Sierra Leone

Background

Situation Analysis/Context
Sierra Leone’s internal conflict reached troubling heights in the early 1990s. After being ruled by one President (Siaka Stevens) and having one sole political party (“All People’s Party”) from 1971-1985, Sierra Leoneans were ready for multi-party politics. However, Major General Joseph Momoh, elected in 1985, opposed multi-party expression, which led to the start of unrest in Sierra Leone. In early 1991, 100 Sierra Leonean and Liberian fighters attempted to overthrow Momoh. The Sierra Leonean dissidents were part of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh, a photographer and an ex-army corporal. Tensions escalated and full-fledged civil war broke out on March 23, 1991. The Liberian fighters joined Foday Sankoh in retaliation for Momoh’s support for ECOMOG (Economic Community of West Africa States’ Monitoring Group) which had prevented of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from capturing of Monrovia during the conflict in neighbouring Liberia. In 1992, Momoh fled the country and Captain Valentine Strassy assumed the presidency, committing to multi-party politics and establishing the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). However in the background of Strassy’s political promises, discontent among the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) rose over continued poor conditions and some SLA members decided to join the RUF. They became known as “rebel soldiers” or “SOBELS,” claiming to be part of the SLA by day, but fighting for RUF by night. Throughout the conflict diplomatic efforts were made to resolve the crisis. Among them were negotiations that led to the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement on November 30, 1996 and the Conakry Peace Plan on October 23, 1997. However these efforts for peace were hampered when on 25 May 1997 Major J.P. Koroma led a coup which ousted the newly elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The coup confirmed the collaboration between the option parties of the (SLA) and the (RUF). To add to the mix, Koroma created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and asked the RUF to collaborate in the Junta government, forcing President Kabbah into exile in Conakry, Guinea. Realizing the growing strength of the rebels and in order to protect themselves against the "SOBELS", the local population formed local armed militia known as the Civil Defense Force (CDF), exacerbating the conflict.

In 1998, exiled President Kabbah took decisive action and re-assumed power with the help of ECOMOG troops assisted by the Komajors (mostly made up of village huntsmen) and a British company called Sandline. Following Kabbah’s return to Freetown in February 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) backed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, embarked on a policy framework to end the conflict, pursue peace and reconciliation, and undertake the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants of the SLA, RUF, CDF and AFRC. In July of 1998 the GoSL established the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). As this is a national policy and programme guidance policy, the body is chaired by the President and incorporates national sentiments into the process while working in coordination with international and regional organizations. An Executive Secretariat was also established, responsible for the overall programme planning and implementation. Prior to the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone there were three peace agreements signed: the Abidjan Peace Accord of November 30, 1996; the Conakry Peace Plan of October 23, 1997; and the Lome Peace Accord of July 7, 1999. The Lome Peace Agreement eventually became the operational document for the peace process in Sierra Leone. Included in the text was a provision for a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme that was based on the GoSL developing a programme framework in close collaboration with relevant stakeholders.

In 1999, the UN Security Council established UNAMSIL and under Chapter 6 of the UN charter contributed a force of 6,000 peacekeepers. This force was later increased to 17,500 peacekeepers when it replaced the ECOWAS troops in an effort to maintain the peace accords. The RUF, which at the time was backed by Charles Taylor, the President of Liberia, took 500 members of UNAMSIL hostage, effectively breaking the Lomé agreements. This led to increased international mediation efforts and in May of 2001 the Second Abuja agreement was signed which, during its implementation in January of 2002, effectively ended Sierra Leone’s 11-year civil war. With the end of the civil war, elections were held, and Kabbah was re-elected as President. Additionally, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established and the interim forces withdrew, leaving a monitoring force to assist with DDR and to observe the peace agreement.

DDR Strategy and Approach

The Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program (DDRP) was officially completed in February of 2004. The successful DDR program in Sierra Leone helped to finalize and create an environment conducive for sustainable peace and development. The Sierra Leone DDR programme, as is seen in DDR programs in other post conflict countries, underwent a series of turbulent periods in which early peace agreements were derailed before the final negotiated agreement. The DDR program was an initiative of the Government of Sierra Leone designed to help consolidate peace and begin the process of rebuilding the country after a decade of civil conflict, this helped to put the concern for civil society and the rehabilitation of the nation at the for front of peace. Throughout the period between September 1998 and January 2002, the Disarmament and Demobilization of the combatants in Sierra Leone went through three (3) distinct phases and an interim phase which are mentioned below.

Mandate and DDR provision in the CPA
Security Council resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998 stated that UNAMSIL was to:

• Monitor the military and security situation in the country as a whole, as security conditions permit, and provide the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with regular information thereon, allowing him/her to determine when conditions were sufficiently secure to allow subsequent deployments of military observers beyond the first phase;
• Monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country, including monitoring of the role of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas;
• Assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites, where security conditions permit;
• Monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), as security conditions permit.”

In the aftermath of the rebel attack, Special Representative Francis Okelo, in consultation with West African states, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999 and on 7 July all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of national unity.

The Lome Peace Agreement included numerous requests for international involvement, specifically that of the United Nations, in implementing provisions contained therein, and required a substantial increase in the role of UNOMSIL and, accordingly, in its human and administrative resources. Reporting to the Security Council on 30 July 1999, the Secretary-General outlined a number of measures to maintain momentum in the peace process, and recommended that the Council approve, as an immediate first step, the provisional expansion of UNOMSIL. The Secretary-General indicated that following discussions with all interested parties, he would submit additional recommendations on the overall activities of the United Nations in Sierra Leone, including the mandate and structure of a United Nations peacekeeping presence in the country.

On 20 August, Security Council resolution 1260 (1999), authorized the provisional expansion of UNOMSIL up to 210 military observers along with the necessary equipment and administrative and medical support to perform the tasks set out in the report of the Secretary-General. It also authorized the strengthening of the political, civil affairs, information, human rights and child protection elements of the Mission.

Aim and Objectives
The main aim of the DDR program was to assist the government in stabilizing the region and ensuring peace within the nation. The objective was to disarm combatants and reintegrate them back into society to ensure peace and development of the nation.

Eligibility and Criteria
In order to participate in the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, every combatant was required to demonstrate participation as an adult or child as a combatant member of the following fighting forces:

• Revolutionary United Front/ Paramilitary Groups
• Armed Forces of Sierra Leone
• Civil Defense Force
AND
• Present acceptable proof of participation in the armed conflict as a combatant member of at least one of the above mentioned groups, including :
• Presentation of a serviceable weapon by each combatant
• Presentation of a group weapon and munitions, an acceptable ratio of 2/3 persons to weapons with appropriate rounds of munitions, TBD (i.e. valid SLA number)
OR
• Be an underage combatant, accompanying minor, unaccompanied minor or any other participant under the age of 18, presenting themselves at the Reception Centre with any of the above mentioned groups.

Approach
The DDR programme in Sierra Leone adopted a phased approach. It was carried out in three phases:

Phase 1 (September to December 1998)
Phase 2 (October 1999 to April 2000)
Phase 3 (18 May 2001 to 6 January 2002)

Phase 1 (September to December 1998)
The initial DDR programme, which was prepared in April 1998, was to be implemented by the Government with the assistance of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), targeting all persons who belonged to any of the armed groups that participated in the civil war following the coup of May 25, 1997 i.e. a total of about 75,000 combatants (10,000 ex-SLA/AFRC; 55,000 CDF; 7,000 RUF and 3000 child combatants as well as 300 disabled).

This programme was reviewed in July 1998 with the assistance of the World Bank, soon after the establishment of the NCDDR (recommended by the World Bank based on the Ugandan model). It targeted about 45,000 combatants (6,000 SLA; 15,000 RUF, 15,000 CDF, 7,000 AFRC and 2,000 paramilitary elements). During this phase, about 3,200 combatants were disarmed, mostly ex-SLA/AFRC who surrendered to ECOMOG. This phase was interrupted following the deterioration of the security situation and a rebel attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999.

Phase 2 (October 1999 to April 2000)
The second phase was implemented based on the framework of the Lomé Peace Agreement signed on 7 July 1999, which, in its Article XVI, called for the disarmament of all the combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. This Agreement came as a result of the talks that took place between the Government and the RUF following the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on 19 May 1999, which also requested the United Nations to deploy Military Observers to monitor the ceasefire. During this phase, UN presence in Sierra Leone was strengthened with the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) by Security Council’s resolution 1270 (22 October 1999), which succeeded ECOMOG, with a mandate to carry out the disarmament of combatants.

Accordingly, the DDR programme was further reviewed and redesigned to represent a multi-agency effort, through an agreed Joint Operation Plan involving the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) , the World Food Programme (WFP) and other agencies and donors. During this phase, a total of 18,898 were disarmed. This phase was also interrupted by the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, which also resulted in the hostage-taking of over 500 peacekeepers by the RUF.

This interruption had serious implications on both the political situation (exclusion of RUF members from government, arrest and detention of Foday Sankoh and other senior RUF members, as well as Sankoh’s replacement by Issa Sesay) and on the DDR programme, including the re-arming of many ex-combatants and the suspension of the Transitional Safety Allowance (TSA). A low-key disarmament continued sporadically, which brought about the disarmament of 2,600 combatants in what is referred to as an Interim phase (May 2000 to 17 May 2001).

Phase 3 (18 May 2001 to 6 January 2002)
The third and most significant phase came as a result of intensive concerted efforts by ECOWAS and the United Nations to bring the peace process back on track. Subsequently a ceasefire was signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000, and an agreement was reached on 2 May 2001 between The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to resume the disarmament. Accordingly, the disarmament was simultaneously re-launched in Port Loko (CDF) and Kambia (RUF) on 18 May 2001.

The third and final phase of the DDR process, which got underway in May 2001, was successful largely because the parties to the conflict had all realized that, for a variety of reasons, military victory was not within grasp. The government of Sierra Leone came to fully understand that it could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on the allegiance of its own army. For their part, the rebels factored in British military intervention and regional development, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of the government there. These considerations, together with the change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in a more robust commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The commitment of all parties to the peace process deepened, and DDR became a means to achieving peace rather than a tactical maneuver aimed at buying time.

On 18 January 2002, President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah declared the decade-old civil war ended with the completion of disarmament and demobilization of former RUF and CDF combatants in all 12 districts of the country. Based on the conclusions from numerous studies commissioned by NCDDR and World Bank, as well as studies by independent consultants, institutions and other international organizations, it can be stated that most ex-combatants have now returned to their families and communities and, like all other Sierra Leoneans, are making some contribution to national recovery.

Operational Structure and Framework

The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) is responsible for all policy decision on issues identified by TCC or due to political considerations.

The Executive Secretariat headed by the Executive Secretary was responsible for programme deisgn, co-ordinating and management and monitoring the activities of the implementation partners.

The UNAMSIL DDR Cell was responsible for assisting the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization phases. UNAMSIL’s assistance included providing internal and external security in all DDR facilities; establishment of disarmament/reception centers and weapons storage centers and weapons verification at the reception centers and screening and registration of ex-combatants at the demobilization centers. UNICEF conducted screening of child combatants at demobilization centers and family unification for abducted and/or separated children.

Area of Activity

Disarmament
Disarmament entailed the collection, registration, disabling and destruction of all conventional weapons and munitions retrieved from the combatants during the period. This took place in designated reception center centers. About 72,490 people were disarmed. Over 30,000 weapons were collected.

Target Ex-combatant Beneficiary Groups and Actual Program Participation at Disarmament stage

Subsidiary Disarmament: Community Arms Collection & Development (CACD)
Upon completion of the disarmament of the factions, it was expected that some weapons (Small Arms Light Weapons – SALW) may remain hidden in the bush or among the community. These included licensable weapons such as shotguns. In order to sustain the momentum associated with the peace process and the desire to develop capacity of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), UNDP supported by UNAMSIL, led the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program (CACD) in mid 2002. This particular program occurred in parallel with the development and processing of appropriate licensing legislation. More than 9,000 weapons, predominantly shot guns, were collected.

The program has been expanded and extended to different districts of the country and is now called Arms for Development (AFD). It aims at certifying each chiefdom as “Arms Free” and developing a mindset towards a weapons free society. Specifically, AFD provides development incentives valued at $20,000 to each chiefdom which achieves the "Arms Free" rating. The appropriate licensing legislation is now at an advanced stage of processing.

Between 2003 and January 2005, over 1,487 weapons have been collected. The UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section UNAMSIL was the focal point in collaboration with UNDP for communications in relation to psychosocial aspects of the program and for supporting the communities in all aspects of the utilization of the development incentives.

Demobilization
Demobilization entailed the reception and re-orientation of ex-combatants for the re-entry into civil society, which took place in designated centers. At the point, all command structures were dismantled to prevent a regrouping. The children were also separated from the adults and sent to care centers for reunification with their families. About 71,043 people went through this process and were duly registered.

Assistant to Children and Female Combatants
Of the number disarmed and demobilized, 4,751 were women while 6845 were children below the age of 18years. Within the context of the DDR program children of armed conflict were targeted with the assistance of UNICEF for the removal of children as combatants and the reintegration of them back into society. This entailed social and trauma counseling as well as life skills training. Women were also targeted and given counseling and were demobilized and their specific needs were addressed throughout the programs. For more information, please see the UNICEF DDR Lessons Learned on Sierra Leone.

Disarmament Statistics

Total Disarmed Children and Adults

Total Demobilized Children and Adults

Total Discharged Children and Adults

Number of combatants Disarmed and Demobilized

Note: Discrepancies between disarmament and demobilization are the result of “lost” combatants during the January 1999 Freetown attack and May 2000 resumption of hostilities following RUF hostage-taking of UNAMSIL troops.

Reintegration
The Reintegration program in Sierra Leone started in 2000/2001 and was completed in January 2004. 56,700 former combatants registered for reintegration support by December 2002 (almost one year after the completion of disarmament and demobilization). By 31 January 2004, a total of 51,122 had been supported in the following categories:

• Vocational/Apprenticeship (28,901)
• Formal Education (12,182)
• Agriculture (9,231)
• Job placement (444)
• Others (364)

About 2,800 out of the 3,500 remaining caseload that could not take advantage of the Reintegration Opportunity Program (ROP) for various reasons were given a one-time payment package, equivalent to USD150. As most ex-combatants had no skills, the ROPs provided them with the opportunity to learn some skills. This was an incentive for them to return to their towns of origin. About 54,439 people participated. Various skills were taught such as carpentry, masonry, and tailoring in order to assist ex-combatants in returning to society and to provide them with skills that could be used in entrepreneurship.

Below is chart showing participation in the Reintegration programme.

Under a joint operational plan in cooperation with OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WHO and UNOPS, WFP provided food aid support to the national DDR programme in Sierra Leone from April 2000 to October 2001. 45,000 former combatants received food benefits, condiments and utensils. Additionally, some dependents who accompanied former combatants to the camps received benefits. WFP also provided food support to parallel rehabilitation programmes for children affiliated with the armed forces and groups in Interim Child Care centers (ICCs) established by UNICEF. WFP partnered with Oxfam, Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee in the implementing the programme.

As part of a comprehensive HIV strategy which targets various groups and communities, UNFPA is supporting reintegration programmes for ex combatants by using HIV prevention and promotion of Reproductive Health as a tool of social cohesion and reconstruction in the country. In addition, UNFPA is also providing psychosocial support and counselling, occupational training and skills development which have given hundreds of abused and traumatized boys and girls hope for their future. Many of these girls are no more coerced into survival sex work as they learn alternate skills to generate income.

Resource Mobilisation

Voluntary Contributions (2002-2005)

Estimated cost of DDR activities: US$80 million
Amount committed US$80 million

Assessed Contributions

2001/02 Approved appropriation of US$587, 000 in staff costs;

2002/03 Approved appropriation of US $596,400 in staff costs for 3 posts;

2003/04 Approved appropriation of US $ 606, 000 in staff costs for 3 posts;

2004/05 Approved appropriation of US $ 84, 200 in staff costs for 2 posts

Current Challenges and Updates

During the initial meeting of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission on Sierra Leone held in New York on 19 July 2006, the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone stressed that the problem of youth unemployment was compounded by large numbers of ex-combatants and school dropouts who could be a source of threat to security.

The volatile security and political situation in Sierra Leone’s immediate neighbourhood remains a concern, which can be expected to continue to present serious security challenges for the country. While Sierra Leone is making commendable efforts to rebuild good-neighbourly relations, those efforts should be underpinned by the revitalization of the Mano River Union and the construction of new mechanisms for security cooperation among Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia.

In the meantime, it is hoped that continued peacekeeping engagement in Liberia in the post-election period will remain a key stabilizing factor for both Sierra Leone and the wider Mano River basin. Concerted efforts to resolve the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire will also be important for Sierra Leone, as the presence of armed combatants in any country in the West Africa subregion does not bode well for the stability of all.

The following lessons learned were identified from the DDR programme in Sierra Leone:

• The duration of the 6 months skills training was insufficient and did not provide the recipients with the required experience to favorably compete in the labor market.
• Monitoring at the community level for social trends during the DDR process could have helped in identifying combatants and other individuals who were genuinely left out as these particular groups feel disgruntled and marginalized. Foreign fighters, especially from within the sub-region, and Women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) fall under this category.
• There was remnant discrimination against ex-combatants in the labor market because of their background.
• People generally attribute public wrongdoing in the community to ex-combatants.
• The slow pace of revamping and re-invigorating the private sector activity is a major setback in addressing youth unemployment and poverty reduction.
• The loose linkages between the DDR programme and other longer-term reintegration and recovery programmes in the country have affected the smooth transition to longer-term recovery.