Democratic Republic of Congo

Background

Situation Analysis/Context:
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was established as a Belgian colony in 1908. It gained independence in 1960 and was headed by Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and President Joseph Kasavubu. In 1961, President Kasavubu dismissed and arrested Lumumba, who was then killed by the opposition. In 1965, Colonel Joseph Desire Mubuto (later known as Mubuto Sese Seko), ousted the new Prime Minister Moise Tshombe and President Kasavubu. In 1971, Mobutu changed the country’s name to Zaire and ruled the nation for 32 years.

Further to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the DRC became home to a large number of Rwandan Hutu refugees who fled the country upon the arrival in power of the Tutsi backed Rwandan Patriotic Front. Amongst these refugees were many who had been involved in the genocide in Rwanda (also known as the interahamwe). Rwandan rebel groups based in the DRC began to launch operations into Rwanda and in retaliation the Government of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, supported by Burundi and Uganda intervened in the DRC by backing a Congolese rebel leader, Laurent Desire Kabila.

By May of 1997, with the support of his Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian backers Laurent Kabila had taken the capital Kinshasa and toppled Mobutu Sese Seko who fled into exile. One of President Kabila’s frst moves was to rename the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Not long after coming to power Kabila took steps to remove Tutsis from his government, including a Rwandan who had been serving as the army Chief of Staff. Further to this purge, Rwanda intervened in DRC for a second time, this time with the intention of removing President Kabila. Rwandan troops backing Congolese Tutsi rebels invaded in August 1998. Kabila called for assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries and troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, intervened to support the Kinshasa regime, sparking what some called Africa’s first world war.

A ceasefire agreement was signed at Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 and the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in November 1999. On 24 February 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1291 authorized the expansion of the Mission to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers and depsite the ceasefire agreement, violence largely fuelled by fighting over mineral resources continued, particularly in the East of the DRC. A turning point in the peace process came in January 2001 when Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. This provided a new impetus to the peace process and by the end of 2002, Rwanda and Uganda had withdrawn their troops from the DRC.

A power-sharing unity government was set up under Joseph Kabila in July 2003. Meanwhile, a long-simmering conflict over land and mineral wealth in north-eastern Ituri region broke into widespread inter-ethnic violence and massacres in 2002-2003. This precipitated the deployment of a more robust United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and MONUC’s troop strength was increased to over 17,000 troops.

In 2006 the international community supported successful elections in the DRC in which Joseph Kabila was elected president.

DDR Strategy and Approach

DDR Mandate

The United Nations has been mandated to assist with several different DDR operations in the DRC, as follows:

Disarmament, Demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign combatants

Security Council Resolution 1291(2000) of 24 February 2000 calls upon MONUC to develop, an action plan “for the overall implementation of the [Lusaka] Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned with particular emphasis on the following key objectives: the collection and verification of military information on the parties’ forces, the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement, and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces”.

This mandate was further strengthened by Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004) of 1 October 2004. In paragraph 5 (c) of that resolution, the Council decided that MONUC would “support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by undertaking the steps listed in paragraph 75, subparagraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e). Those steps are listed as follows:

“(b) An augmented and fully deployed MONUC military presence in the Kivus, acting in support of FARDC operations, would take a more active and robust role in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, including through measures such as cordon and search operations, declaration of weapon-free zones and operations to ensure respect for the arms embargo, with a view to preventing the resupply of the foreign armed groups, from whatever sources;
“(c) A suitably resourced MONUC military force would position itself, in close coordination with the FARDC, to deter or prevent reprisal attacks by foreign elements against the Congolese civilian population;
“(d) MONUC disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration teams would be put in place to take advantage of the physical scattering of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe units following stepped-up FARDC actions against them. Where security and logistics considerations permit, such teams would gather deserters and their dependents, and facilitate their voluntary disarmament and repatriation. MONUC would expand and intensify Radio Okapi broadcasting and coverage to support these operations;
“(e) Full support would be provided to the Joint Verification Mechanism, made up of representatives of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as Burundi and Uganda on an as-needed basis. Those representatives would assist in identifying and locating foreign armed groups.”

Further, by subparagraph 5 (d) of resolution 1565 (2004), the Council asked MONUC “to facilitate the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependents”.

Voluntary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants:

By Security Resolution 1493 of July 28, 2003, MONUC is also tasked to ‘assist the Government of National Unity and Transition in disarming and demobilizing those Congolese combatants voluntarily decide to enter the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme’ (S/RES/1493).

In addition, Resolution 1565 adopted in October of 2004, in relation to DDR, mandates MONUC to:

• contribute to the disarmament portion of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese combatants and their dependants, in monitoring the process and providing as appropriate security in some sensitive locations.
• seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493, and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate
• support of the Government of National Unity and Transition: …to support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo...to facilitate the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependants
• establish the necessary operational links with the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), and with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, in order to coordinate efforts towards monitoring and discouraging cross-border movements of combatants between the two countries.

Approaches and Strategies
MONUC’s mandate to conduct the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups by voluntary means, has been complicated by the absence until very recently of a Congolese force able or willing to take military action against the armed groups. Furthermore, the fact that MONUC can neither negotiate with the leadership of the foreign armed-groups nor offer them any kind of immunity has obliged the mission to develop highly specific methods for addressing the problem. That fact that these groups not had entered into any cease-fire agreement, or engaged in political discussions with their countries of origin or with MONUC made the situation more difficult.

MONUC’s strategy vis-à-vis the foreign armed groups has therefore evolved over time, not only in response to adjustments in the mandate by the Security Council, but also in light of the growing knowledge and understanding of the real situation of the armed groups on the ground that MONUC has gained through its own extended contacts in the bush.

This evolved and integrated strategy is based on the following considerations:

• The resolution of the armed-group problem is not a prerequisite for the success of the DRC peace process, but will be a by-product of its success;
• Responsibility for the resolution of the problem, both now and after the installation of an elected Congolese Government, rests with the Governments of the subregion. MONUC’s role is to assist them;
• Nevertheless, for various reasons, none of the Governments concerned has been able or willing to accomplish much repatriation. With the exception of the Burundese combatants, who left the DRC to take part in the successful peace process in their country, nearly all the combatants and their dependents who have left the DRC have been contacted, sensitised, persuaded to enter the programme and repatriated by MONUC itself;
• In the absence of any political agreement or cease-fire agreement with the armed groups, or any attempt to discuss such agreements, nearly all the combatants repatriated by MONUC have been deserters from their units, who entered DDRRR as a result of direct or indirect contacts by MONUC personnel;
• The armed-group problem will eventually be resolved as the incoming DRC Government extends its political and military control throughout its territory and cooperates with its neighbours in a serious effort to remove this irritant to relations between them;
• In doing so, the Governments concerned should take into account the existing range of legal measures, as well as the economic activities in which the foreign armed groups are increasingly engaged.

Operational Structure and Framework

Disarmament, Demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign combatants

MONUC’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation Resettlement (DDRRR) unit has been established to implement programmes and conduct operations in the DRC. MONUC works to support operations that disarm foreign combatants through a Joint Verification Mechanism, comprised of representatives from the Governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, and which was established to determine foreign combatants. MONUC’s primary role was to gather information that could be reported back to the UN while encouraging voluntary entrance into DDRRR. MONUC established DDRRR teams in North and South Kivu, in Goma, Bukavu, Butembo, Beni and Uvira in order to establish and maintain contact with the armed groups and to familiarise them with MONUC’s mandate and the DDRRR programme. MONUC also has gathered information from combatants and their dependents entering DDRRR and conducted public information operations through radio programmes and leaflets that target combatants, giving them the option to voluntarily enter into DDRRR.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants:

In December 2003, the Government of the DRC established an interdepartmental committee that was given charge of the conceptual and political aspects of the National Program of Disarmament, Démobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR). A national DDR commission (CONADER) was also created, and was tasked with the execution and the coordination of the programme, in all its phases. Thus, disarmament is carried out in the Regrouping Centres (Centres de Regroupement or CR), the verification and orientation in the Orientation Centres (Centres d’Orientation or CO), while integration is carried out in the Integration and Training Centres (Centres de Brassage et Recyclage or CBR). The objectives of the PNDDR are to: (a) substantially reduce the number of illegal weapons in the country and in every region; (b) reintegrate the demobilized combatants as well as their dependents in the community; (c) professionalize and modernize the national army by creating an initial 15 integrated Brigades regrouping troops from the former Congolese army and the rebel forces. The programme also incorporates neighboring governments Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi in the efforts for repatriation.

Area of Activity

Three separate but linked demobilization processes are underway in the DRC:

DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement)
DDRRR targets foreign combatants on Congolese soil. Most of these are Rwandans, estimated to be between 8 to 10,000. Approximately 13,000 Rwandan combatants and dependents have already been repatriated by MONUC. Of these, most belong to the armed group Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). A minority belong to independent armed groups, mostly involved in banditry, commonly referred to as Ex- Forces Armees Rwandais (FAR) / Interahamwe in official documents. While some of them did belong to the FAR, and others were Interahamwe militiamen, the bulk of the Rwandan combatants in eastern Congo today were refugees when they first entered the Congo. The majority of Rwandan combatants were mobilized into the Armée de Liberation du Rwanda (ALiR), which later evolved into the FDLR.

There are several hundred Burundian (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie and Forces Nationales de Liberation) and Ugandan (Allied Democratic Forces) combatants believed to be in eastern Congo (South Kivu and Ituri/North Kivu respectively). Most of the Burundians repatriated following the FDD’s inclusion in the Burundian Transitional Government. The FNL use eastern Congo as a rear-base for their attacks on Burundi.

MONUC has conducted numerous missions into the forests of eastern Congo in order to seek out these foreign armed groups and encourage them to join the voluntary DDRRR process. Public information tools, such as a Kinyarwanda radio programme, as well as pamphlets, videos, and comics on the DDRRR process have been developed and distributed, some with the support of DFID, USAID and the World Bank.

MONUC’s DDRRR activities also incorporate a number of political, military, legal and justice-related elements, as follows:

• Military: With population centres as a priority, MONUC takes military action as necessary to protect civilians from imminent danger of attack, including from foreign armed groups. MONUC also supports FARDC in joint operations to extend the Government’s authority throughout its entire territory, to protect the civilian Congolese population, the national borders and the country’s natural resources;

• Political: MONUC has supported the DRC Government’s efforts to pursue the Rome process, by which the FDLR political leadership renounced violence and agreed to enter DDRRR. Since FDLR failed to follow up the Rome declaration, MONUC continues to sensitize and persuade individual combatants and their dependents to break away from their hard-line commanders and be repatriated. Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian amnesty and DDR packages are also propagated. However, there has been no political process involving the Ugandan and Rwandan combatants and the Governments of their countries of origin.

• Legal and justice-related: In October 2002, the DRC Government declared FDLR persona non grata, and all its activities on DRC territory illegal. Many Rwandan combatant leaders are also wanted for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) . The Security Council sanctions committee has also named a number of individuals, including the President and military commander of FDLR, in connection with the violation of the arms embargo. Targeting hard core criminals and isolating them is pursued.

Results so far

Armed-group presence in the DRC cut by half: Since 2002, MONUC facilitated the voluntary repatriation of some 13,000 foreign combatants and dependents. More than 3,500 Burundese combatants left the DRC to participate in their country’s successful peace process. More than 4,300 Rwandan combatants have also been repatriated on a voluntary basis.

Ugandan ADF/NALU broken as a viable military force: FARDC attacks drove ADF/NALU from their camps in December 2005, splitting the Ugandan hard-liners from their Congolese adherents. The Ugandans, who number fewer than 1,000, fell back on the Ugandan border, and some have already crossed into Uganda. MONUC considers that the ADF/NALU is no longer a viable military force.

FDLR split and under attack: Despite the failure of the FDLR President and high command to follow up the Rome declaration, many junior commanders have acted in support of the declaration. Several hundred combatants and their dependents have crossed back into Rwanda as a direct result, and a split has emerged among commanders in northern North Kivu. MONUC has taken action against FDLR in North and South Kivu to protect the civilian population. MONUC believes that FDLR does not represent a significant military threat to Rwanda.

The National DDR Programme (PNDDR)
One of the provisions in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement is the integration of the former Congolese belligerents into a unified army. Concomitantly disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is to take place. In the first months of the transition, all of the Congolese armed groups, except for those in Ituri, became part of the new Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).

The Government has established criteria to verify whether people belong to the eligible armed groups and separate eligibility criteria for integration into the army. For those who are 1) not eligible for integration into the army, and 2) those who volunteer for demobilization and reinsertion benefits. The following 1 general criteria apply:

i. Congolese nationality;
ii. Possession of a weapon or possession of a certificate o f disarmament issued by competent authorities, including those issued during spontaneous and voluntary disarmament. The ratio of combatant/weapon will be determined in the Joint Operations Plan (JOP). The JOP links the activities necessary for the reform of the army with the activities necessary for demobilization and reintegration.
iii. Proof of membership in a recognized armed group;
iv. Proof of having taken part in conflict in DRC between October, 1996 and May, 2003.

An estimated 150,000 ex-combatants will be demobilized. CONADER, the national implementing agency, will coordinate actions on the programme.

The World Bank, through its MDRP facility, has provided funding for CONADER. Reintegration projects will also be funded in part from MDRP funds, and are currently being identified by CONADER. Particular emphasis is being placed on community-led initiatives.

MONUC’s role in the DDR of Congolese is limited to the disarmament portion and general security. MONUC has being providing logistical support to CONADER and SMI staff, and provided other office support as needed. In eastern DRC, MONUC has been brining the various DDR actors together (CONADER, SMI, FARDC, UNDP, UNICEF etc) in order to ensure coordination between the various actors.

As of September 2006, CONADER had demobilized more than 91,806 ex-combatants, including 27,346 children. Meanwhile, some 62,000 elements have yet to undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

UNDP has provided assistance to the Congolese Government in terms of the identification and implementation of reintegration projects in the interim period until CONADER was up and running.

Disarmament and Community Reintegration (DCR) process
DCR was conceived to address the disarmament and socio-economic reintegration of non-signatory militia, in the absence of a legal framework. While DCR applies to non-signatory irregular armed groups throughout the country, it largely takes place in Ituri, the north-eastern district of Orientale province. The militia in Ituri, most of which are spin-offs of the RCD-K/ML (itself a signatory of the All Inclusive Agreement), signed an agreement amongst themselves in May 2003 – the Dar es Salaam Act – by which they committed to engage in the DCR process. The Transitional Government signed as an observer, as did MONUC.

The DCR programme addresses the needs of civilian population in an integrated manner. Hence, reintegration programmes take a holistic approach, providing humanitarian aid to communities rather than to ex-fighters exclusively.

There are three phases in the DCR programme:

Preparatory Phase (1): Paving the way for reintegration by conducting infrastructure development projects, such as the reconstruction of roads, schools, health centres, while conceiving and implementing income generating activities (in agriculture, fisheries, markets) for the benefit of civilian communities;

Transit Phase (2): This is the DCR operational phase. The transit sites receive the militia for arms collection, identification, specific assistance to handicapped and other vulnerable groups, guidance on reintegration. The militia receives food, health and civilian clothing at this stage. Upon exit, they receive a shelter kit. UNICEF and other specialized partners address the specific needs of children associated to armed forces and groups;

Community Reinsertion Phase (3): The ex-militia and families return to their communities and choose, based on their skills and the screening conducted at the transit site, an income-generating activity. Through the reintegration support scheme, psycho-social support, vocational training, a production kit and access to a micro project will be made available by specialized teams and/or NGOs for a period of 6 months. Employment opportunities, in infrastructure rehabilitation and others are also given. Return to education is also considered.

Participation in the DCR programme does not affect the ex-combatants’ rights to later engage in the national DDR programme. When the national DDR plan becomes operational, ex-fighters who possess an identification card from the DCR disarmament phase will be able to apply, on a voluntary basis, for entry into the new Congolese army, the FARDC.

There are approximately 15,000 fighters in Ituri District. With the deadline on 1 April 2005, participation has stepped up; the programme may be extended for a limited period of time. Thereafter, messages have been passed by MONUC that any non-FARDC individual found to be carrying a weapon or otherwise engaged in a combat-related activity will be disarmed by force by MONUC and/or the FARDC.

As of 8 September, 4,758 militia elements had surrendered with 2,332 weapons.

Resource Mobilisation

I) Voluntary Contributions

Estimated cost of DDR activities (national programs) from 2004: US$200 million
Amount pledged/committed US$200 million

II) Assessed Contributions

2002/03 Approved appropriation of US $ 4.3 million in staff costs
2003/04 Approved appropriation of US $ 3.7 million in staff costs
2004/05 Approved appropriation of US 3.6 million in staff costs and $224,000 in rations for 8,000 ex-combatants (14 days @ $2 per day per ex- combatant);
2005/06 Proposed amount of US $ 4.5 million in staff costs and $224,000 in rations for 8,000 ex-combatants (14 days @ $2 per day per ex-combatant);

Current Challenges and Updates

Disarmament and demobilization process in Ituri
On 5 June 2006, the Government reopened the disarmament and demobilization process in Ituri. As of 8 September, 4,758 militia elements had surrendered with 2,332 weapons. However, operational, managerial and financial difficulties of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration agency, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CONADER), have significantly hampered the demobilization process.

MONUC has also continued to focus on the two remaining militia groups in Ituri, the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC) of Mathieu N’Gudjolo and the Forces de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (FRPI) of Cobra Matata. On 26 July, MONUC facilitated discussions between MRC and the Government, pursuant to which MRC would discontinue hostilities and integrate into FARDC. Sensitization of MRC elements began immediately, but the Government and MRC have yet to reach agreement on a timetable for integration or on a mutually-acceptable venue for talks. MONUC is assisting in overcoming these roblems.

DDRRR
On 24 August 2006, Major Ninja, an FDLR leader active in North and South Kivu, and 84 of his followers were disarmed. Of those, 26 FDLR elements were repatriated to Rwanda, while 58 Congolese elements entered the national disarmament and demobilization programme. Major Ninja was a well-known source of destabilization in the Kivus, and his repatriation is likely to further weaken FDLR command and control in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encourage remaining rank and file FDLR combatants to also undergo disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. During the reporting period, some 600 additional FDLR elements voluntarily repatriated to Rwanda, bringing the total of voluntary repatriation of foreign armed groups under the facilitation of MONUC to 13,000 combatants and dependents.

National DDR
As of 8 September 2006, CONADER had demobilized more than 91,806 ex-combatants, including 27,346 children. Meanwhile, some 62,000 elements have yet to undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. However, the budget of some $200 million of CONADER, provided by donors through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), has been exhausted. The World Bank has indicated that additional funding from MDRP would be contingent on its assessment of CONADER operations.

The financial crisis facing the Government structures related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has had a significant impact on the brassage process. As brassage follows demobilization, delays in demobilization have a direct impact on army integration, inter alia, creating difficulties for the stabilization of the Kivus, Katanga and Ituri. Delays in the payment of safety net and demobilization allowances, as well as the implementation of reinsertion projects, has caused discontent among ex-combatants.

The Joint Commission for Security Sector Reform has decided that priority for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the outstanding caseload would be accorded to the more than 44,000 troops from the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Military Regions (North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga), while discussions would start on the brassage of the Republican Guard and the Kinshasa Garrison (30,000 troops total).