DDR);
involving youth in decision-making processes (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR);
helping to ensure the sustainability of reintegration by developing community capacity to provide services and establishing community monitoring, management and oversight structures and systems.
6.2. Engaging ex-combatants in reintegration planning
DDR programme planners should ensure that participatory planning includes representation of ex-combatants, especially mid-level commanders (see section 4.8). This will help to ensure that their expectations are, where possible, met in the programme design or at least managed from an early stage. The creation of veterans’ associations is often encouraged as a way of ensuring adequate representation of ex-combatants in a DDR process. These associations are also considered to be an early warning and response system for identifying dissatisfaction among ex-combatants, and for confidence-building between discontented groups and the rest of the community.
However, experience shows that such associations will usually be respected by communities members if they emerge naturally and spontaneously from other reintegration activities, but are not set up as national or hierarchical organizations, since formal veterans’ associations can delay or prevent the effective reintegration of ex-combatants by helping them keep their identity as soldiers and their involvement in the command structures that they were familiar with when they were combatants. DDR programme planners may respond supportively to the creation of associations of ex-combatants where these emerge because former combatants organize themselves within the context of the broader community. Where national top-down associations have already been formed as a result of political processes, DDR programme planners may assist such associations to take part positively in reintegration activities.
6.3 Involving communities in reintegration planning
Communities play a central role in the reintegration of ex-combatants. Ultimately it is communities who will, or will not, reintegrate ex-combatants and it is communities who will, or will not, benefit from a successful DDR programme. It is important therefore to ensure that communities are at the centre of reintegration planning when it comes to identifying opportunities for individuals, potential stress points and priorities for community development projects. International support should strengthen the capacities of local and provincial actors and service providers to play a central role in the reintegration process.
It is good practice to involve families, traditional and religious leaders, women’s and youth groups, and other local associations in planning the return of ex-combatants. These groups should receive support and training to assist the process. Women, in particular, often bear the burden of reintegration of ex-combatants in families and communities, and will require assistance to deal with the reintegration of sick, traumatized, violent ex-combatants, and of children. Community women’s groups should also be sensitized to support and protect women and girls returning from armed groups and forces, who may struggle to reintegrate.
Reintegration programmes should be designed to support receiving communities to the fullest extent possible. All DDR interventions have components that potentially help other target groups in some way. For instance, setting up training or health centres for ex-combatant services usually requires an upgrading of basic health-related infrastructure (clinics, hospitals, etc.), which, if well planned through consultation with communities and in coordination with authorities, can directly benefit other community members. The sustainability of ex-combatant reintegration is directly linked to wider issues such as public security, communications and social services. Within the funding constraints of the DDR programme, and if care is taken to avoid underinvesting in the central objective — ex-combatant reintegration — these issues can, and should, be dealt with through participatory planning processes.
6.4. Developing national and local capacities
A primary role of international assistance is to support the development of national and local capacities to implement DDR. This capacity will encourage ownership, commitment and the successful delivery of services, as well as the long-term sustainability of the DDR process. The reintegration component of DDR should be focused on developing the capacity of national and local training institutions and service providers through education and training, and technical and material assistance. Support should also be given to communities to set up local forums and consultative committees.
6.5. Ensuring coordination and partnership
As emphasized in all IDDRS modules, effective coordination assures the success of DDR programmes. It should be the guiding principle from the earliest pre-mission assessment phase and continue throughout all stages of strategy development, programme planning and implementation. DDR programme managers will need to ensure close coordination:
in the field, where coordination mechanisms within the UN system, with national counterparts, with implementing partners, with receiving communities and with donors should be established at the earliest stages of mission planning;
in Headquarters, through integrated mission planning structures and processes (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures) to ensure that coordinated, coherent and consistent direction and support is provided to field operators;
between the field and Headquarters to ensure that lessons learned and policy development on DDR are built into field-level programming, particularly at the start of missions and DDR processes, as well as to ensure the participation of key stakeholders at the international level.
In order to ensure the sustainability of reintegration, DDR programme manager should also focus on building strong local, national and international partnerships from the start. Partnerships are essential, both in direct, short-term programme implementation and in forming links to longer-term recovery, peace-building and governance programmes.
6.6. Public information and awareness-raising strategies
The return of ex-combatants to communities can create real or perceived security problems. The DDR programme should therefore include a strong, long-term, public information campaign to keep communities informed of the reintegration strategy, timetable and resources available. Focus-group interviews with a wide range of people in sample communities should provide DDR programme managers with a sense of the difficulties and issues that should be dealt with before the return of the ex-combatants. Mapping ‘areas at risk’ can also help managers and practitioners identify priority areas in which support will need to be offered to communities. Lessons learned from previous DDR programmes suggest that radio programmes in which ex-combatants have spoken about their experiences are a powerful reconciliation tool (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).
6.7. Developing a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system
One of the weaknesses of DDR programmes in the past has been the lack of clearly defined objectives and indicators of the effect the programme is having, which are needed for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). As a result, it has been difficult to assess the actual overall impact and success of DDR interventions and the relative merits of specific approaches. Once the decision to implement a DDR programme has been taken, the NDDRC and/or national and local stakeholders, together with UN agencies and partners, shall develop a framework for results-based M&E.
The starting point for effective, results-based M&E is for all the concerned parties to arrive at a clear and unambiguous agreement about the objectives and expected results of the DDR programme. Different contexts will require different DDR approaches, with different objectives and expected results, so these must be clarified from the start rather than assuming that DDR always produces certain standard outcomes. Once expected results are clearly defined, key indicators for monitoring and measuring programme impact must be agreed by all stakeholders. Individuals or organizations responsible for monitoring should also be identified, as well as how often monitoring reports will be drawn up.
Conventional assessment of DDR programmes has tended to focus on short-term quantitative outputs such as the number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants demobilized or trained. DDR planners should also focus on qualitative impacts such as changes in ex-combatant behaviour, successful interactions with other social groups, and improvement in security both at national and local levels. The early development of a rigorous M&E mechanism will allow for ‘lessons learned’ to be identified, communicated and shared.
The M&E framework becomes the tool by which stakeholders together measure progress and identify bottlenecks. Through a process of defining the M&E framework, stakeholders develop a shared understanding of the objectives of the DDR programme, which in turn leads to greater ownership (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).
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6.8. Establishing a management information system (MIS)
The collection of sex- and age-disaggregated personal and socio-economic data (including information on special needs) provides information on which to base the planning and implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes, as well as the later M&E of ex-combatants as they reintegrate into civilian life. The volume of data needed to track ex-combatants, and to design and monitor reintegration programmes, requires a comprehensive MIS. The software used during the registration of ex-combatants in the disarmament and demobilization process will greatly assist in gathering data and in management, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Specially designed software is essential to avoid double counting, to track ex-combatants, and to manage programme monitoring, evaluation and reporting. These information systems must include data not only on thousands of individuals, but also on the opportunities available for their reintegration and the status of individual and collective reintegration projects.
The lack of readily available commercial or institutional software packages for this purpose has meant that every DDR programme has had to build its own database and MIS, placing a heavy burden on their financial and human resources during the critical start-up period. The need to design this software every time a DDR programme is initiated has often delayed the beginning of project activities in situations where security-related issues do not permit delays. Furthermore, creating a new system for each programme failed to ensure that experiences gained from previous programmes were effectively integrated into new MIS systems. To solve these problems, UNDP has developed a generic MIS that can be adapted to the needs of each UN integrated DDR programme to minimize implementation delays and provide savings for future DDR projects.vii
6.9. Resource mobilization
Many people and large amounts of funds are required at the start of a DDR programme. Given the need for early planning and implementation of key reintegration activities, such as pre-registration surveys and the development of the capacity of service providers, adequate funds need to be available at the start in order to prevent delays that could undermine programme credibility. Previous UN programmes have faced serious funding problems, as outlined below:
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The move towards integration across the UN will help to solve some of these problems. In addition, a recent decision in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly clarified the use of the regular budget for DDR during peacekeeping operations.viii Resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 formally endorsed the financing of staffing and operational costs for disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion activities) pending a final policy decision at its sixtieth session. The resolution agreed that the demobilization process must provide “transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year”. This decision should greatly assist DDR programme managers in planning their reintegration programmes.
Flexible funding arrangements are essential to deal with the complex nature of DDR, and to enable UN agencies to adopt an integrated approach to programming. Both the types of funding mechanisms, such as trust funds and pooled funding, and the criteria established for the use of funds must be flexible. As past experience has showed, strict allocating of funds for specific DDR components (e.g., reintegration only) or expenditures (e.g., logistics and equipment) reinforces an artificial distinction between different parts of DDR. This is particularly the case with phased funding or funding from assessed contributions, whose inherent limitations have in the past seriously undermined the capacity and performance of DDR operations (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).
6.10. Exit strategy
The time-frame of DDR is limited, covering the conflict, transition and early recovery periods, and therefore close attention should be paid, from the start, to ending programmes and their transition into longer-term development and peace-building processes managed by national counterparts and in-country UN agencies. Many aspects and outcomes of the reintegration programme therefore need to be sustained beyond the lifespan of a DDR operation. Therefore, DDR programme managers shall clearly define the exit strategy during the planning stage, focusing in particular on the transition between reintegration and broader and/or longer-term SSR, violence prevention, recovery and peace-building processes.
A capacity-development component should be included in the programme design, to assure a smooth programme transition and a gradual transfer of responsibility to national institutions and government. This capacity development should focus on activities that are relevant to other aspects of socio-economic recovery and development and not only to specific DDR activities. Ideally, DDR should be a one-time intervention, done correctly the first time, and never to be repeated again. Otherwise, no matter what safeguards are put in place, the rewards people think they receive from taking part in DDR can become an incentive for them to participate in future conflicts.
7. Context-specific approaches to reintegrationix
While the above principles, assessments, and design and planning issues should be taken into account in all reintegration programmes, the process of adapting the DDR programme to the political, socio-economic and security context of each DDR intervention will require different approaches each time. Depending on the nature and type of conflict, the way in which it has been ended and the post-conflict security and development priorities, it is possible to identify three broad approaches to reintegration.
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The specific context of a DDR intervention in any country may require a mix of the above reintegration strategies, combining an individually focused reintegration strategy for ex-combatants with an approach that deals with the main priorities of the receiving communities, in terms of both improving their capacity to absorb ex-combatants and dealing with their most urgent security concerns — other than the presence of ex-combatants themselves. The various approaches are discussed below. They are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined at various times in the DDR process to increase responsiveness and flexibility.
7.1. Short-term stabilization
In this strategy, stopgap (temporary) projects combined with an extended transitional subsistence allowance to cover the resettlement period are usually seen as a sufficient response. The short-term stabilization approach is used in situations where it can reasonably be assumed that ex-combatants will reintegrate through their own networks, that they already possess the means for their reintegration (social capital, access to land) and/or that they are not a threat to peace. This approach is very useful in the short term, when longer-term reintegration is planned but not available immediately after demobilization is complete. It can increase the flexibility and responsiveness of DDR by ensuring that former fighters are kept busy and can sustain themselves until longer-term reintegration programmes start.
7.2. Reintegration focused on ex-combatants
The second type of reintegration strategy, which focuses specifically on the needs of ex-combatants, is characterized by the need to develop an individual long-term reintegration strategy for each ex-combatant. This approach is mostly used when ex-combatants are seen as a threat to long-term security and development or in contexts where normal life has continued for others in post-conflict communities. In these circumstances, the reintegration programme should assist individual ex-combatants by providing relevant training, identifying employment opportunities in existing businesses and by creating microenterprises. The DDR programme should also provide ongoing technical advice, as well as monitoring and supervisory services to each microproject. Advice, monitoring and supervision will help to keep ex-combatants focused on their plans and help them to adapt their original plans if the circumstances of their microenterprises change in some way.
7.3. Community-based reintegration
The third approach to reintegration links the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants directly into a wider strategy for the recovery of a community, where there is not a specific focus on ex-combatants for livelihood support, except by providing key services such as mental and physical health care. This approach ensures that ex-combatants’ reintegration programmes form a part of the wider goal of community recovery and development. It also helps avoid the potential problem of community members feeling excluded from specially designed reintegration programmes that are solely for ex-combatants, and it deals with the problems that arise when stabilization strategies focus on short-term security issues.
7.4. Linking reintegration to wider recovery programming
Whichever of the above approaches (or combination of approaches) is adopted, DDR managers should ensure that the reintegration programme is closely linked to wider reintegration programmes, which are designed to meet the needs of IDPs, refugees and other war-affected populations. It should also link to wider peace-building activities, including the promotion of human rights, justice and SSR and recovery. Reintegration activities should deal with not only vital security and political issues, but also the social context in which processes of reconciliation, changing social relations, and strengthening the rule of law are taking place. Therefore, when designing reintegration programmes, UN practitioners should coordinate and, where possible, jointly plan programmes with actors working on the reintegration of other war-affected groups, reconciliation, justice, governance, political reform, human rights, gender equality, poverty reduction and development.x
DDR managers should also ensure that their programmes are integrated into other relevant frameworks, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)xi and the development of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). This is vital to ensure that DDR programming is linked to peace-building, transition, recovery and reconstruction strategies and that it will facilitate the involvement of the various UN and other international agencies, as well as resource mobilization. However, while all efforts should be made to coordinate closely with other actors implementing related programmes, UN DDR programme managers should clearly identify those objectives that the reintegration programme can deal with directly, and those to which it can only contribute (see Annex C and IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery).
8. The transition from demobilization to reintegration
DDR is not linear or sequential, but dynamic and integrated: reintegration actually starts during the demobilization process. Since the phases of DDR do not occur one after the other, but simultaneously, UN staff responsible for reintegration, as well as national counterparts and other implementing partners, should be involved in the planning and implementation of relevant aspects of the demobilization process. It should be noted that many of the activities described below, such as counselling and referral, will start during demobilization, but will continue during the reintegration period.
8.1. Registration and profiling
Registration and profiling, which usually occurs during the demobilization process, will establish the nature and size of the group for which a DDR programme is to be designed. The collection of personal and socio-economic data provides baseline information needed for the planning, implementation and later monitoring and evaluation of the process of ex-combatants’ reintegration. As stated above, the volume of data needed to track ex-combatants, and design and monitor reintegration programmes requires a good MIS.
Programme managers should ensure that the registration process is designed to support reintegration, and that information gathered through profiling is included in future programme design. Previous DDR programmes have often experienced a delay between registration and the delivery of assistance, which can lead to frustration among ex-combatants. To deal with this problem, UN DDR programmes should provide ex-combatants with a clear and realistic timetable, at the time that they first register for DDR, of when they will receive assistance.
8.2. Information, counselling and referral
A key feature of any ex-combatant reintegration programme should be the information, counselling and referral system, which provides vital briefing and orientation for ex-combatants, preparing them for a return to civilian life. It is essential to start this process during demobilization; however, services should be provided throughout the lifespan of the reintegration programme.
During demobilization, pre-discharge orientation should include information on opportunities available through the reintegration programme, and referral support to help ex-combatants take advantage of these opportunities. Ex-combatants should also be provided with counselling on their expected change in role and status in society, as well as advice on political and legal issues, accommodation support services, their civic and community responsibilities, and reconciliation programmes.
Often ex-combatants do not know how to carry out simple activities that are easily understood by their peers, and do not have the confidence to either ask for assistance or find out for themselves. Making choices is often a new experience for ex-combatants, and even for their dependants, as they are used to command structures and collective lifestyles where they are told what to do by others, rather than personal decision-making. Appropriate counselling and peer support can play an important part in providing ex-combatants with the confidence, ‘life skills’ and aptitude required to face everyday problems, challenges and opportunities without resorting to violence. Where possible, specialized, confidential, gender- and age-appropriate counselling should be offered, to avoid peer pressure and encourage the independence of each ex-combatant. These services are an important way of supporting ex-combatants during the difficult transition from demobilization to reintegration. All counsellors should be trained to handle violent reactions from ex-combatants.
A key challenge for counsellors is to strike the right balance between the hopes and ambitions of ex-combatants and what is available in the labour market. Frustration and hopelessness, which are often at the root of the decision to join an armed force or group in the first place, can reappear when ex-combatants do not find a job after having been involved in ineffective training and employment. Counsellors should therefore match the skills and hopes of ex-combatants with employment or education and training opportunities. This is essential in managing the transition to civilian life and the world of work. If offered during demobilization, guidance and counselling can play a key role in identifying and specifically designing employment programmes and education and training opportunities, as well as helping ex-combatants make realistic career choices.
Once ex-combatants are settled in the receiving communities, information, counselling and referral services should continue to be provided, through as wide a network of offices as possible. These services can help ex-combatants and others associated with armed groups and forces to sort out any uncertainties about the reintegration process and help them to make informed decisions about the most appropriate route to reintegration, taking account of their personal circumstances, the potential reintegration opportunities and the various support services available to them.
Information, counselling and referral services should build on existing national or local employment services, which are normally the responsibility of the ministry of employment. In countries where such services are weak or non-existent, the reintegration programme should either start, re-launch or strengthen national and local services, as appropriate.xii Temporary structures doing the same things should be avoided whenever possible, as using national structures will ensure the sustainability of an essential structure that countries emerging from armed conflict will need in the future for the whole of the civilian population.
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8.3. Health services
The demobilization process provides a first opportunity to brief ex-combatants on key health issues. Former combatants are likely to suffer a range of both short- and long-term health problems that not only affect their own reintegration prospects, but also pose potential threats to the communities to which they will return. In addition to basic medical screening and treatment for wounds and diseases, particular attention should be directed towards the needs of those with disabilities, those infected with HIV/AIDS, and those experiencing psychosocial trauma and related illness. Support should also be given to their main caregivers in the community to which they return. As in the case of information, counselling and referral, the services described below may start during the demobilization process, but continue into and, in some cases, beyond the reintegration process (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).
8.3.1. HIV/AIDS
A very direct and demonstrable connection exists between the spread of HIV/AIDS and conflict. Conflict greatly increases the spread of HIV/AIDS for various reasons. These can include: the lack of a safe blood supply; the shortage of clean equipment for injecting drug users; an insufficient supply of condoms and health care; and the widespread use of sexual and gender-based violence, both as a weapon of war and as a means to discipline and control people, especially women and girls, but also including boys, within armed groups and forces.xiii The overall post-conflict recovery strategy should urgently focus on the threat and impact of HIV/AIDS, and the DDR programme is an obvious place in which to plan interventions. Military personnel and armed groups and forces are known high-risk groups for the transmission of HIV/AIDS, as well as other diseases that spread among those living in close quarters or difficult conditions. The demobilization and reintegration process can therefore contribute to the spread of disease. However, it also provides an excellent opportunity to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS among this key target group and offer voluntary counselling and testing services. In many cases, counselling on substance abuse, especially those practices that contribute to the transmission of HIV/AIDS, should also be supplied at this stage (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).
8.3.2. Psychosocial and mental health care
The widespread presence of psychosocial problems among combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups has only recently begun to emerge as a major issue affecting DDR programmes.xiv Many of them have been victims or perpetrators of horrendous violence, which may have left deep emotional and psychological scars resulting in depression, apathy or rage. Post-war trauma, especially in combination with substance abuse, is likely to affect reintegration processes, overstraining the capacity of the receiving community; limiting the development of human-rights-based social practices, especially gender equality; and undermining possibilities for the non-violent resolution of conflict.
Psychosocial support and counselling to deal with these effects is an essential, but often overlooked, component of DDR. Particular attention should be paid to post-war trauma and mental illness, which, especially in combination with alcohol or drug abuse, is likely to affect both reintegration processes and the capacity for using non-violent methods to resolve conflict, particularly within the family.xv As long as ex-combatants remain traumatized, their productivity and self-esteem, and their commitment to self-help and recovery remain extremely limited and they continue to threaten peace, stability and recovery.xvi The dramatic increase in domestic violence recorded in post-conflict countries highlights the need to raise awareness and provide education on women’s human rights and non-violent ways of resolving interpersonal conflict within reintegration programmes.
8.3.3. Disabilities
War leaves behind large numbers of injured people, both civilians and fighters. Ex-combatants with disabilities should be treated as victims of armed conflict; they have special needs and require special care. This group should be included in general reintegration programmes, not excluded from them, i.e., many ex-combatants with disabilities can and should benefit from the same programmes and services made available to non-disabled ex-combatants. DDR programme managers should ensure that the following guidelines are taken into account when dealing with disabilities in reintegration programmes:
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Some ex-combatants with disabilities will require long-term medical care and family support. They sometimes receive some form of pension and medical assistance, especially if they were part of a government force. However, it is very rare to find long-term assistance for disabled ex-combatants who were part of a rebel movement or other kinds of informal army, with the exception of direct medical assistance such as artificial limbs. In places where the health infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, attention must be paid to informal care providers — often women and girls — who care for disabled combatants, and support structures must be put in place to lessen the largely unpaid burden of care that they carry.
8.3.4. Reproductive health services
The provision of reproductive health services, which should start as soon as the demobilization registration and screening process has identified specific needs, should be continued, as appropriate, during reintegration. Efforts should be made to direct those requiring further support and health services to public or private national and/or community health facilities. Preferential or subsidized access may still be required, particularly in those cases where the lack of continued treatment can in itself create a renewed public threat, such as HIV/AIDS, drug abuse and psychological illness.
8.4. Transitional subsistence support (TSS)
Ex-combatants are usually provided with benefits as a part of demobilization. Normally, some sort of transitional subsistence support (TSS) is provided for the immediate and basic needs of the combatant and his/her dependants. However, because the material benefits of DDR have often been overemphasized, DDR has been regarded as a commodity, and considered to be an entitlement, rather than a process. Cash-based TSS packages have contributed to this misconception.
When designing UN integrated DDR programmes, special attention should be paid to refocusing and repackaging benefits, especially those given in the transitional phase. The tendency has been to provide money as TSS. Although intended to provide ex-combatants and their dependants with a way of supporting themselves while waiting for reintegration assistance, cash payments have many drawbacks, especially if provided in large instalments. Small payments over a longer period are a more effective way of ensuring a peaceful resettlement process. Experience has shown that a family member or partner of the beneficiary should also be informed of the payment and its purpose, to improve the chances that money will be spent wisely. Packages should be linked to work or services performed by the ex-combatant, for their benefit and that of the community. Stopgap or quick-impact projects have an important role to play, as is discussed in section 8.5, below.
DDR programme managers should consider TSS, which provides ex-combatants, those previously associated with armed forces and groups, and their dependents with food, civilian clothing and personal items, household goods, building materials, work tools, agricultural inputs, and some basic services such as medical assistance. In addition to the TSS, and in order to deal with the possible resistance of communities to receiving returning ex-combatants and prevent accusations that ex-combatants are receiving more and better benefits, it may be useful to issue a ‘reintegration voucher’ to ex-combatants. Ex-combatants can give this to their community of return, for use in local activities aimed at increasing the communities’ capacity to receive ex-combatants and to improve local security conditions. Another option is to issue an ‘employment voucher’, giving ex-combatants access to employment programmes.
As with much of reintegration programming, the TSS should be adapted to a specific context. However, the following issues should be taken into consideration:
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8.5. Stopgap projects and temporary employment creation
The transition from military to civilian life can be a difficult time for ex-combatants struggling to come to terms with their new identity and role in society. ‘Stopgap’ projects are short-term interventions that help to provide a smoother transition from demobilization to reintegration. Stopgap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas may help reintegrate ex-combatants into the community by creating short-term jobs while they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes. The use of these projects is only a temporary fix rather than a well-thought-out, sustainable solution to the problem.
Ex-combatants may be involved in public infrastructure works, such as reconstruction of schools, water systems, hospitals, roads, demining, garbage collection, etc. Stopgap projects should only help with the community’s immediate needs. Since they are highly visible, they contribute to improving the public perception of ex-combatants and may serve as a first, crucial step towards the latter’s reintegration, especially if other members of the community are included in the workforce. This approach is particularly recommended for the urgent repair of damaged infrastructure, because during post-conflict reconstruction it is best to rely on what is immediately available at low cost, i.e., local light equipment and labour. Heavy equipment is generally not available, or else out of order or lacking spare parts, fuel or skilled machine operators.xvii
DDR programme managers should avoid falling into the trap of using stopgap projects so often, and for so long, that they finally become the main reintegration mechanism. This can be avoided by reducing the time between demobilization and reintegration support. This can best be done by starting the profiling of ex-combatants as soon as possible through the pre-registration survey (see section 5.2), and through reintegration opportunities mapping (see section 5.4). This will allow for the early establishment of information, counselling and referral services, and will reduce the transitional period to a minimum.
9. Economic reintegration
Large-scale armed conflicts usually have a devastating effect on economies, productive capacities and livelihoods, leading to the impoverishment of much of the population. The end of hostilities does not automatically result in an improvement of economic conditions. At the end of a conflict there is often an abrupt release into the labour market of thousands of ex-combatants who compete with ordinary civilians for extremely scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. In such circumstances, ex-combatants might attempt to use violence to make a living, becoming involved in banditry, theft and other forms of illegal and harmful activity. Providing support for the reintegration of ex-combatants is therefore vital to help develop alternatives to violence-based livelihoods. This support can have an immediate positive effect on security and contribute to the improvement of overall economic conditions. Economic reintegration will be successful only if the reintegration support provides or encourages viable forms of economic activity and is socially productive. All interventions must be sustainable to ensure that ex-combatants do not turn to violence to earn a living.
9.1. Ongoing labour market analyses
As outlined in section 5.4, early assessment of the opportunities and services open to ex-combatants is vital in the design and planning of a reintegration programme. However, this analysis of the labour market needs to be regularly updated during the implementation of the reintegration programme, and should include analysis of culturally appropriate professions for men and women of varying age groups, recognizing how conflict may have changed cultural norms about gender-appropriate work. The capacity of the ministry of employment or labour should be strengthened to perform this task at the national and provincial level, while providers of vocational training and employment services should be equipped to carry out assessments regularly at the local level. This labour market analysis should be shared with national authorities, UN agencies, and local and international non-governmental organizations involved in supporting reintegration, and should serve as the basis for training activities.
9.2. Education, training and skills development
Many ex-combatants have missed opportunities for basic and further education, and as a result are disadvantaged in the competition for jobs and opportunities. Provision of adult literacy classes, adult education, and technical and vocational training is important both to improve the skill sets of adult and young ex-combatants and provide opportunities for reorientation and demilitarization. Training and education offered to children should be specialized for their needs (see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR). As far as possible, education and training for ex-combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups should be supplied as part of the wider provision of educational services to the general population, and not in schools or colleges exclusively for them, even when ex-combatants have preferential access (e.g., by not having to pay fees).
In the past, DDR programmes often sent ex-combatants on training courses and assumed that they would be reintegrated when the course was over. In the majority of cases, this does not happen, and the resulting frustration can lead to increased security risks, which undermines the objective of the DDR programme. Another problem has been that ex-combatants have been provided with a range of training courses and asked to make their choices with limited advice and no opportunity to consult their families or peers, or to understand their options as part of the broader reintegration process. These choices may have no relation to the state of the economy or an individual’s capacity to benefit from the training provided.
Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration and not as reintegration itself. It should be practical, and should be designed mainly to respond to the requirements of the informal sector, which is where most microenterprises will start up. As outlined in section 5.4, socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants should be directly linked to reintegration opportunities and services mapping. With this in mind, DDR programme managers should provide the following services, if they are appropriate (which will depend on the specific context of each DDR intervention).
9.2.1. Education and scholarships
Young ex-combatants, especially those aged under 15, should be reintegrated into formal education, which may mean extra support for teachers and trainers to manage the special needs of such learners. Some ex-combatants can be offered scholarships to finish their studies. Youth should have priority in these cases, and particular attention must be paid to assisting girls to return to school — which may mean making available nursery facilities for children in their care. In some countries where the conflict has lasted a long time and combatants have received little or no schooling, emphasis should be placed on ‘catch-up’ education to ensure that this group does not stay trapped in life-long poverty. If allowances or school fees are to be funded by the reintegration programme, DDR programme managers should ensure that resources are available for the full duration of ex-combatants’ education, which could be longer than the reintegration programme. If resources are not available, there should be a clearly communicated plan for phasing out support.
9.2.2. Vocational training
Ex-combatants often need to learn new skills in order to make a living in the civilian economy. Vocational education plays a vital role in successful reintegration, by increasing ex-combatants’ chances to effectively join the labour market. Training can also help break down military attitudes and behaviour, and develop values and norms based on peace and democracy. Vocational training activities need to be linked with studies of the local labour market and identification of the economic potential of an area and its business opportunities. Attention should be paid to existing economic cultures, including whether women and men will have equal access to all types of work and how this can be addressed. Training should also be regularly adapted to the changing demands of the labour market. Certification of training has proved important in ensuring that the quality of training given by the different providers is similar, to increase the confidence of ex-combatants when applying for work, and to gain recognition by employers.xviii
9.2.3. Apprenticeships and on-the-job training
After completing a vocational training course, the trainee can use his/her newly acquired skills through apprenticeships or on-the-job training in existing workshops or businesses. Alternatively, apprenticeships and on-the-job training can themselves be a particularly effective form of training, since they might result in more sustainable employment. A reintegration programme can subsidize these learning and training opportunities by paying the trainee an allowance. Apprenticeship and on-the-job training should be carried out according to the local tradition of apprenticeships, in order to ensure sustainability. An apprenticeship can also be an excellent means of social reintegration and reconciliation, as it also offers insertion, through an association with a mentor/trainer, into an already existing socio-economic network consisting of groups and communities of people who are not ex-combatants.
9.2.4. Life skills
DDR programme managers should regard the provision of life skills as a necessity, not a luxury, in reintegration programmes. Life skills include non-violent ways of resolving conflict, civilian social behaviour, and career planning, but also understanding what kinds of behaviour, etc., employers expect. This type of training should complement the various other forms of educational and/or training services provided. Education on political rights and responsibilities, especially in countries undergoing major governance reform, is essential to encourage the participation of ex-combatants in democratic structures.
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9.3. Employment creation
Labour-based public works programmes and public sector job creation are often important features of reintegration programmes. It is essential that the inclusion of these activities in reintegration programmes is based on a clear understanding that they are a temporary measure only. Public sector job creation is often a political expedient forced on governments when reintegration programmes fail to provide sustainable job opportunities for ex-combatants. While taking ex-combatants into public service may be an important part of overall reconciliation and political integration strategies, especially as part of SSR, it can be sustainable only when economic circumstances allow for the expansion of public services, and therefore should be managed as a part of overall economic development strategies.
9.4. Livelihood and income generation
9.4.1. Developing the private sector and business development services
Policies and programmes that support the creation and expansion of businesses can help create employment in a post-conflict environment. Providing business development services (BDS) can help overcome the difficulties faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, inadequate technical skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure. Government agencies should be encouraged to develop the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks to encourage private sector growth and to play a role in monitoring and coordinating this growth. However, in many post-conflict societies, government agencies lack the capacity to support and deliver services to micro- and small enterprises. Various actors, including businesses, local NGOs with experience in economic projects, paragovernmental institutions and community groups can be encouraged to provide BDS (see Annex D).xix
9.4.2. Employment in existing businesses
Reintegration programmes ideally should try to place qualified ex-combatants in existing jobs, as the risk of failure is lower than if they try to start a new microenterprise themselves. In reality, there are very few employment opportunities in post-conflict environments, and, where these opportunities do exist, business owners are often not willing to employ ex-combatants. Reintegration programmes should therefore help to increase the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering wage, training and equipment subsidies. These subsidies, however, should have the following conditions:
wage subsidies should be partial and last for a fixed period of time;
newly hired ex-combatants should not take the jobs of workers who are already employed;
employers should use the subsidies to expand their businesses, which means that the ex-combatant’s job will be permanent.
Governments should be also supported in the creation of a legal framework to ensure that labour rights are respected and that demobilized or other vulnerable groups do not become ‘slaves’ of the private sector.
9.4.3. Microenterprise and small business start-ups
In most post-conflict societies there are few businesses that can rapidly expand their workforce. Therefore, while the recovery and expansion of the private sector should be encouraged, it is often necessary to focus on creating new microenterprises for most ex-combatants. Once opportunities for employment in existing businesses have been exhausted, the DDR programme should therefore help ex-combatants to develop their own microenterprise start-up business plans.
DDR programme managers should provide support that is specifically designed to meet the needs of each individual ex-combatant, wherever possible, to prevent commanders from extorting part of their reintegration assistance from previous group members. Although it is more expensive and more time-consuming, this kind of support also equips ex-combatants to decide for themselves what they will do, and to act alone, which helps to break their dependence on the group structure. Specifically designed support does not mean that reintegration projects cannot involve more than one ex-combatant, but rather that each individual should make the decision to start a microenterprise without too much outside pressure. Recent evaluations have shown that the bigger the group, the less likely it is that an income-generating project will last very long; this is because of the increased difficulties in managing a multi-member project. Reintegration programmes should also ensure that many different kinds of small businesses are started , to avoid distorting the balance of supply and demand in local markets. Too many of the same type of business means that many are bound to fail.
9.4.4. The provision of microgrants
The main way of funding the creation of microenterprises should be microgrants, which, as recent experience shows, should be provided to the ex-combatants only after they have drawn up a clear start-up business plan, and should be paid in instalments.xx The instalments should, as far as possible, be given in kind (equipment, supplies, training, etc.), avoiding large cash payments, which are difficult to monitor effectively and can be misused. Training and technical assistance services are essential to the success of start-ups, together with direct, on-the-ground supervision and monitoring by the DDR programme.
Credit, rather than grant schemes, has regularly been used in reintegration programmes. However, credit has rarely been successful, mainly because ex-combatants are one of the groups of society least able to take on the obligations of credit schemes, especially in the early phases of their reintegration. Grants are therefore a more appropriate way of providing start-up resources. Because of their poor track record, microfinance programmes that are designed for ex-combatants should not be encouraged. Offering ‘credit’ to individuals who cannot repay, or to institutions that do not have the capacity to ensure repayment, can undermine the local credit culture and hence the sustainability of other financial institutions, if the population comes to see credit as something that does not have to be repaid.
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10. Social reintegration
10.1. Land distribution, property rights and resettlement
Disputes over land and access to water or mineral resources are the root causes of many conflicts. UN DDR programme planners must take these underlying conflicts into account when planning the return, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants, as they are often competing with other returnees for access to land. Conducting an early conflict analysis will assist programme managers in designing conflict-sensitive programmes. However, it cannot be the task of the reintegration programme to advance reforms of land access or mineral rights, for example. These are national policy issues. DDR programmers must be aware of and responsive to these issues, and should not make things worse through their interventions.
Most ex-combatants, like refugees and IDPs, wish to return to the places they have left or were forced to flee. Returning home, where this is possible for individuals, is often a key step in reintegration programmes. However, they may find their land occupied by others, either spontaneously or as part of a planned strategy. As many intended beneficiaries of reintegration processes will return to rural areas and to mainly pastoral or agricultural economies, access to land is an extremely important issue for them.xxi For women, in particular, land inheritance traditions may exclude them from owning land. While it is beyond the scope of the DDR programme to reform constitutional and statutory laws, it should support efforts to make changes to legislation so that women can own property. Where necessary, the reintegration programme should support female ex-combatants and other women previously associated with armed groups and forces in their efforts to receive legal assistance to protect their property rights (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).
The lack of available land for resettlement has been a major obstacle to successful reintegration in several countries. Failing to deal with issues of equity and land redistribution within the broader recovery framework can mean that when ex-combatants try to return to land they previously owned, they become a source of conflict. Programme planners and national and local authorities need to focus carefully on issues of land resettlement as part of post-conflict recovery and reintegration strategies in rural areas. Specifically designed land resettlement and agricultural extension services and support may be appropriate during the resettlement of war-displaced groups by including ex-combatants who may have lost access to land as a result of the war. However, the resettlement of former combatants within communities is always likely to be a sensitive matter, and a great deal of consultation and reassurance are essential.
Preferential access to housing is another way in which ex-combatants may receive specifically designed assistance to enable them to re-enter civilian life. Such support is based on the assumption that combatants have not had the same opportunities as their civilian peers and so deserve to receive such support. However, former combatants are usually not the only sector of society that has to reintegrate, and refugees and IDPs may also require similar support to get access to land and property they previously owned. Community consultation and arbitration are essential to resolve these matters fairly and peaceably.
Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants should work together with other reintegration programmes to support the establishment of local conflict-resolution mechanisms that can work towards finding equitable and sustainable solutions to potential conflict about access to land and other resources. Such mechanisms can transform potential conflict into reconciliation opportunities, e.g., through involving both ex-combatants and non ex-combatants in stopgap projects that use land for the benefit of entire communities.
10.2. Urban reintegrationxxii
Because of a number of factors, such as changing expectations and difficulties in reintegrating into village life, ex-combatants are increasingly reintegrating into urban settings. For ex-combatants reintegrating into cities and towns, where they cannot depend as much on family or other support networks, transitional assistance and reintegration programmes are essential to prevent them from returning to violence and insecurity. Ex-combatants’ preference for reintegration in an urban setting can also be a sign of marginalization, possibly indicating that families and communities of origin are unwilling to accept them.
When accommodation is limited and services are run down, urban reintegration presents both a challenge and an opportunity: combatants should be discouraged from entering urban slums, whose degraded conditions will not offer them many opportunities for reintegration. Instead, former combatants could be usefully employed in repairing houses or building new ones, both for themselves and to contribute to urban renewal projects in the reconstruction phase. The preparation of such projects is complex and requires early and integrated planning.
10.3. Restoring social cohesion
The success of any DDR programme and the effective reintegration of former combatants depend on the extent to which they become positive agents for change in their societies. The creation of social cohesion between ex-combatants and other community members is essential, but relations between ex-combatants and other community members are usually anything but ‘normal’ at the end of a conflict. Ex-combatants often return to extremely difficult social environments, where they might be seen as additional burdens to the community, rather than assets. UN DDR programme planners should carry out sensitization campaigns to ensure a broad understanding among stakeholders that DDR is not about rewarding ex-combatants, but rather about turning them into valuable assets to rebuild their communities and ensure that security and peace prevail (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR). Ex-combatants should also be actively involved in activities designed to both stabilize their own socio-economic situations and benefit the community as a whole. This approach should consolidate peace and contribute to security, with minimum involvement from external actors, while enabling government counterparts, local authorities, traditional authorities and the demobilized ex-combatants themselves to take ownership of the process.
10.4. Reconciliation and peace-building
A key component of the reintegration of ex-combatants, people previously associated with armed forces and groups, and their dependants is the process of reconciliation, which should take place within war-affected communities if long-term security is to be firmly established. Ex-combatants, people previously associated with armed groups and forces, and their dependants are one of several groups who are returning and reintegrating into the community. These groups, and the community itself, have each had different experiences of conflict and may require different strategies and assistance to rebuild their lives and social networks. Reconciliation among all groups is perhaps the most fragile and significant process within a national peace-building strategy. DDR reintegration programmes should focus on supporting reconciliation among different groups, not only through focused ‘reconciliation activities’, but also by introducing activities that encourage reconciliation into all components of reintegration programmes. To achieve this, the DDR programme should benefit the community as a whole, ex-combatants need to work with other groups, and specifically designed assistance should also be available to other war-affected people. DDR programmes should also identify, together with other reintegration and recovery programmes, ways of supporting reconciliation initiatives and mechanisms.
10.5. Human rights
Armed conflict generally results in gross human rights violations. Confidence in the justice system and citizens’ (including ex-combatants’) perceptions of their own security are affected by how past and ongoing human rights violations are handled.xxiii It is often felt that ex-combatants who violated human rights should be appropriately punished. However, harsh punishments might not only increase tensions, e.g., between ex-combatants and the rest of society, but prevent them from presenting themselves for DDR in the first place. The problem of people not being punished for war crimes should be tackled and the DDR programme should be supported by efforts to strengthen and reform both the justice and the security sector. However, an emphasis on protection, human rights and reconciliation should also be at the heart of reintegration programming, which should ‘re-educate’ combatants into civilian life, prepare communities for the return of ex-combatants and help both groups anticipate some of the difficulties they may encounter, which in itself makes such problems less difficult to deal with.
10.6. Reducing armed violence
A key characteristic of many post-conflict societies is the breakdown of the traditional state monopoly on the use of violence, because a wide variety of individuals possess and use weapons. Despite a formal end to hostilities, high levels of armed violence can continue, undermining the ability of the state to restore or maintain law and order, and threatening peace, security and development.
Warring factions and violent youth gangs exploit the feelings of alienation and marginalization of jobless, frustrated young men in many poor countries. Because of their specific needs and ambitions, young men, and increasingly, young women, form a distinct group among ex-combatants, requiring specific interventions to help them adjust peacefully to civilian life. In addition, there may be numerous ‘pre-combatants’: groups of violence-prone, at-risk youths, who have not (as yet) participated in formal conflict, but can easily fall prey to the next round of instability because of their alienation from mainstream society. To avoid this situation, young men and women should be involved in all decision-making processes in reintegration programmes to ensure that their specific concerns are dealt with.
Youth organizations can help the reintegration of young ex-combatants and ‘pre-combatants’ into society by allowing them to meet with other people of their age in a non-military environment. In addition to their social benefits, youth centres and clubs can be focal points for training and employment activities by offering computer or language classes, organizing job information fairs, and designing and implementing youth projects. Also, theatre, music, arts and sports activities have excellent social benefits, can provide employment, and can help young people learn life skills that prepare them to be better partners, parents and citizens. Given the vulnerability of youth to recruitment into armed violence, DDR reintegration programmes should consider how to support youth organizations to give them a safe space where they can meet off the street and enjoy non-violent excitement in a secure and controlled environment (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).
Annex A: Terms, definitions, and abbreviations
Terms and definitions
Business development services (BDS): A set of ‘business services’ that include any services that improve the performance of a business and its access to and ability to compete in markets.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs): Persons who have been obliged to flee from their homes “in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, [1998]).
Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs): PRSPs are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes that a country will follow over several years to bring about broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing (IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: A Fact Sheet, September 2005, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm).
Quick-impact projects (QIPs): Small, rapidly implemented projects intended to:
help create conditions for durable solutions for refugees and returnees through rapid interventions;
through community participation, provide for small-scale initial rehabilitation and enable communities to take advantage of development opportunities;
help strengthen the absorptive capacity of target areas, while meeting urgent community needs (UNHCR, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): A Provisional Guide, Geneva, May 2004).
Abbreviations
|
ABD BDS CDA DDR IDDRS IDP ILO INGO LED M&E MIS NGO SSR TSS UN UNDP |
area-based development business development services conflict-related development analysis disarmament, demobilization and reintegration integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards internally displaced person International Labour Organization international non-governmental organization local economic development monitoring and evaluation management information system non-governmental organization security sector reform transitional subsistence support United Nations UN Development Programme |
Annex B: Foreign combatants and mercenaries
Foreign combatants and mercenaries are potential spoilers of both the peace process and DDR, and must be planned for as follows:
Are they included in the peace accord? If not, DDR planners may wish to advocate for their inclusion. If there is resistance to account for them in the peace negotiations, what are the underlying political reasons and how can the situation be resolved?
How do the foreign combatants and/or mercenaries fit into the conflict? Are they a root cause of the conflict, or opportunists who arrived after it started?
Do they have a coherent chain of command? If so, is their leadership seen as a legitimate participant in the peace process by the other parties to it and the UN? Can they be approached for discussions on DDR?
Are measures for the repatriation and reintegration of foreign combatants in place in their country of origin? If not, DDR planners should consider contacting the authorities of their home country to establish a mechanism for their return and reintegration.
Who is employing and commanding mercenaries?
Do individuals have the capacity to act unilaterally?
What threat, if any, do they pose to the peace process?
Do they have an interest in DDR?
If not, what measures can be put in place to neutralize them, and by whom — their employers and/or the national authorities and/or the UN?
Annex C: Conflict analysis and DDR priorities
The UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance Working Group on Transitions has developed a ‘framework for conflict analysis’ for the UN system and its partners that can easily be adapted for DDR strategic and programme planning. Three steps are given, as follows:
Step 1: Conflict analysis;
Step 2: Mapping ongoing responses and actor roles and capacities;
Step 3: Strategic and programmatic priorities in DDR.
In each step, there is a disaggregation of information at every sector and level, as in the following table:
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Before DDR is implemented, the contextual analysis and conflict assessment attempt to answer the following questions:
What are the root causes of conflict? Have they been resolved? What, if any, are the ideologies behind the war and are they still relevant?
What circumstances led to the negotiation and signing of the peace agreement? Are all parties to the conflict included? Has one of the parties ‘won’ the fighting? Is DDR called for in the peace agreement?
What is the current level of security in the country? What is the capacity of state security forces to enforce security during the peace consolidation phase? How long is this phase expected to last?
Does the current government have political legitimacy? Will there be elections? When? How does DDR fit into the goal of political reform?
Is DDR an appropriate peace-building strategy? What kind of armed forces will undergo DDR? Is downsizing a goal? Should there be a formal DDR within a peacekeeping operation, requiring encampment, formal demobilization with disarmament, and structured reintegration procedures? Should there be informal processes such as decentralized DDR interventions, voluntary turn-in of weapons, self-demobilization and decentralized reintegration support mechanisms?
What are the short- and long-term goals, e.g., comprehensive disarmament or the long-term reintegration of violence-prone groups?
What institutional actors in the country are able to carry out DDR activities (e.g., public and private institutions, UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, donors and other civil society actors)? What support do they need? What institutions need to be created?
What internal and external resources are available to fund DDR and wider reconstruction and recovery activities?
Annex D: Tools for reintegration planning and programming
Outlined below are key tools that can assist UN DDR programme managers in implementing reintegration programmes. More information on these tools can be found at http://www.unddr.org.
1. Area-based development
Developed by UNDP, ‘area-based development’ (ABD) deals with overall social and economic recovery while also assisting with reintegration. The usual features of all ABD programmes are as follows:
they are based on well-defined geographical areas and are responsive to the needs of the overall population;
they are genuinely participatory and are driven by beneficiaries’ needs and demands;
they are largely managed by local institutions and organizations using systems that are decentralized, but still accountable;
they require high levels of inter-agency cooperation to assure coordinated delivery of results within the integrated area-based planning process.
2. Business development services (BDS)
Within the framework of strengthening local capacities for providing support to self-employment and the promotion of micro- and small and medium-sized enterprises, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has developed various ways of improving BDS. These services try to overcome the non-financial problems and limitations encountered by entrepreneurs, such as lack of education, inadequate technical skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure.
Methodologies include:
Start and improve your business (SIYB): This process supplies trainers who can train ex-combatants to start and run their own businesses;
Business training: Most ex-combatants starting a business need specific training, while somebody who already has some experience in running a business may need to improve his/her business skills.
3. Conflict-related development analysis
As part of UNDP’s efforts to make conflict prevention a key part of development, an approach to conflict assessment has been developed that seeks to ‘operationalize’ conflict prevention and peace-building into strategy development and programming. The ‘conflict-related development analysis’ (CDA) builds on the pilot conflict assessments that have been carried during the period 2001–2002 in several countries, including Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau and Tajikistan. CDA has been developed as an analytical aid for country offices to use for both strategic analysis and programme design/review in conflict-prone and -affected countries, and one that will guide UNDP, other UN agencies, and local counterparts to understand conflict causes and dynamics, and the impact of current policies and activities (particularly development) in order to design conflict-sensitive interventions at the macro- and microlevels.
4. Guidelines on employment-intensive reconstruction works in countries emerging from armed conflicts
The ILO published these guidelines in 2000. They provide checklists and recommendations on how to plan for reintegration and rehabilitation. For more information see Guidelines on Employment-intensive Reconstruction Works in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflicts – ILO, Geneva, 2000.
5. Key informants approach/survey
Developed by ILO, the ‘key informants approach/survey’ is a method of rapid appraisal of a regional labour market, its main trends and its possibilities for the future development of local markets. The information gathered from these surveys can provide appropriate information to encourage entrepreneurship and local initiatives, particularly for all qualified former combatants who want to establish their own (formal or informal) businesses.
6. Local economic development (LED)
Experiences in war-affected countries have demonstrated that dialogue involving a wide range of local actors on economic development priorities contributes to the consolidation of peace. The purpose of these consultations is to come to a common and shared vision on the economic development of the territory. The tool LED has been developed by ILO. Key parts of the LED process are:
Territorial diagnosis: Rapid assessment of urgent problems and measures to tackle them, collection and analysis of socio-economic information, and institutional mapping;
Sensitizing: Broad awareness-raising of the issues that affect the socio-economic development of the territory, and creating a feeling of ownership in the LED process among those involved;
Creating a forum: Developing a gathering of all public and private stakeholders as a forum in which to share their views on LED priorities;
Designing a LED strategy: Preparation of a central reference document on which interventions are based and against which progress is measured;
Establishing coordination/implementation structures: Setting up institutional mechanisms to coordinate and maintain the momentum of recovery efforts;
Actions: Translating LED strategy priorities into actions in core areas such as business services, including (micro)finance, training, planning, special groups, environmental awareness and attracting investment.
Annex E: Planning tool: Agency capacity matrix
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Endnotes
i. Because the expectations of these commanders are much higher than those of the rest of the fighters, benefits need to be specifically designed for them, which is not only time-consuming, but also a very difficult balancing act that can easily backfire by creating jealousies among individuals or groups.
ii. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report on the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique (1992–1996) recommends that “within three years of demobilization, the demobilized soldiers should no longer be a specially targeted group, but should be included as an important group in sector or community-based development programmes” (p. 28).
iii. Surveys can be specifically designed to gather specific information on specific groups such as children, youth and adult women. These issues are explored more thoroughly in IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR.
iv. Specific tools for beneficiary survey profiling are as follows: ‘Ex-combatant needs assessment documents: Survey of ex-combatants’ (International Labour Organization [ILO]), ‘Sample registration forms’ (International Organization for Migration, and UNHCR Registration Handbook (UNHCR).
v. The process of gathering this information is know as‘territorial diagnosis and institutional mapping’.
vi. See ILO, Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants, ILO, Geneva, 1997, Annex 2 (c): ‘Labour market analysis support document’; and ILO, Guidelines for Establishing Emergency Public Employment Services, ILO, Geneva, 2003. The school-to-work-transition survey is a generic statistical tool that could also be adapted to an analysis of the youth labour market in a post-conflict situation. For more information on this tool, see http://www.ilo.org/youth.
vii. This generic software is available from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, to all DDR programmes upon request.
viii. See resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 for more information.
ix. This section draws from the UNDP Practice Note on DDR, 2005.
x. UN DDR programme managers need to ensure also that their reintegration programmes take account of the ‘4Rs framework’, which was developed jointly by humanitarian and development actors in an effort to assure an integrated approach to refugee repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. While ex-combatants and their dependants enter the reintegration process from a different starting point than refugees, IDPs and other war-affected populations, they should as far as possible be integrated into larger reintegration frameworks such as 4Rs.
xi. UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the UN system at the country level. It provides a collective, coherent and integrated UN system response to national priorities and needs, including PRSPs and equivalent national strategies, within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments, goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration and international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the UN system (UN, Common Country Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework: Guidelines for UN Country Teams, 2004).
xii. ILO, Guidelines for Establishing Emergency Public Employment Services, ILO, Geneva, 2003.
xiii. Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), HIV/AIDS and Security, http://www.unaids.org.
xiv. A UNDP conference on ‘Lessons Learned in DDR Programmes in Africa’ reviewed presentations from eight African countries, all of which stressed the need to incorporate psychosocial support for demobilized combatants; see UNDP, ‘Presentation to Psychosocial Support Project Workshop’, UNDP, Nairobi, 2002, p. 1.
xv. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Improving External Support to Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life, BICC, Berlin, 2002, p. 7.
xvi. Drawn from UNDP, ‘Presentation to the Psychosocial Support Project Workshop’, op. cit., p. 1.
xvii. For more information see ILO, Good Labour Policies and Practices in Employment-intensive Programmes, ILO, Geneva, undated.
xviii. For more information, see ILO, Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants, ILO, Geneva, 1997; and ILO, Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries, ILO, Geneva, 1998.
xix. For more information, see Miehlbradt, Alexandra O. and Mary McVay, Seminar Reader, Developing Commercial Markets for Business Development Services, prepared for the Small Enterprise Development Programme of the International Labour Office, ILO, Turin, 2004; and Finnegan, Gerry, Are W.E. Being Served? The Work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Promoting More and Better BDS for Women Entrepreneurs, prepared for the ILO InFocus Programme on Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise Development – Women's Entrepreneurship Development, ILO, Geneva, 2003.
xx. For guidance on when to use grants versus loans/credit, see, for example, ‘Recapitalising Liberia: Principles for Providing Grants and Loans for Microenterprise Development’, in Tucker, John, Tim Nourse, Rob Gailey, Dave Park and Stephan Bauman Forced Migration, May 2004, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR20/FMR2006.pdf.
xxi. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, OECD/DAC, Paris, 1998.
xxii. While urban reintegration is a growing phenomenon, more needs to be done to develop guidance and standards to address it. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR will address this issue before the second edition of the IDDRS.
xxiii. International Peace Academy Workshop, paper on ‘Improving External Support to the Reintegration of ex-combatants into Civilian Life’, 12–13 December 2002.