Haiti |
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Background
United Nations involvement in Haiti started in February 1993 when the joint United Nations-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti was deployed. In September 1993, the Security Council set up the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country – the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). However, due to non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be fully deployed at that time and carry out its mandate.
In July 1994, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a 20,000-strong multinational force to facilitate the prompt return of the legitimate Haitian authorities, maintain a secure and stable environment in the country and promote the rule of law. The multinational force was followed by a number of successive United Nations peacekeeping missions from 1994 to 2001, including UNMIH which assumed its functions in full in March 1995, the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).
Throughout this period, there were a number of positive developments, including the restoration of some measure of democracy, with the first peaceful handower of power between two democratically elected presidents; the growth of a multifaceted civil society; and its increasing involvement in the development of a political culture based on democratic values. There were, however, also setbacks. Owing to the continuing political crisis and concomitant lack of stability in the country, serious reforms never took hold.
In the 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party claimed victory with a turnout that hardly rose above 10 per cent of the voters. The opposition, as well as members of the international community, contested the results and accused the Government of manipulating them. Subsequently, dialogue between the Government and the opposition broke down. By late 2003, a newly united opposition movement, comprising political parties, civil society actors as well as the private sector, was calling for the President’s resignation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) offered to mediate and, on 31 January 2004, submitted a Prior Action Plan, followed in February by an implementation plan worked out by the Group of Six, involving the Bahamas for CARICOM, Canada, the European Union, France, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States. Both of these plans were agreed to by President Aristide. The Prior Action Plan had called for major reforms, including a new cabinet, while allowing President Aristide to serve out his term. However, the opposition refused to back the plan. Several diplomatic initiatives, spearheaded by CARICOM and the OAS, were subsequently taken with a view to overcoming the political stalemate and preventing a further deepening of the political crisis.
In early February 2004, armed conflict broke out in the city of Gonaives, and in the following days fighting spread to other cities. Gradually the insurgents took control of much of the northern part of the country. Despite diplomatic efforts, the armed opposition threatened to march on the Haitian capital. Early on 29 February, Mr. Aristide left the country. His letter of resignation was read out by the Prime Minister, Yvon Neptune. Within hours, Boniface Alexandre, the President of the Supreme Court, was sworn in as interim President, in accordance with the constitutional rules of succession. On the evening of 29 February, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations submitted the interim President’s request for assistance, which included the authorization for international troops to enter Haiti. Pursuant to that request, the Security Council adopted resolution 1529 (2004) authorizing the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and declaring Council’s readiness to establish a follow-on United Nations stabilization force to support continuation of a peaceful and constitutional political process and the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. MIF, immediately started its deployment to Haiti, as authorized by that resolution.
In consultation with the interim President and the then-Prime Minister, steps were taken to form a transitional government. On 17 March 2004, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Conseil des sages (a group of eminent persons), formed a 13-member transitional Government.
In order to build broad political consensus for the work of the transitional Government, a political pact, the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact, was signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the transitional Government, members of the Conseil des sages, representatives of various political groups and civil society organizations. The signatories came to a general understanding on the political transition, which would see the holding of municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005 and would end with the installation of a newly elected President, Fanmi Lavalas, denounced the Pact.
The Pact also set out measures to be undertaken during the transitional period in the areas of security, development, fight against impunity and corruption, decentralization, elections, judicial reform, a national conference initiative and a new social contract, institutional strengthening of political parties and civil society organizations, reintegration of former armed elements and professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Additionally, it was agreed to establish a number of commissions to address issues such as recent human rights abuses, financial wrongdoing and matters related to the former military. The Pact emphasized the need to provide assistance to victims of the prior government. The Pact also provided that the signatories would engage in discussions with the United Nations on the status of the MIF and the follow-on peacekeeping operation.
On 30 April 2004, the Security Council, by its resolution S/RES/1542 of 30 April 2004, established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the MIF to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004.
Situation Analysis
While the specter of the former military groups receded during the period as an immediate threat to the State and to security, activities of criminal armed gangs, using kidnapping and rape, particularly in the “hot” areas of Port au Prince, have increased. Insecurity and violence has prevailed in the economically disadvantaged areas of Haitian towns. Although the overall security situation has greatly improved, the security situation in Cité Soleil, controlled by armed groups, remain volatile. Other areas such as Bélair, Carrefour Feuille and Martissant also remain unstable.
The situation of the armed groups in Haiti is complex and often confusing. There is a multiplicity of independent and yet interlinked armed groups that operate in a dynamic political and economic environment, obeying the tendency of pay master of the day. Their allegiance, objectives, composition and strength are based on their financial resources and sponsors. One cannot speak about clearly identified, defined and static armed groups in Haiti. Few possess a clear chain of command or a defined political agenda. Even though the former military may have shown some coherence in their quest for recompense, they remain dispersed around the country and without apparent unitary command. Today, an estimated 215,000 arms are in circulation around the country, 15,000 of which are in the hands of armed groups.
The national psyche in Haiti, an affinity to resolve differences through violent means, is also working against the DDR in Haiti. During the period of the Transitional Government ( June 2004-May 2005 civil society and the government made strong claims against possible pacification through peaceful means. Both requested the reestablishment of the armed forces in Haiti and the use of force by MINUSTAH to address the civil unrest in urban centres.
Yet, solutions have been limited. On one hand, impunity is widespread - The Haitian National Police (HNP), the penal system and the justice systems have limited capacity and they are overstretched. On the other hand, the MINUSTAH Peace Keeping force has had mixed results in containing the security situation in popular areas such as Cité Soleil. Armed gangs are used to considerable financial gains through criminal activity. Unless a credible deterrent can be offered to the armed gangs through the use of force, it is difficult to encourage them to change their way of living with the benefits DDR offers.
Following the elections of February 2006 and the inauguration of President Rene Preval, new windows of opportunity for violence reduction are being sought, However, with the exception of a short period of respite from August to October 2006, as a result of discussion by the President with gang leaders in Cite Soleil, the criminal activity, violence, rape, kidnapping and armed attacks on MINUSTAH Force are continuing.
Weapons control remains a long-term challenge since there is a constitutional right to own a registered weapon for the protection of ones home. Drugs and arms trafficking continue to be a destabilizing presence in Haiti. Such trafficking, supported by linkages with Haitian gangs in the US, continues to provide groups with the financial means to arm themselves and remain in business. Trafficking organizations continue to defy the rule of law in light of their huge resources and the high levels of corruption endemic in Haiti. Moreover, reintegration is rendered challenging in a country where instability and violence preclude even local investment In an environment with up to approximately 80 % unemployment rate, an innovative approach to the development of reintegration option has been necessary. These factors continue to make disarmament and the reduction of armed groups in Haiti extraordinarily complex.
DDR is only one of the many tools required to improve the security situation in these volatile neighbourhoods where Statelessness reigns. Basic law and order must be restored so that rampant criminal activities will not be allowed to continue. Beneficiaries of any DDR programme will not be able to desist from the temptation to join lucrative armed activities or even if they could, their mere survival may depend on their affiliation with armed groups. Massive investment must be made in these communities to improve the socio-economic conditions so that life options beyond that of being a member of armed groups would be available. While the specter of the former military groups receded during the period as an immediate threat to the State and to security, activities of criminal armed gangs, using kidnapping and rape, particularly in the “hot” areas of Port au Prince, have increased. Insecurity and violence has prevailed in the economically disadvantaged areas of Haitian towns. Although the overall security situation has greatly improved, the security situation in Cité Soleil, controlled by armed groups, remain volatile. Other areas such as Bélair, Carrefour Feuille and Martissant also remain unstable.
Mandate and DDR
The key provisions for DDR in Haiti established by the UN Security Council in the formation of MINUSTAH are as follows:
…. to assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures [S/RES/1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004].
The Security Council, in its resolution S/RES/1702 of 15 August 2006, recognized that conditions for conventional DDR do not currently exist in Haiti and requested MINUSTAH to reorient its DDR efforts towards a comprehensive community violence reduction programme including assistance for initiatives to strengthen local governance and the rule of law and to provide employment opportunities to former gang members, and at-risk youth (S/RES/1702).
The Security Council Resolution 1702 is a major breakthrough in recognizing that conditions for a DDR are not in place in Haiti and that an innovative strategy with a strong focus on ‘putting weapons beyond use in a context of community security approach’ must be developed.
Aim and Objectives
The DDR programme in Haiti links short term stabilization objectives of the UN peacekeeping mission to longer term sustainability of UNDP through the following objectives:
• Dismantlement of armed groups and reintegration of hard core members,
• Building the capacity of state actors and communities into a mutually reinforced partnership,
• Development of mechanisms for dialogue and conflict management at the community level,
• Support to community recovery, creating opportunities for the voluntary surrender of weapons,
• Strengthen and support the implementation of the legal framework to reinforce control measures against the proliferation of small arms.
• The impact is intended to:
• Dismantle the network of core armed groups,
• Empower communities to act along with state actors in fighting armed violence,
• Sustain the reduction of armed violence at the community level,
• Secure an efficient legislation on arms ammunitions and explosives
Approaches and Strategy
By mid-2005, it became clear that there was no quick-fix for tackling the disarmament of groups in Haiti and that a traditional DDR approach was not suitable for a context such as Haiti’s, for the following reasons:
• The lack of an appropriate political space in Haiti has prevented any significant disarmament or reconciliation to take place,
• In an environment of increasing lawlessness and impunity, belligerents have not been inclined to negotiate or compromise,
• Security Sector Reform has not occurred to the degree where it can impact on the reduction of violence,
• International interventions have not been able to project adequate credible deterrents on violent criminal or political activities. Belligerents have therefore not resorted to the options provided by DDR.
A consensus was therefore developed between all actors for the need to revise the approach, where the focus would shift from a conventional disarmament to addressing the specific character of armed violence in Haiti. In the absence of basic prerequisites for DDR , the DDR Section adapted quickly to this dynamic environment and developed a holistic approach to addressing the chronic violence, emphasizing a focus on a comprehensive community violence reduction capacity. It creates synergies with and, capitalizes on existing structures to implement a broad concept focused on human, economic and socio-cultural capacity whereby it is “the ability of a society to identify and avoid threats to its members or offset the consequence of the occurrence of such threats” . This vision of community security implies:
• Different societal actors have a role in increasing human security, and that the community can have an important role in conflict management and,
• The community has the ability to identify and develop the capacity to respond at an early stage potential threats.
The grass roots community is organized through democratically elected Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (CPVD). Representatives from youth, women, elders and adult men are empowered to become active and efficient partners to the National Police and Local Authorities in the fight against armed violence. This comprehensive effort is coordinated by the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (NCDDR).
Eligibility Criteria
As the potential of threat from the former military receded, the focus of the Integrated DDR program turned towards the increased activities of the armed groups in urban centers around the country and more specifically in Port-au-Prince. Currently the target for DDR activities in Haiti is illegally armed gangs and groups throughout the country, with a particular focus on the urban areas of Port au Prince. The programme also targets children and women involved in these groups and extends its support to include the beneficiary’s immediate family; while imposing strict criteria for entry to the programme using a ratio of 1 person to 1 functioning weapon.
The policy for eligibility criteria includes the following aspect:
i. One Small Arms or Light Weapon (SALW) for one DDR beneficiary;
ii. Completion of demobilization form required;
iii. Acceptance of appropriate reintegration package and monitoring by DDR Section.
The MINUSTAH DDR Section was established in September of 2004 as the first institutional integration between a peacekeeping operation mission (PKO) and a national UNDP office. The nature of the DDR programme in Haiti tests the validity of integrating both the UN Mission and UNDP staff into a single team of experts. Combining the relative strengths from both organizations, this joint DDR Section has worked to merge elements of extensive experience and expertise in DDR, small arms control and conflict prevention through a community approach. This process culminated in the endorsement of a multi-dimensional strategic approach to Violence Reduction later in the year 2005.

The DDR Section works closely with the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (NCDDR) which was established on 29 August 2006. The establishment of the NCDDR was agreed by the Government of Haiti as a pre-requisite to the implementation of the community security programme for the following reasons: it guarantees the national appropriation of the process and establishes the legitimacy and legality of the process, it becomes an essential intermediary for technical, strategic and political discussions in the framework of the DDR programme, taking into account the Haitian context and, it guarantees the adaptation of the programme to the reality and the conditions of the Haitian environment.
There are five complementary axes of interventions for the DDR programme in Haiti:
i. Disarmament and reintegration of armed groups,
ii. Youths associated with armed groups – disarmament, reintegration and prevention,
iii. Women associated with armed groups and reinforcement of their role as vectors of peace,
iv.Reinforcement of the legislative and Institutional framework to control the proliferation of small arms,
v. Community disarmament and conflict prevention.
Dismantlement of armed groups and reintegration of hard core members
DisarmamentThe process being initiated currently by GoH in reducing armed violence is not a conventional approach to DDR. The GoH negotiates with armed groups the surrender of a symbolic number of weapons, the cessation of attacks on the State and UN forces and, the cessation of kidnapping in return for undisclosed commitments to the armed group leaders and the provision of reinsertion benefits in the context of the DDR. This arrangement has been having significant impact. Armed crime, kidnapping and attacks on police and UN forces have reduced by more than 70 %, thus offering time and political space to GoH to establish a presence in the volatile areas. It is estimated that removing approximately 1,000 hardcore group members from armed activities would significantly reduce the capacity of the groups to control insecure zones.
Brief profiles of major armed groups are the following:
1) The Milices Populaires are the most dangerous of the armed groups because of their high numbers and the official legitimacy which has been given to their existence by certain Police or Ex Police Officers and by MINUSTAH in the capital. Their target is the local population living in the stigmatized area.
2) The Brigades de Vigilance and Brigades de Quartier, as with the Milices Populaires are composed of adults and adolescents of both sexes. However, they only defend their own immediate environment in order to keep the armed violence outside their territory/borders. The Brigades de Quartier are distinguishable from the Brigades de Vigilance by their appearance in periods of political strife, where else the Brigades de Vigilance are a temporary response to an increase of criminality in their area or neighboring areas. Female members of the Brigades de Vigilances will freely use their ‘armes blanches’ to get rid of ‘bandits’ who are caught committing a crime. Women can also organize themselves into ‘une armée’, or a Brigade de Quartier, as in Gonaives.
3) The Organisations Politiques (O.Ps) are politically motivated. The position of an O.P. is dependent upon the role it can play for the political leader. A tension does however exist inside that O.Ps which also operates as Groupes de Bandits or as Milices Populaires (their activities can oscillate between all three different types of groups/functions). Whether or not they assume these varying roles/activities depends upon the advantages which each role can bring. O.Ps own ‘armes de guerre’. Girls and women are not targeted and are not considered to be members of their bases.
4) The Groupes de Bandits (or chimè, rat etc.) are ‘predators’, generally strangers to the zone which is however under their control. There exist Groupes de Bandits which are composed of women (Fanm pye poro, Fanm boss, Baz madivin) and operate in collaboration with male or mixed bases. Girls and women are the principal victims of these groups through gang rape, rape, and extortion – these activities are used as a means to control the community. Female bandits equally rape their victims (female or male hostages) following the example of male or mixed groups.
5) Vagabonds are groups of adolescents which specialize in the gang rape of adolescent girls in their community in order to impose their macho values upon the girls. They only use firearms upon the moment of aggression, in order to weaken their victims. They are never seen in public with girls.
6) Modern Rara Groups are specifically associated to a physical space. They can support the Groupes de Bandits in their area through the diffusion of names of victims through their songs.
The following guiding principals and arrangements are set for dismantlement of hard core members of armed groups in Haiti:
- Negotiation and identification of beneficiaries is the responsibility of the State – NCDDR.
- Main gang leaders wanted by the police are not eligible to enter the DDR process.
- All weapons handed into the DDR process must be registered in the UN data-base system.
- Beneficiaries are hosted to the Reinsertion Orientation Centre (ROC) for a transition period of 4 weeks in preparation to a transition to a pacific way of living. Training in the ROC includes non-violent communications, human rights, gender sensitivity, civic training, the role of the community, individual counselling, sports activities etc.
- Integration process spans over a period of 18 months:
-Option 1: 9 months vocational training followed by job placement or micro-enterprise.
-Option 2: Business management training and micro-enterprise.
Subsistence allowance of 60 USD and support to family is provided during the initial phase of the process. Beneficiaries to the reinsertion programme are monitored for a total period of 18 months in order to ensure a successful reintegration. The unit cost per beneficiary is approximately $3,000 US dollars.- Children are handled by UNICEF in accordance with the MoU signed on 12th September 2006.
- Separated and secure facilities exist in the ROC for female beneficiaries.
- Beneficiaries have access to gainful employment through labour intensive, community vital infrastructure ‘Stop-gap’ projects to cover the period between the exit of the ROC and the starting of the reintegration opportunities.
Reinsertion and Reintegration
The reintegration of former armed group members is an essential element of the programme. In Haiti, support to the reintegration of former armed element is divided into four categories:
i. Placement in formal education,
ii. Vocational skills training,
iii. Micro-entrepreneurial support,
iv. Job placement where possible.
Once beneficiaries surrender their weapons, they receive an orientation at the UN Orientation Centre. The orientation includes socioeconomic profiling of these group members to identify priority needs and personal capacities with regard to educational options, civic education and HIV/AIDS training sessions, etc.
The individual reinsertion options are prepared to target the inner core of hard-line armed group members. The programme in Haiti offers a comprehensive package estimated to cost $3,000 USD per beneficiary. The main objective of individual reintegration is to secure a sustainable livelihood without using violence.
The programme covers a total period of 18 months in which the individual is monitored to ensure a higher level of success in reintegration. Individuals that revert back into violence and criminality will be referred to the PNH to face criminal charges. The GOH and the community representatives have a primary role in this activity. (Details below)
The educational and vocational skills offer up to 9 months of training with a monitoring period afterwards of a further 9 months. The initial nine months includes a nominal monthly subsistence allowance, not exceeding 60 USD, to permit full attendance in courses and job seeking while contributing to domestic maintenance. The entrepreneurial option offers mentoring in the preparation of a Individual Reintegration Project (IRP) including initial investment in stock or equipment, start-up and implementation followed by monitoring through build-up to sustainability, this for a total period not exceeding 18 months.

Reintegration process is monitored jointly by the NCDDR and the Community Violence Prevention and Development Committees which will assist in reinsertion, early warning regarding difficulties and the provision of some counselling and support in developing long-term sustainability for the beneficiary.
Youth Associated with Armed Groups
There are several groups of children ready to renounce violent activities. The Integrated DDR Section supports the implementation of projects targeting the youth in Cité Soleil, Bélair and Martissant. The initiatives aim to engage with young during the evenings and at night to provide basic services and counselling as well as to avail the opportunity to profile youth associated with armed groups.
On 12 September 2006, UNICEF and MINUSTAH signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreeing to work under a common policy. However, according to the UN lead agencies for children in Haiti, the DDR of children - including mechanisms for prevention of recruitment and the use of children by armed groups - will not be supported by the UN agencies before a formal commitment by the Government, and without agreement from security forces and judicial authorities not to arrest, prosecute or detain children solely for their association with armed groups. In the context of Haiti, not being officially classed as a conflict environment, it is as yet undecided if children associated with armed groups should be defined according to the Cape Town Principles.
Women Associated with Armed Violence
The DDR Section together with the MINUSTAH Gender Section undertook a joint analysis addressing the problems of women victims and those associated with armed groups in Haiti. The joint analysis covered main urban centers of violence; Port-au-Prince, Gonaives and Les Cayes, to further understanding on ways to tackle the situation of women’s involvement in armed violence and how they can contribute to conflict resolution.
Some of most surprising findings of the study included: (1) presence of armed groups composed entirely of women, also engaged in rape, in Haiti; (2) women as actors of armed violence; and (3) the destructive coordinated effort by the community to isolate and stigmatize rape victims.
Recommendations of the study include:
(1) rebuilding of the community structure to addressing violence in a coordinated effort;
(2) strengthening of community capacity for identifying and managing threats against women;
(3) support to community based projects to stem violence against women.
These recommendations have strengthened and guided the DDR/Community Security programme towards enhancing the impact on women in the community, through the community. In fact, in a bid to avoid further stigmatization and better identify and support women associated with armed groups in Haiti, a conscious decision was made to exclude women from the DDR traditional approach and to assist them through the Committee for the Prevention of Violence and Development (CPVD) – the programme’s main partner at the grass-roots level.
Reinforcement of the legislative and Institutional framework to control the proliferation of small arms
This pillar aims at reinforcing and supporting the implementation of legal and institutional frameworks for controlling the proliferation of small arms in Haiti and to stem illegal trafficking in the region.
Legal framework for disarmament:
The implementation of improved legislation on Arms and Ammunition (AA) and the rules and regulations supporting it, are a means by which the State can contribute to their effective control. Unfortunately, there are serious gaps and ambiguities in the AA laws due to the large number of decree amendments and revisions over the years. Rules and regulations governing the way in which the legislation is implemented are weak or simply not implemented due to a lack of qualified human resources and materials.
Database and SALW management:
The new French language DREAM software, a monitoring tool, was installed in June. The system is continuously tested and evaluated for its adaptation to the Haitian context. The HNP is trained and participate fully in the review process.
Firearms Control Unit - HNP
Staff at the Firearms Control Unit within the HNP is well below functional capacity, with only one expert. The proposal to reinforce this team is currently being reviewed by the HNP.
Community disarmament and conflict prevention
This community-focused strategy is implemented through a network of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) called Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (CPVDs), which are composed of community representatives selected through a democratic process. The first step in establishing these committees has been to organise the neighbourhood into smaller administrative areas called locality in urban area and commune in provinces. Each commune/locality targeted selects representatives from youth groups, women, elders and adults who form a Community Development Committee (CDC), ensuringes active participation, broad representation and ownership of activities addressing armed violence in the community. Through a consultative process, the CPVD and CDCs were invited to elaborate a first analysis of the conflict in their areas and identify specific activities to reduce armed violence. A first draft mapping of the sources of conflict in the community was completed.


The approximate budget for the DDR Program Haiti is shown below. The figure includes peacekeeping assessed contibutions and voluntary contributions.
| $ 2004 / 2005 | $ 2005 / 2006 | $ 2006 / 2007 | $ 2007 / 2008 | |
| Staffing MINUSTAH/UNDP | 800,000 | 1.750,000 | 1.950,000 | 1.950,000 |
| DDR Support | 200,000 | 400,000 | 250,000 | 250,000 |
| DDR Operations | 200,000 | 1,000,000 | 3,000,000 | 5,000,000 |
| 1,200,000 | 3,150,000 | 5,200,000 | 6,200,00 |
Total projected cost of the DDR Program 2004 – 2008 is $15,750,000.
Dismantlement of armed groups
The dual track strategy proposed by President Préval provided a political context for DDR; however, there is no certainty that group members entering the process under the current round of negotiations with the Government have committed to a genuine DDR process, other than seeking respite from the pressure of robust MINUSTAH and HNP operations. At the same time, a decision has been made to continue providing the agreed-upon entitlements to these groups of DDR participants, with the understanding that they will be under increasing monitoring by HNP/MINUSTAH to ensure that those who are suspected of partaking in criminal activities would be immediately removed from the programme. Having evaluated the limited progress achieved in the last three months, the Government of Haiti and MINUSTAH are now developing a new strategy to adapt to the situation.
Funding for Community Security
In the context of Haiti, the community security of the current programme must take a prominent role in addressing armed violence at the community level. The Integrated DDR Section and the NCDDR are prepared to face this challenge through empowering the Local Authorities, the PNH and the grass root communities into a mutually reinforcing partnership. The NCDDR in collaboration with the UNDP and MINUSTAH have stressed the importance to engage immediately in executing the related activities however, resources mobilized so far have not been adequate.
DDR of Children
Integrating the children associated with armed groups is an essential component to successfully address the armed violence in Haiti. Unfortunately, the Integrated DDR programme has had to decline assistance to children due to the absence of framework between the GOH and the UN system represented by the UNICEF. Negotiations are underway and we hope that this issue will be resolved shortly.
LINKS KEY DOCUMENTS
Robert Muggah, Securing Haiti’s Transitio : Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,Updated version in English http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP14B-Haiti-English.pdf/p>
Robert Muggah, Haiti: les chemins de la transition, Updated version in French http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP14B-Haiti-French.pdf
International Crisis Group - Spoiling Security in Haiti – main report http://www.crisisgroup.org/.../13_spoiling_security_in_haiti.pdf
International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Haiti”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=46
Escola de Cultura de pau, “Haiti”, http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/haitii.pdf
USAID/OTI Haiti Field Report, February 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/haiti/rpt0205.html